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2007.03.20 CC Agenda PacketAGENDA Edmonds City Council Meeting Council Chambers 250 5th Avenue North, Edmonds March 20, 2007 7:00 p.m. - 10:00 p.m. Call to Order and Flag Salute 1. Approval of Agenda 2• Consent Agenda Items A. Roll Call B. Approval of City Council Meeting Minutes of March 6, 2007. C. Approval of claim checks #94672 through #94851 for March 8, 2007 in the amount of $476,953.46. Approval of claim checks #94852 through #95003 for March 15, 2007 in the amount of $257,341.46. D. Acknowledge receipt of Claims for Damages from Frank Tsering Degotsang (amount undetermined), Roseann Wilson (amount undetermined), Mark and Sherri Johnson ($929.94), Richard and Kathleen Glassbum (amount undetermined), and Marilyn G. Walker ($87.04). E. Approval of list of businesses applying for renewal of their liquor licenses with the Washington State Liquor Control Board, January - March 2007. F. Report on final construction costs for the Meter A Rehabilitation Project and Council acceptance of project. G. Report on final construction costs for the 2006 Citywide Storm Improvements project and Council acceptance of project. H. Surplus of computer monitors and donation to Interconnection. I. Authorization for Public Works to Purchase one (1) new 2007 Chevrolet 2500 4x4 Suburban for the Fire Department in the amount of $34,616.21 including Washington State sales tax. 3. (15 Historical Report on Term Limits Min) 4. (10 Public Hearing regarding a Sign Code amendment to clarify language addressing community event banner Min) sites on City -owned property. 5. (45 Public Hearing on the 2007-2013 Capital Improvement Program. Min) 6. (45 Public Hearing on the proposed amendments to Edmonds Community Development Code Chapter 19.10 Min) dealing with development permit requirements for the Earth Subsidence Landslide Hazard Area of North Edmonds. The proposal includes an updated Landslide Hazard Area Map. 7. Ratify Interlocal Cooperation Agreement between Snohomish County, City of Edmonds, and Edmonds (s Min) School District #15 regarding Termination of Previously Executed Interlocal Agreement, and Ratify Interlocal Cooperation Agreement between Snohomish County and the City of Edmonds for Assistance in the Acquisition of All or Part of the Old Woodway Elementary Site. 8. Audience Comments (3 minute limit per person) AgendaQuick©2005 - 2007 Destiny Software Inc., All Rights Reserved Packet Page 1 of 433 9. (15 Report on City Council Committee Meetings. Min) 10. (5 Min) Mayor's Comments 11. (1-1 Min) Council Comments 12. Adjourn AgendaQuick©2005 - 2007 Destiny Software Inc., All Rights Reserved Packet Page 2 of 433 AM-890 Approve Minutes Edmonds City Council Meeting 2.13. Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Sandy Chase, City Clerk's Office Time: Consent Department: City Clerk's Office Type: Action Review Committee: Action: Agenda Memo Subiect Title Approval of City Council Meeting Minutes of March 6, 2007. Recommendation from Mayor and Staff It is recommended that the City Council review and approve the minutes. Previous Council Action N/A Narrative A copy of the draft March 6, 2007 City Council Minutes is attached. Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Attachments Link: 03-06-07 Draft Minutes Form Routing/Status Route Inbox Approved By Seq 1 City Clerk Sandy Chase 2 Mayor Gary Haakenson 3 Final Sandy Chase Approval Form Started By: Sandy Chase Final Approval Date: 03/16/2007 Date Status 03/15/2007 10:14 AM APRV 03/15/2007 10:24 AM APRV 03/16/2007 07:09 AM APRV Started On: 03/15/2007 09:58 AM Packet Page 3 of 433 EDMONDS CITY COUNCIL DRAFT MINUTES March 6, 2007 The Edmonds City Council meeting was called to order at 7:00 p.m. by Mayor Haakenson in the Council Chambers, 250 5 h Avenue North, Edmonds. The meeting was opened with the flag salute. ELECTED OFFICIALS PRESENT Gary Haakenson, Mayor Peggy Pritchard Olson, Council President Michael Plunkett, Councilmember Richard Marin, Councilmember Mauri Moore, Councilmember Deanna Dawson, Councilmember Dave Orvis, Councilmember Ron Wambolt, Councilmember 1. APPROVAL OF AGENDA STAFF PRESENT David Stern, Chief of Police Duane Bowman, Development Services Director Noel Miller, Public Works Director Rob Chave, Planning Manager Dave Gebert, City Engineer Scott Snyder, City Attorney Sandy Chase, City Clerk Jana Spellman, Senior Executive Council Asst. Jeannie Dines, Recorder Mayor Haakenson requested the addition of a 30 minute Executive Session regarding pending litigation as Item 8A, advising that the Council would adjourn at the conclusion of the Executive Session. COUNCILMEMBER MARIN MOVED, SECONDED BY COUNCILMEMBER DAWSON, TO APPROVE THE AGENDA AS AMENDED. MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY. 2. CONSENT AGENDA ITEMS COUNCILMEMBER MARIN MOVED, SECONDED BY COUNCILMEMBER WAMBOLT, TO APPROVE THE CONSENT AGENDA. MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY. The agenda items approved are as follows: A. ROLL CALL B. APPROVAL OF CITY COUNCIL MEETING MINUTES OF FEBRUARY 27, 2007. C. APPROVAL OF CLAIM CHECKS #94507 THROUGH #94671 FOR MARCH 1, 2007 IN THE AMOUNT OF $225,518.00. APPROVAL OF PAYROLL DIRECT DEPOSITS AND CHECKS #44567 THROUGH #44616 FOR THE PERIOD OF FEBRUARY 16 THROUGH FEBRUARY 28, 2007 IN THE AMOUNT OF $784,837.01. D. COUNCIL CONFIRMATION OF 2007 MEMBERS OF THE LODGING TAX ADVISORY COMMITTEE. E. AUTHORIZATION TO CALL FOR BIDS FOR THE 164TH STREET SW WALKWAY AND THE 74TH PLACE WEST DRAINAGE IMPROVEMENTS PROJECTS. F. AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT WITH JAMES MURPHY AUCTIONEERS TO SELL SURPLUS CITY VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT. Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 1 Packet Page 4 of 433 G. PURCHASE (1) ONE NEW CATCH BASIN CLEANER TRUCK USING WASHINGTON STATE PURCHASING CONTRACT #07005 FOR THE PUBLIC WORKS STORM WATER DIVISION. H. CONTRACT FOR ANIMAL KENNELING SERVICES WITH ADIX'S BED & BATH FOR DOGS AND CATS. I. ORDINANCE NO. 3630 AMENDING EDMONDS CITY CODE 8.51.030, COMMUTE EXEMPTION FROM THREE-HOUR PARKING LIMITS, RELATING TO THE DISPLAY OF THE EMPLOYEE PARKING PERMIT. Mayor Haakenson introduced several scouts from Troop 312 who were attending the Council meeting working on their citizenship badge. 3. PROCLAMATION IN HONOR OF PORT OF EDMONDS DAY, MARCH 7, 2007. Councilmember Wambolt, Council representative to the Port of Edmonds, read a Proclamation declaring March 7 as Port of Edmonds Day in honor of the Port's 2006 Marina of the Year Award. He presented the Proclamation to Commission President Marianne Burkhart, Commissioner Mary Lou Block and Executive Director Chris Keuss. Ms. Burkhart commented ten years ago the Port had been on the cover of Marina Dockage magazine because the marina had been destroyed by snow. A decade later, they would again be the cover story for being the best marina in the entire country. She noted they had been selected from over 12,000 marinas in the country; this honor was due to the very competent and customer -oriented staff led by Executive Director Chris Keuss. Councilmember Moore congratulated the Port Commissioners, noting that type of leadership came from the top. 4. PROJECT UPDATE AND AUTHORIZATION FOR MAYOR TO SIGN SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT NO. 6 TO THE PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AGREEMENT WITH PERTEET, INC. FOR DESIGN OF 220TH STREET SW IMPROVEMENTS (9TH AVENUE SOUTH TO 84TH AVENUE WEST) PROJECT. City Engineer Dave Gebert advised construction of the 220th Street SW project was substantially completed and the road reopened in July 2006. Since July, the contractor completed landscaping, modular rock walls, fencing, property restorations and miscellaneous details. Construction included reconstruction and widening of the road from 84th to 9th, grading to improve visibility and safety, sidewalks and bike lanes on both sides, left turn pockets at selected intersections, new traffic signals at 84th Avenue West and 9th Avenue West, lighted pedestrian crossing at 96th Avenue West. Permanent radar speed signs, landscaping behind the sidewalk at selected locations, and associated relocation and installation of utilities. Construction funding included $3.26 million in State and Federal grants, $400,000 in low -interest Public Works Trust Fund loans, and approximately $700,000 in reimbursement from funding partners including the Olympic View Water and Sewer District, Edmonds School District, and the City of Edmonds water, sewer and storm utilities. Other partners who participated through in -kind contributions included Snohomish County PUD, Puget Sound Energy, Verizon, Comcast and the U.S. Post Office. The construction contract for this project was a unit price contract. The contract was bid and awarded based upon estimated quantities for over 140 bid items, and the total final contract amount was based Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 2 Packet Page 5 of 433 upon actual final quantities of work installed at the bid unit prices. Although final project closeout actions remain to be completed, it is possible to estimate a final total project construction cost, including construction administration and engineering, right of way acquisition, public art, and miscellaneous other minor costs. As is typical in construction contracts like the 220th Street SW improvements project, Mr. Gebert explained actual quantities have varied from estimated quantities, and construction change orders have increased the cost as construction progressed. Some of the revenues into the project budget have also increased. He referred to Attachment 1, explaining the total project construction budget, including grants, loans, reimbursable amounts and other funding sources, authorized by Council in June 2005 was $5,075,650. This budget included construction contract, contingency, construction administration and engineering, public art, right of way acquisition and miscellaneous other minor costs. On November 21, 2006, the Council approved the 2006 Final Budget Amendment, including an increase in 2006 capital project expenditures in Fund 112 for this project, which increased the overall project construction budget for the 220th Street SW Improvements project to $5,689,510. Included in the revised budget were increased revenues from reimbursable partners in the project (Olympic View Water & Sewer District and Edmonds School District) to pay for change orders for requested scope increases for their elements of the project. Increased revenues include $277,011 in Traffic Impact Fees and $5,442 in sidewalk "in -lieu" payments from private development projects not included in the construction budget authorized by Council in June 2005, for a total increased revenue of $282,453. Also shown in Attachment 1, the estimated final total project construction cost is approximately $5,405,000, including construction, construction administration and engineering, right of way acquisition, public art, and miscellaneous other minor costs. Mr. Gebert reviewed the following significant items that caused the overall project construction cost to increase over the original construction budget authorized by Council in June 2005: a. Scope increase requested by reimbursable project partners. Olympic View Water and Sewer District requested a change order for the addition of a Pressure Reducing Valve Vault at the cost of $30,198, and the Edmonds School District requested paving and other playground improvements at Westgate Elementary School at a cost of $67,724. The City has been reimbursed for these costs. b. A change order was required at a cost of $29,913 to provide a left turn pocket on 9th Ave S. for vehicles turning left onto 220th Street SW. The City has been reimbursed for this cost by the design engineering consultant. c. A change order was required for additional storm drainage improvements at a cost of $41,641 to address drainage issues on abutting private properties caused by changes in the grade of 220th Street SW and which could not be identified during the design. d. The quantity of modular block walls required was underestimated by 1,902 square feet. This resulted in a cost increase of $34,227 from the bid amount of $163,260 to an actual total of $197,487. There were a number of locations where the design did not anticipate modular block walls would be required, but they were determined to be needed when grading was completed and the new road and sidewalk were constructed. e. The contract included time -and -materials bid items for property restoration, erosion control, and unforeseen site conditions with an estimated amount of $75,000 provided in the bid documents. This amount proved to be underestimated and actual cost ($169,540) exceeded the estimated amount by $94,540. Examples of work in this item included regrading of private property to Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 3 Packet Page 6 of 433 blend into new street and driveways, special driveway treatments to match existing, fence restorations, resolving underground utility conflicts, and removal of obstructions and debris not shown on plans. £ The most significant single item of cost increase ($330,695) was in traffic control. Traffic control is paid on a unit price per hour, as required by WSDOT on projects with Federal grant funds. The estimated number of traffic control hours for the contract bid amount was based upon totally closing the road to all but residents, as was our original plan. However, this proved to be impractical due to the number of drivers who continually disregarded traffic barricades, which necessitated implementation of increased and continuous traffic control to ensure safety of workers and the public. In addition, the project duration was extended by delays in Verizon relocating their lines and other excusable delays, which also necessitated increased traffic control hours. This cost increase is partly reimbursed by the project funding partners on a prorated basis. g. In January 2006, the City's Traffic Engineer, who had been the project manager for this project for the prior 4 1/2 years, resigned to take a position with the project's design engineering consultant. To maintain continuity on this major project, it was determined to be in the best interest of the City to increase the consultant's scope of services for the remainder of the project. This resulted in an unanticipated additional project management cost of approximately $140,000. This cost increase was also partly reimbursed by the project funding partners on a prorated basis. Mr. Gebert explained the project was designed by Perteet, Inc. In March 2005, Council approved Supplemental Agreement No. 3 for Perteet to provide construction administration and construction engineering support services. Subsequently, the Council approved two Supplemental Agreements. A significant portion of the additional construction administration and construction engineering support services was to increase the scope of services provided by Perteet for the remainder of the project to include the majority of the duties previously performed by the City Traffic Engineer. Mr. Gebert explained the scope of services and budget for the original contract and supplemental agreements executed to date were based on an average of 20 hours per week being spent on City project administration through August 2006, and a total of an additional 60 hours through December 2006 for project closeout. The actual amount required has been significantly more to ensure completion of all construction requirements, negotiate final quantities with the contractor, complete project documentation for the WSDOT audit, and other project closeout requirements. It is now anticipated that the remaining project closeout actions will require continued support from Perteet through approximately June 2007. Supplemental Agreement No 6 is to compensate Perteet for additional costs over that anticipated in the previous supplemental agreements as well as the estimated additional effort required through project closeout. Sufficient funds are available in the approved project budget to award this supplemental agreement. Mr. Gebert requested Council authorize the Mayor to sign Supplemental Agreement No. 6. Councilmember Moore commented because the work had been done the Council had little choice. Mr. Gebert explained the Council already approved the budget increase in November, this request was for approval of the Supplemental Agreement. Councilmember Dawson did not recall the Council being advised that the Traffic Engineer had been hired as a consultant on this project. She expressed concern with an employee leaving the City and then the City paying more for their services via a consulting firm. She requested this be a future Council discussion item. Mr. Gebert recalled it was presented to and approved by the Council. He explained City Attorney Scott Snyder and he discussed the situation as he shared her concerns. After evaluation, they were comfortable it was legal. Once it was determined to be legal, from a practical standpoint, there was little choice due to Traffic Engineer Darrell Smith's extensive involvement in the project, making it Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 4 Packet Page 7 of 433 impractical at that stage to have someone else manage the project. Councilmember Dawson referred to the additional $140,000 that would be paid to Perteet Engineering, expressing concern with a firm the City contracted with hiring one of the city's employees and then charging more. She acknowledged it was legal but did not seem quite right. Mr. Gebert commented this illustrated the value of in-house staff. Councilmember Wambolt shared Councilmember Dawson's frustration, noting it was common in private industry. Mr. Snyder commented it was legal because there were no State Statutes that prohibited civil servants from contracting with another agency for a period of time after leaving the City's employ. He noted the Council could consider such a provision. Councilmember Moore requested this topic be placed on a future agenda. Council President Olson asked whether not utilizing Mr. Smith as a consultant would have slowed the project and increased costs. Mr. Gebert remarked he would hate to think how the project would have been managed without Mr. Smith due to his 4%2 years of background and knowledge of the project. He noted it would not have been realistic for the new Traffic Engineer to take over the project management. He concluded although it was more expensive, it was the right thing to do. Councilmember Plunkett acknowledged Mr. Smith's assistance at community meetings and his institutional knowledge of the project; however, he would like to have this concept reviewed. As four Councilmembers questioned the concept, he requested it was added to the retreat agenda. COUNCILMEMBER MARIN MOVED, SECONDED BY COUNCIL PRESIDENT OLSON, TO AUTHORIZE THE MAYOR TO SIGN SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT NO. 6. MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY. 5. PUBLIC HEARING ON THE PLANNING BOARD RECOMMENDATION TO UPDATE THE EDMONDS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CODE WITH NEW DESIGN GUIDELINES AND A NEW "UP -FRONT" DESIGN REVIEW PROCESS APPLICABLE TO SPECIFIC DISTRICTS (INITIALLY LIMITED TO DOWNTOWN AND HIGHWAY 99). Planning Manager Rob Chave provided a history of this issue, explaining in 1993 the court case Anderson v. Issaquah highlighted the need for predicable design standards and a process to be followed. As the City's ordinance was similar to the ordinance addressed in that case, some revision to the City's ordinance was felt to be necessary. In 1999 the City Council commissioned a study by Cedar River Associates who addressed the general design guidelines and design process. Their conclusions emphasized the need for design guidelines that were specific enough that developers knew what was expected and for the design review to occur at the beginning. In 2000 the City hired Cascade Design to develop design guidelines. The Planning Board completed an extensive review process as well as public hearings and forwarded a recommendation with specific guidelines to the City Council. In 2002-2003, the Council reviewed the design guidelines, concluding the proposed design guidelines were too specific and referred the design guidelines to committee. The committee removed a portion related to signs and that portion was adopted in 2003. In 2004-2005, the City embarked on an extensive update of the Comprehensive Plan. During that process, design objectives were adopted. At the conclusion of the Comprehensive Plan process in 2005, the Council also had a series of discussions with urban design expert Mark Hinshaw that focused on downtown. Mr. Hinshaw provided several ideas for enhancing the City's guidelines specific to downtown. Following additional meetings with the Council, Planning Board and Architectural Design Board (ADB) in 2006, the ADB agreed an upfront design review process was appropriate. The Council Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 5 Packet Page 8 of 433 agreed and forwarded the process to the Planning Board. The Planning Board has completed its review and forwarded a recommendation to the Council for this new process. Mr. Chave displayed a diagram of the current design review process in which design review occurs late in the process. The problem with the existing process was by the time design review at the ADB occurs, the applicant has a detailed design on which they have expended a great deal of time, money and effort, making it difficult for the ADB to convince them to modify their design to any significant degree. He displayed a diagram of the proposed new design review process where design review occurs at the beginning. The new process would use a two -phased public hearing for major projects. At Phase 1 of the public hearing, the ADB reviews a checklist with the applicant to determine what aspects of the design criteria checklist needed to be addressed by the design of the project. Public input would also occur at this time. The next meeting with the ADB to review the project concept for compliance with the ADB guidelines is considered to be a continuation of the public hearing or "Phase 2" of the public hearing. Any appeal would also occur at this stage. At the completion of Phase 2, the applicant using the conceptual design proceeds with detailed design work to obtain a building permit. Staff then reviews the plans against the design review conditions established by the ADB as well as the City's codes. He anticipated this would streamline the process as the design parameters would be established upfront. The Planning Board recommendation contains the current process as the default. The same design review applies; however, the new process would be applied to districts or sections of the City as specific design code requirements, standards, etc. were adopted such as had been done for Hwy. 99 and downtown. He summarized this new process would apply initially to those two areas. He noted the new process also incorporates the new landscaping standards taken from the 2001 draft design guidelines. Mr. Chave reviewed a comparison of the current process and the proposed new process: Current process New Process General design review Section 20.11 District Based Section. 20.12 ADB and public input at the end of the process ADB and public input at the beginning of the process Guidance from criteria in 20.11.030, tweak Guidance from the ADB design guidelines and the recommended by the Planning Board to address checklist long, monotonous walls paragraph Zoning bulk standards Zoning bulk standards and applicable adopted district -based design standards Comprehensive Plan design objectives Applicable Comprehensive Plan design objective Mr. Chave summarized the existing process was retained as the default; the new process would be applied in areas where specific design standards had been developed. He pointed out the Historic Preservation Commission was in the process of developing standards that could be applied to one or more areas of the downtown, focusing on the retail core. As those were a separate process and it was uncertain when they would be complete, he recommended not delaying the establishment of the upfront process until they were completed. Those standards would supplement the existing downtown design standards. He noted ACE had also submitted some suggested design recommendations related to downtown. He suggested they be combined with the standards being developed by the Historic Preservation Commission. Councilmember Plunkett asked whether ADB review occurred at the beginning and the end of the new process. Mr. Chave referred to the diagram of the new process, identifying the ADB review at the beginning of the process where they would address the general parameters of design, making decisions Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 6 Packet Page 9 of 433 regarding what criteria were important and how they should be applied in the project. He noted the ADB's input would occur early in the design before building plans were developed. Currently much of the detail was developed before the ADB review. For Councilmember Plunkett, City Attorney Scott Snyder advised at the second phase of the public hearing the ADB would establish specific design criteria and approve the checklist. He clarified the biggest risk in the ADB review was subjective/ad hoc decisions to deny or grant projects based on someone's feeling about an applicant or the way a building looked. The decision must be based on specific design criteria. The problem with the existing process was the public often did not have an opportunity to comment until the design was "cast in stone" and their objections are often with aesthetic elements upon which specific design guidance is not provided. The intent was to allow public input to influence the design process before the building was designed. Staff approval at the end of the process was similar to a building review process; specific conditions were developed, generalized design criteria were specified and staff would have a list of 30-40 elements as well as code requirements with which to review the proposed design. The intent was to eliminate the implication/reality that decisions were made based on subjective or generalized feelings rather than criteria. Councilmember Plunkett observed the preliminary ADB hearing was for discussion and the second was the formal ADB hearing. Mr. Chave explained Phase 1 was to discuss the criteria and look generally at the site and identify what was important to address such as adjacent buildings, slopes, etc. and developing the checklist. Based on that discussion, the applicant would refine their ideas and return to the ADB at Phase 2 with one or more concepts and obtain a decision regarding the general design of the project. Any appeal would also occur at this point. Councilmember Plunkett asked whether Phase 2 was quasi judicial. Mr. Snyder answered the entire process was quasi judicial with appeal to the City Council. Councilmember Plunkett asked whether there was a firewall between the phases. Mr. Snyder explained the ADB holds a two-part hearing that is entirely quasi judicial. They would not hear an appeal of the decision as they were involved in the decision. There was still opportunity for a LUPA appeal at the end of the process to Superior Court. Councilmember Orvis asked whether the standard for commercial transparency that currently existed had been removed. Mr. Chave answered there were no standards in the code, there were only guidelines that were vague and not well defined. Guidelines provide flexibility; as long as the applicant met the intent, it was approvable. Mr. Snyder commented as design standards for the neighborhood districts were developed, there was the potential for neighborhoods to establish criteria that must be met. He used the example of where entrances were located; although of great importance on Hwy. 99 and downtown, it may be less important in a neighborhood business area. Mr. Chave recalled there was a requirement for window transparency in the BD 1 zone. Councilmember Orvis asked how that could be expanded to the Arts Corridor. Mr. Chave answered that would need to be addressed via a separate process, either by amending the BD zones or possibly via incorporating it into the standards being developed by the Historic Preservation Commission. Councilmember Marin commented the upfront design review process was not a new model; it was being used successfully by other cities. Mr. Chave agreed it was used by Seattle and the Cedar River study identified several cities utilizing the upfront process. Councilmember Moore supported developing standards by neighborhood/district as it allowed neighborhoods more control. With regard to the appeal to the Council, as the project at that point would not have detailed drawings, she asked what the Council would be reviewing. Mr. Chave answered the Council would be provided building massing, site plan, elevations, etc. but not be to the degree of detail Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 7 Packet Page 10 of 433 necessary for a building permit, they would be more conceptual. He acknowledged there was a balance — enough to know what a project looked like without requiring so much time and effort that the design was locked in. The intent was to consider major issues that people cared about such as the location of the building on the site, rooflines, entries, etc. Councilmember Moore asked if a LUPA appeal would be filed at that point. Mr. Snyder advised once the conditions were established by the ADB, the appeal would be to the Council. The preamble described how the process worked. He pointed out each property and its surroundings were unique; the design review process provided an opportunity to develop the checklist and prioritize the guidelines with regard to the building and its surroundings. The detailed design of the building would be left to the developer, thus the importance of developing specific conditions that could be applied in the second phase. Councilmember Wambolt commented the criteria still seemed very subjective; for example the criteria to address long, massive unbroken, monotonous buildings was multiple rooflines or forms, architectural detailed entries, appropriate landscaping, and windows with architectural fenestration. He asked whether the applicant could be provided input at Phase 1 regarding how to address a long, unbroken or monotonous building. Mr. Chave pointed out the statement regarding long, massive, unbroken or monotonous in Section 20.11 was in the existing process; that wording did not appear in the new upfront process. Mr. Snyder explained the applicant would present information regarding the neighborhood, lot, etc. and a general description of their design and the ADB, based