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170_172 SUNSET AVE111111'1)D U � AV Date: 7 l .� s-r,2s1 T acct.: Fire Protection, Inc. Work Order 0:_ COMTRAQ�TIOROFIFIEPI'021ML Fire and Security Alarm Installations (425 ) 290-9600 • (800 ) 681-1125 24 Hour Local UL Monitoring Fax: (425) 353-4546 FIRE ALARM SYSTEM (One System per Report) CONFIDENCE TEST ❑ REPAIRS Certification Given YE E.p51�Y WHITE Occupancy Address: L+ (��" - r �f AJA ./, Testers Name: t/ cjl ,tvtie. Cu%C= F. Time In: I, tM Time Out- qS q64t&-_ - Central station monitoring? 1AYes ❑ No System Make: E 1 re-1 System Location: �� Z Occupancy Name:c�lyr��7� Phone Number: Responsible Party E-maKAddress: inspection Frequencytrype: Certification Number: Monitoring Company Name: System Model: Tsr4 et f ❑ Monthly O quarterly O Semi -Annual Annual V-07573 Fire Protection, Inc. r' , -5D----3 CORRECTIONS NEEDED: CORRECTIONS MADE: Date Corrected: Corrected By: This certifies that this fire and life safety system has been inspected. Discrepancies are noted and have been reported to the building representative, along with a copy of this report for corrective action. Signature of Tester. - Tech # Phone # 425-290-9600 Building Representative: tslonfX: i � tv, — nzf Fire Atarm Systems Page .t of 2 Fa; Fire Protection, Inc. Acct. #1: -54 7,-�& -w A'uo . The items on this checklist have been inspected and tested. This list does not constitute all of the required inspecting and testing of the fire and life safety system. Hefter to Fire Department Fire Codes for inspecting and testing requirements. Alarm System Functionality 1. Trouble signal with AC power off? Yes U No 2. System operalisrs-property on battery backup? )kYes 0 No 3. Battery voltage (no load) -L volts 4. Battery voltage (ful toed) _ kLI- volts (signals operating) 5. Charge circuit voltage ZJT , ti volts 6. System operates property on standby_power? Yes J No 7. All signals operate on AC power? Yes 0 No 8. Number of ini c =ft 9. Number of signal circuits 10. Does alarm sylllem meet audibility standards as accepted? Yes J No 11. All circuits checked for electrical supervision? I AYes L) No 12. All auxiliary ec pmeM operates (ellevators. fans, dampers)? pQ N/A J Yes J No 13. Ventilatlon controls operate? 3 NIA Yes Q No 14. Key to panel aftraulabie? Yes J No 15. Operating instructions atpanel? Yes U No 16. Trouble indicators function property? Yes J No 17. Remote Annunciator Panels function property? N/A O Yes U No 18. Elevator Call Down lurw`tions properly?_ ft N/A J Yes J No 19. Test record poster) at panel? KYes U No 20. General alarrtt auton tic time delay! -_(minutes) N/A 21. Was a signal received at the Central Station monitoring company? 0 NIA #' ,Yes U No 22. Other Devices s J Yes ' No i' Total Number of ;' Total Number System Devices Ili Units in Builds"nqUnits%ste_d Test Results Az€abie 23. Bells. Horns. Clhunes _ _. _ . _' _ J N/A q�k Yes U No 24. Voice Speakers (Voice Clarity) %,N/A 13 Yes © No 25. Smoke Detector J N/A qkYes J No 26. 27. Heat Detectors Duct Detectkx* _t _ _ %,N/A U NIA iJ Yes Yes U No J No 28. Sprinkler Flow Switches � ��, U N/A Yes U No 29. Sprinkler Supovisory Switches _ I 1 _ _.... _ U N/A kYes J No 30. Visual Alarm Devices - { --- O NIA 0-Yes 0 No 31. Manual Putt SNOws - --- - r N/A Yes J No 32. Annunciator(s) N/A U Yes 0 No 33. 8eanrF3t 1 01 col4ww----- {� �i �'� N/A J Yes J No 34. - Automatic Door Unlocks _K____ __ �_ - - N/A © Yes E! No 35. Automatic Doti` FkRease i N/A J_Yes J No 36. - - _ Fire Dampers _ _ WA _ 13 Yes U No (� Total Number o? Total Number Communicati quipmenT Units in Buildfng Unfts Tested Test Hesuft Acceptable 37 Phone Sets ! _ N/A J Yes J No 38. Phone Jacks N/A U Yes U No 39. Call -in Si nal r /A J Yes J No T ;re Atarrn Systrns Page 2 of 2 k. City of Edmonds A C�, 4 4 M CID - Legend 0 < Administiziflive Boundaries Cz Parcels N 41 4 /CP Zr b "v 6; BID Boundary S-Ipwcluf .� -E . �ll1 fit' � . ,` _ l tvr'- • 180 < W Dayton St c Dayton St 1: 2,645 © Notes 0 110211 2204 Feet This map is a user generated static output from an Internet mapping site and is for reference only. Data layers that appear on this map mayor may not be accurate, WGS_1984,Web_Mercator_Auxilia.ry-$phere. current, or otherwise reliable. 0 City of Edmonds THIS MAP 15 N .. OT TO HE USED FOR DESIGN OR CONSTRUCTION CITY OF EDMONDS 121 5th AVENUE NORTH • EDMONDS, WA 98020 • (425) 771-0220 • fax (425) 771-0221 www.edmondswa.gov DEVELOPMENT SERVICES DEPARTMENT April 23, 2015 MEMO TO: Edmonds School District Verizon Northwest SNOCOM Police and Fire Dispatch SNOPAC Snohomish County E911 U.S. Post Office Snohomish County Assessor's Office Snohomish County Information Services Snohomish County P.U.D. Puget Sound Energy Edmonds Fire Department Edmonds Police Department Edmonds Utility Billing Edmonds Public Works Edmonds Building/Street File Edmonds Address Files Lynnwood Disposal Comcast Cable Waste Management Northwest Allied Waste DAVE EARLING MAYOR Please be advised that the attached addresses have been added to the Edmonds address system. 172 Sunset Ave S 174 Sunset Ave S Note that 170 Sunset Ave S is going to remain for building services pertaining to the entire structure. Parcel: 27032300104500 The following addresses are now retired: 111, 115, 119, 123, 192, 194 Sunset Ave S If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact a City of Edmonds Permit Coordinator at 425-771-0220. Please contact our office if you wish to be removed from future address change notifications. Sincerely, ,& Aii,, J-b Kristin Johns Senior Permit Coordinator City of Edmonds Building Department L\Temp\DST's\Master Letters\New Address4/ 3/2015 • rlcorporated August 11, 1890 • Cic+nr ('ifii - I-1o6inan .Ianan City of Edmonds 2-1C)323b0 ►oL4 500 Legend t_i Administrative Boundaries Parcels 4;\ �s 6 � � �6oSd BP �'r0 aPJ� \boa �a St \ tt- �, 1, 6 1 8 Ire 9 q0 L �o p � � v N a� .O w W Dayton St toe BID Boundary / 1 1 to 180 > Dayton St Notes 0 110.21 220A Feet This map is a user generated static output from an Internet mapping site and is for reference only. Data layers that appear on this map may or may not be accurate, WGS_1984-Web Mercator Auxiliary_Sphere current, or otherwise reliable. m City of Edmonds THIS MAP IS NOT TO BE USED FOR DESIGN OR CONSTRUCTION -- �i5H G�.osSI ` city,(, o#M PNRcSt� 2-1032300 1 0+soo a max. yo a •» b a•lr4` �'`" „Iw a,Sn'vY`•, �y/�► •.� S. i, - ", sya•�- J'Ij �.. �; f V I 5•- i I'r . A FAf i ��1 M ,ate•5 �f' � � �` 4 K� ro 4J 1 fp ..SFr-. I 4 + ,x�a4a yimonds Stuti r y , ,^� n• nnVif•ramar�?tl _ I d \ 104 'ell17 �,��` ,gip; - � �; ' \ � �.�';• ,� yJ YJ r \1{,`. F��.�t .'�� _ , It �yal "T',fit .t E71i fJ'SC. 5��'a$+F�' may, zl'2�.��7, sytyt P, 4�.4.+s Lr %1�,h _ /W 'y�� .s }' ,r &`y{, HT 7y /eei� r/ ' �„ n iJ' .✓',i ,� !^,�+`F rtt!.i.N#--t�S23 T27N R3E eJ t % . 7V d j 'r .+/ a y �•f , i 1 ��b b�aai 3G ,. rx ! `r ,�� s 1. ' ,i 4 ' �.�:' �� S;i .wawa am•>� - o W. Dayton St. Dayton. St 1: 2,051 0 85.45 170.9 Feet This map Is a user generated static output from an Internet mapping site and Is for reference only. Data layers that appear on this map may or may not be accurate, WGS_1984—Web—Mercator—Auxiliary—Sphere current, or otherwise reliable. ® City of Edmonds THIS MAP IS NOT TO BE USED FOR DESIGN OR CONSTRUCTION APOoiuls AWenvS ; ^ r,Pet;M., y ?A untlake. Legend I' I Administrative Boundaries A su �15�'r Na S gi-=nn0ye Notes 412-5 it 8�"-06 b APPLICATION FOR PERMIT FOR MATERIALS OR PROCESSES January 3, 2012 Please verify and correct the following information: Name of Company (DBA): Channel Marker Pub & Grill Edmonds Location : 170 Sunset Avenue S In conformity with the terms of the International Fire Code, application is - - — hereby made to store, use Places of Assembly - Occupant Load: 271 or maintain the following activity, storage or pro- cesses: c/o J. L. Minster Mailing Address: 170 Sunset Ave S Edmonds, WA 98020 EFD UFIR #: 161271036202 (for office use) Your Signature Your Name (print)VL- S �, Your Title OLI,_'�� Please make corrections, attach $40 payable to the City of Edmonds and mail to: Fire Marshal Department of Fire Prevention 121-5th Avenue North Edmonds, WA 98020 FOR OFFICE USE ONLY Rec'd Z Z Check# -t `7 APPLICATION FOR PERMIT FOR MATERIALS OR PROCESSES March 7, 2011 Please verify and correct the following information: Name of Company; DBA Channel Marker Pub & Grill Edmonds Location 170 Sunset Ave In conformity with the terms of Places of Assembly - Occupant Load: 271 the International Fire Code, application is hereby made to store, use or maintain the following activity, storage or processes: Mailing Address: J. L. Minster 170 Sunset Ave S Edmonds WA 98020 EFD UFIR #: 027103B202 (for office use) Your Signature Your Name (print) J. Ir- Your Title Gc i Please make corrections, attach $40 payable to the City of Edmonds, and mail to: Fire Marshal Department of Fire Prevention 121-5th Avenue North Edmonds, WA 98020 CITY OF EDMONDS DEPARTMENT OF FIRE PREVENTION PERMIT January 1, 2011 0-271-0313-202 December 31, 2011 Date of Issue UFIR Number Date of Expiration This PERMIT is issued to: I Channel Marker Pub & Grill located at: 1170 Sunset Ave S Edmonds, WA To engage in the business, occupation or process of: And shall constitute permission to maintain, store, use or handle materials or to conduct process which produce conditions hazardous to life or property or to install equipment used in connection with such activities as follows: Places of Assembly -Occupant Load: 271 Allowed Occupant Load: 1 271 Pursuant to the provisions of the International Fire Code, any violation of the Code may be grounds for the revocation of this PERMIT. This permit does not take the place of any license required by law and is not transferable. Any change in the use or occupancy of premises shall require a new permit. Fir arshal J Debktment of Fire Prevention This Permit Must Be Posted At All Times in The Premises Identified Above City of Edmonds Community Development Code 19.25.020 1i1: 41 AM PDT 071271: 7 Page 1 s® A"ccount Activity Printout From: C. S. S. S. To: JOHN WESTFALL Subject: Alarm Activity for: CHANNEL MARKER PUB & GRILL If you have any questions, did not receive all the pages or what you requested, please call: 800-357-2882 Comments: 1,1: 41 AH PDT 07127/:7 Page 2 HE 7127107 CSSS, INC. PAGE 1 DETAILED ACCOUNT ACTIVITY PRINTOUT(222) INST 0 TO 999999999 ACCTS 5181100 10 5181100 01/00/68 THROUGH 07127107 LOCAL 530 SIATEWIDE SEC (845/992) EVT DATE EVI TIME OPER EVEIIT/COMNENT .................................................................................................................................. CS ACCT: 5101100 CHANNEL MARKER PUB 6 GRILL ALT 10: 5181100 170 SUNSET AVE. FIRE SYSTEM " EONONDS WA 98020 425.275.9590 07127107 11:41:40 SPI 4951 FAX ACTIVITY 07127107 11:41:40 COMKEHI: Attn: JOHN WESTFALL 07127107 11:41:40 COMMENT: MANUAL PHI:14257757121 07127107 11:36:08 CDMHEMI: SPI: FD SHOWS ADDRESS AS SUNSET AVE, NO 'SOUTH' 07127107 11:35:34 CONHENI: SPI: PD1FD CPO 67 07127101 11:35:34 SPI 4372 ' VERIFIEO POM ' 07127107 11:34:50 534 6531 ALARM BELL SILENCED '1 0/1"lll0/ ll:34:4u 04 2000 HtSIUHt '1 Nil HUUU 07/27107 11:34:46 04 41 FIRE - ANSUI 11 HIT HOOD 07127107 11:34:22 02 2000 RESTORE 'I PANEL SHN 07127107 11:34:00 S34 6531 ALARM BELL SILENCED '1 07127107 11:33:57 02 58 FIRE-SMOHE DETECTOR 'T PANEL SHN 07127107 11:33:14 SPI 721 ON LINE PER: HARH -A- 07127107 11:33:09 SPI 4615 DW - IN SERVICE 07127107 11:31:41 SPI 1999 PASSCARD HARK -A- 07127107 11:31:41 SPI 4210 PLACE ON TEST CAT: 1 07127107 11:31:41 CDHNENT: 072707 1131 072707 1600 07127107 11:31:41 COMMENT: TEST:ALI 07127107 11:29:40 02 2000 RESTORE PANEL SHN 07127107 11:29:26 04 2D06 RESTORE HIT HOOD 07127107 11:29:02 02 7801 FIRE TROUBLE PANEL SHN 07127107 11:28:36 04 7901 FIRE TROUBLE KIT HOOD 07127107 11:26:36 585 6596 LOCAL PROGRAMMING 07127107 11:25:52 05 2000 RESTORE BELL TRBL 07127107 11:25:50 05 B50 TROUBLE BELL TRBL 07127107 11:24:11 S34 653r ALARM BELL SILENCED 07/27107 11:23:47 02 2000 RESTORE KIT HOOD 07127107 11:23:47 2 41 FIRE - ANSUI HIT HOOD 07127107 11:23:11 05 850 TROUBLE BELL TRBL 07127107 11:21:33 534 6534 ALARM BELL SILENCED 07127107 11:20:58 03 2000 RESTORE WATERFLOW 07127107 11:20:10 3 63 FIRE - WATERFLOW WATERFLOW 07/27107 11:09:30 05 B50 TROUBLE BEII TRBL 07/27107 11:07:04 PVT 1121 ' SIGNED MAR RCVO 07/27107 11:07:00 COMHENI: AVI:INFO ADDED PER MAR 07127107 11:07:00 AV1 4101 UPDATE ACCOUNT INFO 07127107 07:07:34 S83 6583 REhO1E PRDG COMPLETE 07126107 22:58:07 S83 6583 RE1101E PRDG COMPLETE 07/25/07 17:19:27 S86 6586 LOCAL PROGRAMMING 07/26107 17:01:54 05 2000 RESTORE SUPRVSRV 5 KITCHEN HOOD @ PANEL .I1: 41 AH POT 071271:7 Page 3 EOOI 7127107 CSSS, INC. PAGE 2 DETAILED ACCOUNT ACTIVITY PRINTOUT(212) INST 0 TO 999999999 ACCIS 5181100 10 5181100 01M /68 THROUGH 07127107 EV1 ORTE EVT TINE OPER EVENTJCOMMENT 07/25107 17:00:46 05 850 TROUBLE SUPRVSRY 5 07125107 16:58:24 S34 6534 ALARM BELL SILENCED 07/25107 10:50:24 03 2000 RESTORE HATERFLON 07125/07 16:58:22 3 63 FIRE - HAIERFLON HATERFLON 07/26/01 16:57:49 05 2DOO RESTORE SUPRVSRY 5 07/25/07 16:57:23 05 B50 TROUBLE SUPRVSRY 5 07/26107 16:56:45 05 B50 TROUBLE SUPRVSRY 5 07/25/07 16:56:45 $34 6534 ALARM BELL SILENCED 07/26107 16:56:23 05 2000 RESTORE SUPRVSRY 5 07/26107 16:55:57 03 2D00 RESTORE HATERFLON 07/26107 16:55:55 3 63 FIRE - HAIERFLOH HATERFLOH 07/26107 16:55:31 COMMENT: AFT: ZONE 6 DATA CHANGED TO ZONE 5 07/26107 16:55:31 RF1 4973 ZONE CHANGED BAER -A- 07116107 16:53:54 05 B50 TROUBLE SUPRYSRY 5 07/25107 16:52:40 COMMENT: SP1: RODEO ACCOUNT DATA. 07/26107 16:52:40 SP1 4101 UPDATE ACCOUNT INFO NARR -A- 07/26107 16:52:21 SP1 4526 ON - OUT OF SERYICE CAT: 1 07/26107 16:49:11 586 6586 LOCAL PROGRAMMING ENO OF REPORT `printfile fo% S- � hil Page 1 of 1 E ,R�S Municipal Research & Services Center of Washington State Court of Appeals Upholds Mini -Casino Ban MRSC, June 24, 2003 On June 23, 2003, Division One of the Washington State Court of Appeals in Edmonds Shopping Center Assoc. v. City of Edmonds addressed a challenge to an Edmonds ordinance, presented to the city council through an initiative petition, that prohibited cardrooms and that provided for a phase -out of existing cardrooms. The plaintiff had received a gambling permit from the Washington Gambling Commission to operate an "enhanced" cardroom in Edmonds, allowing the plaintiff to expand its existing cardroom to 15 tables. In February 2000, the plaintiff applied to the city for a building permit for the cardroom expansion, and the city granted that permit in March 2000. In September 2000, the city adopted the challenged ordinance. The plaintiff challenged the ordinance on a number of grounds. In its decision, the court first rejected the challenge to the prohibition of cardrooms. The court held that the prohibition was a valid exercise of the city's police power authority under article 11, section 11 of the state constitution. The court stated that "there can be no doubt that the regulation of gambling, whether licensed or not, is within the police power specified in article XI, section 11." The court rejected the idea that the city had to provide evidence of a negative effect by cardrooms on the public health and safety. The court then determined that the prohibition was a reasonable means to achieve a legitimate public purpose, particularly since a statute (RCW 9.46.295 specifically authorizes cities and counties to absolutely prohibit any particular type of gambling activity, such as cardrooms. Given the language of RCW 9.46.295, the court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that the city was preempted by state law from enacting a prohibition that effectively revokes a license issued by the gambling commission. The court, however, held that the city was preempted by state law from requiring the phasing -out of existing cardrooms, with the result that the plaintiff is immediately affected by the prohibition. The ordinance had provided, among other restrictions, that existing cardrooms would be considered a legal nonconforming use but that they would have to cease operations five years after enactment of the ordinance. The court determined that the phase -out requirement and other interim restrictions changed the scope of issued gambling licenses and were thus preempted by RCW 9.46.295. Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that the prohibition would violate its vested rights, holding that the vested rights doctrine does not exempt a development "from later -enacted police power regulations in furtherance of a legitimate public goal." It is not known at this time whether the plaintiff will appeal this decision to the state supreme court. http://www.mrsc.orglprintfile.aspx?pmtPath=%2ffocus%2fFiles%2fD3O6minicasino.htm 7/24/2003 Washington State Courts: Opinions Page 1 of 12 Washington Courts I Opinions Court of Appeals Division I Graphics View I Print Page State of Washington Opinion Information Sheet Docket Number: 50815-6-I Title of Case: Edmonds Shopping Center Assoc., et Al., App/cr-Res V City of Edmonds, Respondent/cross-App. File Date: 06/23/2003 SOURCE OF APPEAL Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County Docket No: 00-2-08372-4 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 06/26/2002 Authored by Ronald E. Cox Concurring: Ann Schindler Mary Kay Becker JUDGES COUNSEL OF RECORD ----------------- Counsel for Appellant(s) Robert Michael Tull Langabeer Tull & Lee PS PO Box 1678 Bellingham, WA 98227-1678 Heather Wolf Brownlie & Evans LLP 119 N Commercial Ste 1250 Bellingham, WA 98225 Counsel for Respondent(s) Joseph Zachary Lell Ogden Murphy Wallace PLLC 1601 5th Ave Ste 2100 Seattle, WA 98101-1686 Walter Scott Snyder Attorney at Law 2100 Westlake Ctr Twr 1601 5th Ave Seattle, WA 98101-3621 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON EDMONDS SHOPPING CENTER ASSOCIATES, a Washington No. 50815-6-I http ://www. courts.wa. gov/opinions/index. cfm?fa=opinions.opindisp&docid=5 08156MAJ... 7/24/2003 'Washington State Courts: Opinions Page 2 of 12 limited partnership; MBPH, INC. d/b/a MARTY'S PUBLIC HOUSE, a Washington corporation; and ALBERT and MARGARET RYAN-DYKES, husband and wife, Appellants, em CITY OF EDMONDS, a Washington municipal corporation, Respondent. DIVISION ONE PUBLISHED FILED: COX, A.C.J. -- Edmonds Shopping Center Associates, MBPH, Inc. d/b/a Marty's Public House, and Albert Dykes and Margaret Ryan -Dykes (collectively 'Dykes') appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment substantially in favor of the City of Edmonds concerning its adoption of Ordinance 3328. The ordinance prohibits cardrooms and addresses other issues that we describe later in this opinion. We hold that section 1 of the ordinance is a proper exercise of the police power of the City. Moreover, state law preempts the field of the other activities that the ordinance purports to affect. The City's exercise of its police power divested Dykes of the claimed vested right to operate a cardroom. The ordinance does not operate to take property in the constitutional sense, and there were no violations of substantive or procedural due process rights. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision as to section 1 of the ordinance, but reverse the decision to the extent that it validates portions of section 2. Albert Dykes and Margaret, Ryan -Dykes own and operate Marty's Public House ('Marty's'). Marty's is a restaurant, bar, and cardroom facility located in Edmonds. Marty's has an E-5 gambling permit from the Washington Gambling Commission. This authorizes social card games as 'commercial stimulants' to the selling of food and drink for consumption on the premises, as provided by law.l In September 1998, Dykes applied to the Commission for an E-15 gambling permit to expand the cardroom to 15 tables. In order to obtain this license, Dykes needed to renovate Marty's. Dykes applied to the City for a building permit in February 2000. The.City granted the permit in March 2000. In September 2000, citizens presented an initiative petition to the Edmonds City Council that called for a ban on cardrooms and further provided for a phase out of existing cardrooms. The City Council adopted the initiative without modification, enacting Ordinance 3328. Dykes sued the City, seeking a declaratory judgment against the ordinance. Following cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court substantially granted the City's motion. But the court also ruled that certain portions of the ordinance were invalid. Dykes appeals and the City cross -appeals. We may affirm an order granting summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2 We review questions of law de novo.3 Here, both sides expressly concede there are no genuine issues of material fact. We agree. Thus, our focus is on the legal question of whether the City was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ARTICLE XI, SECTION 11 Dykes argues that Ordinance 3328 conflicts with article XI, section 11 