on the guidelines developed by the neighborhood, would specify techniques in the conditions and the applicant would return with a more specific design for staff review. Mr. Snyder commented Anderson v. Issaquah was in regard to unconstitutional vagueness. An ordinance could be unconstitutional on its face or as applied. The City has created guidelines to provide techniques for a developer to use to address the generalized criteria. Even with that protection, an ordinance could be unconstitutionally vague as applied if the hearing body ignored detail in the guidelines and for example identified a building as monotonous without considering whether the guidelines were applied. Mayor Haakenson opened the public participation portion of the public hearing. Roger Hertrich, Edmonds, commented under the existing process, an early review was available although it was optional. He noted a developer who had built in the City for a long time may not need the early review versus a developer new to the City who may need the early review. Because the new process had more meetings and the ADB only met once a month, he anticipated the process would be slower that the existing process for a developer who was familiar with the City. He inquired whether the public had an opportunity to provide input at the Phase 1 hearing. Similar to the optional review in the existing process, he suggested holding an informal meeting with the applicant, a couple of ADB members and a member of the Historic Preservation Commission that was advertised to the public. He used the renovation of Old Milltown as an example and the question regarding the square footage of new building that determined whether SEPA was required. He asked what opportunity the public had for input once the detailed plans were submitted. He objected to staff making more decisions in the proposed process, opining that staff needed to be supervised by the public. He preferred the quasi judicial portion of the hearing remain where it was in the existing process to allow the public to analyze project details. Tony Shapiro, Edmonds, commented on the inability for government to flow with the natural sequence of the design process. He anticipated the sequence as proposed would make it very challenging to keep the natural momentum of a project under design. He stated a conceptual design to a developer may be simplistic bubble diagrams, not elevations. He found it counterproductive to have a long review sequence at the beginning of process, anticipating the end result would be mediocre architecture. He anticipated elevations would not be provided at the initial hearing. He suggested an applicant be allowed to submit Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 8 Packet Page 11 of 433 materials, meet with the ADB the following week, the ADB provide their input and the applicant incorporate the design guidelines and ADB recommendations and return with more detailed drawings at a hearing that would be advertised to the public. He was concerned with the amount of time this design review process would consume. Bob Gregg, Edmonds, expressed support for the proposed process. He referred to the letter he submitted from Dennis Reynolds, the attorney who tried the Anderson v. Issaquah case who they invited to assist them in reviewing the proposed process. He highlighted several suggested changes including eliminating the statement "long, massive, unbroken or monotonous" from Section 20.11 and addressing a conflict in wording on pages 9 and 12 — page 9 states "to comply with the input of the public and ADB" and page 12 states "adequately address the input of the ADB," stating his preference for the latter wording. On page 7 of the design guidelines, he pointed out the box and convex awning should be allowed and awnings should be allowed above or below the transom depending on the grade. On page 11 he recommended changing the sentence, "Design Review should not result in gny sigHifie reduction in actual bulk and scale." He advised the materials he submitted contained additional revisions. He summarized the two step process that invited input early in the process and using that to create the final design would serve the public well by allowing them to have input before a developer had designed a building in detail. He urged the Council to adopt the proposed new process. Don Kreiman, Edmonds, commented as a community activist, he was proud of his neighborhood; however, his neighborhood was deteriorating including an unoccupied and obsolete strip mall. He supported the proposed process because it allowed him to be part of the process at the beginning. Using a custom designed product as an example, he explained only after the specifications had been agreed to was the product designed. The proposed process would involve the architect, staff and the public at the beginning and if the public was part of the process of creating the design guidelines and reviewing proposals, they would be happy to tell developers what aspects they felt were most important. He suggested increasing the notification to more than just property owners with a 300 foot radius. Scott Schlumberger, Edmonds, agreed with the design review process upfront although he had concerns with the process as outlined. He recommended SEPA occur earlier in the process. He suggested the design guidelines provided flexibility and streamlining, noting design departures were an important part of design guidelines. He questioned the time to prepare the staff report between Phases 1 and 2, anticipating four months could elapse between the phases. He suggested consideration be given to a method to accomplish the steps more quickly such as staff making a threshold determination at the counter. He concluded longer lead times led to higher costs which affected the ability to provide affordable housing as well as developers' interest in building in Edmonds. Councilmember Moore inquired about a threshold determination. Mr. Schlumberger suggested a threshold determination could be made at the counter, noting it currently took months. He pointed out a completeness letter was required to be provided in 29 days; they submitted an application on December 7 and received a completeness letter last week. He viewed the design guidelines as a new attitude of collaboration between the building community and planning/permitting department. Rob Michel, Edmonds, suggested staff work with the development community who would be using the proposed process to ensure it worked for them and for the public. He pointed out the diagram of the proposed process did not match the text in the code and there were no timelines associated with each step. He noted there was the potential for a long time between Phase 1 and 2 as the applicant was required to submit their response to input provided at the first meeting and then staff prepared a report to the applicant and ADB. He suggested that report also be provided to the public. He suggested very tight timelines be established. He pointed out a SEPA appeal would require another hearing as could an appeal to the City Council, a total of four hearings in the proposed process. He recommended staff prepare Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 9 Packet Page 12 of 433 examples of what they expected developers to provide at each hearing, noting conceptual drawings meant different things to different people. He referred to the arduous requirement to provide a site plan that includes every significant building within a 200-foot radius, suggesting an aerial photo would be sufficient due to the difficulty in determining what was considered a significant building. He preferred the public have opportunity to review final drawings because final drawings may be different than conceptual drawings. He noted the text in the code also did not state what the developer did after the Phase 2 hearing. Finis Tupper, Edmonds, commented when the ADB was originally formed in the late 70s, it was an aesthetics board whose goal was high quality development in Edmonds. He expressed concern with the proposed process, pointing out the detailed plans were never presented to the public. He referred to a recent contract rezone for a single family lot in the BC zone that included specific requirements, commenting none of the specific conditions of the contract rezone were met in the final development. He acknowledged the public's ability to file a LUPA appeal, yet once the hole was dug and the building extended 15 feet into the single family zone, the public had no recourse. He acknowledged this may be an issue for the State Legislature. He provided another example of a contract rezone for a PRD that reduced lot sizes from 12,000 square feet to 8,000 square feet. Although the materials repeatedly stated 24 houses would be built, 4 additional houses were allowed. He expressed concern about the public not seeing the details. Hearing no further public comment, Mayor Haakenson closed the public hearing. In response to Mr. Hertrich's comment regarding the optional preliminary review, Mr. Chave explained it was extremely rare for a developer to request a preliminary review. That preliminary review tends to occur with major projects that have the most architects and engineers involved because they realized it was to their advantage to get as much input as possible before beginning their design. Staff tends not to get requests for preliminary review for projects done by smaller developers who may feel they cannot afford the time for that review. With regard to the comment about SEPA thresholds, Mr. Chave explained the SEPA determination must be made before the ADB's decision so that the developer and public knew early on whether SEPA applied. If a project were to be reviewed by the ADB based on false information that SEPA did not apply, the applicant would risk starting over when he learned SEPA was required. With regard to Mr. Shapiro's comments regarding design sequence and flow, Mr. Chave explained the intent was for the design review to occur very early in the process at the conceptual stage. Although the proposed process required the developer to get involved with the City much earlier than they had before, the intent was to fit into the design process versus having it back loaded. With regard to comments about elevations, Mr. Chave referred to packet page 13 which contained a short list of what an applicant needed to do for Phase 1. Although an elevation was mentioned as one of the items, it only needed to depict the volume of the proposed structure in relation to the surrounding buildings and improvements — it was not a detailed elevation. He compared this to the language on the next page, the elevations for Phase 2 portion of the hearing which required elevations for all building faces illustrating building massing and openings, materials and colors, and roof forms. The more detailed elevations were provided in the second phase. With regard to Mr. Gregg's suggestions, Mr. Chave commented they could be reviewed along with the language to be developed by the City Attorney. With regard to Mr. Kreiman's suggestion to increase the 300-foot notice, Mr. Chave pointed out in addition to the 300-foot notice, notice was published in the newspaper as well as posted in several locations. Residents could also inform others in their neighborhood who were beyond the 300-foot radius. Extending the notice requirement would have a significant impact on the City's budget as the City bore the cost of mailings. Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 10 Packet Page 13 of 433 Mr. Chave agreed with Mr. Schlumberger's comment about providing more flexibility via the ADB design guidelines. He agreed the SEPA determination needed to be done early but disagreed it could be done at the counter as there were mailing requirements based on the determination, etc. With regard to Mr. Schlumberger's suggestion about design departures, Mr. Chave recalled the Cedar River study suggested the City consider design departures which had been successfully used in Seattle. He noted design departures could work with an upfront design guidelines process but would be more problematic with standards. He suggested after the City had some experience with this process, consideration be given to design departures. With regard to Mr. Michel's comments about the diagram versus the text, he explained the intent was to have the two be consistent. He agreed with Mr. Michel's suggestion to mail the report to the public, noting although the code did not currently require it, that was staff s practice. With regard to Mr. Michel's concern with it being an open-ended process, Mr. Chave explained Regulatory Reform dictated a 120 day timeline within which the City was required to reach a decision. The biggest determinant of the amount of time between the Phase 1 and Phase 2 hearing was how long the applicant took to develop a design for ADB consideration. In response to Mr. Tupper's comment on the need for detail, Mr. Chave remarked on the conundrum of how much detail to require versus how much influence the ADB and public could have on the design before the details were developed. The only way detail worked was with the ADB at the end of the process such as in the current process which was counter to the intent of the proposed new process. COUNCILMEMBER MOORE MOVED, SECONDED BY COUNCILMEMBER MARIN, TO EXTEND DISCUSSION OF THIS ITEM FOR 20 MINUTES. MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY. Mayor Haakenson referred to the comment that the ADB met only once a month but had previously met twice a month and the suggestion that a smaller group of ADB members conduct the first review. Mr. Chave stated historically the ADB met twice a month and that could be considered again. The risk with a subcommittee of the ADB was there were different perspectives and different fields of expertise among ADB members. He offered to inquire about the ADB's availability for two meetings a month. Mr. Snyder agreed with providing written notice of final plans to the public. He urged caution regarding expectations, explaining the reason the upfront design process was proposed was to allow developers to get specific direction before developing final designs. Therefore the conceptual drawings may differ from the final design if all the specific conditions of approval are met. He clarified it was not design by committee or the public designing a building, it was about the developer meeting specific conditions established from existing guidelines and codes with the input of the public and ADB. It was also not whether someone liked or did not like a building; marketability was the developer's right/risk. With regard to Mr. Tupper's comment about how design review was conducted in the 70s and 80s, that process was no longer available. Councilmember Marin commented there did not seem to be much debate about the design guidelines themselves, the concerns were with the upfront process. If the Council approved the Planning Board's recommendation and directed the City Attorney to prepare an ordinance, it could be scheduled as a discussion item on the Council agenda in two weeks. He suggested in the meantime, if there were funds available, hiring a consultant to update the Cedar River study particularly what cities were successfully utilizing the upfront process. He suggested staff could then contact those cities with regard to specifics on how the process was working. He was also concerned with the amount of time that would elapse between the first meeting and the second meeting. He asked if these efforts could be accomplished in the next two weeks. Mr. Chave answered not by hiring a consultant due to the time that required; staff could attempt Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 11 Packet Page 14 of 433 to contact some of the cities. He pointed out another city's process would not exactly mirror the proposed process. Councilmember Marin wanted assurance the proposed process would not extend into four months and that the two-step process could occur fairly quickly. Mr. Chave reiterated it would depend primarily on the applicant. He pointed out the current ADB process was also governed by the 120 day requirement. He acknowledged the design review would be earlier but did not anticipate the new process would take more time than the current process and actually should be shorter. Councilmember Marin commented although he liked the proposed process, he wanted assurance regarding how it worked in other cities. Mr. Chave agreed staff could do some investigation. Councilmember Plunkett asked how design departures would be integrated. Mr. Chave suggested gaining some experience with the process as proposed to determine whether it provided enough flexibility and revisit it after a year. He commented design departures were not easy to craft as parameters were required with regard to when they were appropriate, on which aspect of the design would they be allowed, etc. Councilmember Plunkett referred to Mr. Chave's comment that the issues outlined in Mr. Gregg's email could be addressed by Mr. Snyder, observing most appeared to be policy issues. Mr. Chave advised he did not have Mr. Gregg's written comments; his response was to Mr. Gregg's verbal comments. He offered to have staff address in writing at the time an ordinance was presented the other issues Mr. Gregg raised. With regard to box awnings, he recalled discussions with Mark Hinshaw related to downtown commercial that indicated the ends of box awnings obstructed the view of hanging signs. Councilmember Plunkett asked staff to comment on the 4-page letter from Davis Wright Tremaine. Mr. Snyder answered much of it was chapter and verse of what had been said before. There were some comments regarding the ACE comments that may require Council consideration. He clarified the adopted design guidelines were intended to be a way of explicating the generalized code requirements. David Wright Tremaine was suggesting they be specifically referenced. With regard to design departures, Mr. Snyder explained there were two kinds of design departures — variances and incentives. The intent was very specific design guidelines and requirements; if a design departure was not to do something that was required, that would constitute a variance. If the departure was to substitute something for another requirement or an incentive, the best place to develop those was via the neighborhood process. Councilmember Dawson agreed with Councilmember Marin's suggestion with regard to additional information regarding the timeline. She asked if staff believed the proposed process would take the same amount of time as the existing process. Mr. Chave answered the proposed process should be quicker, due in part to the checklist the ADB developed. Another thing that would speed up the process was it dealt with conceptual issues rather than specific drawings. Councilmember Dawson anticipated concern by developers with a project that would sail through the old process but now must contend with the new process. Mr. Chave stated the maximum time under the existing process and new process was 120 days. Councilmember Dawson was concerned with the two-phase process taking longer and suggested establishing a reasonable amount of time for staff s review. Mr. Chave offered to provide a more detailed diagram comparing the existing process versus the new process. Councilmember Dawson referred to the comment about what materials they would provide at each phase, suggesting staff develop examples. Councilmember Dawson asked if providing the final report to all parties of record was required by the code. Mr. Chave answered that was staff's current practice but it was not required. Councilmember Dawson commented it would be appropriate to include it in the code. Mr. Snyder suggested notice be in Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 12 Packet Page 15 of 433 the form of an offer to view the plans at City Hall as copying drawings for a large project may be quite burdensome. Councilmember Dawson agreed, asking whether there was an opportunity for the public to provide comment. Mr. Chave advised the public could always make comments; he was hesitant to codify that to avoid the impression it was a formal comment period. Councilmember Dawson asked whether there was the ability to have a formal comment period. Mr. Snyder cautioned against anything that looked like multiple hearings on the same project. Development Services Director Duane Bowman explained typically a building permit application went through multiple reviews — an initial review, review of comments and final review. He suggested if information was to be provided to the public, applicants could be required to submit electronic drawings of the building exterior elevations at the time of building permit that could be viewed online. He advised the public could also view the plans at City Hall; however, they may not always be readily available as they were being reviewed by staff. He cautioned against another de facto public hearing. Councilmember Wambolt echoed the concern that the public would not see the detailed design at the public hearing. This was a concern to citizens because under the existing process, the public hearing was held after the detailed design was created, yet many buildings when constructed did not look like the plans. The public wanted to know that what they saw was really what was built. Mr. Chave responded the most practical solution was the additional notice when final plans were available. He commented if the Council increased the notice requirement, staff would return with a request to increase the fee. Mr. Snyder commented the electronic drawings should include a link to the ADB's decision so that the public could identify which of the ADB's conditions were not met. COUNCILMEMBER MOORE MOVED, SECONDED BY COUNCILMEMBER MARIN, TO EXTEND DISCUSSION OF THIS ITEM FOR 20 MINUTES. MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY. Councilmember Moore expressed interest in considering design departures in 6-12 months. Mr. Chave suggested 12 months. Councilmember Moore agreed with the suggestion to research other cities' experience with the upfront process. Councilmember Marin stated the proposed recommended action was to approve the Planning Board recommendation and direct the City Attorney to prepare an ordinance for Council adoption. He was interested in moving the process forward, acknowledging there were some questions remaining. He asked if the Council could provisionally approve the Planning Board recommendation and direct the City Attorney to prepare an ordinance for further Council discussion and adoption. Mr. Snyder advised allowing two weeks for him to prepare the ordinance would also allow staff the time needed to respond to Council questions/requests. The ordinance could then be scheduled on the agenda for further discussion. Councilmember Plunkett suggested keeping the public hearing open to allow the public another opportunity to comment once the additional information was provided. COUNCILMEMBER MARIN MOVED, SECONDED BY COUNCILMEMBER MOORE, TO PROVISIONALLY APPROVE THE PLANNING BOARD RECOMMENDATION AND DIRECT THE CITY ATTORNEY TO PREPARE AN ORDINANCE FOR FURTHER COUNCIL DISCUSSION AND ADOPTION AND CONTINUE THE PUBLIC HEARING. Councilmember Moore asked whether members of the public who spoke during the public hearing could be invited to provide further comment. Mr. Snyder advised the public hearing had been closed. The public hearing could be reopened or a new public hearing scheduled. Councilmember Dawson suggested scheduling another public hearing which would allow the public to comment on the information that would be provided by staff. She expressed her support for the motion inasmuch as it required staff provide further information. Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 13 Packet Page 16 of 433 Council President Olson suggested scheduling the ordinance on the April 3 agenda as the March 20 agenda was already full and the animal control ordinance was scheduled on the March 27 agenda. Councilmember Moore requested Mr. Snyder also address the inconsistency in the wording. Councilmember Plunkett expressed concern with the provisional approval as he was uncertain whether he would ultimately support the ordinance. His intent was to move it forward for further discussion. MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY. 6. AUDIENCE COMMENTS Don Kreiman, Edmonds, Chair of the Citizen Transportation Advisory Committee, explained the mission of the Committee was to educate their neighbors about transportation issues. He invited the public to take the bus to the Sound Transit open house at the Lynnwood Convention Center on March 15 from 4:30 — 7:30 p.m. As he began to describe Sound Transit's proposal, Mr. Snyder advised the Council adopted a procedure that prevented comment on a ballot measure. Mr. Kreiman advised buses to the open house would leave the Edmonds library at 3:56 (accompanied by Councilmember Marin, who also serves as Sound Transit and Community Transit Boardmember) and 4:26 p.m. (accompanied by Hank Moravec, Citizen Transportation Committee Member) Parking was available at the City's municipal lot, the library, or near City Hall. The bus fare is $1.25 for adults and $0.50 for seniors and riders must have exact change. For further information, he invited the public to contact Mr. Moravec at 425-771-2751. Ray Martin, Edmonds, commented overlapping responsibilities between departments resulted in poor organization and poor results. He explained animals were addressed in Chapter 17 - Code Enforcement as well as in Chapter 5 - Public Safety. He recommended combining the responsibility in one department, preferably a separate animal department under the Police Chief. He described a complaint he filed with code enforcement regarding 25 quail being raised in a residential neighborhood. The Code Enforcement Officer referred his complaint to Police Chief Stern who referred it to the Animal Control Officer. His most recent request was answered by Chief Stern stating there was no violation of Chapter 5.05 as quail were not poultry or domestic animals and the correct definition would seem to be wild animals, technically upland game birds. The limit of five animals referred to domestic animals but his complaint would be referred to Code Enforcement as they enforced Chapter 17. Chief Stern advised should there be a violation of Chapter 5.05 staff would take appropriate action. Mr. Martin responded if quail were wild birds, then Chapter 5.05.131, which prevented a person from owning a wild animal, had been violated and he requested the City take appropriate action. Roger Hertrich, Edmonds, referred to Supplemental Agreement No. 6 with regard to the 2201h Street SW improvements project, suggesting the Council review the numbers again. He found the numbers astounding as well as the practice of paying an employee who left the City's employ more via a consultant contract. The overruns on the project were due to the Traffic Engineer as well as inflation due to the delay in Verizon moving their poles. He suggested many of the cost increases could have been anticipated, particularly with the delay. He also questioned the amount of City engineering time that had been expended on this project in addition to the outside engineering. He summarized the significant increases warranted further discussion as well as criticism regarding how the contract was handled. 7. MAYOR'S COMMENTS Mayor Haakenson reported Parks & Recreation Director Brian McIntosh, Councilmember Dawson and he accepted a check from Snohomish County Executive Aaron Reardon today for $1.2 million for the park in South Edmonds. Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 14 Packet Page 17 of 433 Mayor Haakenson invited the public to his neighborhood meeting at Meadowdale Elementary School Library on Thursday, March 8. 8. COUNCIL COMMENTS Councilmember Moore pointed out Councilmember Marin was in a photograph in the Seattle Times today regarding a Sound Transit ribbon cutting. Councilmember Moore recalled she was shocked when the Council was asked to approve the cost overruns on the 2001h Street SW project. She remarked there appeared to be shockingly bad estimates. She noted the cost overruns were due to administration's lack of management on the project. However, the budget had been approved and the lesson learned was assuming someone was irreplaceable. Councilmember Moore urged Mayor Haakenson and Mr. McIntosh to get the citizens in south Edmonds involved in providing input early in the process of developing the park. She noted this park was very important to the citizens in that area and they likely had done a great deal of visioning and would like to be involved in the planning at the beginning. Councilmember Moore noted Council Comments was the only forum for the Council to present new ideas. She suggested consideration be given to term limits for the Mayor. Her discussions with previous Councilmembers and historians indicated term limits had been in place in the past but have been removed. She suggested consideration be given to term limits for the following reasons: Mayor Haakenson has said there is no one who can run the City except him which she found humorous as well as dangerous. She noted the Traffic Engineer was an example of what happened when only one person could do a job. If there was only one person qualified to be Mayor, she recommended developing leadership by getting more people on the Council and Boards/Commissions. She noted term limits leveled the playing field as most Mayors were former City Councilmembers. In the case of most cities in Washington, four of the seven Councilmembers could not run for Mayor without giving up their Council seats as they were on the same cycle as the Mayor. The playing field was leveled if there was not an incumbent. She relayed the advice of City Attorney Scott Snyder that term limits were illegal. She cited information provided by Municipal Research via a 2001 memo that term limits were legal, referenced term limits in other Washington cities, and an Attorney General ruling. She requested some research be done on the issue of term limits for the Mayor. Councilmember Moore also suggested citizens consider a City Manager form of government, noting she was not certain she was in favor of this. She noted most younger cities had a City Manager form of government. She explained with a City Manager form of government, there was a better chance of a hiring a professional administrator versus an elected Mayor who may lack management skills and a City Manager was answerable to a board who could terminate his/her employment. Under a City Manager form of government, the Council would elect a Mayor from the Councilmembers. She noted Mountlake Terrace had a City Manager form of government that appeared to work well. She recognized a change in the City's form of government would require a public vote. Councilmember Moore invited any citizen who wanted a change made to the minutes to contact a Councilmember rather than staff. Councilmember Marin complimented the Citizens Transportation Advisory Committee on the initiative to invite the public to take the bus to the Sound Transit open house on March 15 at the Lynnwood Convention Center. He noted he may be on the second bus. Councilmember Marin reported he attended the dedication of the new light rail operations and maintenance facility on Monday west of the former Rainier Brewery. He explained the 8-foot R on the Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 15 Packet Page 18 of 433 old brewery had been refurbished and a neon company built the letters AIL and the letters RAIL were mounted on the side of the maintenance and operations building. He noted one of the advantages of being the last large regional area without light rail was the ability to take advantage of lessons learned in systems built over the last 30 years. He noted the maintenance and operation facility was miles ahead of any facility built in the last 30 years. Councilmember Wambolt agreed with Councilmember Moore's suggestion regarding term limits for the Mayor, finding 8 years to be adequate for anyone to serve. He acknowledged there may not be anyone willing to challenge the current Mayor but if he did not run, there likely would be other candidates. He did not know enough about the City Manager form of government but the rationale described by Councilmember Moore sounded logical, having a professional person run the City. He agreed this may be something the citizens wanted to consider. 