http://www. courts.wa.gov/opinions/index. cftn?fa=opinions. opindisp&docid=5 0815 6MAJ... 7/24/2003 'Washington State Courts: Opinions Page 3 of 12 of the state constitution because it is not a reasonable exercise of the City.'s police power. Because case and statutory authority is to the contrary, we reject this unpersuasive argument. Section 1 of the Ordinance states: Chapter 3.24 Taxation and Regulation of Gambling is hereby amended by the enactment of a new Section 3.24.015 Cardrooms Prohibited to read as follows: 3.24.015 Cardrooms Prohibited. The conduct or operation of social card games as commercial stimulants as defined in RCW 9.46.0217 and 9.46.0282 shall be prohibited. 'Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.14 An ordinance is inconsistent with article XI, section 11 if (1) the ordinance conflicts with some general law; (2) the ordinance is not a reasonable exercise of the City's police power; or (3) the subject matter of the ordinance is not local.5 'Whether an ordinance is reasonable, local, or conflicts with a general law for purposes of article XI, section 11 is purely a question of law subject to de novo review.16 The second of the three above criteria is at issue here. Reasonable Exercise of Police Power Dykes argues that Ordinance 3328 is not a legitimate exercise of the City's police power because the City has failed to demonstrate that the ordinance was enacted to protect the health, safety, or general welfare of the public. Specifically, he contends there is no evidence in the record that licensed cardrooms negatively affect the community and there is no public policy to reduce or eliminate lawful gambling. We hold that the ordinance is a reasonable exercise of the City's police power. A two-part test applies to determine whether a law is a reasonable exercise of the police power. First, the regulation 'must promote the health, safety, peace, education, or welfare of the people.'? Second, the requirements of the regulation 'must bear some reasonable relationship to accomplishing the purpose underlying the statute.18 An ordinance may only be struck down as beyond the police power if it is shown that it is 'clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.19 The first question is whether the ordinance promotes the health, safety, peace, education or welfare of the people. We resolve that question by comparing the ordinance in question with the provisions of article XI, section 11.10 Case law and statutes make clear that the regulation of gambling is a valid exercise of a municipality's police power.11 Municipal police power is as extensive as that of the state.12 And there can be no doubt that the regulation of gambling, whether licensed or not, is within the police power specified in article XI, section 11. Furthermore, RCW 9.46.010 sets forth a legislative declaration of policy respecting gambling. Among other things, it states the policy of this state is to limit the nature and scope of gambling activities and further states a policy of strictly regulating and controlling such activities. Dykes cites no authority for the novel proposition that evidence in the record is required for a municipality to affect, within constitutional and statutory limitations, the business of gambling. Because he has cited no authority, we must presume he has found none.13 Because Dykes cannot and does not argue that his activity is exempted from regulation, and the case and statutory authority does not support his claim, he fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under the first prong of the analysis. We move to.the second prong. Once we determine that an ordinance serves a legitimate public purpose, we must next examine whether the ordinance uses 'means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose.114 While it is unclear whether and to what extent Dykes focuses his argument on the second prong of the governing test, we will assume that he claims http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/index.cf n?fa--opinions.opindisp&docid=508156MAJ... 7/24/2003 'Washington State Courts: Opinions Page 4 of 12 that the record must evidence some sort of showing to support the City's actions. Thus, he focuses on evidence in the record that a police chief's survey of the Puget Sound region indicated that there was little peripheral crime associated with cardrooms. However, that report is not dispositive. 'The State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.115 'In determining whether particular legislation tends to promote the welfare of the people of the State of Washington, {the court} must presume that if a conceivable set of facts exists to justify the legislation, then those facts do exist and the legislation was passed with reference to those facts.' 16 Here, the record makes clear that while the City's decision may have been debatable, it used reasonable means to effectuate that decision. First, the ordinance was passed pursuant to a state statute that specifically authorized the municipality to exercise a•local option to ban cardrooms. Dykes does not argue that the statute is invalid. Thus, it is difficult to see why the City's exercise of the express authority granted to it by statute does not satisfy the second prong of the test we apply in this case. Second, the record shows that prior to its decision, the City formed a task force to study the question of whether cardrooms should be allowed in Edmonds. The task force considered three aspects of cardroom gambling: law enforcement concerns, taxes and revenue, and the effects on neighborhoods. That task force considered various studies on these subjects and surveyed members of the community. Some council members expressed their strong beliefs that gambling negatively affected the local community and one concluded that the City should not use gambling to generate revenue. The council member noted that the City did not want to rely on revenue from gambling, potentially five to ten percent of the City's revenue, because that might give one or two businesses substantial control over the City's revenue base. Simply because there is no clear consensus on the benefits or harms associated with an activity does not make a move to ban that activity inherently unreasonable.17 As the cases hold, a determination on this issue is best left to a legislative body.118 Dykes fails to demonstrate entitlement to relief under the second prong of the test. The City's exercise of its police power to regulate gambling was reasonable. Preemption Dykes also argues that sections 1 and 2 of Ordinance 3328 ate preempted by state law. He argues that section 1 is preempted because it revokes a license that only the Gambling Commission can revoke, in violation of RCW 9.46.295. He argues that section 2 alters the scope of his gambling license, also in conflict with RCW 9.46.295. The City agrees that state law preempts the phasing out schedule in section 2. We hold that state law preempts section 2, but not section 1 of the ordinance. A person challenging a statute bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unconstitutional.19 Preemption occurs when the Legislature states its intention either expressly or by necessary implication to preempt the regulated field.20 The test for determining whether an ordinance is in conflictwith a general law is whether the ordinance permits that which the statute forbids, or forbids that which the statute permits.21 RCW 9.46.285 expressly preempts any licensing and regulatory functions of gambling by any entity other than the state, 'except as to the powers and duties of any city, town, city -county, or county which are specifically set forth in this chapter.', RCW 9.46.295 states: Any license to engage in any of the gambling activities authorized by this http://www. courts.wa. gov/opinions/index.cfm?fa=opinions.opindisp&docid=508156MAJ... 7/24/2003 'Washington State Courts: Opinions Page 5 of 12 chapter as now exists or as hereafter amended, and issued under the authority thereof shall be legal authority to engage in the gambling activities for which issued throughout the incorporated and unincorporated area of any county, except that a city located therein with respect to that city, or a county with respect to all areas within that county except for such cities, may absolutely prohibit, but may not change the scope of license, any or all of the gambling activities for which the license was issued.(22) We construe statutes as a whole to give effect to all the language and to harmonize all provisions.23 The construction of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.24 In considering a statute, we must 'assume that the legislature means exactly what it says,125 and we will 'give words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning.126 We will construe statutes to avoid strained or absurd results.27 Dykes's argument that the ordinance revokes a license that only the Gambling Commission can revoke is unpersuasive. Section 1 of Ordinance 3328 states, '{t}he conduct or operation of social card games as commercial stimulants as defined in RCW 9.46.0217 and 9.46.0282 shall be prohibited.' RCW 9.46.295 clearly allows the City to 'absolutely prohibit gambling activities for which the license was issued.128 There is no room to argue that a city can prohibit only future gambling activities; the use of the language 'was issued' controls. The interpretation offered by Dykes would lead to the illogical result that a city could only prohibit future gambling activities, but would have to allow existing activities. Dykes also argues that section 1 applies only to future cardrooms and that this is an invalid regulation, as opposed to an outright prohibition, on gambling activities. Dykes's reasoning is that, because section 2 applies only to existing cardrooms, section 1 must only apply to future cardrooms. First, the plain language of section 1 gives no indication that it is limited to future cardrooms. Second, as will be discussed below, state law preempts section 2.. Thus, there is no conflict between section.2 and section 1 that would force the conclusion that section 1 applies only to future cardrooms. Dykes next argues that section 2 is preempted in its entirety by RCW 9.46.295. The City agrees that state law preempts the phasing out of the activities in subpart F, section 2. We, too, conclude that state law preempts the entirety of section 2 because it regulates, rather than prohibits gambling outright. Section 2 states in