8A. At 9:51 p.m., Mayor Haakenson recessed the Council to a 30 minute Executive Session regarding pending litigation. 9. ADJOURN The Council meeting was adjourned at the conclusion of the Executive Session (10:10 p.m.) Edmonds City Council Draft Minutes March 6, 2007 Page 16 Packet Page 19 of 433 AM-891 Approval of Claim Checks Edmonds City Council Meeting Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Debbie Karber, Administrative Services Submitted For: Dan Clements Time: Consent Department: Administrative Services Type: Action Review Committee: Action: Approved for Consent Agenda Agenda Memo Subiect Title Approval of claim checks #94672 through #94851 for March 8, 2007 in the amount of $476,953.46. Approval of claim checks #94852 through #95003 for March 15, 2007 in the amount of $257,341.46. Recommendation from Mayor and Staff Approval of claim checks. Previous Council Action N/A 2.C. Narrative In accordance with the State statutes, City payments must be approved by the City Council. Ordinance #2896 delegates this approval to the Council President who reviews and recommends either approval or non -approval of expenditures. Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Fiscal Year: Revenue: Expenditure: $ 734,294.92 Fiscal Impact: Claims: $ 734,294.92 Attachments Link: Claim cks 3-8-07 Link: Claim cks 3-15-07 Form Routing/Status Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 Admin Services Kathleen Junglov 03/15/2007 10:21 AM APRV 2 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/15/2007 11:46 AM APRV 3 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/15/2007 06:01 PM APRV 4 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/16/2007 07:09 AM APRV Form Started By: Debbie Karber Started On: 03/15/2007 10:09 AM Final Approval Date: 03/16/2007 Packet Page 20 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 1 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94672 3/5/2007 029900 DEPT OF RETIREMENT SYSTEMS February 2007 FEBRUARY 2007 DRS February 2007 DRS 811.000.000.231.540.000.00 168,109.34 Total : 168,109.34 94673 3/8/2007 062614 ABPA A7292 NATIONAL DUES - L MC MURPHY- NATIONAL DUES - L MC MURPHY- 411.000.654.534.800.490.00 50.00 CHAPTER SRC4 - LOCAL DUES 411.000.654.534.800.490.00 20.00 Total : 70.00 94674 3/8/2007 061029 ABSOLUTE GRAPHIX 0307241 BASKETBALL T-SHIRTS BASKETBALL T-SHIRTS 001.000.640.575.520.310.00 187.74 Sales Tax 001.000.640.575.520.310.00 16.71 0307242 VOLLEYBALL T-SHIRTS VOLLEYBALL T-SHIRTS 001.000.640.575.520.310.00 312.84 Sales Tax 001.000.640.575.520.310.00 27.84 Total : 545.13 94675 3/8/2007 069876 ACCIS 2007 Membership WATERS & DANNINGER 2007 Organization Membership Dues 001.000.310.518.880.490.00 75.00 Total : 75.00 94676 3/8/2007 069634 ACCURINT - ACCT 1201641 1201641-20070228 INV#1201641-20070228 EDMONDS SEARCHES/REPORTS 02/07 001.000.410.521.210.410.00 54.25 Total : 54.25 94677 3/8/2007 071177 ADVANTAGE BUILDING SERVICES 07-48 JANITORIAL SERVICE Page: 1 Packet Page 21 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 2 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94677 3/8/2007 071177 ADVANTAGE BUILDING SERVICES (Continued) JANITORIAL SERVICE 411.000.656.538.800.410.23 334.00 Total : 334.00 94678 3/8/2007 001057 ALMY, DON ALMY0313 VOLLEYBALL LEAGUE SUPERVISI( VOLLEYBALL LEAGUE SUPERVISI( 001.000.640.575.520.410.00 864.00 Total : 864.00 94679 3/8/2007 069829 AMIDO, BENJAMIM AMIDO7980 UKULELE CLASSES UKULELE #7980 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 392.00 Total : 392.00 94680 3/8/2007 069751 ARAMARK 512-3828093 UNIFORM SERVICES PARK MAINTENANCE UNIFORM SE 001.000.640.576.800.240.00 35.46 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.240.00 3.16 Total : 38.62 94681 3/8/2007 069751 ARAMARK 512-3823126 18386001 UNIFORMS 411.000.656.538.800.240.00 85.18 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.240.00 7.58 512-3828095 18386001 UNIFORMS 411.000.656.538.800.240.00 85.18 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.240.00 7.58 Total : 185.52 94682 3/8/2007 069751 ARAMARK 512-3826478 FLEET UNIFORM SVC Page: 2 Packet Page 22 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 3 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor 94682 3/8/2007 069751 ARAMARK Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount (Continued) FLEET UNIFORM SVC 511.000.657.548.680.240.00 17.40 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.240.00 1.55 512-3826479 PW MATS PW MATS 001.000.650.519.910.410.00 1.38 PW MATS 111.000.653.542.900.410.00 5.24 PW MATS 411.000.654.534.800.410.00 5.24 PW MATS 411.000.655.535.800.410.00 5.24 PW MATS 511.000.657.548.680.410.00 5.26 Sales Tax 001.000.650.519.910.410.00 0.12 PW MATS 411.000.652.542.900.410.00 5.24 WATER UNIFORM SVC 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 8.00 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.410.00 0.47 Sales Tax 111.000.653.542.900.410.00 0.47 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.410.00 0.47 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.410.00 0.47 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.410.00 0.47 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 0.70 Page: 3 Packet Page 23 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 4 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94682 3/8/2007 069751 ARAMARK (Continued) 512-3826480 STREET/STORM UNIFORM SVC STREET/STORM UNIFORM SVC 411.000.652.542.900.240.00 3.24 STREET/STORM UNIFORM SVC 111.000.653.542.900.240.00 3.24 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.240.00 0.29 Sales Tax 111.000.653.542.900.240.00 0.29 512-3828094 FAC MAINT UNIFORM SVC FAC MAINT UNIFORM SVC 001.000.651.519.920.240.00 33.69 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.240.00 3.00 Total : 101.47 94683 3/8/2007 071124 ASSOCIATED PETROLEUM 555437 75179 DIESEL FUEL 411.000.656.538.800.320.00 2,063.20 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.320.00 165.06 Total : 2,228.26 94684 3/8/2007 064343 AT&T 425-771-1124 PARKS MAINT. BLDG PARKS MAINT. BLDG 001.000.651.519.920.420.00 25.73 425-771-4741 CEMETERY CEMETERY 130.000.640.536.200.420.00 25.73 Total : 51.46 94685 3/8/2007 001801 AUTOMATIC WILBERT VAULT CO 06-3012 & 06-3014 BURIAL SUPPLIES Page: 4 Packet Page 24 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 5 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94685 3/8/2007 001801 AUTOMATIC WILBERT VAULT CO (Continued) BURIAL SUPPLIES: GIDNER 130.000.640.536.200.340.00 358.00 BURIAL SUPPLIES: THORNTON 130.000.640.536.200.340.00 358.00 Total : 716.00 94686 3/8/2007 070992 BANC OF AMERICA LEASING 9465975 Canon 5870 copier lease 4/1 - 4/30/0 Canon 5870 copier lease 4/1 - 4/30/0 001.000.610.519.700.450.00 101.35 Canon 5870 copier lease 4/1 - 4/30/0 001.000.220.516.100.450.00 101.32 Canon 5870 copier lease 4/1 - 4/30/0 001.000.210.513.100.450.00 101.33 Canon 5870 copier supply charge 4/1 001.000.610.519.700.450.00 25.01 Canon 5870 copier supply charge 4/1 001.000.220.516.100.450.00 25.00 Canon 5870 copier supply charge 4/1 001.000.210.513.100.450.00 24.99 Sales Tax 001.000.610.519.700.450.00 11.25 Sales Tax 001.000.220.516.100.450.00 11.25 Sales Tax 001.000.210.513.100.450.00 11.25 Total : 412.75 94687 3/8/2007 068032 BLANCH, ANN BLANCH7619 TAIJIQUAN CLASSES TAIJIQUAN #7619 001.000.640.575.540.410.00 144.00 Total : 144.00 94688 3/8/2007 002500 BLUMENTHAL UNIFORM CO INC 539679 INV#539679 EDMONDS PD - COMIV Page: 5 Packet Page 25 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 6 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94688 3/8/2007 002500 BLUMENTHAL UNIFORM CO INC (Continued) COMMENDATION BAR 001.000.410.521.220.240.00 11.40 King County Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.220.240.00 1.00 Total : 12.40 94689 3/8/2007 071527 BRAND, KURT 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94690 3/8/2007 067947 BROWNELLS INC 04280715.00 INV#04280715.00 ACCT#00557761 1 3/32 FIGURE STAMP SET 001.000.410.521.400.310.00 19.12 1/16 SINGLE LETTER STAMP "I" 001.000.410.521.400.310.00 2.22 Freight 001.000.410.521.400.310.00 9.25 Total : 30.59 94691 3/8/2007 071510 BUCK, ALICIA BUCK7645 KIDZART KIDZART SQUIGGLES TO GRINS- 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 202.80 Total : 202.80 94692 3/8/2007 071528 BURROWS, DALE 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94693 3/8/2007 071529 BURY, KAREN 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94694 3/8/2007 071530 BUTLER, JULIE 20907 JURY FEE Page: 6 Packet Page 26 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 7 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94694 3/8/2007 071530 BUTLER, JULIE (Continued) JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94695 3/8/2007 003510 CENTRAL WELDING SUPPLY LY 104048 SUPPLIES OXYGEN, ETC. 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 29.73 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 2.65 Total : 32.38 94696 3/8/2007 003510 CENTRAL WELDING SUPPLY LY100835 ALS SUPPLIES medical oxygen 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 26.79 Sales Tax 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 2.38 LY104017 ALS SUPPLIES medical oxygen 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 19.23 Freight 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 13.50 Sales Tax 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 2.91 LY104018 ALS SUPPLIES medical oxygen 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 28.84 Freight 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 13.50 Sales Tax 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 3.76 RN02071014 ALS SUPPLIES medical oxygen 001.000.510.526.100.450.00 15.50 Sales Tax 001.000.510.526.100.450.00 1.38 Page: 7 Packet Page 27 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 8 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94696 3/8/2007 003510 003510 CENTRAL WELDING SUPPLY (Continued) Total : 127.79 94697 3/8/2007 064840 CHAPUT, KAREN E CHAPUT7701 CHILDREN'S CLASSES MARCH MORNING OUT #7701 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 44.80 FRIDAY NIGHT OUT #7656 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 130.20 Total : 175.00 94698 3/8/2007 071305 CHIEF 496728 INV#496728 CUST#235024 EDMON NIK "Q" TEST KITS 001.000.410.521.910.310.00 68.97 NIK "K" TEST KITS 001.000.410.521.910.310.00 17.99 Total : 86.96 94699 3/8/2007 066382 CINTAS CORPORATION 460573200 OPS UNIFORMS Stn 17 - ALS 001.000.510.526.100.240.00 101.09 Stn 17 - Ops 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 101.09 Sales Tax 001.000.510.526.100.240.00 9.00 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 8.99 460573223 OPS UNIFORMS Stn. 20 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 123.97 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 11.03 Total : 355.17 94700 3/8/2007 019215 CITY OF LYNNWOOD FALK 80/HOUR BASIC POLICE MC COUR FALK/REGISTRATION- 001.000.410.521.400.490.00 150.00 Total : 150.00 Page: 8 Packet Page 28 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 9 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94701 3/8/2007 004095 COASTWIDE LABORATORIES E1755554 005302 TISSUE/PAPER TOWELS/TP 411.000.656.538.800.310.23 218.03 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.23 19.19 Total : 237.22 94702 3/8/2007 068077 CODES KNOWLEDGE COMPANY 446 PROFESSIONAL SERVICES FOR P PROFESSIONAL SERVICES FOR P 001.000.620.524.100.410.00 1,838.00 447 BLD20061240/CALIAS APT. BLDGA BLD20061240/CALIAS APT. BLDGA 001.000.620.524.100.410.00 902.00 Total : 2,740.00 94703 3/8/2007 062975 COLLISION CLINIC INC RO 006741 UNIT 233 - BODY REPAIR & SUPPL UNIT 233 - BODY REPAIR & SUPPL 511.000.657.548.680.480.00 977.90 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.480.00 87.03 RO 006614 UNIT 720 - BODY REPAIR& SUPPLI UNIT 720 - BODY REPAIR& SUPPLI 511.000.657.548.680.480.00 3,194.03 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.480.00 284.27 Total : 4,543.23 94704 3/8/2007 066368 CRYSTAL AND SIERRA SPRINGS 020729897715374044 INV#020729897715374044 EDMONI 15 - 5 GALLON WATER BOTTLES 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 112.35 HOT/COLD COOLER RENTAL 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 10.00 Freight 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 1.91 Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 0.89 Page: 9 Packet Page 29 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 10 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94704 3/8/2007 066368 066368 CRYSTAL AND SIERRA SPRINGS (Continued) Total : 125.15 94705 3/8/2007 071552 CUBBAGE, NANCY CUBBAGE7932 MOSAIC MIRROR CLASS STAINED GLASS MOSAIC MIRROR 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 146.25 Total : 146.25 94706 3/8/2007 071267 DENNIS R CRAIG CONST INC E5AC.Final Pmt E5AC.Final Progress Payment E5AC.Final Progress Payment 112.200.630.595.330.650.00 29,779.79 Total : 29,779.79 94707 3/8/2007 047450 DEPT OF INFORMATION SERVICES 2007020133 CUSTOMER ID# D200-0 Scan Services for February, 2007 001.000.390.528.800.420.00 311.45 1135634 ACROBAT 8.0 PROFESSIONAL WIP 330-00330 Acrobat 8.0 Professional Windows UI 001.000.410.521.100.490.00 171.11 Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.100.490.00 12.41 Sales Tax 001.000.310.518.880.490.00 1.28 Total : 496.25 94708 3/8/2007 063064 DEZURIK WATER CONTROLS RPI/53000961 843968 C-161 SCREENING SYSTEM IMPRC 414.000.656.594.320.650.00 1,052.00 Total : 1,052.00 94709 3/8/2007 064531 DINES, JEANNIE 07-2728 MINUTE TAKING 2/27/07 Council Minutes 001.000.250.514.300.410.00 221.20 Total : 221.20 94710 3/8/2007 068591 DOUBLEDAY, MICHAEL Feb 2007 LOBBYING SERVICES FOR FEBRU Lobbying for February 2007 001.000.610.519.700.410.00 4,135.00 Page: 10 Packet Page 30 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 11 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94710 3/8/2007 068591 068591 DOUBLEDAY, MICHAEL (Continued) Total : 4,135.00 94711 3/8/2007 069605 EAGLE EYE CONSULTING ENGINEERS 2007169 PROFESSIONAL SERVICES - BLDC PROFESSIONAL SERVICES - BLDC 001.000.620.524.100.410.00 5,098.65 Total : 5,098.65 94712 3/8/2007 007675 EDMONDS AUTO PARTS 76998 SUPPLIES UNDERCOAT, ETC. 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 40.72 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 3.62 Total : 44.34 94713 3/8/2007 070683 EDMONDS MAIL & PARCEL 9711 UPS/AM TEST UPS/AM TEST 411.000.656.538.800.420.00 8.47 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.420.00 0.75 Total : 9.22 94714 3/8/2007 008688 EDMONDS VETERINARY HOSPITAL 150876 INV#150876 CLIENT#308 EDMOND: SYNOVI G3 SOFT CHEWS 001.000.410.521.260.410.00 70.00 Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.260.410.00 6.23 Total : 76.23 94715 3/8/2007 008705 EDMONDS WATER DIVISION 7-05275 EDMONDS CEMETERY EDMONDS CEMETERY 130.000.640.536.500.470.00 109.97 Total : 109.97 94716 3/8/2007 008812 ELECTRONIC BUSINESS MACHINES 023038 ADMIN REPAIR/MAINT Page: 11 Packet Page 31 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 12 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94716 3/8/2007 008812 ELECTRONIC BUSINESS MACHINES (Continued) copier maint 001.000.510.522.100.480.00 88.97 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.100.480.00 7.92 Total : 96.89 94717 3/8/2007 068405 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SERV 9726 INV#9726 EDMONDS PD CASE OF MILLENIUM ENERGY BAI 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 112.00 Freight 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 8.89 Total : 120.89 94718 3/8/2007 066004 ESRI 91498351 ARCGIS MAINTENANCE - PLANNIN ARCGIS MAINTENANCE - PLANNIN 001.000.620.558.600.480.00 7,900.00 Sales Tax 001.000.620.558.600.480.00 663.60 Total : 8,563.60 94719 3/8/2007 009880 FEDEX 8-706-75372 Community Services Dept. mailing Community Services Dept. mailing 001.000.610.519.700.410.00 36.41 8-707-48157 PW Correspondenc - G. Gradias PW Correspondenc - G. Gradias 001.000.651.519.920.410.00 32.87 Community Services Dept. mailing 001.000.610.519.700.410.00 43.26 Total : 112.54 94720 3/8/2007 009895 FELDMAN, JAMES A 22807 PUBLIC DEFENDER FEE PUBLIC DEFENDER FEE 001.000.390.512.520.410.00 9,510.00 Total : 9,510.00 94721 3/8/2007 066590 FELIX LLC, ROBERT W FELIX7492 STOP SMOKING CLASS Page: 12 Packet Page 32 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 13 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94721 3/8/2007 066590 FELIX LLC, ROBERT W (Continued) STOP SMOKING WITH HYPNOSIS- 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 367.50 Total : 367.50 94722 3/8/2007 009815 FERGUSON ENTERPRISES INC 0080122 WATER METER INVENTORY - M-M WATER METER INVENTORY - M-M 411.000.000.141.170.310.00 6,946.68 Freight 411.000.000.141.170.310.00 117.11 Sales Tax 411.000.000.141.170.310.00 628.67 Total : 7,692.46 94723 3/8/2007 071496 FIRST MUTUAL BANK ESAC.Final Retainage ESAC.Dennis Craig Retainage #2 ESAC.Dennis Craig Retainage #2 112.200.630.595.330.650.00 1,567.36 Total : 1,567.36 94724 3/8/2007 071532 FISCHER, LINDA 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94725 3/8/2007 071546 FLUID TECH INC 133448 PRESSURE SWITCH PRESSURE SWITCH 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 504.00 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 6.80 Total : 510.80 94726 3/8/2007 010660 FOSTER, MARLO 32 LEOFF 1 Reimbursement LEOFF 1 Reimbursement 009.000.390.517.370.230.00 150.00 Total : 150.00 94727 3/8/2007 071533 FRAZIER, RICHARD 20907 JURY FEE Page: 13 Packet Page 33 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 14 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94727 3/8/2007 071533 FRAZIER, RICHARD (Continued) JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94728 3/8/2007 071522 GALCO INDUSTRIAL 81236201 067253 VFD PART 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 99.24 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 45.50 Total : 144.74 94729 3/8/2007 071521 GEORGE GODDARD INC 207-215 LAB SINK LAB SINK 411.000.656.538.800.310.23 379.00 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.23 33.35 Total : 412.35 94730 3/8/2007 018495 GLACIER NORTHWEST 12047 STREET - CEMENT FOR SIDEWALI STREET - CEMENT FOR SIDEWALI 111.000.653.542.610.310.00 392.40 Sales Tax 111.000.653.542.610.310.00 34.53 Total : 426.93 94731 3/8/2007 071534 GOOTEE, LAURIE 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94732 3/8/2007 012190 GORSUCH, BRUCE GORSUCH7533 VOLLEYBALL SKILLS VOLLEYBALL INTERMEDIATE SKIL 001.000.640.575.520.410.00 720.00 Total : 720.00 94733 3/8/2007 069864 GRAPHIC ENTERPRISES INC AR123639 METER CHARGES FOR K&E/8036-E Page: 14 Packet Page 34 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 15 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94733 3/8/2007 069864 GRAPHIC ENTERPRISES INC (Continued) METER CHARGES FOR K&E/8036-E 001.000.620.524.100.480.00 55.03 Sales Tax 001.000.620.524.100.480.00 4.90 Total : 59.93 94734 3/8/2007 067476 GROUP FOUR INC 66804 E7JA.2007 Waterline Survey E7JA.2007 Waterline Survey 412.100.630.594.320.650.00 5,000.00 66974 E7JA.2007 Waterline Survey E7JA.2007 Waterline Survey 412.100.630.594.320.650.00 500.00 Total : 5,500.00 94735 3/8/2007 069733 H B JAEGER COMPANY LLC 77091 WATER - 4 1/12" NST X 4" STORZ WATER - 4 1/12" NST X 4" STORZ 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 435.00 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 33.06 Total : 468.06 94736 3/8/2007 010900 HD FOWLER CO INC 12045730 WATER - DEBUR TOOL WATER - DEBUR TOOL 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 26.63 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 2.35 Total : 28.98 94737 3/8/2007 071526 HODGSON, HOLLY HODGSON0227 REFUND REFUND FOR CANCELLED CLASS 001.000.000.239.200.000.00 63.00 Total : 63.00 94738 3/8/2007 070896 HSBC BUSINESS SOLUTIONS 027997 OPS SUPPLIES stations' supplies 001.000.510.522.200.310.00 54.01 Page: 15 Packet Page 35 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 16 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94738 3/8/2007 070896 070896 HSBC BUSINESS SOLUTIONS (Continued) Total : 54.01 94739 3/8/2007 070864 IDEARC MEDIA CORP S/P2864983 CUSTOMER # S114983 2/2007 Superpages.com 001.000.390.528.800.420.00 69.90 Total : 69.90 94740 3/8/2007 070042 IKON FINANCIAL SERVICES 72435506 COPIER LEASE PARK MAINTENANCE COPIER LEA 001.000.640.576.800.450.00 22.87 Total : 22.87 94741 3/8/2007 070042 IKON FINANCIAL SERVICES 72435501 Finance Copier Rental 2/22-3/21/07 Finance Copier Rental 2/22-3/21/07 001.000.310.514.230.450.00 454.07 Meter Charge 1/3-2/3/07 001.000.310.514.230.450.00 138.05 Sales Tax 001.000.310.514.230.450.00 52.71 Total : 644.83 94742 3/8/2007 070042 IKON FINANCIAL SERVICES 72435483 RENT ON RECEPTION COPIER RENT ON RECEPTION COPIER 001.000.620.558.800.450.00 75.89 72435491 RENT ON LARGE COPIER RENT ON LARGE COPIER 001.000.620.558.800.450.00 1,035.03 72435497 RENT ON ENG. COLOR COPIER RENT ON ENG. COLOR COPIER 001.000.620.558.800.450.00 356.11 Total : 1,467.03 94743 3/8/2007 014430 INDUSTRIAL ELECTRIC CO INC 0029003 018325 MOTOR 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 448.00 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 38.53 Page: 16 Packet Page 36 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 17 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94743 3/8/2007 014430 014430 INDUSTRIAL ELECTRIC CO INC (Continued) Total : 486.53 94744 3/8/2007 068952 INFINITY INTERNET 410951 MEADOWDALE PRESCHOOL INTEI INTERNET ACCESS FOR MEADOW 001.000.640.575.560.420.00 15.00 Total : 15.00 94745 3/8/2007 069179 INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION INC ESJA.Pmt #1 E5JA.2005 Waterline thru 02/07 E5JA.2005 Waterline thru 02/07 412.100.630.594.320.650.00 149,595.65 E7JA.Retainage 1 412.100.000.223.400.000.00 -6, 868.49 Total : 142,727.16 94746 3/8/2007 061614 J J SHOE REPAIR & ALTERATION 4688 OPS REPAIRS & MAINT Hepler boot repair 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 60.00 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 5.34 Total : 65.34 94747 3/8/2007 068737 JOHNSON ROBERTS & ASSOC 106415 INV#106415 EDMONDS PD PRE -OFFER PHQ - GIBENS 001.000.410.521.100.410.00 15.00 Freight 001.000.410.521.100.410.00 1.26 Total : 16.26 94748 3/8/2007 071137 KIDZ LOVE SOCCER KIDZ7543 KIDZ LOVE SOCCER Page: 17 Packet Page 37 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 18 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94748 3/8/2007 071137 KIDZ LOVE SOCCER (Continued) KIDZ LOVE SOCCER #7543 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 1,067.50 KIDZ LOVE SOCCER #7542 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 811.30 KIDZ LOVE SOCCER #7541 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 939.40 KIDZ LOVE SOCCER #7540 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 640.50 KIDZ LOVE SOCCER #7539 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 341.60 Total : 3,800.30 94749 3/8/2007 016600 KROESENS INC 74730 OPS PROTECTIVE CLOTHING Soucy boots 001.000.510.522.200.250.00 505.00 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.250.00 44.44 75507 OPS PROTECTIVE CLOTHING Turner rescue boots 001.000.510.522.200.250.00 160.00 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.250.00 14.08 75613 SOUCY RETURNED BOOTS RE: IN' Soucy ret. wrong size boots 001.000.510.522.200.250.00 -225.60 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.250.00 -19.85 Total : 478.07 94750 3/8/2007 071536 LAIRD-BURRIS, NANCY 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94751 3/8/2007 067475 LANDSVERK QUALITY HOMES INC 2-16730 RE: 19524 94TH PL W EDMONDS U Page: 18 Packet Page 38 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 19 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94751 3/8/2007 067475 LANDSVERK QUALITY HOMES INC (Continued) 19524 94TH PI W Edmonds Utility Ri 411.000.000.233.000.000.00 134.22 Total : 134.22 94752 3/8/2007 068493 LAW ENFORCEMENT EQUIP DISTRIBU 03010703 INV#03010703 EDMONDS PD STREAMLIGHT TLR-1 LED WEAPO 001.000.410.521.230.350.00 353.85 Freight 001.000.410.521.230.350.00 7.95 Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.230.350.00 31.84 Total : 393.64 94753 3/8/2007 068711 LAWN EQUIPMENT SUPPLY 2007-270 SUPPLIES FUEL FILTERS 130.000.640.536.500.310.00 14.51 Freight 130.000.640.536.500.310.00 11.30 Sales Tax 130.000.640.536.500.310.00 2.30 Total : 28.11 94754 3/8/2007 018760 LUNDS OFFICE ESSENTIALS 093453 SISTER CITY SUPPLIES SISTER CITY LETTERHEAD 623.200.210.557.210.490.00 128.00 Sales Tax 623.200.210.557.210.490.00 11.39 Total : 139.39 94755 3/8/2007 018760 LUNDS OFFICE ESSENTIALS 093380 Markers Markers 001.000.310.514.230.310.00 6.24 Sales Tax 001.000.310.514.230.310.00 0.56 Total : 6.80 Page: 19 Packet Page 39 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 20 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94756 3/8/2007 018760 LUNDS OFFICE ESSENTIALS 093265 BUSINESS CARDS COURT CS DS f 250-00134 Business Cards:- 001.000.230.512.501.310.00 42.20 250-00134 Stephen Clifton 001.000.610.519.700.310.00 17.20 250-00134 Jenny Readwin 001.000.620.558.800.310.00 17.20 250-00134 Michael Snook 001.000.620.558.800.310.00 17.20 250-00134 Rich Lindsay 001.000.640.574.100.310.00 17.20 Sales Tax 001.000.230.512.501.310.00 3.76 Sales Tax 001.000.610.519.700.310.00 1.53 Sales Tax 001.000.620.558.800.310.00 3.06 Sales Tax 001.000.640.574.100.310.00 1.53 093398 LOGO WINDOW ENVELOPES CITY 250-00136 City Clerk Logo Envelope- 001.000.250.514.300.310.00 295.00 Sales Tax 001.000.250.514.300.310.00 26.26 Total : 442.14 94757 3/8/2007 018950 LYNNWOOD AUTO PARTS INC 515210 STORM - SPOT LIGHT FOR SWEEF STORM - SPOT LIGHT FOR SWEEF 411.000.652.542.320.310.00 11.43 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.320.310.00 1.02 Total : 12.45 94758 3/8/2007 071547 MAINSTREAM MECHANICAL INC 1165 REPAIR EVAPORATOR LEAK Page: 20 Packet Page 40 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 21 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94758 3/8/2007 071547 MAINSTREAM MECHANICAL INC (Continued) REPAIR EVAPORATOR LEAK 411.000.656.538.800.480.21 356.23 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.480.21 31.70 Total : 387.93 94759 3/8/2007 069362 MARSHALL, CITA 2906 INTERPRETER FEE INTERPRETER FEE 001.000.230.512.500.410.01 45.00 2907 INTERPRETER FEE INTERPRETER FEE 001.000.230.512.500.410.01 150.00 2908 INTERPRETER FEE INTERPRETER FEE 001.000.230.512.500.410.01 90.00 2915 INTERPRETER FEE INTERPRETER FEE 001.000.230.512.500.410.01 45.00 2916 INTERPRETER FEE INTERPRETER FEE 001.000.230.512.500.410.01 45.00 2917 INTERPRETER FEE INTERPRETER FEE 001.000.230.512.500.410.01 60.00 2923 INTERPRETER FEE INTERPRETER FEE 001.000.230.512.500.410.01 120.00 2924 INTERPRETER FEE INTERPRETER FEE 001.000.230.512.500.410.01 45.00 Total : 600.00 94760 3/8/2007 019650 MASTER POOLS OF WASHINGTON INC 42829 YOST POOL IMPROVEMENTS Page: 21 Packet Page 41 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 22 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94760 3/8/2007 019650 MASTER POOLS OF WASHINGTON INC (Continued) MERMAID FILTER LEAVES 125.000.640.594.750.650.00 2,475.00 Freight 125.000.640.594.750.650.00 558.25 Sales Tax 125.000.640.594.750.650.00 269.96 Total : 3,303.21 94761 3/8/2007 071537 MATE, ZSOLT 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94762 3/8/2007 064047 MCCONNELL & ASSOCIATES 857 HEARING EX. SERVICES FOR FEB HEARING EX. SERVICES FOR FEB 001.000.620.558.600.410.00 3,334.23 Total : 3,334.23 94763 3/8/2007 020039 MCMASTER-CARR SUPPLY CO 60016493 123106800 FLOWMETER/WASTE CONTAINER 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 196.82 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 5.38 60128007 123106800 GLASS BEAD/FLOWMETER 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 619.76 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 48.04 60285469 123106800 WASTE CONTAINER 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 61.86 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 4.73 Total : 936.59 Page: 22 Packet Page 42 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 23 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94764 3/8/2007 071487 MED-TECH RESOURCE INC 25916 INV#25916 EDMONDS PD STREAMLIGHT SL20 BATTERIES 001.000.410.521.220.310.00 141.72 Freight 001.000.410.521.220.310.00 7.39 Total : 149.11 94765 3/8/2007 069285 MERCER MD, JAMES 1002-007 ALS PROF SERVICES Feb'07 med prgm dir 001.000.510.526.100.410.00 1,644.75 Total : 1,644.75 94766 3/8/2007 069592 METROCALL Q0298897B INV#Q0298897B ACCT#02988970 E PAGER SERVICE 2/27-3/26/07 001.000.410.521.100.420.00 79.65 Total : 79.65 94767 3/8/2007 071538 MILLER, DIANE 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94768 3/8/2007 020900 MILLERS EQUIP & RENT ALL INC 40802 STORM - SPROCKET & GEAR GRE STORM - SPROCKET & GEAR GRE 111.000.653.542.710.310.00 3.95 Sales Tax 111.000.653.542.710.310.00 0.35 Total : 4.30 94769 3/8/2007 020900 MILLERS EQUIP & RENT ALL INC 40658 OPS EXPENDABLE TOOLS sharpen chain 001.000.510.522.200.359.00 105.00 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.359.00 9.35 Page: 23 Packet Page 43 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 24 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94769 3/8/2007 020900 MILLERS EQUIP & RENT ALL INC (Continued) 40984 OPS EXPENDABLE TOOLS 25' reel of chain 001.000.510.522.200.359.00 700.00 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.359.00 62.30 Total : 876.65 94770 3/8/2007 064570 NATIONAL SAFETY INC 0193255-IN STREET - OVERALLS FOR SUMME STREET - OVERALLS FOR SUMME 111.000.653.542.900.240.00 187.50 JACKETS FOR SUMMER HELP 111.000.653.542.900.240.00 150.00 XXL JACKET 111.000.653.542.900.240.00 41.00 Freight 111.000.653.542.900.240.00 12.08 Sales Tax 111.000.653.542.900.240.00 34.37 Total : 424.95 94771 3/8/2007 024001 NC MACHINERY CO SECS0431990 UNIT 50 - KEYS UNIT 50 - KEYS 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 40.00 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 3.52 SECS0431991 UNIT 50 - SHIPPING AND HANDLIN UNIT 50 - SHIPPING AND HANDLIN 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 14.00 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 1.23 Total : 58.75 94772 3/8/2007 024302 NELSON PETROLEUM 0320591-IN FLEET INVENTORY - FILTER Page: 24 Packet Page 44 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 25 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94772 3/8/2007 024302 NELSON PETROLEUM (Continued) FLEET INVENTORY - FILTER 511.000.657.548.680.340.40 9.99 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.340.40 0.86 0321179-IN FLEET - DIESEL 535 GAL FLEET - DIESEL 535 GAL 511.000.657.548.680.340.10 1,009.38 FED EX TAX, FED LUST/OIL SPILL' 511.000.657.548.680.340.10 322.94 Total : 1,343.17 94773 3/8/2007 067098 NEXTEL COMMUNICATIONS 323912314 323912314-063 IT Cell Phone Service 1/25-2/24/07 001.000.310.518.880.420.00 174.11 Total : 174.11 94774 3/8/2007 067098 NEXTEL COMMUNICATIONS 411191318-063 CELLULAR CHARGES 1/25-2/24/07 CELLULAR CHARGES 1/25-2/24/07 001.000.620.524.100.420.00 107.95 Total : 107.95 94775 3/8/2007 067098 NEXTEL COMMUNICATIONS 976032312 COMMUNICATIONS Admin 001.000.510.522.100.420.00 35.97 Operations 001.000.510.522.200.420.00 437.08 Prevention 001.000.510.522.300.420.00 76.19 ALS 001.000.510.526.100.420.00 67.21 Total : 616.45 94776 3/8/2007 024910 NORMED 24808-516250 INV#24808-516250 EDMONDS PD Page: 25 Packet Page 45 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 26 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor 94776 3/8/2007 024910 NORMED 94777 94778 Invoice (Continued) 24808-516392 3/8/2007 063034 NORTH CENTRAL LABORATORIES 213821 PO # Description/Account CETAFEN EXTRA 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 ASPIRIN 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 CETAFEN 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 BANDAGES 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 VIONEX TOWLETTES 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 Freight 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 INV#24808-516392 EDMONDS PD RELIEF -SF COLD CAPSULES 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 Freight 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 Total 13465 BOD STANDARD 411.000.656.538.800.310.31 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.31 Total 3/8/2007 066391 NORTHSTAR CHEMICAL INC 0076980 SODIUM BISULFILTE SODIUM BISULFILTE 411.000.656.538.800.310.54 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.54 Amount 11.95 4.52 2.69 5.39 39.16 6.40 6.17 11.24 4.15 1.35 93.02 45.00 7.59 52.59 408.00 36.31 Page: 26 Packet Page 46 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 27 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94778 3/8/2007 066391 066391 NORTHSTAR CHEMICAL INC (Continued) Total : 444.31 94779 3/8/2007 061013 NORTHWEST CASCADE INC 0430915 HONEY BUCKET RENTAL HONEY BUCKET RENTAL- 001.000.640.576.800.450.00 95.36 Total : 95.36 94780 3/8/2007 025690 NOYES, KARIN 000 00 459 MINUTES 2/8/07 - HPC - PLAN. DEF MINUTES 2/8/07 - HPC - PLAN. DEF 001.000.620.558.600.410.00 135.00 000 00 461 PLANNING BOARD MINUTES 2/28/( PLANNING BOARD MINUTES 2/28/( 001.000.620.558.600.410.00 210.00 Total : 345.00 94781 3/8/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC 034202 OFFICE SUPPLIES ROLODEX 117.100.640.573.100.310.00 14.56 King County Sales Tax 117.100.640.573.100.310.00 1.19 144265 CREDIT FOR RISER CREDIT FOR MONITOR RISER 001.000.640.574.100.310.00 -27.98 King County Sales Tax 001.000.640.574.100.310.00 -2.46 216269 OFFICE SUPPLIES RULER 001.000.640.574.200.310.00 5.75 King County Sales Tax 001.000.640.574.200.310.00 0.42 987837 OFFICE SUPPLIES MONITOR RISER 001.000.640.574.100.310.00 28.98 King County Sales Tax 001.000.640.574.100.310.00 2.46 Total : 22.92 Page: 27 Packet Page 47 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 28 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94782 3/8/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC 263881 WATER - INK CARTIDGES WATER - INK CARTIDGES 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 45.13 PW ADMIN SUPPLIES - CLIPS, PO: 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 14.92 King County Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 5.28 Total : 65.33 94783 3/8/2007 026200 OLYMPIC VIEW WATER DISTRICT 0000130 WATER 220TH ST SW & 84TH AVE W 001.000.640.576.800.470.00 10.11 0001530 WATER 820 15TH ST SW 130.000.640.536.500.470.00 97.64 0002930 WATER 5TH & ST RTE 104/SPRINKLER 001.000.640.576.800.470.00 11.78 0005060 WATER 9803 EDMONDS WAY 001.000.640.576.800.470.00 11.78 Total : 131.31 94784 3/8/2007 002203 OWEN EQUIPMENT COMPANY 00044981 UNIT 55 - WASHERS, LOCKNUTS, ; UNIT 55 - WASHERS, LOCKNUTS, ; 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 69.04 Freight 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 8.15 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 6.80 Total : 83.99 94785 3/8/2007 027060 PACIFIC TOPSOILS 42092 STORM - DUMP FEES Page: 28 Packet Page 48 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 29 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94785 3/8/2007 027060 PACIFIC TOPSOILS (Continued) STORM - DUMP FEES 411.000.652.542.320.490.00 88.00 FUEL SCHG 411.000.652.542.320.490.00 1.32 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.320.490.00 0.09 42101 STORM - DUMP FEES STORM - DUMP FEES 411.000.652.542.320.490.00 88.00 FUEL SCHG 411.000.652.542.320.490.00 1.32 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.320.490.00 0.09 42112 STORM DUMP FEES STORM DUMP FEES 411.000.652.542.320.490.00 128.00 FUEL SCHG 411.000.652.542.320.490.00 1.92 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.320.490.00 0.14 Total : 308.88 94786 3/8/2007 064070 PALMATIER, LISA PALMATIER0207 CONCERT COORDINATION CONCERT COORDINATOR- 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 180.00 Total : 180.00 94787 3/8/2007 066817 PANASONIC DIGITAL DOCUMENT COM 9465970 COPIER CONTRACT COPIER CONTRACT 411.000.656.538.800.450.41 145.22 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.450.41 12.60 Total : 157.82 94788 3/8/2007 071539 PARK, MICHAEL 20907 JURY FEE Page: 29 Packet Page 49 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 30 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94788 3/8/2007 071539 PARK, MICHAEL (Continued) JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94789 3/8/2007 027165 PARKER PAINT MFG. CO.INC. 517641 PAINT & SUPPLIES PAINT, TRAYS, ROLLER COVERS, 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 88.94 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 7.92 Total : 96.86 94790 3/8/2007 063951 PERTEET ENGINEERING INC 26009-00010 E5AB.SR99 Traffic thru 2/25/07 E5AB.SR99 Traffic thru 2/25/07 001.000.620.532.200.410.00 712.62 Total : 712.62 94791 3/8/2007 065105 PORT SUPPLY 5778 OPERATIONS SUPPLIES M-16 supplies 001.000.510.522.200.310.00 75.96 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.310.00 6.76 Total : 82.72 94792 3/8/2007 046900 PUGET SOUND ENERGY 084-904-700-6 WWTP PUGET SOUND ENERGY WWTP PUGET SOUND ENERGY 411.000.656.538.800.472.63 1,833.15 Total : 1,833.15 94793 3/8/2007 046900 PUGET SOUND ENERGY 0230757007 PARK & BUILDING MAINTENANCE PARK & BUILDING MAINTENANCE 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 453.76 5254926008 MEADOWDALE CLUBHOUSE MEADOWDALE CLUBHOUSE 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 329.80 Page: 30 Packet Page 50 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 31 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94793 3/8/2007 046900 PUGET SOUND ENERGY (Continued) 5672895009 SEWER LIFT STATION #9 SEWER LIFT STATION #9 411.000.655.535.800.470.00 29.59 Total : 813.15 94794 3/8/2007 070809 PUGET SOUND EXECUTIVE 07-069 COURTROOM SECURITY COURTROOM SECURITY 001.000.230.512.500.410.00 1,610.00 Total : 1,610.00 94795 3/8/2007 065579 QUIKSIGN 55251 MICHEL/ADB-06-154 - SIGN INSTAL MICHEL/ADB-06-154 - SIGN INSTAL 001.000.620.558.600.410.11 156.00 Sales Tax 001.000.620.558.600.410.11 13.73 Total : 169.73 94796 3/8/2007 030780 QUIRING MONUMENTS INC 74573 MARKER MARKER: CARETTA 130.000.640.536.200.340.00 285.00 74574 INSCRIPTION INSCRIPTION: NIXON 130.000.640.536.200.340.00 75.00 75105 MARKER MARKER: VANDER SYS 130.000.640.536.200.340.00 260.00 75106 INSCRIPTION INSCRIPTION: SMITH 130.000.640.536.200.340.00 75.00 75107 INSCRIPTION INSCRIPTION: SNELL 130.000.640.536.200.340.00 83.00 Total : 778.00 94797 3/8/2007 031500 REID MIDDLETON & ASSOC INC 0702072 ESMC.Services thru 2/23/07 Page: 31 Packet Page 51 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 32 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94797 3/8/2007 031500 REID MIDDLETON & ASSOC INC (Continued) ESMC.Services thru 2/23/07 125.000.640.594.750.650.00 3,487.00 Total : 3,487.00 94798 3/8/2007 071554 REZVANI, FARSHID AND KATHERINE 4-05175 UTILITY REFUND Duffy/Rezvani 8423 198th St SW, Ed 411.000.000.233.000.000.00 81.69 Total : 81.69 94799 3/8/2007 071540 RIECK, CLIFFORD 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94800 3/8/2007 068484 RINKER MATERIALS 9412128620 STREET - ASPHALT STREET - ASPHALT 111.000.653.542.310.310.00 360.00 Sales Tax 111.000.653.542.310.310.00 31.68 9412138155 STORM DUMP FEES STORM DUMP FEES 411.000.652.542.320.490.00 169.90 STORM - ASPHALT 411.000.652.542.320.310.00 499.20 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.320.310.00 42.94 9412138157 STORM - ASPHALT STORM - ASPHALT 411.000.652.542.400.310.00 360.00 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.400.310.00 31.68 9412147908 STORM - DUMP FEES STORM - DUMP FEES 411.000.652.542.320.490.00 54.80 Page: 32 Packet Page 52 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 33 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94800 3/8/2007 068484 RINKER MATERIALS (Continued) 9412147919 STREET -ASPHALT STREET -ASPHALT 111.000.653.542.310.310.00 360.00 Sales Tax 111.000.653.542.310.310.00 31.68 9412159825 STORM - ASPHALT STORM - ASPHALT 411.000.652.542.400.310.00 240.00 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.400.310.00 21.12 9412191291 STORM - ASPHALT STORM - ASPHALT 411.000.652.542.400.310.00 374.16 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.400.310.00 32.93 Total : 2,610.09 94801 3/8/2007 071541 ROBBINS, JOHNATHON 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94802 3/8/2007 071525 ROMINE, RENEA 127990 SPAY/NEUTER REFUND FOR RECE SPAY/NEUTER REFUND - ANIMAL 001.000.000.343.930.000.00 50.00 Total : 50.00 94803 3/8/2007 071542 RYAN, MARJORIE 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94804 3/8/2007 071467 S MORRIS COMPANY 02/26/07 02/26/07 BILLING - EDMONDS AC P ANIMAL DISPOSAL 2/12&2/19/07 001.000.410.521.700.410.00 48.75 Page: 33 Packet Page 53 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 34 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94804 3/8/2007 071467 071467 S MORRIS COMPANY (Continued) Total : 48.75 94805 3/8/2007 071007 SAWDON, MANDY SAWDON0303 GYM MONITOR ANDERSON CENTER GYM MONITC 001.000.640.574.100.410.00 48.00 Total : 48.00 94806 3/8/2007 065001 SCHIRMAN, RON 29 LEOFF 1 Reimbursement LEOFF 1 Reimbursement 009.000.390.517.370.230.00 1,721.48 Total : 1,721.48 94807 3/8/2007 069219 SIEMENS WATER TECHNOLOGIES COF 2024467 043133501 RENTAL DI TANKS 411.000.656.538.800.450.21 643.50 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.450.21 56.64 Total : 700.14 94808 3/8/2007 068489 SIRENNET.COM 0057621-IN UNIT K93 - B LINK FLASHER UNIT K93 - B LINK FLASHER 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 90.00 Freight 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 24.50 0058042-IN UNIT 488 - STREAMLIGHT SL20X B UNIT 488 - STREAMLIGHT SL20X B 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 154.00 Freight 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 13.50 Total : 282.00 94809 3/8/2007 071543 SMITH, KEVIN 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94810 3/8/2007 060889 SNAP -ON INDUSTRIAL ESV/10588030 FLEET - CHARCOAL FILTER Page: 34 Packet Page 54 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 35 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94810 3/8/2007 060889 SNAP -ON INDUSTRIAL (Continued) FLEET - CHARCOAL FILTER 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 22.00 Freight 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 10.00 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 2.85 Total : 34.85 94811 3/8/2007 037375 SNO CO PUD NO 1 2340031869 MINI PARK RESTROOMS MINI PARK RESTROOMS 001.000.640.576.800.470.00 276.01 3010022725 BRACKETT'S LANDING BATH HOU: BRACKETT'S LANDING BATH HOU: 001.000.640.576.800.470.00 246.84 3110774142 UTILITY BILLING 23202 EDMONDS WAY 001.000.640.576.800.470.00 123.66 5100017325 IRRIGATION SYSTEM IRRIGATION SYSTEM 001.000.640.576.800.470.00 38.16 Total : 684.67 94812 3/8/2007 037375 SNO CO PUD NO 1 192006345 463-001-705-3 23219 74TH AVE W 411.000.656.538.800.471.62 26.22 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.471.62 1.57 Total : 27.79 94813 3/8/2007 037375 SNO CO PUD NO 1 2180017895 BEACON LIGHT CROSS WALK BEACON LIGHT CROSS WALK 111.000.653.542.640.470.00 32.04 2710014826 SIGNAL LIGHT SIGNAL LIGHT 111.000.653.542.640.470.00 95.95 Page: 35 Packet Page 55 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 36 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94813 3/8/2007 037375 SNO CO PUD NO 1 (Continued) 2900012432 SIGNAL LIGHT SIGNAL LIGHT 111.000.653.542.640.470.00 28.28 3630019994 SIGNAL LIGHT SIGNAL LIGHT 111.000.653.542.640.470.00 82.72 3900430020 Ballinger Lift Station 7403 Ballinger Ballinger Lift Station 7403 Ballinger 411.000.655.535.800.470.00 27.79 5450010938 SIGNAL LIGHT SIGNAL LIGHT 111.000.653.542.640.470.00 176.96 Total : 443.74 94814 3/8/2007 038100 SNO-KING STAMP 33940 "COMPLETED" STAMP - BLDG DEP "COMPLETED" STAMP - BLDG DEP 001.000.620.558.800.310.00 19.38 Total : 19.38 94815 3/8/2007 037800 SNOHOMISH HEALTH DISTRICT C000106 ACCT ID C000106 - ROSSI/EDMONI HEP B SHOT 001.000.410.521.220.410.00 64.00 Total : 64.00 94816 3/8/2007 038500 SO COUNTY SENIOR CENTER INC Mar-07 03/07 Recreation Services Contract F 03/07 Recreation Services Contract F 001.000.390.519.900.410.00 4,791.67 Total : 4,791.67 94817 3/8/2007 070678 SORVAG, BRIGID SORVAG0305 REFUND REFUND FOR CANCELLED CLASS 001.000.000.239.200.000.00 75.00 Total : 75.00 94818 3/8/2007 038300 SOUND DISPOSAL CO 03587/0207 DISPOSAL SERVICES Page: 36 Packet Page 56 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 37 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94818 3/8/2007 038300 SOUND DISPOSAL CO (Continued) WASTE DISPOSAL SERVICES 001.000.640.576.800.470.00 576.16 Total : 576.16 94819 3/8/2007 038300 SOUND DISPOSAL CO 03583 garbage & recycle for PS garbage & recycle for PS 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 487.49 03586 garbage & recycle for Library garbage & recycle for Library 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 491.20 03588 garbage & recycle -City Hall garbage & recycle -City Hall 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 379.46 Total : 1,358.15 94820 3/8/2007 038410 SOUND SAFETY PRODUCTS 4107217-01 SEWER - WORK JEANS SEWER - WORK JEANS 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 159.75 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 14.22 4107256-01 STORM - WORK PANTS - R WICHE STORM - WORK PANTS - R WICHE 411.000.652.542.900.240.00 184.80 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.240.00 16.45 4107258-01 SEWER - WORK JEANS - J CLEME SEWER - WORK JEANS - J CLEME 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 157.50 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 14.02 4107580-01 BOOT EXCH - D CRAWFORD BOOT EXCH - D CRAWFORD 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 4.40 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 0.39 Page: 37 Packet Page 57 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 38 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94820 3/8/2007 038410 SOUND SAFETY PRODUCTS (Continued) 4107625-01 STORM - WORK JEANS - K CLARKI STORM - WORK JEANS - K CLARKI 411.000.652.542.900.240.00 165.00 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.240.00 14.69 4107675-01 WATER - 2007 BOOT ALLOWANCE WATER - 2007 BOOT ALLOWANCE 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 152.00 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 13.53 4107910-01 STORM - WORK JEANS - D BROWI STORM - WORK JEANS - D BROWI 411.000.652.542.900.240.00 152.90 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.240.00 13.61 Total : 1,063.26 94821 3/8/2007 070677 SPRINT Eng.Feb 2007 Engineering Nextel thru 02/24/07 Engineering Nextel thru 02/24/07 001.000.620.532.200.420.00 539.53 Total : 539.53 94822 3/8/2007 067148 STERNBERG LANTERNS INC 00110159 STREET - REPLACEMENT LAMP P/ STREET - REPLACEMENT LAMP P/ 111.000.653.542.640.310.00 4,588.00 Total : 4,588.00 94823 3/8/2007 040250 STEUBER DISTRIBUTING 139118 FLOWER PROGRAM SUPPLIES MISC. FLOWER PROGRAM SUPPL 001.000.640.576.810.310.00 411.11 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.810.310.00 34.94 Total : 446.05 94824 3/8/2007 040430 STONEWAY ELECTRIC SUPPLY 910298 FS 17 - ELECT SUPPLIES Page: 38 Packet Page 58 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 39 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94824 3/8/2007 040430 STONEWAY ELECTRIC SUPPLY (Continued) FS 17 - ELECT SUPPLIES 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 56.68 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 5.04 Total : 61.72 94825 3/8/2007 068360 SUMMIT LAW GROUP 3/6/07 3/30/07 Seminar - Employment law (I 3/30/07 Seminar - Employment law (I 001.000.220.516.100.490.00 65.00 3/30/07 Seminar - Employment law (I 001.000.220.516.100.490.00 45.00 Total : 110.00 94826 3/8/2007 040917 TACOMA SCREW PRODUCTS INC 10501129 SUPPLIES WEDGE ANCHORS 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 115.80 Freight 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 5.72 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 10.82 Total : 132.34 94827 3/8/2007 040917 TACOMA SCREW PRODUCTS INC 10494738 STORM - 25 LB WIPING CLOTHS, L STORM - 25 LB WIPING CLOTHS, L 411.000.652.542.400.310.00 107.56 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.400.310.00 9.57 10496532 STORM - UPSIDE DOWN FL GREEI STORM - UPSIDE DOWN FL GREEI 411.000.652.542.400.310.00 285.84 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.400.310.00 25.44 Page: 39 Packet Page 59 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 40 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor 94827 3/8/2007 040917 TACOMA SCREW PRODUCTS INC 94828 3/8/2007 040916 TC SPAN AMERICA Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount (Continued) 10496533 STORM - WORK GLOVES STORM - WORK GLOVES 411.000.652.542.900.240.00 269.80 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.240.00 24.01 Total : 722.22 38371 WATER/SEWER - WORK - POCKEI WATER/SEWER - WORK - POCKEI 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 144.50 WATER/SEWER - WORK - POCKEI 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 144.50 WORK - LONG SLEEVED POCKET 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 304.75 WORK - LONG SLEEVED POCKET 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 304.75 UPCHARGE FOR 4 XXL 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 6.00 UPCHARGE FOR 4 XXL 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 6.00 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 40.52 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 40.52 Page: 40 Packet Page 60 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 41 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor 94828 3/8/2007 040916 TC SPAN AMERICA 94829 3/8/2007 068201 THE ACTIVE NETWORK LTD Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount (Continued) 38373 WATER/SEWER - HATS WATER/SEWER - HATS 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 48.00 WATER/SEWER - HATS 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 48.00 HATS 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 45.00 HATS 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 45.00 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 8.28 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 8.28 Total : 1,194.10 LTD002385 CLASS RECEIPTING SOFTWARE/1- Class Receipting Software/Hardware 001.000.310.514.230.410.00 1,439.50 Class Receipting Software/Hardware 411.000.652.542.900.410.00 806.12 Class Receipting Software/Hardware 411.000.654.534.800.410.00 2,245.62 Class Receipting Software/Hardware 411.000.655.535.800.410.00 1,266.76 Sales Tax 001.000.310.514.230.410.00 128.12 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.410.00 71.74 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.410.00 199.86 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.410.00 112.74 Page: 41 Packet Page 61 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 42 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor 94829 3/8/2007 068201 THE ACTIVE NETWORK LTD 94830 3/8/2007 068201 THE ACTIVE NETWORK LTD Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount (Continued) LTD002470 CLASS RECEIPTING SOFTWARE/F Class Receipting Software/Hardware 001.000.310.514.230.410.00 250.00 Class Receipting Software/Hardware 411.000.652.542.900.410.00 140.00 Class Receipting Software/Hardware 411.000.654.534.800.410.00 390.00 Class Receipting Software/Hardware 411.000.655.535.800.410.00 220.00 Sales Tax 001.000.310.514.230.410.00 22.25 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.410.00 12.46 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.410.00 34.71 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.410.00 19.58 Total : 7,359.46 INC001781 CLASS RECEIPTING SOFTWARE/F Page: 42 Packet Page 62 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 43 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94830 3/8/2007 068201 THE ACTIVE NETWORK LTD (Continued) Class Receipting Software/Hardware 001.000.310.514.230.410.00 31.25 Class Receipting Software/Hardware 411.000.652.542.900.410.00 17.50 Class Receipting Software/Hardware 411.000.654.534.800.410.00 48.75 Class Receipting Software/Hardware 411.000.655.535.800.410.00 27.50 Sales Tax 001.000.310.514.230.410.00 2.78 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.410.00 1.56 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.410.00 4.34 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.410.00 2.45 Total : 136.13 94831 3/8/2007 066197 THE BENTLEY COMPANY 596307-001 WATER/SEWER - VULCAN SHANK! WATER/SEWER - VULCAN SHANK! 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 150.85 WATER/SEWER - VULCAN SHANK! 411.000.655.535.800.310.00 150.85 Freight 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 6.14 Freight 411.000.655.535.800.310.00 6.13 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 13.81 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.310.00 13.81 Total : 341.59 94832 3/8/2007 009350 THE DAILY HERALD COMPANY C/A 148134 Parks Dept. BPW, #07-06 Page: 43 Packet Page 63 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 44 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94832 3/8/2007 009350 THE DAILY HERALD COMPANY (Continued) Parks Dept. BPW, #07-06 001.000.220.516.100.440.00 39.51 Lead Water Maint. Worker, #07-04 001.000.220.516.100.440.00 34.96 CIO, #07-05 001.000.220.516.100.440.00 34.96 Transportation Eng., #07-07 001.000.220.516.100.440.00 39.51 Parks Dept. Laborer, #07-08 001.000.220.516.100.440.00 34.24 Parks MW I, #07-09 001.000.220.516.100.440.00 38.79 Total : 221.97 94833 3/8/2007 009350 THE DAILY HERALD COMPANY 1481670 NEWSPAPER AD Ordinance 3629 001.000.250.514.300.440.00 28.80 1481672 NEWSPAPER ADS Ordinance 3628 001.000.250.514.300.440.00 28.80 1481673 NEWSPAPER AD Ordinance 3627 001.000.250.514.300.440.00 24.48 Total : 82.08 94834 3/8/2007 071550 THE PROP SHOP 18108 OPERATIONS SUPPLIES spare propeller 001.000.510.522.200.310.00 550.00 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.310.00 48.95 Total : 598.95 94835 3/8/2007 066056 THE SEATTLE TIMES C/A 042483000 Transportation Eng., #07-07 Page: 44 Packet Page 64 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 45 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94835 3/8/2007 066056 THE SEATTLE TIMES (Continued) Transportation Eng., #07-07 001.000.620.532.200.440.00 237.98 Transportation Eng., #07-07 001.000.220.516.100.440.00 237.97 Parks Dept. BPW, #07-06 001.000.220.516.100.440.00 268.52 Lead Water Maint. Worker, #07-04 001.000.220.516.100.440.00 220.14 CIO, #07-05 001.000.220.516.100.440.00 220.14 Parks Dept. Laborer, #07-08 001.000.220.516.100.440.00 295.14 Total : 1,479.89 94836 3/8/2007 071544 THORSRUD, HEIDI 20907 JURY FEE JURY FEE 001.000.230.512.540.490.00 14.85 Total : 14.85 94837 3/8/2007 038315 THYSSENKRUPP ELEVATOR 638278 MONITORING -PS monitoring-PS- 001.000.651.519.920.480.00 35.15 648652 SENIOR CENTER ELEVATOR MON SENIOR CENTER ELEVATOR MON 001.000.651.519.920.480.00 10.57 Total : 45.72 94838 3/8/2007 068254 TOWERS, LORRIE C 01-JAN07 PRO TEM JUDGE PRO TEM JUDGE 001.000.230.512.510.410.00 97.50 Total : 97.50 94839 3/8/2007 068249 TRAUTMANN MAHER & ASSOCIATES 2/28/07 MEBT 2 services thru 2/28/2007 MEBT 2 services thru 2/28/2007 001.000.220.516.100.410.00 133.73 Page: 45 Packet Page 65 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 46 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94839 3/8/2007 068249 068249 TRAUTMANN MAHER & ASSOCIATE (Continued) Total : 133.73 94840 3/8/2007 071545 TRIMMER, KIM TRIMMER7941 YOGA PLAY YOGA PLAY #7941 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 224.00 Total : 224.00 94841 3/8/2007 011900 VERIZON NORTHWEST 425-712-0647 IRRIGATION SYSTEM IRRIGATION SYSTEM 001.000.640.576.800.420.00 42.83 425-771-4741 EDMONDS MEMORIAL CEMETERY EDMONDS MEMORIAL CEMETERY 130.000.640.536.200.420.00 48.13 Total : 90.96 94842 3/8/2007 011900 VERIZON NORTHWEST 425-DHO-0667 DEDICATED LINE FS #17 TO SNOC Dedicated Line FS #17 to Snocom 2/ 001.000.310.518.880.420.00 350.09 425-NW2-0887 Frame Relay for Snocom & Internet / Frame Relay for Snocom & Internet / 001.000.310.518.880.420.00 280.00 Total : 630.09 94843 3/8/2007 011900 VERIZON NORTHWEST 425-206-1108 TELEMETRY LIFT STATIONS TELEMETRY LIFT STATIONS 411.000.654.534.800.420.00 145.03 TELEMETRY LIFT STATIONS 411.000.655.535.800.420.00 269.35 425-206-1137 SEAVIEW RESERVOIR SEAVIEW RESERVOIR 411.000.654.534.800.420.00 53.00 425-206-1141 TELEMETRY LIFT STATION TELEMETRY LIFT STATION 411.000.654.534.800.420.00 18.43 TELEMETRY LIFT STATION 411.000.655.535.800.420.00 34.22 Page: 46 Packet Page 66 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 47 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94843 3/8/2007 011900 VERIZON NORTHWEST (Continued) 425-206-4810 TELEMETRY LIFT STATION TELEMETRY LIFT STATION 411.000.654.534.800.420.00 42.17 TELEMETRY LIFT STATION 411.000.655.535.800.420.00 78.32 425-712-8347 PUBLIC SAFETY BLDG ELEVATOR PUBLIC SAFETY BLDG ELEVATOR 001.000.651.519.920.420.00 57.03 425-778-3297 VACANT PW BLDG 200 DAYTON S' VACANT PW BLDG 200 DAYTON S' 411.000.654.534.800.420.00 17.77 VACANT PW BLDG 200 DAYTON S' 411.000.655.535.800.420.00 32.99 Total : 748.31 94844 3/8/2007 011900 VERIZON NORTHWEST 425-771-0152 FS #16-FAX LINE FS #16-FAX LINE 001.000.510.522.200.420.00 50.25 425-778-2153 FS #20 PHONE SERVICE FS #20 PHONE SERVICE 001.000.510.522.200.420.00 47.08 425-FLO-0017 FS #16 FRAME RELAY FS #16 FRAME RELAY 001.000.510.528.600.420.00 354.07 Total : 451.40 94845 3/8/2007 067865 VERIZON WIRELESS 764466185-00001 CENTRALIZED IRRIGATION CENTRALIZED IRRIGATION 001.000.640.576.800.420.00 3.00 Total : 3.00 94846 3/8/2007 067865 VERIZON WIRELESS 2114225707 965420720-00001 PRETREATMENT CELL 411.000.656.538.800.420.00 36.18 Total : 36.18 Page: 47 Packet Page 67 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 48 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94847 3/8/2007 067865 VERIZON WIRELESS 2117297233 INV#2117297233 ACCT#470497482- CELL PHONES 2/24-3/23/07 104.000.410.521.210.420.00 121.39 Total : 121.39 94848 3/8/2007 069889 VETERINARY SPECIALTY CENTER 53962 INV#53962 CLIENT#7257 EDMOND: EMERGENCY VISIT - DASH 001.000.410.521.260.410.00 45.00 BIOHAZARD FEE 001.000.410.521.260.410.00 4.48 Total : 49.48 94849 3/8/2007 061395 WASTE MANAGEMENT NW 0731775-2677-6 202-0001256-2677-0 ASH DISPOSAL 411.000.656.538.800.474.65 3,605.28 Total : 3,605.28 94850 3/8/2007 071484 WESTERN SAFETY PRODUCTS INC 48573 FAC MAINT - MICROWAVE DETEC- FAC MAINT - MICROWAVE DETEC- 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 34.95 Freight 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 10.03 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 3.96 Total : 48.94 94851 3/8/2007 071551 ZIMMERLUND, PER Insp Fee Refund Refund unused inspection fees Refund unused inspection fees 001.000.000.343.200.000.00 300.00 Total : 300.00 180 Vouchers for bank code : front Bank total : 476,953.46 180 Vouchers in this report Total vouchers : 476,953.46 Page: 48 Packet Page 68 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 49 03/08/2007 12:12:18PM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Page Amount 49 Packet Page 69 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 1 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94852 3/15/2007 071373 AGRO DISTRIBUTING LLC 2168259 RI FLOWER PROGRAM SUPPLIES IRON SULFATE 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 1,272.00 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 111.94 2180393 RI FLOWER PROGRAM SUPPLIES FLOWER PROGRAM SUPPLIES 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 297.00 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 26.14 Total : 1,707.08 94853 3/15/2007 066417 AIRGAS NOR PAC INC 101133192 M5Z34 CYLINDER RENTAL 411.000.656.538.800.450.21 81.08 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.450.21 7.14 Total : 88.22 94854 3/15/2007 070348 AIRPURE 12372177 879400 FILTERS 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 80.43 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 7.66 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 7.08 Total : 95.17 94855 3/15/2007 000850 ALDERWOOD WATER DISTRICT 8209 MONTHLY WHOLESALE WATER CI MONTHLY WHOLESALE WATER CI 411.000.654.534.800.340.00 77,883.10 Total : 77,883.10 94856 3/15/2007 014940 ALL BATTERY SALES & SERVICE 475690 FLEET INVENTORY - 3 BATTERIES Page: 1 Packet Page 70 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 2 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94856 