pertinent part, All land uses operating social card games which are currently in existence within the City, which were legally established under land use regulations in effect at the time of the establishment, and which have current gambling licenses issued by the State Gambling Commission may continue to operate at a current level provided that such level is authorized by the current gambling license. All such land uses operating social card games: A. Shall be considered legal nonconforming uses under this act. B. Shall not be expanded or intensified by the addition of tables at which social card games are played beyond the numbers authorized by current gambling license. C. Shall permanently cease operations upon revocation or failure to renew license issued by the Washington State Gambling Commission. D. Shall permanently cease operation of any table for social card games where operation is discontinued for more than 30 days. E. Shall permanently cease operation if site or tables for social card games are relocated, reconstructed or redeveloped. F. Shall permanently cease operation five years after this ordinance is enacted. The trial court determined that subparts A, C, D, and E were preempted by http ://www. courts.wa. gov/opinions/index.cfm?fa=opinions.opindisp&docid=508156MAJ... 7/24/2003 'Washington State Courts: Opinions Page 6 of 12 state law. Neither party challenges that conclusion on appeal. Accordingly, subparts B and F only are at issue. RCW 9.46.295 allows cities only to 'absolutely prohibit, but may not change - the scope of license, any or all of the gambling activities for which the license was issued.' Instituting a schedule to phase out existing gambling activities is not absolutely prohibiting gambling activities. Rather, it is regulation. We also agree that Dykes and the City are correct that differentiating between existing and future uses is more regulatory in nature, thus violating RCW 9.46.295. We conclude that state law preempts the phase out schedule in subpart F. Dykes argues that all of Section 2 changes the scope of his license, in violation of RCW 9.46.295, because it purports to do that which the Gambling Commission has the sole authority to do - regulate the scope of gambling activities. This argument is persuasive. The introductory paragraph of section 2 gives special authorization for existing cardroom activities to continue. RCW 9.46.295 does not give municipalities the authority to prohibit selectively gambling activities. Specifically, the ordinance authorizes these gambling activities to continue to operate at their 'current level.' But any regulation pertaining to the scope of gambling activities is under the sole authority of the Gambling Commission. If gambling activities continue, it is in the sole discretion of the Gambling Commission, whether to allow expansion, intensification, or the revocation of a license. Similarly, subparts A through F, of which subpart B is a part, attempt to regulate the scope of gambling, rather than merely prohibiting it. We conclude that state law preempts the entirety of section 2. VESTED RIGHT TO CARDROOM Dykes next argues that Ordinance 3328 violates a vested right to operate a cardroom in conjunction with Marty's eating and drinking establishment. Specifically, Dykes argues that the February 2000 filing of the building permit application to remodel the establishment vested a constitutional right to operate under land use regulations then in effect. Accordingly, Dykes maintains that the later enactment of the ordinance does not bar expansion of the cardroom. We hold that any claim to a vested right by virtue of the filing of the application for a permit was extinguished by the City's later exercise of its police power by enactment of the ordinance. 'Under Washington's 'vested rights doctrine' developers who file a timely and complete building permit application obtain a vested right to have their application processed according to the zoning and building ordinances in effect at the time of the application.129 The purpose of the vested rights doctrine is to 'fix' the rules that will govern land development with reasonable certainty.30 But the vested rights doctrine does not allow a business to operate exempt from later -enacted police power regulations in furtherance of a legitimate public goal.31 'This doctrine provides only a right to have the application processed under existing rules; it does not provide a right to have any particular law or regulation apply to the location or use after the application is approved.132 The development must then comply with later - enacted police power regulations that are limited only by constitutional safeguards.33 Dykes argues that the filing of a building permit application to remodel the eating establishment vested a constitutional right to operate under the land use regulations in place at the time. This argument suggests that filing for expansion of the cardroom license with the Commission and the land use application for expanding the cardroom somehow created a vested right to operate a cardroom. Although Dykes characterizes his claim as one to a 'vested right,' we need not decide whether Dykes had such a right by the filing of his http://www.courts.wa. gov/opinions/index.cfm?fa=opinions.opindisp&docid=508156MAJ... 7/24/2003 ' Washington State Courts: Opinions Page 7 of 12 application. Assuming without deciding that Dykes had such a right, '{m}unicipalities can regulate or even extinguish vested rights by exercising the police power reasonably and in furtherance of a legitimate public goal.134 For example, the court in West Main observed, 'under the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 a municipality has the discretion to deny an application for a building permit because of adverse environmental impacts even if the application meets all other requirements and conditions for issuance.135 Here, we have a statute that allows municipalities to prohibit all gambling and a valid exercise of the City's police power under that statute. Dykes fails to address why this reasoning does not apply here. Dykes filed a building permit application that disclosed his plan to expand the cardroom at Marty's. The City approved the application. Six months later the City, in a valid exercise of its police power, and under the statutory authority of RCW 9.46.295, banned all cardrooms in the city. Dykes does not challenge RCW 9.46.295. Any vested right Dykes may have had was extinguished with the passage of Ordinance 3328. Dykes misplaces reliance on Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County.36 In that case, a developer argued that its right to develop its land in the manner described in its short plat application vested on the same day as the short plat application itself.37 Subsequent development regulations would have made it impossible for the developer to develop the land as contemplated on the day the application for short platting was filed.38 The Court held that the vested rights doctrine, and its codification in the short plat context in RCW 58.17.033, included the right to develop consistent with the land use and zoning laws in place on the day the county received the short plat application.39 Noble•Manor is distinguishable. There, the court applied the vested rights doctrine to preserve a developer's expectations as to land use ordinances existing at the time of the application. The case does nothing to overcome the rule articulated in West Main that a police power regulation subsequent to an application can extinguish a vested right. Finally, we need not address the City's argument that WAC 230-04-175 controls the question of whether Dykes had a vested right. It states, '{t}he issuance of any license by the commission shall not be construed as granting a vested right in any of the privileges so conferred.' The City claims this language is broad enough to require its application here, in the land use and vested rights context. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the City on this issue. TAKINGS Dykes contends that because Ordinance 3328 does not advance a legitimate state interest, it constitutes a taking under the Washington State and United States Constitutions. Dykes fails to persuade us that any unconstitutional taking of property occurred in this case.40 Guimont establishes the revised analysis for a takings challenge following Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council41 and our state's previous jurisprudence set forth in Presbytery.42 The case authority establishes two threshold questions. First, whether the regulation destroys or derogates any fundamental attribute of property ownership, including the right to possess, to exclude others, to dispose of property, or to make some economically viable use of the property.43 If the landowner claims less than a 'physical invasion' or a 'total taking' and if a fundamental attribute of ownership is not otherwise implicated, we proceed to the second question. That question is whether the challenged regulation safeguards the public interest in health, safety, the environment, or the fiscal integrity of an area or whether the regulation 'seeks less to prevent a harm than to impose on those regulated the requirement of providing an affirmative public benefit.144 http://www. courts.wa. gov/opinions/index.cftn?fa=opinions.opindisp&docid=5 08156MAJ... 7/24/2003 'Washington State Courts: Opinions Page 8 of 12 If the answer to.both threshold questions is no, then there is no taking. If the answer to one or both questions is yes, then additional analysis is required. This additional analysis includes consideration of two additional points. First, whether the regulation advances a legitimate state interest. Second, a balancing test to determine if the state interest in the regulation is outweighed by its adverse economic impact to the landowner, with particular attention to the regulation's economic impact on the property, the extent the regulation interferes with investment -backed expectations, and the character of the government action.45 Dykes does not argue that the ordinance imposes the burden of providing an affirmative public benefit. Nor 'does he argue that all economic value has been taken or that he has been deprived of an attribute of ownership. Rather, Dykes challenges whether the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of power for the public interest in health, safety, or welfare. - Dykes argues that nothing in the record suggests that the ordinance was motivated by any concern that cardrooms lead to 'negative secondary impacts' on the community. This assertion is at odds with the record, as we previously observed in this opinion. The council president indicated that half of the people he spoke with found gambling to be offensive. Another councilmember said she too found that half of the citizens she talked to did not want cardrooms, in the City. Furthermore, Dykes fails to account for the fact that RCW 9.46.295 allows municipalities to 'absolutely prohibit' gambling activities. Dykes concludes that in order to justify the cardroom ban, the City must demonstrate that the prohibition implements the public policy o.f''keeping the criminal element out of gambling' or 'restraining professional gambling activities' as discussed in RCW 9.46.010. This argument makes no sense. The City cannot regulate professional gambling or -the criminal element in gambling. The City is limited only to absolutely prohibiting gambling activities or doing nothing at all, under RCW 9.46.295. Because the ordinance protects the public health, safety, and welfare and neither destroys a fundamental attribute of ownership nor imposes a private burden for a public benefit, no taking has occurred. Accordingly, we proceed to determine whether the regulation violates substantive due process.46 SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS Dykes argues that Ordinance 3328 violates his substantive due process rights because it fails the due process test of reasonableness. Again, we disagree. 'Even if a regulation is not susceptible to a takings challenge, under our Presbytery framework, it is next subject to substantive due process scrutiny for reasonableness.147 Washington courts apply the three -pronged test stated in Presbytery to determine whether a regulation violates substantive due process. There the court stated the test as '(1) whether the regulation is aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose; (2) whether it uses means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose; and (3) whether it is unduly oppressive on the landowner.148 The purpose of this analysis is to prevent the use of excessive police power that would require an individual to shoulder an economic burden, which in justice and fairness the public should rightfully bear.149 Legislative enactments are presumed constitutional, and the challenging party bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unconstitutional.50 Dykes maintains that Ordinance 3328 fails any constitutional reasonableness test because it does not achieve a legitimate public purpose. As noted above, this argument is not persuasive. Based on the evidence presented at the council meeting, there was a significant public interest in prohibiting gambling in the city. The ordinance was a http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/index.cf n?fa=opinions.opindisp&docid=508156MAJ... 7/24/2003 Washington State Courts: Opinions Page 9 of 12 legitimate expression of this public interest. Dykes's arguments that some studies find little peripheral crime associated with cardrooms are insufficient to overcome the presumption that this regulation is constitutional. Furthermore, in light of the historical acceptance of the regulation of gambling as a valid exercise of the police power,51 and the explicit authorization by the Legislature in RCW 9.46.295 to permit municipalities to prohibit gambling absolutely, this argument must fail. As to the second prong, Dykes argues that the City has many options to address its concerns about gambling. This is not true. The City can either prohibit gambling activities or do nothing under RCW 9.46.295. Furthermore, Dykes fails to address how a prohibition on cardrooms is not a reasonably necessary means to achieve the public purpose of stopping cardroom activity. Finally, Dykes argues that the ordinance is unduly oppressive. To determine whether a regulation is unduly oppressive on the landowner, courts must balance the public's interests against those of the regulated landowner. The Presbytery court listed several interests for the courts to consider, including the nature of the harm sought to be avoided, the availability and effectiveness of less drastic protective measures, the economic loss suffered by the property owner, and the property owner's ability to anticipate the regulation.52 Applying these factors, we conclude that the prohibition on gambling is not unduly oppressive. The public has a significant interest in abating an activity that many find to be offensive or damaging to the community. That the community perceived gambling to be a significant problem is supported by the fact that the ordinance was brought about through a citizen initiative. No less restrictive means are available because RCW 9.46.295 allows municipalities to either totally prohibit gambling or to not act at all. Municipalities are not allowed to simply regulate particularly offensive aspects of gambling. Dykes has failed to address what, if any, economic losses he has suffered due to the ordinance. Furthermore, Dykes is not being required to bear a financial burden or solve a social problem that is not created by gambling itself. As observed in Weden, '{i)t defies logic to suggest an ordinance is unduly oppressive when it regulates only the activity which is directly responsible for the harm.153 Finally, Dykes should have anticipated the ordinance because he knew that, under RCW 9.46.295, the possibility existed for the City to prohibit gambling activities. Nevertheless, Dykes maintains that the destruction of a legitimate business is unduly oppressive. Dykes cites to City of Seattle v. McCoy.54 McCoy is distinguishable. In McCoy, the trial court found a restaurant to be a drug nuisance under chapter 7.43 RCW because of the drug activity that was taking place on the property, despite the owners' best efforts to stop it.55 This court reversed and concluded that the drug nuisance statute, as applied, constituted a taking and violated due process.56 But the cardroom at Marty's is not being shut down due to activities outside of Dykes's control. It is being closed because the City has decided that it does not want cardrooms. The ordinance does not require that Marty's, a restaurant, bar and cardroom, be closed completely. Dykes's attempt to equate Marty's to the restaurant in McCoy is not persuasive. We conclude that there is no substantive due process violation. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS Dykes also argues that the City should have given him special notice and a hearing because this was a quasi-judicial action. We reject this claim as well. Both the Washington and U.S. Constitutions provide that no person shall be deprived of 'life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.157 State deprivation of these protected interests is unconstitutional unless accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards.58 Our supreme court has held http ://www. courts.wa. gov/opinions/index. cftn?fa=opinions.opindisp&docid=5 08156MAJ... 7/24/2003 'Washington State Courts: Opinions Page 10 of 12 that our due process protection is largely coextensive with that of the U.S. Constitution.59 In looking at the degree of process that will be afforded, the court balances the following interests: (1) the private interest to be protected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest by the government's procedures and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest in maintaining the procedures.60 The private interest here is Dykes's interest in maintaining the cardroom facility within the bar and restaurant at Marty's. Despite Dykes's characterization, the ordinance does not result in the complete termination of his business. The space planned for the expanded cardroom could be used for many other functions, and the restaurant and bar remain unaffected. The risk of erroneous deprivation is low because the ordinance was the product of a citizen initiative that prohibited cardroom gaming throughout the city. Despite Dykes's characterization to the contrary, this was not a quasi-judicial action, but a legislative one. Area -wide actions involving the exercise of the legislative body's policy -making power are generally legislative.61 The legislative process provides all the process that is due.62 'And such actions are not made quasi-judicial simply because they affect specific individuals, even if -the method chosen by the legislative body to acquire input from property owners allows the owners to specifically discuss their own properties.163 Similarly, the government's interest in maintaining the procedure, the citizen initiative process, is quite high. It would be unduly burdensome on the City to provide an individualized hearing for each party affected by a city-wide, legislative enactment. Thus, Dykes was entitled to no more process than he received in this legislative action by the City. Dykes next argues that because the ordinance affects land uses, the City was -required to comply with the public participation requirements of the Growth Management Act in RCW 36.70A.035. There is no indication in the record that Ordinance 3328 is Growth Management Act legislation. The ordinance was promulgated under the authority of RCW 35.17.260, not chapter 36.70A RCW. RCW 36.70A.035 is not applicable. In sum, we conclude that Ordinance 3328 does not violate Dykes's procedural due process rights. We affirm the summary judgment order in part and reverse in part WE CONCUR: 1 RCW 9.46.070(2). 2 CR 56 (c) . 3 Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington, 121 Wn.2d 810, 813, 854 P.2d 1072 (1993). 4 Article XI, section it of the Washington Constitution. 5.Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wn.2d 678, 692, 958 P.2d 273 (1998). 6 Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 693. 7 Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 700 (citations omitted). 8 Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 700 (citations omitted). 9 Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 700 (quoting Homes Unlimited, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wn.2d 154, 159, 579 P.2d 1331 (1978)). 10 See Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 700-701 (comparing the challenged ordinance with article XI, section 11 to determine whether the first prong of the test was satisfied). 11.Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 691 (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385 (1894)). 12 Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 692 (citing Covell v. City of Seattle, 127 Wn.2d 874, 905 P.2d 324 (1995)). http ://www. courts.wa.gov/opinions/index. cfm?fa=opinions.opindisp&docid=5 0815 6MAJ... 7/24/2003 Washington State Courts: Opinions Page 11 of 12 13 State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625, 574 P.2d 1171, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870, 99 S. Ct. 200, 58 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1978) (courts may assume that where no authority is cited, counsel has found none after search). 14 Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 701 (quoting Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wn.2d 320, 330, 787 P.2d 907 (1990)). 15 Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 691 (quoting Lawton, 152 U.S. 133). 16 See Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 705 (quoting State ex rel. Faulk v. CSG Job Ctr., 117 Wn.2d 493, 504, 816 P.2d 725 (1991)). 17 See Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 704-705; See also Jim Springer, Norm Maleng & Mike Lowry, Pro/Con: Should Washington Take The Big Gamble?, The Seattle Times, April 6, 2003, at C1 (the public policy questions associated with gambling in Washington, including the effect on state and local revenues, and who benefits from gambling income, are debated). 18 Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 703. 19 State v. Labor Ready, Inc., 103 Wn. App. 775, 779, 14 P.3d 828 (2000) (citing City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wn.2d 583, 589, 919 P.2d 1218 (1996)). 20 Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 376, 383, 617 P.2d 713 (1980). 21 Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 693 (citing village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923)). 22 (Italics ours.) 23 City of Seattle v. Fontanilla, 128 Wn.2d 492, 498, 909 P.2d 1294 (1996). 24 Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 128 Wn.2d 508, 515, 910 P.2d 462 (1996). 25 Morgan v. Johnson, 137 Wn.2d 887, 891-92, 976 P.2d 619 (1999). 26 State v. Keller, 98 Wn. App. 381, 383-84, 990 P.2d 423 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130, 122 S. Ct. 1070, 151 L. Ed. 2d 972 (2002). 27 State v. Akin, 77 Wn. App. 575, 580, 892 P.2d 774 (1995). 28 (Italics ours.) 29 Rhod-A-Zalea & 35th, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 136 Wn.2d 1, 16, 959 P.2d 1024 (1998) (citing West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wn.2d 47, 51, 720 P.2d 782 (1986)); RCW 19.27.095. 30 West Main, 106 Wn.2d at 51 31 West Main, 106 Wn.2d at 53 (citing Hass v. Kirkland, 78 Wn.2d 929, 481 P.2d 9 (1971)). 32 Skamania County v. Woodall, et al., 104 Wn. App. 525, 537, 16 P.3d 701, review denied, 144 Wn.2d 1021 (2001) (citation omitted). 33 Rhod-A-Zalea, 136 Wn.2d at 16. 34 West Main, 106 Wn.2d at 53. 35 West Main, 106 Wn.2d at 53. 36 133 Wn.2d 269, 943 P.2d 1378 (1997). 37 Noble Manor, 133 Wn.2d 274. 38 Noble Manor, 133 Wn.2d 272. 39 Noble Manor, 133 Wn.2d 278. 40 Dykes fails to brief the Gunwall factors,, and does not argue that the state constitutional provisions of article 1, section 16 are more protective than the federal constitutional provisions. Accordingly, we follow the same analysis applied in Guimont and other cases. See Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wn.2d 586, 602-04, 854 P.2d 1 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1176, 114 S. Ct. 1216, 127 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1994). 41 .505 U.S. 1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992). 42 114 Wn.2d 320; Guimont, 121 Wn.2d at 600. 43 Guimont, 121 Wn.2d at 602. 44 Guimont, 121 Wn.2d at 603. 45 Guimont, 121 Wn.2d at 604. 46 See Guimont, 121 Wn.2d at 594. 47 Guimont, 121 Wn.2d at 608. 48 Presbytery, 114 Wn.2d at_330. 49 Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 706 (quoting Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 648- 49, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987)). 50 Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wn.2d 864, 869, 872 P.2d 1090 (1994). http://www. courts.wa. gov/opinions/index. cfin?fa=opinions.opindisp&docid=508156MAJ... 7/24/2003 Washington State Courts:. Opinions Page 12 of 12 51 See Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 691. 52 Girton v. City of Seattle, 97 Wn. App. 360, 368, 983 P.2d 1135 (1999), review denied, 140 Wn.2d.1007 (2000). 53 Weden, 135 Wn.2d at 707. 54 101 Wn. App. 815, 4 P.3d 159 (2000). 55 McCoy, 101 Wn. App. at 823. 56 McCoy, 101 Wn. App. at 844. 57 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1; Wash. Const. art. I, 3. 58 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985). 59 State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 679-80, 921 P.2d 473 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1201, 117 S. Ct. 1563, 137 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1997). 60 Rivett v. City of Tacoma, 123 Wn.2d 573, 583, 870 P.2d 299 (1994) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976)). 61 Holbrook, Inc. v. Clark County, 112 Wn. App. 354, 365, 49 P.3d 142 (2002), review denied, 148 Wn.2d 1017 (2003). 62 In re Personal Restraint of Metcalf, 92 Wn. App. 165, 176, 963 P.2d 911 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1041, 119 S. Ct. 2405, 144 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1999) . 63 Holbrook, 112 Wn. App. at 365. Back to Top I Privacy and Disclaimer Notices http://www. courts.wa. gov/opinions/index. cfrn?fa=opinions.opindisp&docid=5 0815 6MAJ... 7/24/2003 MEMORANDUM TO: BILL ANGEL, Captain FROM: Gary L. McComas DATE: July 27, 1993 SUBJECT: EVENING INSPECTIONS During the evening of August 6,1993, between the hours of 2100 & 2300 you are assigned the following occupancies to do a walk through inspection. As in the past the main focus of the inspections is to make sure that exits are not blocked and that overcrowding does not occur. If any problems are observed during your inspections attempt to correct them at the time you are there and document your observations and forward your report to the inspection office for filing or follow up. STATION 7: Arnies At The Landing,300 Admiral Way Goldies O _Edmonds,180 Sunset Ave STATION 6: Romeo's Restaurant Pizzeria, 21110-76th Ave w Harvey's Tavern,21116-Highway 99 Evening Inspections August 6, 1993 2130 hours CC: Station 7_ Arnies at the Landing, 300 Admiral Way - Aisles OK Occupant Load OK Exit Lights OK Goldies of Edmonds, 180 Sunset Ave. Aisles OK Occupant Load OK Exit Lights - North and East Exit Doors Either one (1) or both lights burnt out. June 26, 1989 MEMO TO: Hal Reeves Building Official FROM: Gary L. McComas Fire Marshal SUBJECT: TENANT IMPROVEMENT - GOLDIES, 180 SUNSET WAY After review, the Fire Department has the following comments: The current allowed occupant load is 125 and, with the proposed addition, that number will increase by 30 to 155 occupant load. It appears to me that three exits will now be required. I know it shows three now but the south exit goes through'a service corridor that, unless it is improved, can't really be considered an exit. r GLM:be CIT Y OF E®MONDS HARVE H. HARRISON CIVIC CENTER • EDMON06. WASHINGTON 98020 (206) 775-2525 ' FIRE DEPARTMENT April 7, 1978 Parlor Car Tavern 180 Sunset Avenue Edmonds, WA 98020 Dear Sir: Your Fire Department Permit expired December 31st and is now 90.days past due. If the nature of your business or process has changed and no longer requires such a Permit, please advise so we may correct our records. If your Permit renewal is an oversight, please complete the enclosed -application and return with the Five Dollars ($5.00) renewal fee within fifteen days. On receipt of your renewal. application, the Fire Prevention Bureau will schedule a safety survey within 60•days to as- sist in reducing possible hazards on your premises. Yours for a safer community -through fire prevention, f Jack F. Cooper Fire Chief Edmonds Fire Department JFC : amm Enclosure 7 r F CITY- OF EDMONDS a FIRE ®EPARTMEN-f APPROVED SUBJECT ACHANGES INDICATED Examined By Date Approved By Jack C Per, Chief . r ; I I PL.C..N�4wa ntY4_, �4L i 1 11*1 U 4 . Gem 1—T UK y�rn� *hr,Cnon � W 06 -ftP��At.,.... �(.-2J�-fit. �'�::� 1 .. � ..y�.��. - �•�:._ � APPROVE.0 By , I - �� .1 -, --, �- � WANINGTON gpta, (.(, & SEATTLE. WASH, 7z-- / Approval applipz to ol�ns 1� —hrr!Lt and Tor construction sno, ,, t -: j .. " ;t"al of finished installatioq q(joj-cj in,f) -r, and final acceptance. eyOusiveiv to relative Vitect of L i iey are not to is construed is be i whether "due, C.are" has been exec i % 7,y for personal ,§pjury or damage to propc,., ie,czn,zed that nazards,which mad loss still exist. � P--� ---. NN 5 27 ? Hdmonds, Washinrkonl !,..../.............................. y .d.................... ................. ... Q . �_,& .... :i—y.. //�° .` . ....................r...................................................... ...-.«. •.a......•r.,. _.... ....•... < 4 • rr .�is ........ ' ?.%..1�4'.a... ..-.......... 4.r�.��'.C'.(r,•,-.,•,,,�,�1r..._..�........................ ...................... .......__. .......__.........,-.....�.. .. i Y,;y > �! �/;!�t lf. .. .....__... � ....................... ...... �' ✓?�?/ y� +�s: � A P P L I C A T I O N To - CITY OF EDMONDS FIRE DEPARTMENT For Permit Date ! Jack F. Cooper, Chief Fire Department Civic Center Edmonds,'Washington 98020 Dear Sir: In conformity with the terms of the Fire Code, application is hereby made to store, use or maintain the following specific materials or processes: The materials or processes are at the following specific locations at the below address: - /ml-, , /.r / 410 _ _ _ , /) ,e Lj 14 45A t/ Name of Firm of Company Address - - treet and Number Signatur ,✓` ,GG/ Title ,-v'z> IF APPLICATION IS FOR SALE OR USE OF FIREWORKS, FILL OUT REVERSE SIDE ALSO. efd 11-70 1 V, MY OF EDMMOS o MHE DEPARYMEW APPROVED SUBJECTp AR" CHANGES INDICATED Examined By Date - Approved By Jack 'ooper, Chief . P �- ♦i YIl tw�,r•, �q'x ►d' NO ZLI-- ;4-T ✓ �h i�U�z n1P�; 2-4 C 1 N-\ FUN ' >AL J tot)" �•3t L-N • C= AS A?Q\..\UMUL, P'4\-17J3 Mbl4 \ TJC.n � kYa ,"��_LCLh �w nf�.6 L--J F ��r \Q A.,j.. G, A) S -IAMEPEI. SAlowl1% k.—rl A/ PRO R6 r?, SPR>/ N /C'Z.Z— I IeSIG r A) Z) SPACING- IA) L-E 'Del EDMONDS FIRE DEPARTMENT The following are portions of the Fire Code relating to fire extinguishing systems (other than automatic sprinklers): 1. An installation premit is required from the Fire Department. 