3/15/2007 014940 ALL BATTERY SALES & SERVICE (Continued) FLEET INVENTORY - 3 BATTERIES 511.000.657.548.680.340.40 189.85 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.340.40 16.90 Total : 206.75 94857 3/15/2007 014940 ALL BATTERY SALES & SERVICE 704593 FLEET SHOP SUPPLIES - LAMPS, \ FLEET SHOP SUPPLIES - LAMPS, \ 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 48.08 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 4.28 881170 UNIT 124 - BATTERY UNIT 124 - BATTERY 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 68.95 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 6.14 881785 SHOP SUPPLIES - GATES SEALED SHOP SUPPLIES - GATES SEALED 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 48.00 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 4.13 Total : 179.58 94858 3/15/2007 014940 ALL BATTERY SALES & SERVICE 110425121 INV#110425121 116275 EDMONDS BATTERIES 104.000.410.521.210.310.00 284.30 Sales Tax 104.000.410.521.210.310.00 25.30 Total : 309.60 94859 3/15/2007 066415 ALLIED BODY WORKS INC 17010 UNIT 25 - LOCK SUPPLIES Page: 2 Packet Page 71 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 3 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor 94859 3/15/2007 066415 ALLIED BODY WORKS INC <rift%ii�7iF�f►�iZ�><ZiL�iFiIi1_1��I��l�i%F���9�:,�/[�3�9 Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount (Continued) UNIT 25 - LOCK SUPPLIES 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 33.50 Freight 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 9.98 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 3.83 Total : 47.31 0197-000813891 PUBLIC WORKS FACILITY Public Works Facility 001.000.650.519.910.470.00 20.76 Public Works Facility 111.000.653.542.900.470.00 78.88 Public Works Facility 411.000.652.542.900.470.00 78.88 Public Works Facility 411.000.654.534.800.470.00 78.88 Public Works Facility 411.000.655.535.800.470.00 78.88 Public Works Facility 511.000.657.548.680.470.00 78.87 197-0800478 FIRE STATION #20— FIRE STATION #20- 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 84.34 197-0801132 0197-000813963 garbage for F/S #16- 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 94.02 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 7.49 197-0829729 INVOICE 0197-000814647 garbage for MCC- 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 47.50 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 5.11 Page: 3 Packet Page 72 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 4 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94860 3/15/2007 061540 061540 ALLIED WASTE SERVICES (Continued) Total : 653.61 94861 3/15/2007 065568 ALLWATER INC 030807086 COEWASTE DRINKING WATER 411.000.656.538.800.310.11 30.85 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.11 1.42 Total : 32.27 94862 3/15/2007 065413 ALPINE TREE SERVICE 2013 TREE REMOVAL TAKE DOWN OF 4 DEAD CHERRY' 001.000.640.576.800.480.00 1,500.00 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.480.00 132.00 2014 TREE REMOVAL TREE REMOVAL AT MAPLEWOOD 001.000.640.576.800.480.00 200.00 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.480.00 17.60 2015 TREE REMOVAL TAKE DOWN OF LEANING TREE II\ 001.000.640.576.800.480.00 300.00 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.480.00 26.40 2016 TREE REMOVAL REMOVAL OF 2 MAPLES & CUT IN" 001.000.640.576.800.480.00 1,600.00 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.480.00 140.80 Total : 3,916.80 94863 3/15/2007 069751 ARAMARK 512-3832806 UNIFORM SERVICES PARK MAINTENANCE UNIFORM SE 001.000.640.576.800.240.00 35.46 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.240.00 3.16 Page: 4 Packet Page 73 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 5 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor 94863 3/15/2007 069751 069751 ARAMARK 94864 3/15/2007 069751 ARAMARK 94865 3/15/2007 069751 ARAMARK Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount (Continued) Total : 38.62 512-3832808 18386001 MATS 411.000.656.538.800.410.11 85.06 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.410.11 7.57 Total : 92.63 512-3831251 FLEET MAINT UNIFORM SVC FLEET MAINT UNIFORM SVC 511.000.657.548.680.240.00 17.40 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.240.00 1.55 Page: 5 Packet Page 74 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 6 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor 94865 3/15/2007 069751 ARAMARK Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount (Continued) 512-3831252 PW MATS PW MATS 001.000.650.519.910.410.00 1.38 PW MATS 411.000.652.542.900.410.00 5.24 PW MATS 111.000.653.542.900.410.00 5.24 PW MATS 411.000.654.534.800.410.00 5.24 PW MATS 411.000.655.535.800.410.00 5.24 PW MATS 511.000.657.548.680.410.00 5.26 WATER UNIFORM SVC 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 8.00 Sales Tax 001.000.650.519.910.410.00 0.12 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.410.00 0.47 Sales Tax 111.000.653.542.900.410.00 0.47 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.410.00 0.47 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.410.00 0.47 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.410.00 0.47 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.240.00 0.70 512-3832807 FAC MAINT UNIFORM SVC FAC MAINT UNIFORM SVC 001.000.651.519.920.240.00 33.69 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.240.00 3.00 Page: 6 Packet Page 75 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 7 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94865 3/15/2007 069751 069751 ARAMARK (Continued) Total : 94.41 94866 3/15/2007 071120 ASHLAND SPECIALTY CHEMICALS 2500026790 113009/0702 POLYMER 411.000.656.538.800.310.51 1,937.50 Total : 1,937.50 94867 3/15/2007 071124 ASSOCIATED PETROLEUM 555365 FLEET INVENTORY - DIESEL 180 C FLEET INVENTORY - DIESEL 180 C 511.000.657.548.680.340.10 351.43 WA ST SVC FEE 511.000.657.548.680.340.10 60.00 WA OIL SPILL RECOVERY TAX, Wi 511.000.657.548.680.340.10 64.30 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.340.10 4.80 Total : 480.53 94868 3/15/2007 064343 AT&T 425-776-5316 PARKS FAX MODEM PARKS FAX MODEM 001.000.640.576.800.420.00 32.07 Total : 32.07 94869 3/15/2007 070305 AUTOMATIC FUNDS TRANSFER 39588 OUT SOURCING OF UTILITY BILLS Page: 7 Packet Page 76 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 8 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor 94869 3/15/2007 070305 AUTOMATIC FUNDS TRANSFER Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount (Continued) UB Outsourcing area #200 PRINTIN( 411.000.652.542.900.490.00 89.29 UB Outsourcing area #200 PRINTIN( 411.000.654.534.800.490.00 89.29 UB Outsourcing area #200 PRINTIN( 411.000.655.535.800.490.00 89.55 UB Outsourcing area #200 POSTAGI 411.000.654.534.800.420.00 250.40 UB Outsourcing area #200 POSTAGI 411.000.655.535.800.420.00 250.40 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.490.00 7.79 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.490.00 7.79 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.490.00 8.02 39624 OUT SOURCING OF UTILITY BILLS UB Outsourcing area #700 PRINTIN( 411.000.652.542.900.490.00 23.31 UB Outsourcing area #700 PRINTIN( 411.000.654.534.800.490.00 23.31 UB Outsourcing area #700 PRINTIN( 411.000.655.535.800.490.00 23.37 UB Outsourcing area #700 POSTAGI 411.000.654.534.800.420.00 86.39 UB Outsourcing area #700 POSTAGI 411.000.655.535.800.420.00 86.38 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.490.00 2.03 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.490.00 2.03 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.490.00 2.10 Total : 1,041.45 Page: 8 Packet Page 77 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 9 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94870 3/15/2007 001835 AWARDS SERVICE INC 66707 RANGER BADGES FLAT GOLD BADGES 001.000.640.574.350.310.00 52.50 Sales Tax 001.000.640.574.350.310.00 4.68 Total : 57.18 94871 3/15/2007 002343 BILL HATCH SPORTING GOODS 19713-00 OPS UNIFORMS Beanies 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 653.50 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 57.51 Total : 711.01 94872 3/15/2007 071553 BLACKHAWK PRODUCTS GROUP LLC 796317 INV#796317 CUST#0098020 EDMOI BHI CHALKER SLING 104.000.410.521.210.310.00 59.99 Freight 104.000.410.521.210.310.00 9.95 Total : 69.94 94873 3/15/2007 002500 BLUMENTHAL UNIFORM CO INC 572263 INV#572263 EDMONDS PD - GANN, DUTY BELT 001.000.410.521.220.240.00 45.95 King County Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.220.240.00 4.04 Total : 49.99 94874 3/15/2007 002840 BRIM TRACTOR CO INC IE02444 UNIT 53 - SWITCH UNIT 53 - SWITCH 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 44.95 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 3.87 Total : 48.82 94875 3/15/2007 003001 BUILDERS SAND & GRAVEL 276569 ROCKERY SUPPLIES Page: 9 Packet Page 78 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 10 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94875 3/15/2007 003001 BUILDERS SAND & GRAVEL (Continued) ROCKERY ROCK 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 515.00 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 39.14 Total : 554.14 94876 3/15/2007 070954 CASCADE MEDICAL CENTER 07-021 PARAMEDIC LECTURE SERIES 20( Hoover/Paramedic Lecture Series 201 001.000.510.526.100.490.00 275.00 Total : 275.00 94877 3/15/2007 068660 CCECO LAB AND FILTRATION 12692 CO270 FILTERS 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 288.00 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 12.29 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 26.43 Total : 326.72 94878 3/15/2007 067446 CEM CORPORATION 285405 306951 MICROWAVE PARTS 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 313.00 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 87.90 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 27.86 Total : 428.76 94879 3/15/2007 003510 CENTRAL WELDING SUPPLY RN02071015 HELIUM HELIUM FOR GYMNASTICS BIRTHI 001.000.640.575.550.450.00 7.75 Sales Tax 001.000.640.575.550.450.00 0.69 Total : 8.44 Page: 10 Packet Page 79 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 11 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94880 3/15/2007 003510 CENTRAL WELDING SUPPLY RN02071017 2954000 ARGON/N ITROG EN/OXYGEN 411.000.656.538.800.450.21 31.00 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.450.21 2.76 Total : 33.76 94881 3/15/2007 003510 CENTRAL WELDING SUPPLY RN02071013 FLEET CYLINDER RENTAL FLEET CYLINDER RENTAL 511.000.657.548.680.450.00 7.75 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.450.00 0.69 RN02071016 SEWER CYLINDER RENTAL SEWER CYLINDER RENTAL 411.000.655.535.800.450.00 7.75 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.450.00 0.69 RN02071018 WATER - CYLINDER RENTAL WATER - CYLINDER RENTAL 411.000.654.534.800.450.00 31.00 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.450.00 2.76 Total : 50.64 94882 3/15/2007 003510 CENTRAL WELDING SUPPLY LY104343 ALS medical oxygen 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 46.90 hydrotest cylinders 001.000.510.522.200.480.00 81.25 Freight 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 19.67 Sales Tax 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 5.86 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.480.00 7.29 Page: 11 Packet Page 80 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 12 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94882 3/15/2007 003510 CENTRAL WELDING SUPPLY (Continued) LY104344 ALS SUPPLIES medical oxygen 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 37.52 Freight 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 14.44 Sales Tax 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 4.62 LY104345 ALS SUPPLIES medical oxygen 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 18.76 Freight 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 13.97 Sales Tax 001.000.510.526.100.310.00 2.91 Total : 253.19 94883 3/15/2007 064840 CHAPUT, KAREN E CHAPUT7657 FRIDAY NIGHTS OUT FRIDAY NIGHT OUT #7657 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 89.60 Total : 89.60 94884 3/15/2007 003710 CHEVRON USA 7898305185703 INV#7898305185703 ACCT#789-83C FUEL 104.000.410.521.210.320.00 257.37 CAR WASHES 104.000.410.521.210.480.00 15.00 Total : 272.37 94885 3/15/2007 064341 CINGULAR WIRELESS 425-418-8755 INV #150421551X03042007 425.418.8755 Service 2/28-3/27/07 001.000.310.514.100.420.00 130.10 Total : 130.10 94886 3/15/2007 064341 CINGULAR WIRELESS 206-369-4557 CELL PHONE FLEET Page: 12 Packet Page 81 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 13 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94886 3/15/2007 064341 CINGULAR WIRELESS (Continued) cell phone fleet 511.000.657.548.680.420.00 5.04 Total : 5.04 94887 3/15/2007 064341 CINGULAR WIRELESS 4XO3032007 ALS COMMUNICATIONS IRIS 001.000.510.526.100.420.00 44.91 X03082007 OPS COMMUNICATIONS vehicles' wireless 001.000.510.522.200.420.00 147.10 Total : 192.01 94888 3/15/2007 066382 CINTAS CORPORATION 460577354 UNIFORMS Volunteers 001.000.510.522.410.240.00 46.36 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.410.240.00 4.12 460577355 OPERATIONS UNIFORMS Stn. 16 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 106.82 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 9.51 460578434 OPS UNIFORMS Stn. 20 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 123.97 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 11.03 Total : 301.81 94889 3/15/2007 019215 CITY OF LYNNWOOD 5216 MAINT/OPERATION SANITARY SEA MAINT/OPERATION SANITARY SEb 411.000.655.535.800.470.00 13,800.83 Total : 13,800.83 94890 3/15/2007 019215 CITY OF LYNNWOOD 5221 INV#5221 CUST#47 EDMONDS PD Page: 13 Packet Page 82 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 14 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94890 3/15/2007 019215 CITY OF LYNNWOOD (Continued) PRISONER R&B JANUARY 2007 001.000.410.523.600.510.00 5,196.11 Total : 5,196.11 94891 3/15/2007 035160 CITY OF SEATTLE 2-533584-460571 WATER USEAGE FOR FEB 07 WATER USEAGE FOR FEB 07 411.000.654.534.800.340.00 420.00 Total : 420.00 94892 3/15/2007 070231 CNR INC 11138 03/07 MAINT PHONE SYSTEM 03/07 Phone Maintenance 001.000.390.528.800.480.00 736.67 Sales Tax 001.000.390.528.800.480.00 65.56 Total : 802.23 94893 3/15/2007 004095 COASTWIDE LABORATORIES E1757969 FAC - ROLL TOWELS, CREW NEUI FAC - ROLL TOWELS, CREW NEUI 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 411.96 Freight 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 2.50 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 36.47 W1759606 FAC MAINT - TT, ROLL TOWELS, B FAC MAINT - TT, ROLL TOWELS, B 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 830.22 Freight 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 2.50 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 73.28 Total : 1,356.93 94894 3/15/2007 069892 COLUMBIA FORD INC 3-8109 UNIT 12 REPLACEMENT- NEW 200, Page: 14 Packet Page 83 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 15 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94894 3/15/2007 069892 COLUMBIA FORD INC (Continued) UNIT 12 REPLACEMENT- NEW 200, 511.100.657.594.480.640.00 19,224.40 Cowlitz Co 511.100.657.594.480.640.00 1,537.95 Total : 20,762.35 94895 3/15/2007 004595 CONKLIN APPLIANCE A039663 FS 17 - WHIRLPOOL DISHWASHEF FS 17 - WHIRLPOOL DISHWASHEF 001.000.651.519.920.350.00 499.00 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.350.00 44.41 Total : 543.41 94896 3/15/2007 062891 COOK PAGING WA 6621961 ACC NO 1126518 pagers-water- 411.000.654.534.800.420.00 11.42 pagers-streets- 111.000.653.542.900.420.00 0.27 pagers-storm- 411.000.652.542.900.420.00 4.22 pagers -facilities 001.000.651.519.920.420.00 23.70 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.420.00 1.15 Sales Tax 111.000.653.542.900.420.00 0.03 Sales Tax 411.000.652.542.900.420.00 0.42 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.420.00 2.38 Total : 43.59 94897 3/15/2007 004867 COOPER, JACK F 34 LEOFF 1 Reimbursement LEOFF 1 Reimbursement 617.000.510.522.200.230.00 76.00 Page: 15 Packet Page 84 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 16 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94897 3/15/2007 004867 004867 COOPER, JACK F (Continued) Total : 76.00 94898 3/15/2007 068815 CORRECT EQUIPMENT 7992 SEAL SEAL 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 27.35 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 5.98 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 2.93 Total : 36.26 94899 3/15/2007 065683 CORRY'S FINE DRY CLEANING 510-0418 OPS UNIFORMS Batt Chiefs 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 79.46 510-0995 PREV UNIFORMS Fire Marshall 001.000.510.522.300.240.00 32.38 510-1524 PREV UNIFORMS Fire Inspector 001.000.510.522.300.240.00 17.67 510-1539 OPS UNIFORMS Admin BC 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 38.26 510-1884 UNIFORMS Fire Chief 001.000.510.522.100.240.00 26.49 510-2341 OPS UNIFORMS Asst. Chief 001.000.510.522.200.240.00 29.43 Total : 223.69 94900 3/15/2007 065683 CORRY'S FINE DRY CLEANING FEBRUARY 2007 INV# FEBRUARY 2007 EDMONDS F DRY CLEANING FEBRUARY 2007 001.000.410.521.220.240.00 903.99 Total : 903.99 94901 3/15/2007 005850 CRETIN, LAWRENCE CRETIN0310 GYM MONITOR Page: 16 Packet Page 85 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 17 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94901 3/15/2007 005850 CRETIN, LAWRENCE (Continued) ANDERSON CENTER GYM MONITC 001.000.640.574.100.410.00 48.00 Total : 48.00 94902 3/15/2007 005965 CUES INC 264130 SEWER DEPT CAMERA REPAIR SEWER DEPT CAMERA REPAIR 411.000.655.535.800.480.00 462.47 Freight 411.000.655.535.800.480.00 104.81 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.480.00 27.07 CM13955 SEWER DEPT - RETURNED SCREV SEWER DEPT - RETURNED SCREV 411.000.655.535.800.310.00 -1.21 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.310.00 -0.11 CM13956 SEWER DEPT - RETURNED CABLE SEWER DEPT - RETURNED CABLE 411.000.655.535.800.310.00 -47.65 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.310.00 -4.25 Total : 541.13 94903 3/15/2007 066802 CURRAN, JESSE CURRAN0314 BOOT REIMBURSEMENT REIMBURSEMENT FOR WORK BOi 001.000.640.576.800.240.00 164.00 Total : 164.00 94904 3/15/2007 061570 DAY WIRELESS SYSTEMS - 16 134562 OPS COMMUNICATIONS modem calibrate & program 001.000.510.522.200.420.00 65.00 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.420.00 5.60 Total : 70.60 Page: 17 Packet Page 86 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 18 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94905 3/15/2007 070230 DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING feb 2007 STATE SHARE OF CONCEALED PI; State Share of Concealed Pistol 001.000.000.237.190.000.00 273.00 Total : 273.00 94906 3/15/2007 006626 DEPT OF ECOLOGY 0366 JIM NORDQUIST JIM NORDQUIST/OPERATOR CERI 411.000.656.538.800.490.00 30.00 Total : 30.00 94907 3/15/2007 006626 DEPT OF ECOLOGY 2007-WAR045513 PERMIT WAR045513 STORMWATE STORMWATER DISCHARGE PERM 411.000.652.542.400.490.00 7,940.88 Total : 7,940.88 94908 3/15/2007 006626 DEPT OF ECOLOGY VL07208001 8TH AND WALNUT PETROLEUM Cl 8TH AND WALNUT PETROLEUM Cl 411.000.652.542.900.410.00 481.30 Total : 481.30 94909 3/15/2007 064422 DEPT OF GENERAL ADMIN 201568929 FAC MAINT - M & LG GLOVES, CLII FAC MAINT - M & LG GLOVES, CLII 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 120.60 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 10.13 201569505 LIBRARY - WASTEBASKETS LIBRARY - WASTEBASKETS 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 52.80 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 4.44 201570511 FAC MAINT - SEAT COVERS, LINEF FAC MAINT - SEAT COVERS, LINEF 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 43.35 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 3.64 Total : 234.96 Page: 18 Packet Page 87 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 19 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94910 3/15/2007 064422 DEPT OF GENERAL ADMIN 16-1-3755 INV#16-1-3755 CUST#23104-000 EC ADMIN FEE - FED SURPLUS PROG 001.000.410.521.100.490.00 100.00 Total : 100.00 94911 3/15/2007 064531 DINES, JEANNIE 07-2730 MINUTE TAKING 3/6/07 Council Minutes 001.000.250.514.300.410.00 266.00 Total : 266.00 94912 3/15/2007 007675 EDMONDS AUTO PARTS 77377 SUPPLIES OIL 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 25.08 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 2.23 77737 SUPPLIES TUBING/SUPPLIES 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 15.97 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.310.00 1.42 Total : 44.70 94913 3/15/2007 007675 EDMONDS AUTO PARTS 77572 OPS SUPPLIES Hlgn Lamps 001.000.510.522.200.310.00 21.06 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.310.00 1.87 Total : 22.93 94914 3/15/2007 069878 EDMONDS-WESTGATE VET HOSPITAL 94596 INV#94596 CLIENT#5118 EDMOND: SPAY IMPOUND #6689 001.000.410.521.700.490.01 109.75 SPAY IMPOUND #6804 001.000.410.521.700.490.01 97.50 SPAY FELINE IMPOUND #6719 001.000.410.521.700.490.01 86.00 Page: 19 Packet Page 88 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 20 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # 94914 3/15/2007 069878 069878 EDMONDS-WESTGATE VET HOSPI' (Continued) 94915 3/15/2007 008969 ENGLAND, CHARLES ENGLAND7627 94916 3/15/2007 071548 FALCON RIDGE HOMES LLC 94917 3/15/2007 009815 FERGUSON ENTERPRISES INC 125945&6 0077906 0083025 Description/Account Amount Total : 293.25 SATURDAY NIGHT DANCE SATURDAY NIGHT DANCE #7627 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 450.00 SATURDAY NIGHT DANCE #7628 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 450.00 SATURDAY NIGHT DANCE #7629 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 480.00 SATURDAY NIGHT DANCE #7630 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 120.00 Total : 1,500.00 PARTIAL REFUND ON HYDRANT M PARTIAL REFUND ON HYDRANT M 411.000.000.245.110.000.00 853.73 Total : 853.73 WATER - KUPFERIE FLUSH HYDR/ WATER - KUPFERIE FLUSH HYDR/ 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 690.00 Freight 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 85.00 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 68.20 WATER DEPT - TORX, TAMPER SC WATER DEPT - TORX, TAMPER SC 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 91.40 Freight 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 7.32 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 8.78 Page: 20 Packet Page 89 of 433 vchlist 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM Voucher List City of Edmonds Page: 21 Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94917 3/15/2007 009815 FERGUSON ENTERPRISES INC (Continued) 0083317 WATER - DUCTILE IRON READER I WATER - DUCTILE IRON READER 1 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 511.38 14X16X12 DUPLEX METER BOX 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 676.14 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 105.69 0083930 WATER - 2" 3-PC THREADED UNTO WATER - 2" 3-PC THREADED UNTO 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 70.98 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.310.00 6.25 Total : 2,321.14 94918 3/15/2007 069940 FIRST ADVANTAGE BACKGROUND SVC 900JJM0702 INV#900JJM0702 EDMONDS PD CREDIT CHECKS 001.000.410.521.100.410.00 26.12 Total : 26.12 94919 3/15/2007 070855 FLEX PLAN SERVICES INC 92359 Check mailing fee - section 132 plan Check mailing fee - section 132 plan 001.000.220.516.100.410.00 1.80 Total : 1.80 94920 3/15/2007 071562 FORMA 4206 PLANNED SIGN PROGRAM DESIGI DEVLPMNT OF PLANNED SIGN PR 125.000.640.594.750.650.00 1,800.00 Total : 1,800.00 94921 3/15/2007 071311 FORMS AND FILING INC 99455A INV#99455A CUST#8151 EDMOND: Page: 21 Packet Page 90 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 22 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94921 3/15/2007 071311 FORMS AND FILING INC (Continued) COLOR TAB NUMBER LABELS 001.000.410.521.110.310.00 39.00 COLOR TAB NUMBER SERIES LAB 001.000.410.521.110.310.00 52.00 RED "J" LABELS 001.000.410.521.110.310.00 8.90 Freight 001.000.410.521.110.310.00 5.42 Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.110.310.00 9.38 Total : 114.70 94922 3/15/2007 010660 FOSTER, MARLO 33 LEOFF 1 Reimbursement LEOFF 1 Reimbursement 009.000.390.517.370.230.00 1,901.33 Total : 1,901.33 94923 3/15/2007 067232 GERRISH BEARING COMPANY 2070830-01 EDMCIT BEARILNGS 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 35.12 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 3.09 Total : 38.21 94924 3/15/2007 071560 GREAVES COMPANY INC 071357 69419 C-248 SAND UNLOADING VALVE 414.000.656.594.320.650.00 3,955.00 Freight 414.000.656.594.320.650.00 69.84 Sales Tax 414.000.656.594.320.650.00 354.18 Total : 4,379.02 94925 3/15/2007 012555 H & L SPORTING GOODS 91-1423 SOFTBALL SUPPLIES Page: 22 Packet Page 91 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 23 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94925 3/15/2007 012555 H & L SPORTING GOODS (Continued) SCOREBOOKS AND LINE UP CARE 001.000.640.575.520.310.00 840.00 Sales Tax 001.000.640.575.520.310.00 72.24 Total : 912.24 94926 3/15/2007 070515 HARLEY DAVIDSON OF SEATTLE 123164 UNIT 124 POL -RIVETS UNIT 124 POL -RIVETS 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 6.08 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 0.54 Total : 6.62 94927 3/15/2007 069332 HEALTHFORCE OCCMED 2126-79 Medical evaluation Medical evaluation 001.000.220.516.210.410.00 615.00 Total : 615.00 94928 3/15/2007 064129 HENRY'S PLANT FARM 55422 FLOWER PROGRAM SUPPLIES FLOWERS,PLANTS FOR FLOWER 001.000.640.576.810.310.00 437.68 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.810.310.00 38.95 Total : 476.63 94929 3/15/2007 069164 HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY 41913017 HP NOTEBOOK NC6320 PER QUOI 330-00333 HP Notebook nc6320 per quote 1192 001.000.510.522.400.350.00 1,491.00 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.400.350.00 132.70 Total : 1,623.70 94930 3/15/2007 067862 HOME DEPOT CREDIT SERVICES 3583914 6035322500959949 Page: 23 Packet Page 92 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 24 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94930 3/15/2007 067862 HOME DEPOT CREDIT SERVICES (Continued) GAS CONNECTOR 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 11.98 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 1.05 4044593 6035322500959949 PLYWOOD 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 29.99 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 2.64 6252403 6035322500959949 GAS CONNECTOR 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 -18.47 74728 6035322500959949 BRUSHES/FIRE CAULK 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 47.73 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 4.20 8066437 6035322500959949 GAS CONNECTOR 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 25.95 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 2.28 9034235 6035322500959949 PAINT SUPPLIES 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 9.94 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 0.87 Total : 118.16 94931 3/15/2007 067862 HOME DEPOT CREDIT SERVICES 3043050 6035322501434934 drywall & bit 001.000.510.522.200.310.00 37.91 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.310.00 3.34 Page: 24 Packet Page 93 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 25 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94931 3/15/2007 067862 HOME DEPOT CREDIT SERVICES (Continued) 6031690 6035322501434934 hinges & 7/16 OSB 001.000.510.522.200.310.00 89.68 Sales Tax 001.000.510.522.200.310.00 7.89 Total : 138.82 94932 3/15/2007 013905 HOUSLER, DAN MARCH 07 BOC CLASS MILEAGE FOR JAN - N BOC CLASS MILEAGE FOR JAN - N 001.000.651.519.920.430.00 81.48 Total : 81.48 94933 3/15/2007 062899 HUFF, ARIELE HUFF7544 POETRY CLASS EXPLORING POETRY #7544 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 126.00 Total : 126.00 94934 3/15/2007 071380 ICHIMURA-HAYASHI, ITSUKO HAYASH17917 ORIGAMI CLASS ORIGAMI #7917 001.000.640.574.200.410.00 15.60 Total : 15.60 94935 3/15/2007 070042 IKON FINANCIAL SERVICES 72600184 CANON IMAGE RUNNER 9070 LEA; 250-00139 Canon Image Runner 9070 Lease- 001.000.250.514.300.450.00 918.90 Total : 918.90 94936 3/15/2007 061546 INDUSTRIAL CONTROLS SUPPLY 700695 SEWER INVENTORY - S-ELECTLS SEWER INVENTORY - S-ELECTLS 411.000.000.141.150.310.00 213.45 Freight 411.000.000.141.150.310.00 7.70 Sales Tax 411.000.000.141.150.310.00 19.68 Page: 25 Packet Page 94 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 26 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94936 3/15/2007 061546 INDUSTRIAL CONTROLS SUPPLY (Continued) 700699 SEWER - TELEM ST 2 - MONITOR I SEWER - TELEM ST 2 - MONITOR 1 411.000.655.535.800.310.00 129.30 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.310.00 11.51 Total : 381.64 94937 3/15/2007 014430 INDUSTRIAL ELECTRIC CO INC 17084 MOTOR MOTOR 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 420.65 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 14.25 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 37.40 Total : 472.30 94938 3/15/2007 069040 INTERSTATE AUTO PART WAREHOUSE 435841 SHOP - END CUTTER SHOP - END CUTTER 511.000.657.548.680.350.00 23.73 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.350.00 2.11 435978 SHOP - WIPER BLADES, 6V BATTE SHOP - WIPER BLADES, 6V BATTE 511.000.657.548.680.350.00 120.50 Freight 511.000.657.548.680.350.00 6.85 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.350.00 11.33 Total : 164.52 94939 3/15/2007 068737 JOHNSON ROBERTS & ASSOC 106475 INV#106475 EDMONDS PD PRE -OFFER PHQ REPORT - MOSS 001.000.410.521.100.410.00 15.00 Freight 001.000.410.521.100.410.00 0.87 Page: 26 Packet Page 95 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 27 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94939 3/15/2007 068737 068737 JOHNSON ROBERTS & ASSOC (Continued) Total : 15.87 94940 3/15/2007 066913 KDL HARDWARE SUPPLY INC 320637 FAC MAINT - KEYIN SC KNOB CYL FAC MAINT - KEYIN SC KNOB CYL 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 163.02 Freight 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 4.57 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 14.75 Total : 182.34 94941 3/15/2007 071556 LENEKE, EDITH LENEKE0306 REFUND REFUND OF DAMAGE DEPOSIT 001.000.000.239.200.000.00 250.00 Total : 250.00 94942 3/15/2007 067725 LES SCHWAB TIRE CENTER 121831 UNIT 332 - SNOW TIRES AND STU[ UNIT 332 - SNOW TIRES AND STU[ 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 190.82 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 18.98 122558 UNIT 67 - TIRE UNIT 67 - TIRE 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 125.41 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 12.16 Total : 347.37 94943 3/15/2007 018900 LYNNWOOD AUTO ELECTRIC 69627 UNIT 53- STARTER UNIT 53- STARTER 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 175.00 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 15.58 Page: 27 Packet Page 96 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 28 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94943 3/15/2007 018900 LYNNWOOD AUTO ELECTRIC (Continued) 69645 UNIT 55 - MOD ALTERNATOR UNIT 55 - MOD ALTERNATOR 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 98.00 Sales Tax 511.000.657.548.680.310.00 8.72 Total : 297.30 94944 3/15/2007 060246 M & M BALLOON CO T-4509 Helium tank rental - 11/06, 12/06, Helium tank rental - 11/06, 12/06, 001.000.210.513.100.450.00 60.00 Sales Tax 001.000.210.513.100.450.00 5.34 Total : 65.34 94945 3/15/2007 071555 MATHEWS, ALYSSA 6657 ANIMAL IMPOUND 6657 - SPAY/NE SPAY/NEUTER REFUND 001.000.000.343.930.000.00 50.00 Total : 50.00 94946 3/15/2007 020039 MCMASTER-CARR SUPPLY CO 60401467 123106800 MULTIMETER 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 93.07 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 5.04 60464764 123106800 PIPE FITTINGS 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 100.61 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 6.15 Total : 204.87 94947 3/15/2007 071557 MOODY, DONALD 43614 MOODY REFUND RE: BLDG. PERM MOODY REFUND RE: BLDG. PERM 001.000.000.257.620.000.00 4.50 Total : 4.50 Page: 28 Packet Page 97 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 29 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94948 3/15/2007 064570 NATIONAL SAFETY INC 0193436-IN SEWER DEPT - WORK JEANS SEWER DEPT - WORK JEANS 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 120.60 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.240.00 10.61 Total : 131.21 94949 3/15/2007 024960 NORTH COAST ELECTRIC COMPANY S1306562.002 CABLES CABLES 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 48.60 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 16.10 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.22 5.56 Total : 70.26 94950 3/15/2007 061013 NORTHWEST CASCADE INC 0436651 HONEY BUCKET RENTAL HONEY BUCKET RENTAL:- 001.000.640.576.800.450.00 231.18 Total : 231.18 94951 3/15/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC 558125 Office Supplies - L. Carl Office Supplies - L. Carl 001.000.210.513.100.310.00 50.97 King County Sales Tax 001.000.210.513.100.310.00 2.48 568555 Office Supplies - HR Office Supplies - HR 001.000.220.516.100.310.00 34.80 Service charge 001.000.220.516.100.310.00 1.00 King County Sales Tax 001.000.220.516.100.310.00 3.06 Total : 92.31 94952 3/15/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC 543141 Extension cord Utility knife & Blades Page: 29 Packet Page 98 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 30 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94952 3/15/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC (Continued) Extension cord Utility knife & Blades 001.000.310.518.880.310.00 24.33 Computer Duster 001.000.310.514.230.310.00 22.30 King County Sales Tax 001.000.310.518.880.310.00 2.15 King County Sales Tax 001.000.310.514.230.310.00 1.96 544490 Extension Cord Extension Cord 001.000.310.518.880.310.00 16.08 King County Sales Tax 001.000.310.518.880.310.00 1.42 560420 Printer toner calulator ribbons tabs Printer toner calulator ribbons tabs 001.000.310.514.230.310.00 207.31 King County Sales Tax 001.000.310.514.230.310.00 18.25 Total : 293.80 94953 3/15/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC 449074 520437 CDR'S/DISPENSER/INK CART/BATI 411.000.656.538.800.310.41 95.27 King County Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.310.41 8.38 Total : 103.65 94954 3/15/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC 287553 OFFICE UPPLIES office supplies 001.000.250.514.300.310.00 249.44 King County Sales Tax 001.000.250.514.300.310.00 21.95 Page: 30 Packet Page 99 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 31 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94954 3/15/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC (Continued) 377578 OFFICE SUPPLIES Envelopes returned Org Inv287553 2, 001.000.250.514.300.310.00 -113.46 King County Sales Tax 001.000.250.514.300.310.00 -9.98 377618 OFFICE SUPPLIES Tyvek envelopes 001.000.250.514.300.310.00 151.68 King County Sales Tax 001.000.250.514.300.310.00 13.35 Total : 312.98 94955 3/15/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC 359978 PW ADMIN - STAMPS, WIPES, LEG PW ADMIN - STAMPS, WIPES, LEG 001.000.650.519.910.310.00 526.01 King County Sales Tax 001.000.650.519.910.310.00 46.28 405180 PW ADMIN - LEGAL FILE FOLDER PW ADMIN - LEGAL FILE FOLDER 001.000.650.519.910.310.00 34.80 SVC FEE 001.000.650.519.910.310.00 1.00 King County Sales Tax 001.000.650.519.910.310.00 3.06 489414 PW ADMIN SUPPLIES - HIGHLITER PW ADMIN SUPPLIES - HIGHLITER 001.000.650.519.910.310.00 26.03 SVC FEE 001.000.650.519.910.310.00 1.00 King County Sales Tax 001.000.650.519.910.310.00 2.28 Total : 640.46 94956 3/15/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC 262932 MISC. OFFICE SUPPLIES DS DEPT Page: 31 Packet Page 100 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 32 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor 94956 3/15/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC 94957 3/15/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount (Continued) MISC. OFFICE SUPPLIES DS DEPT 001.000.620.558.800.310.00 7.15 King County Sales Tax 001.000.620.558.800.310.00 0.63 399134 MISC. OFFICE SUPPLIES. MISC. OFFICE SUPPLIES. 001.000.620.558.800.310.00 141.22 King County Sales Tax 001.000.620.558.800.310.00 12.42 453898 MISC. OFFICE SUPPLIES. MISC. OFFICE SUPPLIES. 001.000.620.558.800.310.00 241.13 King County Sales Tax 001.000.620.558.800.310.00 21.21 Total : 423.76 404396 INV#404396 ACCT#520437 250POL BOISE X-9 LEGAL SIZE PAPER 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 16.96 STAPLES, PENS, FOLDERS, BINDE 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 53.71 CARTON OF TISSUES 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 48.33 King County Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 10.48 Page: 32 Packet Page 101 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 33 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor 94957 3/15/2007 063511 OFFICE MAX CONTRACT INC Invoice (Continued) 585326 94958 3/15/2007 070166 OFFICE OF THE STATE TREASURER Dec 2006 PO # Description/Account Amount INV#585326 ACCT#520437 250POL DRY ERASE BOARD SUPPLIES 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 8.44 RULER 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 0.88 CASSETTE TAPES 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 2.40 HP GLOSSY PHOTO PAPER 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 25.67 HP TONER FOR SGT. SMITH 001.000.410.521.110.310.00 57.39 PENS, POST -ITS, NOTEBOOKS 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 60.06 AA NiMH BATTERIES 001.000.410.521.700.310.00 16.99 King County Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.100.310.00 8.58 King County Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.110.310.00 5.05 King County Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.700.310.00 1.49 Total : 316.43 COURT, BLDG CODE & JIS TRANSI Page: 33 Packet Page 102 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 34 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94958 3/15/2007 070166 OFFICE OF THE STATE TREASURER (Continued) Emergency Medical Services & Traur 001.000.000.237.120.000.00 750.36 PSEA 1, 2,3 Account 001.000.000.237.130.000.00 17,109.60 Building Code Fee Account 001.000.000.237.150.000.00 83.00 State Patrol Death Investigations 001.000.000.237.170.000.00 669.88 Judicial Information Systems Accoun 001.000.000.237.180.000.00 1,909.63 School Zone Safety Account 001.000.000.237.200.000.00 163.14 Total : 20,685.61 94959 3/15/2007 025889 OGDEN MURPHY AND WALLACE 656899 02/07 LEGAL FEES 02/07 Leagl Fees 001.000.360.515.100.410.00 12,136.46 656905 02/07 RETAINER FEES 02/07 Retainer Fees 001.000.360.515.100.410.00 12,400.50 Total : 24,536.96 94960 3/15/2007 026200 OLYMPIC VIEW WATER DISTRICT 0002920 WATER FOR L/S #13 WATER FOR L/S #13 411.000.655.535.800.470.00 23.60 0021400 FIRE STATION #20 FIRE STATION #20 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 100.37 Total : 123.97 94961 3/15/2007 066833 PACIFIC NW PUBLIC FLEET 7118 2007 MEMBER RENEWAL FOR - 2007 MEMBER RENEWAL FOR - 511.000.657.548.680.490.00 100.00 Total : 100.00 Page: 34 Packet Page 103 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 35 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94962 3/15/2007 071558 PETERSON, NELLIE 4-40190 RE: # 07-4070-SV UTILITY REFUND # 07-4070-SV Utility Refund/ 411.000.000.233.000.000.00 99.63 Total : 99.63 94963 3/15/2007 027775 PETRELLA, MARC 510-0326 TRAINING TRAVEL mileage reimbrsmt 001.000.510.522.400.430.00 129.98 Total : 129.98 94964 3/15/2007 007800 PETTY CASH tc petty parking reimb-snook Page: 35 Packet Page 104 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 36 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94964 3/15/2007 007800 PETTY CASH (Continued) parking reimb-snook 001.000.620.524.100.430.00 5.00 sno cnty records document fee 001.000.250.514.300.490.00 10.00 scfoa meeting -chase 001.000.250.514.300.490.00 10.00 scfoa meeting-mcconnell&monroe 001.000.310.514.230.490.00 23.00 scfoa mileage reimb-mcconnell 001.000.310.514.230.430.00 10.67 cookies for mayors neighborhood me 001.000.210.513.100.310.00 9.48 scfoa-meeting-Hynd 001.000.250.514.300.490.00 10.00 mileage reimb-Carl 001.000.210.513.100.430.00 81.00 supplies for Ifd investigation 001.000.510.522.300.310.00 42.47 smp workshop supplies 001.000.620.558.600.310.00 96.23 cookies mayors neighborhood meetir 001.000.210.513.100.310.00 5.49 paper for 2006 comp plans 001.000.620.558.600.310.00 23.48 monthly sno cnty mayors lunch 001.000.210.513.100.490.00 18.00 coffee for 2nd floor 001.000.620.558.800.310.00 36.74 cookies for mayors neighborhood me 001.000.210.513.100.310.00 14.98 can opener-bldg dept 001.000.620.558.800.310.00 11.92 Total : 408.46 94965 3/15/2007 070257 POSTINI INC 290946 INTERNET ANTI -VIRUS & SPAM MA Page: 36 Packet Page 105 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 37 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94965 3/15/2007 070257 POSTINI INC (Continued) 03/07 Internet Anti -Virus & Spam Ma 001.000.310.518.880.480.00 475.83 Total : 475.83 94966 3/15/2007 071184 PROCOM 207-1158 FEB 07 PROF SERVICE FIBER OPT Feb 07 Prof Service Fiber Optic Proje 001.000.390.528.200.410.00 1,187.50 Sales Tax 001.000.390.528.200.410.00 105.69 Total : 1,293.19 94967 3/15/2007 064088 PROTECTION ONE 31146525 24 HOUR ALARM MONITORING -CI 24 hour alarm monitoring-CH- 001.000.651.519.920.420.00 35.00 Total : 35.00 94968 3/15/2007 071559 PUBLIC SAFETY SELECTION PC 863 Employment screening services Employment screening services 001.000.220.516.210.410.00 350.00 Total : 350.00 94969 3/15/2007 046900 PUGET SOUND ENERGY 5322323139 Fire Station # 16 Fire Station # 16 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 1,374.95 Total : 1,374.95 94970 3/15/2007 030695 PUMPTECH INC 26144 SEWER INVENTORY - 3HP GRINDE SEWER INVENTORY - 3HP GRINDE 411.000.000.141.150.310.00 3,111.00 Sales Tax 411.000.000.141.150.310.00 273.77 Total : 3,384.77 94971 3/15/2007 065579 QUIKSIGN 55277 S-06-146 SIGN INSTALLATION Page: 37 Packet Page 106 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 38 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94971 3/15/2007 065579 QUIKSIGN (Continued) S-06-146 SIGN INSTALLATION 001.000.620.558.600.410.11 156.00 Sales Tax 001.000.620.558.600.410.11 13.73 Total : 169.73 94972 3/15/2007 064291 QWEST 206-Z02-0478 332B FLOW METERING STATIONS FLOW METERING STATIONS 411.000.656.538.800.420.00 137.80 Total : 137.80 94973 3/15/2007 071563 SEATTLE CHINESE POST INC 9498724 Transportation Engineer, #07-07 ad Transportation Engineer, #07-07 ad 001.000.220.516.100.440.00 40.00 Total : 40.00 94974 3/15/2007 036070 SHANNON TOWING INC 188624 INV#188624 EDMONDS PD CASE C TOW 2007 MITSUBISHI 660NBY 001.000.410.521.220.410.00 124.00 Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.220.410.00 11.03 Total : 135.03 94975 3/15/2007 037375 SNO CO PUD NO 1 2460018753 CITY PARK RESTROOMS CITY PARK RESTROOMS 001.000.640.576.800.470.00 53.11 3660016779 PARK GAZEBO PARK GAZEBO 001.000.640.576.800.470.00 29.74 5030011778 CITY PARK SOUTH RESTROOMS 8 CITY PARK SOUTH RESTROOMS 8 001.000.640.576.800.470.00 302.93 Total : 385.78 94976 3/15/2007 037375 SNO CO PUD NO 1 750007487 620-001-500-3 Page: 38 Packet Page 107 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 39 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94976 3/15/2007 037375 SNO CO PUD NO 1 (Continued) VARIOUS LOCATIONS 411.000.656.538.800.471.62 6.33 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.471.62 0.38 Total : 6.71 94977 3/15/2007 037375 SNO CO PUD NO 1 2060018765 LIFT STATION #8 LIFT STATION #8 411.000.655.535.800.470.00 73.07 2340018510 SIGNAL LIGHT SIGNAL LIGHT 111.000.653.542.640.470.00 75.30 3180012308 SIGNAL LIGHT SIGNAL LIGHT 111.000.653.542.640.470.00 58.93 3260494996 DECORATIVE LIGHTS 115 2ND AVE deocrative lighting 111.000.653.542.630.470.00 42.30 3380016430 SCHOOL FLASHING LIGHT SCHOOL FLASHING LIGHT 111.000.653.542.640.470.00 29.74 3980029445 LIFT STATION #14 LIFT STATION #14 411.000.655.535.800.470.00 29.74 4650022645 FIRE STATION #20 FIRE STATION #20 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 660.61 5240017631 SIGNAL LIGHT SIGNAL LIGHT 111.000.653.542.640.470.00 41.89 5370016262 STREET LIGHT STREET LIGHT 111.000.653.542.630.470.00 29.74 Page: 39 Packet Page 108 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 40 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94977 3/15/2007 037375 SNO CO PUD NO 1 (Continued) 5720013258 LIFT STATION #1 LIFT STATION #1 411.000.655.535.800.470.00 1,077.04 6000013000 STREET LIGHTING STREET LIGHTING 111.000.653.542.630.470.00 8,422.55 6100013009 STREET LIGHTING STREET LIGHTING 111.000.653.542.630.470.00 7,944.24 6100013306 STREET LIGHTING STREET LIGHTING 111.000.653.542.630.470.00 170.07 6200013008 STREET LIGHTING STREET LIGHTING 111.000.653.542.630.470.00 1,814.76 Total : 20,469.98 94978 3/15/2007 038100 SNO-KING STAMP 34013 INV#34013 EDMONDS PD CRIME PREV. ADDRESS STAMP 001.000.410.521.300.310.00 13.88 NEW DIE & INK PAD FOR CP STAN 001.000.410.521.300.310.00 7.00 Sales Tax 001.000.410.521.300.310.00 1.86 Total : 22.74 94979 3/15/2007 069358 SNO-KING STUMP GRINDERS 3534 STUMP GRINDING STUMP GRINDING @ CITY PARK, 1 001.000.640.576.800.480.00 1,125.00 Sales Tax 001.000.640.576.800.480.00 100.13 Total : 1,225.13 94980 3/15/2007 070167 SNOHOMISH COUNTY TREASURER dec 2006 Crime Victims Page: 40 Packet Page 109 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 41 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94980 3/15/2007 070167 SNOHOMISH COUNTY TREASURER (Continued) Crime Victims 001.000.000.237.140.000.00 576.40 Total : 576.40 94981 3/15/2007 038300 SOUND DISPOSAL CO 03584 RECYCLING RECYCLING 411.000.656.538.800.475.66 23.38 Sales Tax 411.000.656.538.800.475.66 1.40 Total : 24.78 94982 3/15/2007 038300 SOUND DISPOSAL CO 03585 garbage & recycle for FAC garbage & recycle for FAC 001.000.651.519.920.470.00 556.90 Total : 556.90 94983 3/15/2007 070684 STANTEC CONSULTING INC 133431 53769 C-161 SCREENINGS SYSTEM IMPF 414.000.656.594.320.650.00 646.80 Total : 646.80 94984 3/15/2007 031060 STEARNS FINANCIAL SERVICES 7049031-IN RADIX MONTHLY MAINT ARPIL 07 RADIX MONTHLY MAINT ARPIL 07 411.000.654.534.800.480.00 155.40 Sales Tax 411.000.654.534.800.480.00 13.83 Total : 169.23 94985 3/15/2007 040430 STONEWAY ELECTRIC SUPPLY 903517 FS 20 - ELELCTRICAL SUPPLIES FS 20 - ELELCTRICAL SUPPLIES 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 103.80 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 9.24 Page: 41 Packet Page 110 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 42 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94985 3/15/2007 040430 STONEWAY ELECTRIC SUPPLY (Continued) 924664 CITY HALL - ELECT SUPPLIES CITY HALL - ELECT SUPPLIES 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 208.26 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 18.54 929344 OLD PW - ELECT SUPPLIES OLD PW - ELECT SUPPLIES 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 32.94 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 2.93 929345 FS 16 - ELECT SUPPLIES FS 16 - ELECT SUPPLIES 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 19.10 Sales Tax 001.000.651.519.920.310.00 1.70 Total : 396.51 94986 3/15/2007 068995 SUNSHINE FILTERS OF PINELLAS 085803 FILTERS FILTERS 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 198.29 Freight 411.000.656.538.800.310.21 16.74 Total : 215.03 94987 3/15/2007 070578 TEL WEST COMMUNICATIONS 800168 C/A 20044 PR1-1 City Phone Service 2/21-3/21/ 001.000.390.528.800.420.00 835.40 Total : 835.40 94988 3/15/2007 065710 THE CHAMBERS MULTIMEDIA 000494 INTERNET ACCESS FOR CEMETEF CEMETERY INTERNET ACCESS 130.000.640.536.200.420.00 17.95 Total : 17.95 94989 3/15/2007 009350 THE DAILY HERALD COMPANY 1483514 NEWSPAPER AD Page: 42 Packet Page 111 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 43 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94989 3/15/2007 009350 THE DAILY HERALD COMPANY (Continued) Banner Sites Hearing 001.000.250.514.300.440.00 34.56 1483616 NEWSPAPER AD Landslide Hazard Area Hearing 001.000.250.514.300.440.00 40.32 1483619 NEWSPAPER AD CIP Hearing 001.000.250.514.300.440.00 31.68 C/A 101415 NEWSPAPER ADS 02/07 Council & Planning Agendas 001.000.250.514.300.440.00 1,406.71 Total : 1,513.27 94990 3/15/2007 009350 THE DAILY HERALD COMPANY 1477189 EMERALD HILLS/CU-07-8 LEGAL A EMERALD HILLS/CU-07-8 LEGAL A 001.000.620.558.600.440.00 18.72 1479506 REICHLER/CU-06-153 LEGAL ADVE REICHLER/CU-06-153 LEGAL ADVE 001.000.620.558.600.440.00 19.44 1482318 SHAPIRO/R-06-95 LEGAL ADVERTI SHAPIRO/R-06-95 LEGAL ADVERTI 001.000.620.558.600.440.00 28.08 1482954 REICHLER/ADB-06-154 LEGAL AD\v REICHLER/ADB-06-154 LEGAL ADS 001.000.620.558.600.440.00 19.44 1483647 CRISPENO/S-06-146 LEGAL ADVEF CRISPENO/S-06-146 LEGAL ADVEF 001.000.620.558.600.440.00 22.32 Total : 108.00 94991 3/15/2007 071561 TRUCKERS EXPRESS INC 1080331-00 C-248 SAND DELIVERY C-248 SAND DELIVERY 414.000.656.594.320.650.00 550.00 Total : 550.00 Page: 43 Packet Page 112 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 44 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94992 3/15/2007 063596 UNIMIN CORPORATION 2467054 070-0010868 C 248 SAND 414.000.656.594.320.650.00 2,649.20 Sales Tax 414.000.656.594.320.650.00 206.72 Total : 2,855.92 94993 3/15/2007 071549 UNIVAR USA INC KT-012790 SEWER DEPT - COPPER SULFATE SEWER DEPT - COPPER SULFATE 411.000.655.535.800.310.00 102.00 Sales Tax 411.000.655.535.800.310.00 8.98 Total : 110.98 94994 3/15/2007 011900 VERIZON NORTHWEST 425-744-1681 SEAVIEW PARK IRRIGATION MODI SEAVIEW PARK IRRIGATION MODI 001.000.640.576.800.420.00 47.70 425-744-1691 SIERRA PARK IRRIGATION MODEI• SIERRA PARK IRRIGATION MODE 001.000.640.576.800.420.00 47.05 425-745-5055 MEADOWDALE PRESCHOOL MEADOWDALE PRESCHOOL 001.000.640.575.560.420.00 59.51 425-776-5316 GROUNDS MAINTENANCE FAX MC GROUNDS MAINTENANCE FAX MC 001.000.640.576.800.420.00 104.45 Total : 258.71 94995 3/15/2007 011900 VERIZON NORTHWEST 425 NW1-0060 03 0210 1079569413 10 BPS TELEMETRY 411.000.656.538.800.420.00 41.02 425 NW 1-0155 03 0210 1099569419 02 TELEMENTRY 411.000.656.538.800.420.00 215.74 Page: 44 Packet Page 113 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 45 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Amount 94995 3/15/2007 011900 VERIZON NORTHWEST (Continued) 425-771-5553 03 02101014522641 07 AUTO DIALER 411.000.656.538.800.420.00 62.09 Total : 318.85 94996 3/15/2007 011900 VERIZON NORTHWEST 425-640-8169 PT EDWARDS SEWER PUMP STAT Phone line for Sewer Lift Station at P 411.000.655.535.800.420.00 33.82 425-673-5978 LIFT STATION #1 Lift Station #1 411.000.655.535.800.420.00 47.37 425-771-0158 FS # 16 FS #16 001.000.651.519.920.420.00 228.12 425-776-1281 LIBRARY ELEVATOR PHONE LIBRARY ELEVATOR PHONE 001.000.651.519.920.420.00 42.70 425-776-6829 CITY HALL FIRE ALARM SYSTEM CITY HALL FIRE ALARM SYSTEM 001.000.651.519.920.420.00 114.72 425-AB9-0530 1ST & PINE CIRCUIT LINE PT EDW 1st & Pine Circuit Line for Pt Edward: 411.000.655.535.800.420.00 40.30 Total : 507.03 94997 3/15/2007 068265 VERIZON ONLINE 10633864 ACCT #8372119 Mar 07 City of Edmonds Internet 001.000.310.518.880.420.00 667.00 Total : 667.00 94998 3/15/2007 067865 VERIZON WIRELESS 269992985-1 425-308-9867 cell phone -water watch 411.000.654.534.800.420.00 35.93 Total : 35.93 94999 3/15/2007 068180 WA CITIZENS -RESOURCE CONSERV 2007 DUES MEMBERSHIP DUES FOR- S FISHE Page: 45 Packet Page 114 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 46 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice 94999 3/15/2007 068180 WA CITIZENS -RESOURCE CONSERV (Continued) 95000 3/15/2007 064183 WA STATE LEOFF EDUCATION ASSOC 03/13/2007 95001 3/15/2007 045515 WABO 95002 3/15/2007 065035 WASHINGTON STATE PATROL 95003 3/15/2007 065179 WSAPT TREASURER 152 Vouchers for bank code : front 152 Vouchers in this report 3/13/07 12121 106014890 I,by69_120111177 PO # Description/Account Amount MEMBERSHIP DUES FOR- S FISHE 411.000.654.537.900.490.00 50.00 Total : 50.00 LEOFF Education Ass. Conference 2 LEOFF Education Ass. Conference 2 001.000.390.517.220.230.00 275.00 LEOFF Educ. Assn. Conference ; 5/8 LEOFF Educ. Assn. Conference ; 5/8 001.000.390.517.220.230.00 275.00 Total : 550.00 CODE BOOKS & TABS - BLDG. DEF CODE BOOKS & TABS - BLDG. DEF 001.000.620.524.100.310.00 177.00 Sales Tax 001.000.620.524.100.310.00 14.87 Total : 191.87 INV#106014890 EDMONDS PD BACKGROUND CHECKS 02/07 001.000.000.237.100.000.00 96.00 Total : 96.00 2007 MEMBERSHIP FOR MARIE HP 2007 MEMBERSHIP FOR MARIE HP 001.000.620.524.100.490.00 105.00 Total : 105.00 Bank total : 257,341.46 Total vouchers : 257,341.46 Page: 46 Packet Page 115 of 433 vchlist Voucher List Page: 47 03/15/2007 10:38:21AM City of Edmonds Bank code : front Voucher Date Vendor Invoice PO # Description/Account Page Amount 47 Packet Page 116 of 433 AM-875 2. D. Claims for Damages Edmonds City Council Meeting Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Linda Hynd, City Clerk's Office Submitted For: Sandy Chase Time: Consent Department: City Clerk's Office Type: Action Review Committee: Action: Agenda Memo Subiect Title Acknowledge receipt of Claims for Damages from Frank Tsering Degotsang (amount undetermined), Roseann Wilson (amount undetermined), Mark and Sherri Johnson ($929.94), Richard and Kathleen Glassburn (amount undetennined), and Marilyn G. Walker ($87.04). Recommendation from Mayor and Staff It is recommended that the City Council acknowledge receipt of the Claims for Damages. Previous Council Action Not applicable. Narrative Claims for Damages have been received from the following individuals: Tsering Degotsang 719 N.W. Market Street Seattle, WA. 98107 (Amount undetermined) Roseann Wilson 560 115th Avenue NW Coon Rapids, Minnesota 55433 (Amount undetermined) Mark and Sherri Johnson 9220 Cascade Drive Edmonds, WA 98020 ($929.94) Richard and Kathleen Glassburn 21911 98th Avenue West Edmonds, WA 98026 (Amount undetermined) Marilyn G. Walker 8024 181stPlace SW Edmonds, WA 98026 ($87.04) Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Attachments Link: Degotsang Claim for Damages Link: Wilson Claim for Damages Link: Johnson Claim for Damages Link: Glassburn Claim for Damages Link: Walker Claim for Damages Form Routing/Status Packet Page 117 of 433 Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/15/2007 09:27 AM APRV 2 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/15/2007 09:59 AM APRV 3 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/15/2007 10:15 AM APRV Form Started By: Linda Hynd Started On: 03/02/2007 04:35 PM Final Approval Date: 03/15/2007 Packet Page 118 of 433 RECEDE CITY OF EDMONDS MAR 0 2 2007 CLAIM FOR DAMAGES; FORM+ EDM _ S �=Wity Please take note that I' C�O-TsPrN (� , I,] eg I N 61 , who resides at �� 7 mailing address `7/1 N. %i Mar e S SEA��L C� &fit A- home phone # 22'-fqA:J{work phone # 206 79�r/2a-,7is claiming damages against in the sum of $ arising out of the following circumstances listed below. DATE OF OCCURRENCE: Z/ g� 2©(i TIME: - LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE: COM- 7 DESCRIPTION: Describe,occurrence explaining the nature of the defects or acts of negligence causinq damages. a 2. _`Provide a list of witnesses, if applicable, to the occurrence including names, addresses, and phone numbers. rtUS01N�i �C/1�1'e ��� C'�H21/ 17� Yi EDsh,sr7D C ti IA- In c'q 7�l SC �tSIL?11 3. Attach copies of all documentation relating to expenses, injuries, losses, and/or estimates for repair. 4. Have you submitted a claim for damages to your insurance company? Yes No If so, please provide the name of the insurance company: N�/} and the policy #: * * ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR AUTOMOBILE CLAIMS ONLY License Plate # P Y/ �/ 6 Driver License # 'p�61-T-D.;ZC6 0,4 Type Auto: Z003 nit-FSySv.S'fl M/%SU$USH1 C7hLAANT CE (year) (make) (model) DRIVER: -24%V i C� , !/ Al OWNER: PC���)6 '79eA1AW6J Address: '7/q /U Vic% S% • Address: NPJ /M Phone#: 2 dR 2 Z S Phone#: (RQ6 ) '7g?�— Passengers: Name: KEL5AN4 7JQ/? � Name: Address: f'R f <R7Qy Rb-,q-p Address: Packet Page 119 of 433 * *.NOTE: THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND NOTARIZED r564�?44" being first duly sworn, depose and say that I am the claimant for the above described; that I have read the above claim, know the contents thereof and believe the same to be true. Signature of Claimant(s) State of Washington County of 1 certify that I know or have satisfactory evidence that is the person who appeared before me, and said person acknowledged that (he/she) signed this instrument an'4 acknowledg it to be (his/her) free and voluntary act for the uses and purposes mentioned in the instrument. Dated: — - Q +f>>iriiiiii� ++��Q ... 0� s Signature o�� �� r c, CtOTgRY 3% Title s �•.,� v,: My appointment expires �: _ \(7 N �Vi3�IC X X 9j�•.2.0 1 OF WASN���+++t Packet Page 120 of 433 101 AUTO BODY 10059 AURORA AVENUE NORTH SEATTLE, WA 98133 206-525-5778 CD LOG NO 305-1 SHOP: 101 AUTO BODY ADDRESS: 10059 AURORA AVE N CITY STATE: SEATTLE, WA ZIP: 98133- OWNER: DEGOTSANG, TSERING POINT OF IMPACT: 2 LIC#: BODY COLOR: CONDITION: *=USER -ENTERED VALUE EC=REPLACE ECONOMY UM=REMAN/REBUILT PRT OE=REPLACE PXN OE SRPLS TE=PARTL REPL PRICE I=REPAIR TT=TWO-TONE N=ADDITIONAL LABOR AA=APPEAR ALLOWANCE DATE 03/02/07 INSP DATE: CONTACT: PHONE 1: FAX: HOME PHONE: 03/02/07 HO (206) 525-5778 (206) 523-4215 (206) 784-2257 DAYS TO REPAIR: 0 STATE: WA VIN: 4A3AA46G43E167222 MILEAGE: ACCTNG CTL#: E=REPLACE OEM UE=REPLACE OE SURPLUS EU=REPLACE SALVAGE PC=PXN RECONDITIONED ET=PARTL REPL LABOR L=REFINISH CG=CHIPGUARD RI=R&I ASSEMBLY RP=RELATED PRIOR NG=REPLACE NAGS UC=RECONDITIONED PRT EP=REPLACE PXN PM=PXN REMAN/REBUILT IT=PARTIAL REPAIR BR=BLEND REFINISH SB=SUBLET P=CHECK UP=UNRELATED PRIOR 2003 MITSUBISHI GALANT LS V6 4DOOR SEDAN 6CYL GASOLINE 3.0 CODE: G1533C/E OPTNS C/24AFHKROPQL OPTIONS: TWO -STAGE - EXTERIOR SURFACES BUMPER COVER MOUNTED FOG LAMPS MOONROOF TRACTION CONTROL SYSTEM CRUISE CONTROL AUTOMATIC TRANS TWO -STAGE - INTERIOR SURFACES HEATED REMOTE CONTROL MIRRORS ANTI -LOCK BRAKE SYSTEM ALARM SYSTEM FRONT SIDE IMPACT AIRBAGS OP -- GDE MC --- -- DESCRIPTION MFG.PART NO. E 0006 ----------- COVER,FRONT BUMPER ------------ 640OB279 L 0006 13 COVER,FRONT BUMPER REFINISH E 0056 CLOSURE,FRONT BUMPE RT MR520740 E 00.40 LAMP ASSEMBLY,FOG RT MR972846 SB M60 HAZARD. WSTE. REM. SUBLET REPAIR 5 ITEMS PRICE AJo Bo HOURS R 222.32 3.0 1 3.6 4 8.83 1 115.65 INC 1 5.00* 1 PAGE 1 Packet Page 121 of 4933 / 0 2 / 0 7 2003 M:ITSUBISHI GALANT LS V6 4DOOR SEDAN CD LOG NO 305-1 MC MESSAGE(S) 13 INCLUDES 0.6 HOURS FIRST PANEL TWO -STAGE ALLOWANCE FINAL CALCULATIONS & ENTRIES GROSS PARTS 346.80 PAINT MATERIAL 86.40 PARTS & MATERIAL TOTAL 433.20 TAX ON PARTS @ 8.8000 30.52 LABOR RATE REPLACE HRS REPAIR HRS 1-SHEET METAL 46.00 3.0 138.00 2-MECH/ELEC 50.00 3-FRAME 50.00 4-REFINISH 46.00 3.6 165.60 5-PAINT MATERIAL 24.00 LABOR TOTAL 303.60 TAX ON LABOR @ 8.8000 26.72 SUBLET REPAIRS 5.00 TAX ON SUBLET @ 8.800% 0.44 TOWING STORAGE GROSS TOTAL 799.48 NET TOTAL 799.48 SHOPLINK U8126 ES CD LOG 305-1 DATE 03/02/07 11:50:13AM R6.37 CD 01/07 PXN: Y/00/00/00/00/00 CUM 00/00/00/00/00 GEOCODE 98133 HOST LOG (C) 1998 - 2006 AUDATEX NORTH AMERICA, INC. 1.1 HRS WERE ADDED TO THIS EST. BASED ON AUDATEX TWO -STAGE REFINISH FORMULA. PAGE 2 Packet Page 122 of 4 A3/02/07 Packet Page 123 of 433 Packet Page 124 of 433 CITY OF EDMONDS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FORM RECEIVED. MAR 0 5 2007, IDES CIER Date Claim Form Rec ' ed by City Please take note that Roseann Wilson who resides at 560-115th Avenue N.W. , Coon Rapids, Minnesota, mailing. address 560-115t venue RIX., Coon Rapids Minnesota, 55433 home phone # 763-755-359%ork phone # ----- is claiming damages against City of Edmonds in the sum of $ arising out of the following circumstances listed below. DATE OF OCCURRENCE: August 5, 2006 TIME: 10:35 p.m. LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE: Aurora Avenue North & North 170th Street, Shoreline,. WA DESCRIPTION: 1. Describe occurrence explaining the nature of the defects or acts of negligence causing damages. I was a passenger in a vehicle raveling north on Aurora Avenue North. Police vehicles had passed our car in a high speed pursuit. A vehicle driven by Michael Bower, who had been traveling north. made a U-turn to go south. At the same time, a vehicle driven by Jason _ Valentine was trying to pass on the left. Bowers' vehicle hit Valentines vehicle and Vn1antine's vehicle hit the ar T was a passenger in (attach an extra sheet for additional information, if needed) 2. Provide a list of witnesses,. if applicable, to the occurrence including names, addresses, and phone numbers. . See Traffic- Acr-ident R por_t. 3. 4. Attach copies of all documentation relating to expenses, injuries, losses, and/or estimates for repair. See attached copy of Expenses. Have you submitted a claim for damages to your insurance company? XX Yes If so, please provide the name of the insurance company: State Farm Insurance _ and the policy #: 1024 172 23 * * ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR AUTOMOBILE CLAIMS ONLY License Plate # Driver License # Type Auto: (year) (make) (model) DRIVER: OWNER: Address: .Address: Phone#: Phone#: Passengers: Name: Name: Address: Address: No Packet Page 125 of 433 * * NOTE: THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND NOTARIZED I, being first duly sworn, depose and say that I am the cl imant for thQ.