2. lans bearing the stamp of the Washington Survey nd Rating Bureau must be submitted prior to installation. 3. -Carbon Dioxide hood systems are not acceptable. 4. Minimum dry chemical size shall be ten pound. ( 20-B; C ) 5. Automatic actuation shall be employed by approved means. 6. At least one manual station shall be provided. 7. Provisions for automatic fuel shut-off shall be made. 8. Substantial bracing for all system piping shall be provided. 9. System cylinder location shall be approved prior to installation. 10. Trip test shall be performed in the presence of a pepresentative from Edmonds Fire Department. The above items are not the complete regulations of fire extin- guishing systems. They are a guide to prevent unnecessary costs due to improper installation and to assure minimum protection of life and property. 0 �;o 7-8 DRY CHEMICAL EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS 122. Safety Requirements. Where there is a possibility that per- sonnel may be exposed to a dry chemical discharge, suitable safe- guards shall be provided to ensure prompt evacuation of such locations, and also to provide means for prompt rescue of any trapped personnel. Such safety items as personnel training, warning signs; discharge alarms, predischarge alarms, and respiratory pro- tection should be considered. *123. Electrical Clearances. All system components shall be so located as to maintain minimum clearances from live parts. 13. Specifications, Plans and Approvals 131. Purchasing Specifications. Specifications for dry chemical fire extinguishing systems shall be drawn up with care under super- vision of a competent person, and with the advice of the authority having jurisdiction. To ensure a satisfactory system, the following items shall be in the specifications. 1311. The specifications shall designate the authority having jurisdiction and indicate whether plans are required. 1312. The specifications shall state that the installation shall conform to this Standard and meet the approval of the authority having jurisdiction. 1313. The specifications shall include the specific tests that may be required, if any, to meet the approval of the authority having jurisdiction, and indicate how the cost of testing is to be borne. 1314. These specifications shall indicate the hazard to be pro- tected and shall include such information as physical dimensions, combustibles, air handling equipment, heat sources, etc. 132. Plans. Where plans are required," the responsibility for their preparation shall be entrusted only to competent persons. 1321. These plans shall be drawn to an indicated scale or be suitably dimensioned, and shall be made so that they can be easily reproduced. 1322. These plans shall contain sufficient detail to enable the authority having jurisdiction to evaluate the hazard or hazards, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the system. The details on the hazards shall include materials involved, the location and arrange- ment, and the exposure to the hazard. *See Appendix. �.—� �g7 7( �O�cc� CX Im Y�t�s GENERAL INFORMATION AND REQUIREMENTS 17-9 OW 1323. The details on the system shall include sufficient informa- tion and calculations on the amount of dry .chemical; the size, length and arrangement of connected piping, or piping and hose; description and location of nozzles so that the adequacy of the system can be determined. Information shall be submitted per- taining to the location and function of detection devices, operating devices, auxiliary equipment and electrical circuitry, if used. Suffi- cient information shall be indicated to identify properly the ap- paratus and devices used. Any special features should be adequately ex lamed. 133. Approval of Plans. Where plans are required, they shall be ubmitted to the authority having jurisdiction for approval before work starts. 1331. Where field conditions necessitate any substantial change from the approved plan, the corrected as -installed plans shall be submitted to the authority having jurisdiction for approval. 134. Approval of Installations. The completed system shall be teste y qualified personnel as required by the authority having jurisdiction. These tests shall be adequate to determine that the 1 system 'has been properly installed and will function as intended. Only listed equipment and devices shall be used in these systems. 341 The. installer shall certify to the authority having juris- diction that the installation has been made in accordance with the approved plans and the listing of a nationally recognized testing laboratory. 1342. Approval tests shall include a discharge of expellant gas rough the piping and nozzles. Observations for serious gas 'leakage and for continuity of piping with free unobstructed flow shall be made. Observations shall be made of the flow of expellant gas through all nozzles. The labeling of devices with proper desig- nations and instructions should be checked. 343. After any tests, care should be taken to see that all piping and nozzles have been blown clean, using compressed air or nitro- gen if necessary. Care also should be taken to see that the system Is properly charged and placed in the normal, "set" condition. 14. Operation and Control of Systems 141. Methods of Actuation. Systems shall be classified as manu- al or automatic in accordance with the method of actuation. 1411. A manual system is one in which human agency is re- quired for actuation, although it may have other features that are Automatic. 17-10 DRY CHE➢iICAL EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS 1412. An automatic system is one which is actuated by automatic means. Such systems shall also have a readily accessible means for manual actuation. 142. Detection of Fires. Fires or conditions likely to produce fire shall be detected by visual (human senses) or by automatic means. 1421. Visual detection only may be used with permission of the authority having jurisdiction, except in manually actuated systems where fire or conditions likely to produce fire can readily be detected • by such means. 1422. Automatic detection shall be by any listed or approved device that is capable of detecting and indicating heat, flame, smoke, combustible vapors, or an abnormal condition in the hazard, such as process trouble, that is likely to produce fire. 1423. An adequate and reliable source of energy shall be used in detection systems. 143. Operating Devices. Operating devices include expellant gas releasing mechanisms, dry chemical discharge controls, and shutdown equipment. 1431. Operation shall be by listed mechanical, electrical, or pneumatic means. An adequate and reliable source of energy shall be used. 1432. All operating devices shall be designed for the service they will encounter, and shall not be readily rendered inoperative or susceptible to accidental operation. Devices shall be normally de- signed to function properly from —40 F to + 150 F, or marked to indicate temperature limitations. 1433. All devices shall be located, installed, or suitably protected so that they are not subject to mechanical, chemical, climatic, or other conditions that would render them inoperative. 1434. The normal manual control for actuation shall be located so as to be conveniently and easily accessible at all times including the time of the fire. The control shall cause the complete system to andistribution e. All automatically operated valves controlling the release of expellant gas and dry chemical shall be provided with approved independent means for emergency manual operation. If the means for manual actuation of the system required in 1412 provides approved positive operation independent of the automatic actuation, it may be used as the emergency means. The emergency '. GENERAL INFORMATION AND REQUIREMENTS 17.11 means, preferably mechanical, shall be easily accessible and located close to the valves controlled. If possible, the system shall be de- signed so that emergency actuation can be accomplished from one locatio 1436. anuaI controls shall not require a pull of more than 40 . (force) nor a movement of more than 14 in. to secure operation. — 1437. Means shall be provided for checking the amount of ex- pellant gas to assure that it is sufficient for the proper operation of the system. 1438. All shutdown devices shall be considered integral parts of the system and shall function with the system operation. If the expellant gas is used to pneumatically operate these devices, then the gas must be taken prior to its entry into the dry chemical tank. 1439. All remote manual operating devices shall be identified as to the hazard that they protect. 144. Supervision. Supervision of automatic systems is advisable where the possible loss may be high because of any delay of actua- tion and/or where the detection or control systems are so extensive and complex that they cannot be readily checked by visual or other inspection. When supervision is provided, it should be so arranged that there will be immediate indication of failure. The extent and type of supervision shall be approved. 145. Alarms and Indicators. Alarms and/or indicators are used to indicate the operation of the system, hazard to personnel, or failure of any supervised device or equipment. The devices may be audible or visual. The type, number, and location of the devices shall be such that their purpose is satisfactorily accomplished. The extent and type of alarm and/or indicator equipment shall be approved. 1451. An alarm or indicator shall be provided to show that the system has operated, that personnel response may be needed, and that the system should be charged. 1452. Alarms should be provided to give ample positive warning of a discharge where hazard to personnel may exist. 1453. Alarms indicating failure of supervised devices or equip- ment shall give prompt and positive indication of any failure and shall be distinctive from alarms indicating operation or hazardous conditions. 17-12 DRY CHEMICAL EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS 15. Dry Chemical Supply 151. Quantity. The amount of dry chemical in the system shall be at least sufficient for the .largest single hazard protected, or for the group of hazards which are to be protected simul- taneously. 