-above described; that I have read the above claim, know the contents thereof and believe t e to true. X X Signature of Claimants) State of Washington County of I certify that I know or have satisfactory evidence that (041� iis ine person who appeared before me, and said person acknowledged that (he/she) signed this instrument and acknowledged it to be (his/her) free and voluntary act for the uses and purposes mentioned i t e 'nst ym nt. D Q Sign t e Title My appointment expiresm f.., JANET MILLER Notary Public ... °" My CommisMinnesota + sion Expires January 31, 2010. Packet Page 126 of 433 RECEIVED MAR 0 i 2007JAJ1Ukfi a e Iaim Form Receity Please take note that MA^ey SI-WAl TN"QSt W who resides at Ci ZZO CA51CAOE PRIVE • £p'W10.V1)5-1 WA froze) mailing address SAME home phone # y1s77/-5?0iG work phone #,/ZS-771-Ytoo, is claiming damages against —ffft coy in the sum of $ q Z9. 24 arising out of the following circumstances listed below. DATE OF OCCURRENCE: 1' Zg107 TIME: Arroe ✓ocv✓ LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE: 91220 CAScs0E DW-14/1 EDA-coJOS E CvA 9,P020 DESCRIPTION: 1. D�e cribe occurrence explaining the nature of the defects or acts of negligence causing damages. " I I i '1✓ 'Gj I L�'1S OVr L Ft ow�0 �iLl4F►(wfG ,UA_ -7'1_ Aft rxAsA_ -tlar R.a TUO..,, ,. c [Unf OF &DAIDvoT PU-6LIC-Ub K_r — WERE CLE34NUUQ S84W- L1#VES 6iilTt+ wA-myt mm-rr - 18 -0 HsT&T g!7iftt 7-& ) tzoaAAyO Ar N/U xc7t7/f97 L/Ne -Q LL %�,P �(�{C w 4 LINE. ClT4 wc�?Yell� ecr-�,rt�b -tc, a'A"& 7 m v.c -rn r.. 0'd") li PsAT fey w 1 c-ir- A ANC. 3 v ayi c, yuos% r-EL_T A MOR-C hUPe FSt an. Art c t fzoul Uh 1i pv,1 (attach an extra sheet for additional information, if needed) 2. Provide a list of witnesses, if applicable, to the occurrence including names, addresses, and phone numbers. DAM iK%Vk-bu1Nell-OF AbAIA'T Pluwnat44 W1-Nt'5SeSeD -Cif OA.M.4&d juHatt It Cnzt:.er-) V�ttk W NOT KAJP%-AAA w1AA-T WAS t-4WeWlL%r4 �'4'LS- 353 -goZ.7 3. Attach copies of all documentation relating to expenses, injuries, losses, and/or estimates for repair. 400011,� 4. Have you submitted a claim for damages to your insurance company? Yes V/'No If so, please provide the name of the insurance company: and the policy #: * * ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR AUTOMOBILE CLAIMS ONLY License PIall# Driver License # Type Auto: (yea (make) (model) DRIVER: OWNER: Address: Address: Phone#: Phone#: Passengers: Name: Name:. Address: Address:, Packet Page 127 of 433 * *.NOTE: THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND NOTARIZED being first duly swom, -depose and say that. I am the cl ' ant for the above described; that l have read the above claim, know the contents thereof and believe the same to be true. X State of Washington County of 6 I certify that I know or have satisfactory evidence that 1 ' I �i �Q ky) 50 A, is the person who appeared before me, and said person acknowledged that (he/she) signed this instrument and acknowledged it to be (his/her) free and vol;`, he uses and purposDated: es mentioned � 7 the2-0d instrument. `_`���� 111k, Sign a,4re OP i L71vjo\. 6a (dw � ,� s Title My appointment expires 1 q I C) 7 �� h1 or w�s�i.�`' Packet Page 128 of 433 COIT Restoration Services INVOICE Description of Services I Unit Price I Quantity I Total I Mmergency. Services $854.72 1 $854.72 ITEM DETAIL FAAPA I PAYMENT IS DUE UPON RECEIPT OF INVOICE Deductible Paid Tax Rate 8.8% Sales Tax $75.22 BALANCE DUE $929.94 16750 Woodinville -Redmond Road NE _ c p Suite C-102 mrmlly or Woodinville, WA 98072 INSPECTION .1-t' • • and. PHONE (425) 481-9505 RESTORATION • — FAX (425) 481-5828 ' CERTIFIED FIRM E-MAIL: anthony-young@coit.com Packet Page 129 of 433 COIT Restoration Services COIT 16750 Woodinville Redmond Road NE BLDG C-102 Woodinville, WA 98072 (425)481-9505 Insured: Mark Johnson Property: 9220 Cascade Drive Edmonds, WA 98020 Estimator: Anthony Young Title: Restoration Manager Company: COIT Restoration Services Business: 16750 Woodinville -Redmond Road C-102 Woodinville, WA 98072 Claim Number UNKNOWN Policy Number UNKNOWN Date Contacted: 01/29/2007 Date of Loss: 01/29/2007 Date Inspected: 01/29/2007 Price List: WASE4S6D Restoration/Service/Remodel Estimate: R-5135-JOHNSON Type of Loss SEWAGE Home: (206) 940-1115 Business: (425) 481-9505 x255 Date Received: 01/29/2007 Date Entered: 02/01/2007 3:35 PM Deductible $0.00 COIT Restoration Services COIT Restoration Services is 100% IICRC Certified in Water Damage Restoration. We strictly adhere to the Standards and Guidelines set forth in the S-500 Standard and Reference Guide for Professional Water Damage Restoration published by the IICRC. We are committed to excellence and welcome the opportunity to answer any of your questions. Please contact us at your convenience. Thank You. Packet Page 130 of 433 COIT Restoration Services MOITEW 16750 Woodinville Redmond Road NE BLDG C-102 Woodinville, WA 98072 (425)481-9505 Room: MAIN LEVEL }imnNgN� -. flovnWW' , R-5135-JOHNSON DESCRIPTION QNTY REMOVE REPLACE TOTAL Emergency service call - after business 1.00 EA 0.00 180.80 180.80 hours Equip. setup, talce down & monitoring - 2.00 HR 0.00 59.01 118.02 after hrs Equipment setup, take down, and 2.00 HR 0.00 39.30 78.60 monitoring (hourly charge) Equipment decontamination charge - HVY, 1.00 EA 0.00 38.97 38.97 per piece of equip Carpet cleaning - Minimum charge 1.00 EA 0.00 135.00 135.00 Room Totals: MAIN LEVEL 551.39 Room: BATH 1 pevldn'�: DESCRIPTION QNTY REMOVE REPLACE TOTAL Clean the surface area - Heavy 80.00 SF 0.00 0.76 60.80 Dehumidifier (per 24 hour period) - XLarge 1.00 EA 0.00 105.73 105.73 - No monitoring One unit for one day. Room Totals: BATH 1 166.53 R-5135-JOHNSON 02/01/2007 Page: 2 Packet Page 131 of 433 COIT Restoration Services COIT; 16750 Woodinville Redmond Road NE BLDG C-102 Woodinville, WA 98072 (425)481-9505 Room: BATH 2 XowHay DESCRIPTION QNTY REMOVE REPLACE TOTAL Clean the surface area - Heavy 80.00 SF 0.00 0.76 60.80 Room Totals: BATH 2 60.80 Room: BATH 3 7.1 Adr AH y Wes, Pmnlwgli�: DESCRIPTION QNTY REMOVE REPLACE TOTAL Clean the surface area - Heavy 100.00 SF 0.00 0.76 76.00 Room Totals: BATH 3 76.00 Line Item Totals: R-5135-JOHNSON 854.72 R-5135-JOHNSON 02/01/2007 Page: 3 Packet Page 132 of 433 COIT Restoration Services C. , 01 . c 16750 Woodinville Redmond Road NE BLDG C-102 Woodinville, WA 98072 (425)481-9505 Grand Total Areas: 0.00 SF Walls 0.00 SF Ceiling 0.00 SF Walls and Ceiling 0.00 SF Floor 0.00 SY Flooring 0.00 LF Floor Perimeter 0.00 SF Long Wall 0.00 SF Short Wall 0.00 LF Ceil. Perimeter 0.00 Floor Area 0.00 Total Area 0.00 Interior Wall Area 0.00 Exterior Wall Area 0.00 Exterior Perimeter of Walls 0.00 Surface Area 0.00 Number of Squares 0.00 Total Perimeter Length 0.00 Total Ridge Length 0.00 Total Hip Length R-5135-JOHNSON 02/01/2007 Page: 4 Packet Page 133 of 433 COIT Restoration Services GOIT 16750 Woodinville Redmond Road NE BLDG C-102 Woodinville, WA 98072 (425)481-9505 Summary for SEWAGE Line Item Total 854.72 Sales Tax @ 8.800% x 854.72 75.22 Replacement Cost Value 929.94 Net Claim 929.94 Anthony Young Restoration Manager R-5135-JOHNSON 02/01/2007 Page; 5 Packet Page 134 of 433 a tLtVLiYd MAR 0 8 2007 CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FORM ) Date Claim Form Received by Member 3 '" 5 -C Please take note that _ i `l-1� SS Gt 12 ho resides at I I !�j 8 % q h V F ',. I',i I Tmg ,addre§s ` -.4 home phone # i J S - Z 7 '9 .' (1,&*ork phone # 9�; - ` g - �®�R, is claiming -against C i 1 `l 6 F Cf�►`�me �(t)� in the sum of �� j, (�_ arising out o' iifle following circumstances listed below. �� `tTi= v-' 1) �`T DATE OF OCCURRENCE: I � — C ') -7 TIME: LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE: 1 f I N �r 1 DESCRIPTION: 1. explaining the nature of the defects or acts of nggligence causing (attach an extra sheet for additional information, if needed) 2. Provide a list of witnesses, if applica le, to the occurrenge clu " g names, s, and phone numbers. 3. Attach copies of all documentation relating tb expenses, injuries, losses, and/or estimates for repair. 4. Have you submitted a claim for damages to your insurance company? Yes No� If so, please provide the name of the insurance company: u �s fi i and the policy #: 1-19. :11z, **ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR AUTOMOBILE CLAIMS ONLY** License Plate # Driver License # Type Auto: (year) (mak&) (model) DRIVER: OWNER: Address: Address: Phone #: Phone #: Passengers: Name: Name: Address: Address: ** OTE: THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND NOTARED** S5AV"g first duly sworn, depose and say th am the#laimant described, have read the above claim, know the contents thereof and believe the same to be true.,/ / a ov / �_!� X Subscribed and sworn to before me s �7 day of , 20 6-1 NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State of ' gton 141p--p�ol�� r: 135 of 433 CITY OF EDMONDS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FORM R37) UD MO Data Claim Form LOfl. j �i�W Received by City Please take note that � • i i9 f"I &N h 6 . w A i Ke r who resides at c� i 8 % ; 0� Ed- m D n d-s , by l9 9 96 .1 (a mailing address If,} rh a a4 S ' , home phone # , work phone # _,V,+ , is claiming damages against C i F7 14 Ect rho h inthe sum of $ $ ,ice i% arising out of the following circumstances listed below. DATE OF OCCURRENCE: b-q_ IT ) 0 10 iv TIME: Q - UO PM LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE: cTi C S`� `S 0 � "I �12 �� rr' t - - U r 1)- P054 C> r-L e.. DESCRIPTION ©rf v"-fic- O i e-ui 1. Describe occurrence explaining the nature of the defects or acts of negligence causing damages. WAS 7f RUeb'ny 50-Wt ui sJr Kndc -th2 PAYI)'3111Z Usneiv r rangy �i�er-_� (1u� a�1_hd�� 'ir►-ctic_i^D_v►zC.-tus4sd_wrk &_no, �h e fer, o (attach an extra sheet for additional information, if needed) 2. Provide a list of witnesses, if applicable, to the occurrence including names, addresses, and phone numbers. Attach copies of all documentation relating to expenses, injuries, losses, and/or estimates for repair. Have you submitted a claim for damages to your insurance company? Yes No If so, please provide the name of the insurance company: _ and the policy #: * * ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR AUTOMOBILE CLAIMS ONLY * * License Plate # / j ek a Driver License # Al K, k M t)C- TypeAuto: ill i11i;f`G2 e-S 190 E ;Z-6 414 f94lug (year) (make) (model) DRIVER: M Ar ills A 6— , (001 Hef, OWNER: SH m e- A-S Address: 9 1153 ( 5-f —p( • s : Lo Address: EdmnvaZs , to g06ZZ(o Phone#: q ZLA 7 7 9 6r S 4 B Phone#: y a 5 '7'13 a 4 D Ge ) I Passengers: Name: NA Name: Address: Address: * *NOTE: THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND NOTARIZED* * b�i 1PrJ, being first duly sworn, depose and say that I am the claimant for the above described: tht 1 have read the above claim, know the contents thereof and believe the same to be true. /��•��� ��j ��,, X 41/GLG� X Signature of Claimant(s) State of Washington t County of S t� c� it ram'A 1 certify that 1 know or have satisfactory evidence that Mar � U b ' 61 k er Is the person who appeared before me, and said person acknowledged that (he/she) signed this instrument and acknowledged it to be (his/her) nd voluntary act for the uses and purposes mentioned in the Instryment. Dated: 3 - IS- 3-c) 0®RA s Signature U; 6 NO2-- � m �O rla �GL�rlt no ^� �O Title —II— q _71 _ .O�AI, �t X 'C My appointment expires 0 - d f - ZD C '•���°;e3_ 07 .••`te`r, '0a+eaaaaNa o` HINCa`� Packet Page 136 of 433 March 14, 2007 City of Edmonds City Hall 121 Yh Avenue North Edmonds, WA 98020 RE: Claim for Damages Gentlemen/Gentlewomen: I was returning home on 2-10 2006 at approximately 9:00 PM. I was traveling SW at the posted 25 mph speed limit on Olympic View Drive. It was dark, wet pavement, and not well lit along that stretch of road. Just past the Perrinville Post Office, 7601 Olympic View Drive, I ran over a huge Pot Hole (picture attached). The result of that incident didn't appear until the following evening when I left work to return home and my right rear tire went flat. I had my car towed to my mechanic (see attached papers). He called me the next day to let me know that my right rear wheel was badly bent which caused the flat tire. He wanted to know what I had run over. I told him about the noise and pot hole I had run over the night before. Luckily he was able to repair the wheel. The pot hole was asphalted over before I was able to get a picture. However, I have enclosed a picture of the asphalted pot hole just after it had been filled by the City of Edmonds. I am asking for damages in the amount of $80.00 plus .088 tax which is a total of $87.04 dollars. If you have any questions, please call me at 425-7784548 or my cell phone 425-773-2240. My email address is Maril, nw4 a,verizon.net Best regards, Marilyn G. Walker $02418Im PL SW Edmonds, WA 98 6 Enclosures: Packet Page 137 of 433 as and Service of Mercedes, BMW, Audi & VW since 1965 INVOICE Walker, Marilyn Home 425-778-4548 Cust ID: 89 Part Description / Number oil filter 1021800109 Engine Oil 15W40 215/45ZR- 17 Proxes all seasons tire 0870 Shop Supplies EUROPEAN MOTORS CORP. 16017 Aurora Ave N Seattle, WA 98133 fax (206) 417 -1438 33088 service@EuropeanMotorsCorp.com www.EuropeanMotorsCorp.com Org. Est. # 000629 Print Date: 02/12/2006 1987 Mercedes-Benz - 190E 2.3L, In-Line4, VIN (Not Avai Lic # : Odometer In: 114334 Unit # Vin #: Hat#: Ref#: Qty Sale Extended Labor Description Extended 1.00 9.50 9.50 7.00 3.95 27.65 2.00 165.00 330.00 15.00 15.00 9 Z /J [ Technicians: PITMAN, MIKE 11; Please Select, Techni�Jian;"VALOM OWE 1 ] change engine oil and filter Customer state; Odometer stucked, will not turn removed instrument panel, deassembly gauges, repaired odometer best as possible, ( re-insert axle pin ) assemble gauges and re -installed instrument panel install and balance 2 tires repair bend wheel best as possible R/Rear Hazardous Materials Org. Estimate $769.38 Revisions '$0.00 ' Current Es (iml $ 769.38 [ Payments - ] 30.00 15.00 Additional Cost Revised Estimate Labor: $325.00 Parts: $382.15 Sublet: $0.00 ~ Sub: $707.15' Tax: $62.23 Total: $769.38 I hereby authorize the above repair work to be done along with the necessary material and hereby grant you and/or your employees permission to operate the car or truck herein described on street, highways or elsewhere for the purpose to testing and/or inspection. An express mechanic's lien is hereby acknowledged on above car or truck to secure the amount of repairs thereto. Warranty on parts and labor is one years or 12,000 miles whichever comes first. Warranty work has to be performed in our shop & cannot exceed the original cost of repair. SIGNATURE................................................................................................ Date .......................................... Time......................... ODENWALD, UWE Page 1 of 1 06.30.04lnvoicl Packet Page 139 of 433 AM-882 2.E. Liquor Control Board Edmonds City Council Meeting Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Linda Carl, Mayor's Office Submitted For: Gary Haakenson Time: Consent Department: Mayor's Office Type: Action Review Committee: Action: Agenda Memo Subiect Title Approval of list of businesses applying for renewal of their liquor licenses with the Washington State Liquor Control Board, January - March 2007. Recommendation from Mayor and Staff Please approve the attached list of businesses with one exception (below). Previous Council Action On the December 19, 2006 agenda, the agenda memo indicated five businesses that the City took exception to regarding the renewal of their liquor licenses due to not having valid business licenses. Since that time, two of the businesses (La Galleria and Candlelit Moments) have renewed their business licenses, and one business (Good Friends) has a new owner with a valid business license. The City has no further objection concerning those businesses. Two businesses (BCD Tofu House and Kero's Food Market) have still not renewed their business license. Narrative The City Clerk's Office, the Police Department, and the Mayor's Office have reviewed the attached list of businesses and have no concerns with renewing the liquor licenses of these businesses, with the following exception: Mick Finsters, located at 24001 Highway 99, does not have a valid City of Edmonds business license. Mick Finsters and the WSLCB have been notified of the City's objection to their liquor license application. Link: WSLCB list Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Attachments Form Routing/Status Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/12/2007 04:39 PM APRV 2 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/13/2007 07:41 AM APRV 3 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/13/2007 11:28 AM APRV Form Started By: Linda Carl Started On: 03/12/2007 03:31 PM Final Approval Date: 03/13/2007 Packet Page 140 of 433 } W W 0 z !27 H 0 D \ r4 p W E�+ W En W � CD Cn Ol�ri " a H W .�. 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Meter A Rehabilitation Project Acceptance Edmonds City Council Meeting Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Conni Curtis, Engineering Submitted For: Dave Gebert Time: Consent Department: Engineering Type: Action Review Committee: Action: Agenda Memo Subiect Title Report on final construction costs for the Meter A Rehabilitation Project and Council acceptance of project. Recommendation from Mayor and Staff Council accept the Meter A Rehabilitation Project. Previous Council Action On September 18, 2006, Council awarded a contract for the Meter A Rehabilitation Project to Interwest Construction, Inc. in the amount of $95,832. Narrative The Meter A Rehabilitation project was designed by CHS Engineers, Inc. and was inspected and accepted by City Staff. Project Budget $100,000 Meter A Project Cost (Interwest Construction) 95,832 No file(s) attached. Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Attachments Form Routing/Status Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 Engineering Dave Gebert 03/06/2007 03:38 PM APRV 2 Development Services Duane Bowman 03/06/2007 05:58 PM APRV 3 Public Works Noel Miller 03/06/2007 06:18 PM APRV 4 Development Services Duane Bowman 03/07/2007 08:21 AM APRV 5 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/12/2007 06:03 AM APRV 6 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/12/2007 08:27 AM APRV 7 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/12/2007 04:39 PM APRV Form Started By: Conni Curtis Started On: 03/06/2007 02:29 PM Final Approval Date: 03/12/2007 Packet Page 145 of 433 AM-878 2.G. 2006 Citywide Storm Final Acceptance Edmonds City Council Meeting Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Conni Curtis, Engineering Submitted For: Dave Gebert Time: Consent Department: Engineering Type: Action Review Committee: Action: Agenda Memo Subiect Title Report on final construction costs for the 2006 Citywide Storm Improvements project and Council acceptance of project. Recommendation from Mayor and Staff Council accept the 2006 Citywide Storm Improvements project. Previous Council Action On September 18, 2006, Council awarded a contract for the 2006 Citywide Storm Improvements project to Earthwork Enterprises, Inc. in the amount of $219,683.99. On December 19, 2006, Council authorized the Mayor to sign Change Order No. 3 and appropriated an additional $40,183 for the project budget. Narrative The 2006 Citywide Storm Improvements project is now complete. The project was designed, inspected and accepted by City Staff. Project Budget ........ $302,435 Contractor (Earthwork Enterprises) ........ $273,339 Testing (HWA Geosciences)........ $6,224 1 % for Art........ $2,197 Advertising........ $ 3 3 7 Materials for work performed by Public Works ........ $19,311 Total Project Costs ........ $301,408 No file(s) attached. Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Attachments Form Routing/Status Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 Engineering Dave Gebert 03/08/2007 11:55 AM APRV 2 Development Services Duane Bowman 03/08/2007 01:05 PM APRV 3 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/12/2007 06:03 AM APRV 4 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/12/2007 08:27 AM APRV 5 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/12/2007 04:39 PM APRV Form Started By: Conni Curtis Started On: 03/08/2007 11:09 AM Final Approval Date: 03/12/2007 Packet Page 146 of 433 AM-887 Surplus of Computer Monitors and Donation to Interconnection. Edmonds City Council Meeting Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Kathleen Junglov, Administrative Services Time: Consent Department: Administrative Services Type: Action Review Finance Committee: Action: Approved for Consent Agenda Agenda Memo Subiect Title Surplus of computer monitors and donation to Interconnection. Recommendation from Mayor and Staff Authorize surplusing of computer monitors and donation to Interconnection. Previous Council Action Finance Committee March 13, 2007. 2.H. Narrative 45 Computer monitors were replaced this year with LCD flat screen monitors. The surplus CRT monitors are being donated to a company called Interconnection which finds various uses for surplus computer equipment. Donating these monitors to Interconnection will insure that they will be given to a non-profit organization for a good cause. This also means these useful monitors will not end up in a landfill. Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Attachments No file(s) attached. Form Routing/Status Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 Admin Services Dan Clements 03/15/2007 01:00 PM APRV 2 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/15/2007 04:39 PM APRV 3 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/15/2007 06:01 PM APRV 4 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/16/2007 07:08 AM APRV Form Started By: Kathleen Junglov Started On: 03/15/2007 07:29 AM Final Approval Date: 03/16/2007 Packet Page 147 of 433 AM-883 Purchase Vehicle for the Fire Department Edmonds City Council Meeting 2.I. Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Kim Karas, Public Works Submitted For: Noel Miller Time: Consent Department: Public Works Type: Action Review Committee: Action: Approved for Consent Agenda Agenda Memo Subiect Title Authorization for Public Works to Purchase one (1) new 2007 Chevrolet 2500 4x4 Suburban for the Fire Department in the amount of $34,616.21 including Washington State sales tax. Recommendation from Mayor and Staff It is recommended that the City Council authorize the Public Works Fleet Manager to purchase one (1) Chevrolet 2500 4x4 Suburban from Seaview Chevrolet for the total amount of $34,616.21 including Washington State sales tax. Previous Council Action Narrative The Fire Department's Unit #482, a 2000 Ford Expedition is scheduled to be replaced in the 2007 Fiscal year, utilizing the 511 B-Fund replacement monies. The Fleet Division has received five (5) written quotes from local area car dealerships. Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Fiscal Year: 2007 Revenue: $55,000.00 Expenditure: $34,616.21 Fiscal Impact: $10,000 Salvage Value and the 511 Replacement B-Fund Attachments Link: FD Suburban Quote #1 Link: FD Suburban Quote #2 Form Routing/Status Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/15/2007 11:46 AM APRV 2 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/15/2007 06:01 PM APRV 3 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/16/2007 07:08 AM APRV Form Started By: Kim Karas Started On: 03/13/2007 12:59 PM Final Approval Date: 03/16/2007 Packet Page 148 of 433 I' O O O Cl 4f? ti 0 0 _ 4) O r N Md O 7 O O C'M CM dM4 O O C7 Co CV) CS Ci MO M C! CO C'7 CO 6M9 � � C y E O C/ O CC a N L L O Cl w, G Ci > 4) t N C CON 1 M +O+ O 0 C CO O N N Cr) N 6q N M CID _d V :d T C4 i _O m ' CO S. O Y ii to(L 00 LIn Cl n G Ci .....::.: �+ G1 O s CD7 Cn £ ~ O N N M _ tq 0 0 CY CCq p0)j CO Cn CMO CO � c CD N N CO d" Ui v 3 .d N r N a et Cy Y o C Ci Cl O O r O O LO 4110. N t d NJ 3 O O O O M 49 O O In Irl 40 y Packet Page 149 of 433 d 0 0 c 3 0 QCi C;69 O O o:.::::: C ii a a a 0 o o CO CR o N O j O C)9 Q) O CO ti L to ) 6 t N L) O L � O '0 0 6 o f °3 3 Q .... ::::::::::::: .:... u. CO L O a CO O a n iv a N « O O 0) CD C4 L ui M Irl 6M9 6M4 LO N O � C .0 O Y o CV d CI O O O C w O 3 t7 iI J a � d C? C c m e� a d C V N L O E 2 L. 0 0 C 4 a 4) 0 Ca 4) t) C U. L O L O O 2 J Packet Page 150 of 433 AM-884 3. Historical Report on Term Limits Edmonds City Council Meeting Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Jana Spellman, City Council Submitted For: Council President Pritchard Olson Time: 15 Minutes Department: City Council Type: Information Review Committee: Action: Agenda Memo Subiect Title Historical Report on Term Limits Recommendation from Mayor and Staff N/A Previous Council Action At the August 18, 1998 Edmonds City Council Meeting the Council reviewed the term limit ordinance. At that meeting, the Council voted 6 to 1 to adopt Ordinance No. 3223 removing the limitation on the number of years a Mayor serves. Narrative At the conclusion of the March 6, 2007 Edmonds City Council Meeting, Councilmember Mauri Moore, during the Council Comments portion of the meeting, broached the subject of term limits for the Edmonds City Mayor. City Attorney Scott Snyder will make a presentation on the history of the term limits ordinance and the relevant attorney general opinion and court cases. Attached are copies of a Memorandum from Mr. Snyder dated March 15, 2007 along with Exhibits A through E. Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Attachments Link: 8-18-98 Minutes re: Term Limits Link: Citv Attornev Memo and Exhibits A & B Link: City Attorney Memo Exhibits C & D Link: City Attorney Memo Exhibit D continued Link: City Attorney Memo Exhibit E Link: City Attorney Memo Exhibit E continued Form Routing/Status Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/15/2007 08:33 AM APRV 2 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/15/2007 09:59 AM APRV 3 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/15/2007 10:15 AM APRV Form Started By: Jana Spellman Started On: 03/14/2007 08:35 AM Final Approval Date: 03/15/2007 Packet Page 151 of 433 Councilmember Earling recalled the agreement discusses an interim site for the commuter train with the clear understanding it is the City's long-term goal to move the multimodal site to the Pt. Edward's site. Dave Beale, Project Manager, Sound Transit, agreed with Councilmember Earling and said the EIS that is underway has two alternatives for the station, 1) an interim site at the existing Amtrak station (with the intent to expend as little capital as possible) and 2) a permanent Edmonds station as part of the multimodal center. City Attorney Scott Snyder commented that the purpose of this agreement is to expedite the review process and said in response to concerns his office had, Section 12D states nothing in the agreement obligates the City as a permitting agency to approve the project or in any way binds future Councils to the decision -making process. Further, a provision in Section 8C indicates that land use planning and control is the responsibility of the City. He pointed out the Council must balance their desire to plan, move forward, seek federal funds, and work with the RTA and other agencies, clearly indicating the Council's policy preferences without contracting away ultimate decision -making authority that state law requires the Council make as a quasi-judicial body. Councilmember Earling recalled a citizen commented on parking for the commuter rail station and said the initial ridership projections concluded there was more than adequate parking in the area of the Amtrak for the start up operation. Mr. Beale agreed and said Sound Transit has done a variety of. ridership forecasts including one for the Edmonds station. Forecasts through 2010 indicate a low of 50 vehicles and a high of 120 vehicles. For environmental purposes, 120 spaces were used. He said most of the parking requirements could be satisfied by existing parking within walking distance of the station. In addition, one significant property owner within the vicinity of the station has approached Sound Transit with a proposal for a parking arrangement. Councilmember Earling said it is the intent of Sound Transit to form citizen groups within communities to help with planning, site selection, site design, etc. He explained similar memorandums of agreement have been signed in the south corridor which is scheduled to be operational a year sooner than the north corridor. He supported the work Sound Transit has done to customize the desires of each community and was certain issues would be addressed in the process. COUNCILMEMBER EARLING MOVED, SECONDED BY COUNCILMEMBER VAN HOLLEBEKE, TO AUTHORIZE THE MAYOR TO SIGN THE. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH SOUND TRANSIT. MOTION CARRIED.. Term Limit 10. REVIEW OF THE TERM LIMIT ORDINANCE Ordinance City Attorney Scott Snyder explained eight years ago he advised the Council and then Mayor Larry Naughten that the City's provision prohibiting a mayor from serving more than two consecutive terms violated the state election law requirements that set the requirements for public office and was therefore illegal. In recent attempts to initiate term limits, Judge William Dwyer stated that since the powers to determine qualifications for office come from the Federal Constitution, state voters cannot place a limitation on those federal qualifications. Mr. Snyder pointed out Judge Dwyer's ruling was the same as the opinion he gave previously -- the City of Edmonds cannot set a limitation where qualifications for . office are set by the State Legislature. Mr. Snyder said this was an appropriate time to review this issue as it is not an election year and an amendment would not effect the political position of any person. Edmonds City Council Approved Minutes August 18, 1998 Page I I Packet Page 152 of 433 rd. #3223 Removing Limit on enns For Councilmember Plunkett, Mr. Snyder said the term limit is not a constitutional violation but is invalid as it violates state law for public office. Judge Dwyer indicated a lower legislative body cannot impose a limitation where the higher law sets a broader ability. The City Council could pass a resolution stating its belief that it is in the public's best interest to limit Mayors' terms to two years but the City cannot limit the Mayor to two terms by ordinance. COUNCIL PRESIDENT HAAKENSON MOVED, SECONDED BY COUNCILMEMBER NORDQUIST, TO ADOPT ORDINANCE NO. 3223 REMOVING THE LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF YEARS A MAYOR SERVES. MOTION CARRIED, COUNCILMEMBER MILLER OPPOSED. **See Note in Margin. 