152. Quality. The dry chemical used in the system shall be supplied by the manufacturer of the equipment. The character- istics of the system are dependent upon the composition of the dry chemical, as well as upon other factors, and therefore it is im- perative to use the dry chemical provided by the manufacturer of the system. r , 133. Reserve Supply. Where a dry chemical system protects r ' multiple hazards by means of selector valves sufficient dry chemical e and expellant gas shall be kept on hand for one complete recharge <ti of the system. For single y g e hazard systems, a similar supply should be kept on hand if the importance of the hazard is such that it can- "`_ not be shut down until recharges can be procured. A fully charged ' 't'•'' `rr, reserve unit permanently connected to the system is desirable and may be required by the authority having jurisdiction. 154. Storage. The original dry chemical supplied with the system is contained in the dry chemical chamber. Storage of xq...•,•, ?� charging supplies of dry chemical shall be in a constantly dry area, and the dry chemical shall be contained in metal drums or other containers which will prevent the entrance of moisture even in small j quantities. Prior to charging the dry chemical chamber, the dryto chemical shall be carefully checked to determine that it is in free - flowing powdery condition, and the pressure or weight of the •;r}�.: •: ,.,.art expellant gas shall be checked as stipulated by the manufacturer to {;J'A determine that it is above the required minimum. ' 1541. The dry chemical tank and expellant gas assemblies shall be located near the hazard or hazards protected but not where they will be exposed to a fire or explosion in these hazards. "-COW 1542. The dry chemical tank and expellant gas assemblies shall be located so as not to be subjected to severe weather conditions "4'y:•;r°_;�� or to mechanical, chemical, or other damage. When excessive climatic or mechanical exposures are expected, suitable enclosures P P = or guards shall be provided. •' 1543. The dry chemical tank and expellant gas assemblies utiliz- ing nitrogen shall be located where the ambient temperature is normally between —40 F and 120 F. Assemblies utilizing. carbon dioxide shall be located where the ambient temperature is normally GENERAL INFORMATION AND REQUIREMENTS 17-13 between 32 F and 120 F. Exposure extremes of short duration can be tolerated. Otherwise, methods shall be provided for maintaining the temperatures within the ambient ranges given. NOTE: Systems for use at higher or. lower temperatures can be specially designed. 1544. The dry chemical tank and expellant gas assemblies shall be located where they will be easy to inspect, maintain and service. 16. Distribution System *161. Pipe and Fittings. The piping for a dry chemical system embodies distinctive features necessitated by the characteristics of the agent. Threaded pipe and fittings shall be galvanized malleable iron, galvanized steel, stainless steel, copper, or brass. Black steel pipe with welded joints may be used when the atmosphere is relatively noncorrosive. Special corrosion resistant materials should be used for corrosive atmospheres. Steel pipe shallnot be less than Schedule 40 and brass and copper pipe shall be not less than the approximate Schedule 40 wall thickness (regular pipe) for pipe sizes of 6 in. or less. 1611. Cast iron pipe and fittings shall not be used. 1612. Tubing shall not be used for dry chemical distribution. 162. Arrangement and Installation of Pipe and Fittings. Piping. shall be installed in accordance with good commercial practices. 1621. All piping shall be laid out to produce the desired dry chemical flow rate at the nozzles, and care shall be taken to avoid possible restrictions due to foreign matter and faulty fabrication and/or improper installation. 1622. The piping system shall be securely supported and shall not be subject to mechanical, chemical, or other damage. Where explosions are possible, the piping system shall be hung from sup- ports that are least likely to be displaced. 1623. Pipe shall be reamed and cleaned before assembly, and after assembly the entire piping system shall be blown out with dry gas before nozzles or discharge devices are installed. The use of pipe -thread compound or tape is not recommended. 163. Valves. All valves shall be listed for the intended use, particularly in regard to flow capacity and operation. Selector valves shall be of the quick -opening type, allowing essential free passage of the dry chemical without restriction. "See Appendix. 17-14 DRY CHEMICAL EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS 1631. Valves shall not be easily.subject to mechanical,. chemical, or other damage. 164. Discharge Nozzles. Discharge nozzles shall be listed for the use intended, in accordance with subsequent chapters. 1641. Discharge nozzles shall be of adequate strength for use with the ex ected working pressures. 1642 Discharge nozzles shall be of brass, stainless steel, or other •' , corrosion -resistant materials, or be protected inside and out against corrosion. T gy--shall be made of noncombustible materials and shall withstand the expected fire exposure without defolma Ion. 1643. Discharge nozzles shall be able to resist damage due to normal mechanical, chemical, climatic, or other conditions. 1644. Discharge nozzles shall be so connected and supported that they may not be readily put out of alignment. 1645. Discharge nozzles shall be clearly marked for identification of type and size. 1646. Where external clogging by foreign materials is likely, the listed discharge nozzle assemblies shall include protective caps. 165. Pipe Size and Nozzle Determination. Pipe sizes and nozzles shall be selected on the basis of calculations to deliver the required dry chemical flow rate at each nozzle or, for pre-engineered sys- tems, in accordance with limitations set by a nationally recognized testing laboratory. 1651. Equations, or graphs derived therefrom, shall be used to determine the pressure drop in the pipe line in engineered systems. This design information shall be based on tests performed by the manufacturer and confirmed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory. It is not required in pre-engineered systems. 17 spection, Maintenance, and Instruction 171 Inspection and Tests. At least annually, all dry chemical systems including alarms, shutdowns, and other associated equip- ment, shall be thoroughly inspected and checked for proper opera- tion by a competent inspector. Regular service contracts with the manufacturer or his authorized installing or maintenance company are recommended. 1711. The purpose of this inspection and testing shall be not #. only to ensure that the system is in full operating condition but also r. y Y y2 GENERAL INFORMATION AND REQUIREMENTS 17-15 to indicate the probable continuance of that condition until the next inspection. Attention at this inspection shall be given to any extension of the hazard protected by the system. 1712. The inspector's report, with recommendations, if any, shall be filed with the owner or with whomever is designated by the owner. 1713. Between the regular service contract inspection or tests, the system shall be inspected visually or otherwise by competent personnel, following an approved schedule. 1714. At least semiannually, all expellant gas containers shall be checked by pressure or weight against the required minimums. 1715. At least semiannually, all stored pressure dry chemical con- tainers shall be checked by pressure and weight against the required minimums. 1716. Except for stored pressure systems, at least annually the dry chemical in the system storage container shall be sampled from the top center and also near the wall to determine the existence of lumps harder than will be friable when dropped from a height of 4 in. 172. Maintenance. These systems shall be maintained in full operating condition at all times. Use, impairment, and restoration of this protection shall be reported promptly to the owner. 1721. Any troubles or impairments shall, be corrected at once by competent personnel. 173. Instruction. All persons who may be expected to inspect, test, maintain, or operate dry chemical fire extinguishing systems shall be thoroughly trained and kept thoroughly trained in the functions that they are expected to perform. 1731. Training programs shall be established that are approved. F CITY OF Eomp9©s FIRE DEPARYM([<;g APPROVED SUBJECT CHANGES INDICATED Examined By Date /a Z Approved By Jack ooper, Chief W04r�: 2 ,C X.o •. DUC.T�� t4"x id' I t�UC_i ?'1PL; 2-4 C NN i I 1 C� AS A PQLIhU CSc_. Ati70 t•`.AT ��,ZpFC .k. C0� V , �DP10N17S , W A EDMONDS FIRE DEPARTMENT The following are portions of the Fire Code relating to fire extinguishing systems (other than automatic sprinklers): 1. An installation premit is required from the Fire Department. 2. Plans bearing the stamp of the Washington Survey and Rating Bureau must be submitted prior to installation. , 1.--'3. Carbon Dioxide hood systems are not acceptable. V 4. Minimum dry chemical size shall be ten pound. ( 20-B; C ) ✓ 5.. Automatic actuation shall.,be employed by approved' means. �. At least one manual station shall be provided. r/7. Provisions for automatic fuel shut-off shall be made. 8. Substantial bracing for all system piping shall be .,provided. /9., System cylinder location shall be approved prior to V installation. V10. Trip test shall be performed in the presence of a representative from Edmonds Fire Department. The above items are not the complete regulations of fire extin- guishing systems. They are a,guide to prevent unnecessary costs due to improper 'installation and to assure minimum protection of life and property. 06 p/4 . Z 0 do 1 •- • A P P L I C A T I O N To - CITY OF EDMONDS FIRE DEPARTMENT For Permit Jack F. Cooper, Chief Fire Department Civic Center Edmonds, Washington 98020 Dear Sir: Date May 13, 1972 In conformity with the terms of the Fire Code, application is hereby made to store, use or maintain the following specific materials or processes: Addition to sprinkler system (north end building) at Parker Plaza. Approximately seven heads. 4- R M I T C X 7 1 RF-5 The materials or processes are at the following specific locations at the below address: 1M Sunset Avenue South, Edmonds Name of Firm of Company Bert Loper Plumbing DBA J & B Plumbing Address - - Street and Number 302 NW 203 Seattle LI 2-8143 Signature Title Owner IF APPLICATION IS FOR SALE OR USE OF FIREWORKS, FILL OUT REVERSE SIDE ALSO. efd 11-70 MAY 13 197Z EDMONDS FIRE DEPT. Z.