11. CREATION OF DEVELOPMENT SERVICES DIRECTOR POSITION evelop - Mayor Fahey said initially this information was brought to the Human Resources Committee meeting in ent Jul The Jul 28 Council packet contained the job descriptions under consideration and at that meeting, Services y Y P Jg, Director the Council provided input and referred the matter to the Human Resources Committee for consideration and recommendation. Councilmember Miller (Human Resources Committee Chair) said the input of the Council was considered by the Human Resources Committee and it was the consensus of the committee to move forward with the creation of the Development Services Director position and extend the Community Services Director position through 1999 to allow the committee to review it further. He said the Council packet contained the Development Services Director's job description as well as the revised job description for the Community Services Director position. Mayor Fahey responded to citizen comments in opposition to creating this position and that too many supervisory positions are being created in the City. She stressed the Council authorized the Human Resources Study to determine the appropriate organizational structure for the City, reflecting that the City of Edmonds has grown significantly over the past few years. The Human Resources Study was conducted by a group of consultants, one whom is extremely knowledgeable in the organization structure of cities (Phil Kushlan, originally the City Manager of Bellevue). She said the perception that she wants to expand positions in the City inappropriately is incorrect; in reality, she is trying to facilitate the implementation of the consultants' recommendations that the Council accepted as the appropriate direction for the City. She felt the creation of the Development Services Director position was justified, appreciated the work the Human Resources Committee has done, and supported the organization structure recommended by the consultants. In response to an audience member's question regarding funding for the Development Services Director position, Council President Haakenson said the agenda memo indicated the funding source for 1998 will be from unanticipated revenues from permit fees but did not address the funding source for 1999. He assumed it would be part of the 1999 budget. Mayor Fahey agreed, stating a portion of the salary will come from increases in permit fees from projects under consideration as well as funds from the General Fund. She recalled during discussions of the Architectural Design Board, it was noted that permitting and planning -processes in the City are very complex based on numerous new rules and regulations associated with state and federal requirements. This was one of the primary reasons Mr. Kushlan felt the Department of Development Services needed to be created to allow those processes to be done in a more expeditious manner and have one person oversee all components. Edmonds City Council Approved Minutes August 18, 1998 Page 12 *NOTE 'The :Minutes, minutes were icorrecte ;on ,9/ 1/98. .The vote on this ?notion was 6 in savor and :1 no ;vote. .Council - .ember ;Plunkett ;voted no.: ................ Packet Page 153 of 433 DEN vRUY At ACE P.[ .. [_ C. ATTORNL• Y S AT LAW MEMORANDUM DATE: March 15, 2007 TO. Edmonds City Council Mayor Gary Haakenson City of Edmonds FROM: W. Scott Snyder, Office of the City Attorney RE: Legal History - Term Limits A citizen and Councilmember Moore have raised questions regarding repeal of term limits by the City Council in 1997. The purpose of this memo is to provide an outline of the events and court cases which lead to my recommendation that the City Council repeal the ordinance and the Council's action to do so. The issue is not the wisdom of term limits but the method by which they may be imposed. OVERVIEW While there is no published opinion, the prior Edmonds term limits ordinance was invalidated by the Snohomish County Superior Court. Subsequent appellate decisions have affirmed the Court's rationale. An Attorney General's opinion opines that term limits may be imposed by ordinance. As this memo will discuss, however, the City's prior term limit ordinance was later held invalid by Judge James Ailendoerfer of the Snohomish County Superior Court. The issues became moot when the plaintiff, then Mayor Naughten, last during the election process. Subsequent decisions of Judge Dwyer at the Western District Court of Washington, the State Supreme Court and the US. Supreme Court have all affirmed the basic rationale of Judge Allendoerfer's decision. The Attorney General's opinion pre -dates these decisions, but has not updated since 1991. Because the other decisions dealt with the State and federal constitution, while Judge Allendoerfer's decision dealt with the City's authority under RCW Title 35A, they do not constitute binding legal precedent. They do, however, clearly affirm the rationale behind Judge Allendoerfer's decision. A Member of the International Lawyers Network with independent member law firms worldwide 1601 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2100 • Seattle, WA 98101-1686 . 206.447.7000 • Fax: 206.447.0215 • Web: www omwlaw com ( WSS654900.DOC;1/00006.900000!) Packet Page 154 of 433 Edmonds City Council Mayor Gary Haakenson March 15, 2007 Page 2 In 1991, two -term Mayor Larry Naughten, announced his candidacy for Mayor of the City. At that time, the Edmonds City Code 2.01.030 prohibited a mayor from serving a third term. The City engaged outside counsel, and brought an action to declare the City's ordinance valid and to bar Snohomish County from placing Mayor Naughten's name on the ballot. ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION In an effort to help resolve the dispute, then State Senator Gary Nelson requested an Attorney General's opinion. This is the Attorney General's opinion referred to by Councilmember Moore. On June 24, 1991, the Attorney General issued Opinion No. 22 which opined in relevant part that charter cities and optional code municipal cities organized under RCW Title 35A have the authority either by adoption of a home rule charter or by ordinance, respectively, to impose term limitations. This opinion is based upon the broad authority vested in optional code cities by Title 35A. As the Attorney General noted, absent a specific statutory provision limiting the City's authority or conflicting with an ordinance, a City Council may exercise any of "the powers which any city of any class may have and shall be governed in matters of State concern by statutes applicable to such cities in connection with such powers to the extent to which such laws are appropriate and are not in conflict with the provisions generally applicable to code cities.' As the Attorney General noted: The critical point to be dawn from these statutes is that by electing to come under the optional municipal code, a city ceases to be governed by the traditional rules of delegated powers... instead a city so opting thereby becomes possessed of all powers which either have been specifically granted by the legislature to any class of cities [citations omitted] or which could be granted by the legislature [citation omitted] subject only to such restrictions or limitations as are contained in the statutes themselves or within the State Constitution "which is but another way of saying that the optional municipal code entitles cities operating or under the equivalent of the home rule powers otherwise available only to first class charter cities." AGO 1972, No. 24, page 7. 1 AGO 22, p.7. A copy of the Opinion is attached as Exhibit A. (W55654900.DOC;1100006.9000001) Packet Page 155 of 433 Edmonds City Council Mayor Gary Haakenson March 15, 2007 Page 3 Edmonds v. Naughten On August 13, 1991, Judge James Allendoerfer announced his oral decision striking down the city ordinance. A copy of the transcript of his oral decision is attached as Exhibit B. Judge Allendoerfer concurred with the Attorney General's position that term limits are constitutional under the equal protection clause of the US Constitution and advanced legitimate State interests. Judge Allendoerfer noted that term limits are arguably justifiable under a wide variety of theories.z Judge Allendoerfer noted that the Washington constitution is silent on the subject of the qualifications for local elected officials. For a City, like Edmonds, organized under RCW Title 35A, there are only two limitations with respect to a candidate's qualifications. RCW 42.04.020 requires that a candidate for municipal office be a US citizen and an elector of the jurisdiction in which he seeks office. RCW 35A.12.030 requires that a candidate be a registered voter in the City and a resident of the City for at least one year. As Judge AIlendoerfer notes, this is the "sum total" of the restrictions which the legislature has placed on municipal elected officials. Judge Allendoerfer concurs with the Attorney General that the adoption of Title 35A which he refers to as the optional municipal code or "OMC," provides broad powers to a city. Non charter cities must rely upon statutory provisions enacted by the State legislature as constituting their organic act. That is, that the State legislature has written charters for those cities without the necessity of voter participation or City Council participation. Charter cities, on the other hand, must write their own organic act subject to approval by the voters of the City. Under either scenario, however, Judge Allendoerfer notes that the home rule powers of such cities are `extremely broad' and may be "further expanded or supplemented by local legislation." At this point, having raised the issue of "organic" law, or basic structural powers, Judge Allendoerfer examines an issue not addressed in the AG opinion, specifically, the limitations on those powers imposed by the 40th Amendment of the State Constitution (Article XI, §10).. He noted three limitations established by case law: 2 'Term limitations preserve fresh and responsive government. Term limitations guard against political entrenchment. Term limitations inject new and innovative leadership into the political system. They encourage incumbents to devote their full energies to public office rather than campaign during their final term of office. They expand the spectrum of political candidates and they tend to avoid political monopolies." Page 3 of Oral Decision. IWSS654900.DOC;1/00006-900000/1 Packet Page 156 of 433 Edmonds City Council Mayor Gary Haakenson March 15, 2007 Page 4 1. An optional municipal code city must "abide by the State Constitution and cannot violate it in any sense." 2. "... if general laws are enacted by the State which either deny certain powers to cities or preempts certain areas, said laws may not be violated, supplemented or contradicted by the cities themselves." 3. "The third restriction on OMC cities is the requirement that there must be an express or implied delegation of authority from the State legislature to the cities on certain special issues of paramount State concern, or said issues are declared out of bounds for local ordinances."3 Judge Allendoerfer finds that term limits are not violative of the State constitution nor, as the Attorney General noted, prohibited or preempted by State Statute. Judge Allendoerfer struck down the term limits ordinance based on violation of the third factor. He found that the topic of term limitations is "... a area of paramount state concern, or joint state/city concern, thereby placing it out of bounds for city councils.4 As Judge Allendoerfer states: I find that term limitations on political candidates directly relate to the integrity of the electoral process and are, therefore, fundamental to the democratic system of government. The right to run for public office is a basic right of citizenship. Such matters are of organic act significance. The Buckingham case also leads to my next finding: that matters of organic act significance may be enacted, supplemented or amended solely by the level of government that has the underlying organic act authority. In the context of our present case, that would mean that the level of government which establishes the office of Mayor reserves the exclusive authority to set the qualifications for mayoral candidates. In charter cities, that power is vested by the 40th amendment to our constitution, and/or by the OMC, in the electorate of the city; that is, the authors of the charter. In non -charter cities, that power is vested by the constitution and the state legislature, which is the author of the organic act for non -charter cities. 3 Number 1 appears at page 9 of the Oral Decision, number 2 at page 9 and number 3 at page 10 of the Decision. 4 At page 10 of Oral Decision. [WSS654900-DOC;1100006-900000/1 Packet Page 157 of 433 Edmonds City Council Mayor Gary Haakenson March 15, 2007 Page 5 A provision incorporated by reference all powers and authorities of charter cities is not enough because it is the people of those cities that have the power on organic act issues and not the city councils. [After discussing that no delegation was made or intended by the state legislature of organic act authority to city councils on electoral issues, Judge Allendoerfer continues] clearly the state legislature could adopt term limits for the position of Mayor by amending Title 29 RCW or by amending the OMC as an organic act amendment for non charter cities. But it hasn't. Therefore, without a delegation of organic act authority from the state legislature, Edmonds City Council cannot do organic act business on its own. Accordingly, I hereby declare that Section 2.01.030 of the Edmonds Municipal Code is contrary to state law, is in excess of the authority of the Edmonds City Council, and is void and unenforceable. The City then appealed this decision to the State Supreme Court. While argument and briefing were pending, Mayor Naughten lost the election and the issue was mooted. With this litigation as background, a number of years passed. As you may remember, term limits were a hot political issue in the early 90's with the election of a new wave of Republican legislators to the Congress. The Republicans assumed the majority for the first time in many years. Term limits were adopted at a federal level and, in the state of Washington, Initiative 573 was enacted by the voters. The initiative purported to impose a state statutory term limitation on who could appear on the ballot. Congressional term limits were imposed as well as term limits on state elected officials. On February 10, 1994, Judge William Dwyer of the US District Court, Western District of Washington, struck down Initiative 573 as it related to term limits for congressional candidates.5 While this case was based on a finding that Initiative 573 violated the US Constitution, it reaffirmed the rationale of Judge Allendoerfer's decision in finding that: s Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841, F.Supp. 1068 (1994). Copy attached as Exhibit C. {WSS654900.DOC;1/00006.900000/} Packet Page 158 of 433 Edmonds City Council Mayor Gary Haakenson March 15, 2007 Page 6 A fundamental principle of our representative democracy is, in Hamilton's words; `that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.' That is, Judge Dwyer's ruling is based on a finding the right of a voter to have a full range of candidates available to that voter is a fundamental right of government or a part, in Judge Allendoerfer; analysis, of the organic law of the State. At a federal level, changes in the organic law must be made by an amendment to the US Constitution, while at the City level, it must be done either by adoption of a charter or an amendment of the statutory charter, RCW 35A. On January 8, 1998, the Supreme Court of Washington, en banc, overturned the provisions of Initiative 573 which related to term limits on certain state constitutional offices.6 As with the case before Judge Dwyer, many of the arguments made to the Court were policy arguments. The Supreme Court's analysis was very similar to Judge Allendoerfer's. The Supreme Court stated: Washington's constitutional framers believed qualifications for State constitutional officers were a matter of constitutional, not statutory, concern.', In the Supreme Court's analysis, the majority relies on In Re Bartz,$ a decision central to Judge Allendoerfer's analysis in the Edmonds case. In Bartz, the Supreme Court in 1955 had held that the State legislature could fill a vacuum not addressed by the Constitutional office without amending the constitution. Judge Allendoerfer had relied on that case in his analysis noting that if the office of Mayor, like the office of Justice of the Peace in Bartz, had not been an office established by state law, the Council could have established term limits by ordinance. The Supreme Court went on to state: The general rule in Bartz remains the applicable principle as to statutory additions to qualifications for constitutional offices. Please note that in all of the recent appellate decisions on term limits, the issue has not been the policy merits or demerits of term limits but rather the method by which they should be imposed. The wisdom of term limits is ultimately a policy decision for the voters of the State, through the process for constitutional amendment articulated in Washington Constitutional Article 6 Gerberding, et al v. Monro, 134 Wn.2d 188 (1998). Copy attached as Exhibit D. 7 Ibid, Page 204. 8 47 Wash. 2d 161 (1955). 9 Page 1377. (WSS654900.D0C,1/00006.900000/) Packet Page 159 of 433 Edmonds City Council Mayor Gary Haakenson March 15, 2007 Page 7 XXIII. Whether this court thinks such choice wise, or results in the best or most effective state constitutional officers is of no consequence. With or without Initiative 573, the people retain the ultimate power to limit election of incumbents: by the reasoned and determined exercise of their franchise, they may in their discretion evict incumbents from office at the next election. Our review here is limited to the issue of whether the voters acted in compliance with our State's constitution in expressing their collective will.l0 Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down term limits in US Term Limits v. Thorton,t 1 holding that term limits constituted a qualification for federal legislative office in contravention of the constitutional qualifications for federal office. CONCLUSION Therefore, when the City Council in 1997 repealed ECC Section 2.01.030, it did so after that ordinance was declared void by a Superior Court Judge. While that decision was ultimately mooted at the ballot box, Judge Allendoerfer's rationale was affirmed by the US Supreme Court and a federal court. Shortly after repeal, the State Supreme Court reaffirmed that same rationale. The common rationale in each of these decisions is that the right to vote for an officer is a fundamental part of the organic law which governs a political jurisdiction. As such, term limits must be enacted through a constitutional amendment for a state or federal government, or at the municipal level by adoption of a home rule charter or amendment of the state statutory charter by the state Iegislature. The reasoning of Judge Allendoerfer's decision has therefore been affirmed by federal and state courts at the highest level. The City Council has a number of risk -free options: (1) The City Council could pass a resolution stating its opinion that a candidate should not seek a third term but is free to do so. (2) Term limits can clearly be established by adoption of a home rule charter. (3) The City Council could lobby the state legislature for authority, through the amendment of RCW Title 35A, to impose term limits. 1 ° Ibid. " 514 U.S. 779, 115 Escort 842, 131 L.Ed.2dn 881 (1995). Copy attached as Exhibit E. { WSS654900.DOC;1/00006.900000/1 Packet Page 160 of 433 Edmonds City Council Mayor Gary Haakenson March 15, 2007 Page 8 It remains my opinion that the City Council lacks authority to enact term limits by ordinance. In 1991, 1 requested that the City Council utilize special counsel to represent it in litigation between the City/City Council and the Mayor as a mayoral candidate. Such litigation puts a great strain on our working relationships. Therefore, I respectfully request that if the City Council wishes to pursue term limits by ordinance, it engage special counsel to assist it. Respectfully submitted, WSS:gjz {WSS654900.DOC;1/00006.900000/} Packet Page 161 of 433 EXHIBIT A { G1Z596928. DOC:1100000.0000001 } Packet Page 162 of 433 Page 2 of 8 W9wk Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) Page I (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) Wash. AGO 1991 NO, 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) lOffice of the Attorney General State of Washington AGO 1991 No. 22 June 24, 1991 CITIES AND TOWNS -COUNTIES -ELECTIONS -OFFICES AND OFFICERS -CHARTERS -OPTIONAL MUNICIPAL CODE -AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE TERM LIMITATIONS ON ELECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 1. Charter cities, charter counties, noncharter first class cities and noncharter code cities have the authority to impose a limit on the number of terms a locally elected official can serve. 2. Depending upon the provisions of their charter, charter cities and charter counties can adopt a term limitation as a charter provision by ordinance or through the initiative process. Noncharter first class cities and noncharter code cities can only adopt a term limitation through the passage of an ordinance. Honorable Gary A. Nelson State Senator, District 21 106-A Institutions Building, AS-32 Olympia, Washington 98504 Dear Senator Nelson: By letter previously acknowledged you have asked for our opinion on questions we paraphrase as: on the number of terms an elected official can serve? 2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, how can the term Iimitation be enacted? Brief Answer The answer to question 1 is yes for charter cities, charter counties, noncharter first class cities and noncharter code cities. For other cities, towns and counties, the answer is no. With regard to question 2, depending on the provisions of their charter, charter cities and charter counties can adopt a term limitation as a charter provision, by ordinance or through the initiative process. First class cities and noncharter code cities can only adopt term limitations by ordinance. ANALYSIS Question 1: Can a city, town or county impose a limit on the number of terms an elected official can serve? We begin our analysis with a brief review of the types of local governments authorized in Washington. The Legislature classifies cities and towns as first class, second class, third class and fourth class. RCW 35.01.010-.040. These classifications depend upon population. For example, a first class city is defined as "one having at least twenty thousand inhabitants at the time of its organization or reorganization." RCW 35.01.010. On the other hand, a fourth class municipal corporation -called a town instead of a city -is one " having not less than three hundred inhabitants and not more than fifteen hundred inhabitants at the time of its organization." RCW 35.01.040. 1. Can a city, town or county impose a limit Cities may also be organized pursuant to article © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 163 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/piintstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 3 of 8 Wash. AGO 1991 NO, 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) 11, section 10 (amendment 40) of the Washington Constitution, which provides: "Any city containing a population of ten thousand inhabitants, or more, shall be permitted to frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of this state...." In addition to the plan for organizing cities and towns in Title 35 RCW, the Legislature has enacted another scheme for the organization of municipal corporations -the optional municipal code set forth in Title 35A RCW. The optional municipal code authorizes two kinds of cities, a noncharter code city and a charter code city. A noncharter code city is defined as: A noncharter code city is one, regardless of population, which has initially incorporated as a noncharter code city, subject to the provisions of this title, or is an incorporated municipality which has elected, under the procedure prescribed in this title, to be classified as a noncharter code city and to be governed according to the provisions of this title under one of the optional forms of government provided for noncharter code cities.RCW 35A.01.020. A charter code city is defined as: A charter code city is one having at least ten thousand inhabitants at the time of its organization or reorganization which has either initially incorporated as a charter code city and has adopted a charter under the procedure prescribed in this title; or which, as an incorporated municipality, has elected to be classified as a charter code city and to be governed according to the provisions of this title and of its adopted charter.RCW 35A.01.030. The Legislature has set up a somewhat similar organization for counties. Counties are classified by population ranging from AA counties which contain a population of 500,000 or more, to ninth class counties which have a population of less than 3,300. RCW 36.13.010. In addition, article 11, section 4 (amendment 21) of the Washington Constitution provides that "[a]ny county may frame a `Home Rule' charter for its own government subject to the Constitution and laws of this state...." Page 2 Your question is whether any of these units of local government have the authority to limit the number of terms their elected officials can serve. In AGO 1991 No. 17 we discussed the principles governing the authority of municipal corporations: The general rule is that municipal corporations are limited to those powers expressly granted to them by the Legislature and to powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted. Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wn.2d 772, 792, 666 P.2d 329 (1983); City of Spokane v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 90 Wn.2d 722, 585 P.2d 784 (1978). At least as to matters of local concern, however, this general rule does not apply to cities and counties that have adopted charters pursuant to article 11, sections 4 and 10, of the Washington Constitution, respectively, or to cities operating under the Optional Municipal Code, Title 35A RCW. These cities and counties have legislative power akin to that of the state, except that their actions cannot contravene any constitutional provision or legislative enactment. Thus, such a city or county has broad legislative power except when restricted by enactments of the state. King Cy. Coun. v. Public Disclosure Comm'n, 93 Wn.2d 559, 562-63, 611 P.2d 1227 (1980); Winkenwerder v. Yakima, 52 Wn.2d 617, 622, 328 P.2d 873 (1958); La Mon v. Westport, 22 Wn.App. 215, 217-18, 588 P.2d 1205 (1978); Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wn.2d 772, 792-93, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).AGO 1991 No. 17 at 2. To answer your first question we must resolve two issues: (I) Does a term limitation contravene any constitutional provision or legislative enactment? (2) Do the various units of local government have the authority to enact a term limitation? Turning to the first issue, we are persuaded that a term limitation for local elected officials does not contravene a provision of the Washington Constitution or legislative enactment. Article 3, section 25 (amendment 31) sets out qualifications for state office. However, the © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 164 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 4 of 8 Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) Page 3 (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) Constitution is silent on the qualifications for local elected officials. [FNI] Article 3, section 25 provides: "No person, except a citizen of the United States and a qualified elector of this state, shall be eligible to hold any state office." These qualifications only apply to state officers. For example, in In re Bartz, 47 Wn.2d 161, 287 P.2d 119 (1955) the court ruled that a justice of the peace is a judicial officer, rather than a state officer. Accordingly, the court ruled that article 3, section 25 did not apply and that the Legislature had the authority to require that a justice of the peace be an attorney. Since article 3, section 25 does not apply to the elected officials of cities, towns and counties and the Constitution is otherwise silent, a term limitation for these officials cannot conflict with a provision of the Constitution. Under the Constitution, the Legislature is authorized to enact laws for the organization of cities and counties. Article 11, section 10 provides that "the legislature, by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation, organization and classification ... of cities and towns...." Article 11, section 4 provides that "[t]he legislature shall establish a system of county government ... throughout the state ... and by general laws shall provide for township organization, under which any county may organize...." Pursuant to this authority, the Legislature has enacted some qualifications for local officials. These qualifications are scattered throughout Titles 35, 35A and 36 RCW. The prescribed qualifications are very general. They usually require that the candidate be a voter and a resident of the jurisdiction for some specified period of time. For example, RCW 35.23.030 provides: No person shall be eligible to hold any elective office in any city of the second class unless he is a registered voter therein and has resided therein for at least one year next preceding the date of his election.RCW 35.24.030 provides: No person shall be eligible to hold an elective office in a city of the third class unless he be a citizen of and a legal resident therein. RCW 35.27.080 provides: No person shall be eligible to or hold an elective office in a town unless he is a resident and elector therein.RCW 35A.12.030 provides: No person shall be eligible to hold elective office under the mayor -council plan unless the person is a registered voter of the city at the time of filing his declaration of candidacy and has been a resident of the city for a period of at least one year next preceding his election.RCW 36.16.030 provides: In every county there shall be elected from among the qualified voters of the county [authorized county officials]....RCW 36.32.040 provides: [T]he qualified electors of each county commissioner district, and they only, shall nominate from among their own number, candidates for the office of county commissioner of such commissioner district to be voted for at the following general election. A limitation on the number of terms an elected official can serve has the effect of imposing an additional qualification that must be met by the candidate. To use RCW 35.23.030 as an example, if a two -term limitation were in place, a candidate for elective office in a second class city would have to meet the following requirements: 1. The candidate must be a registered voter. 2. The candidate must have resided in the city for at least one year preceding the date of the election. 3. The candidate must not have held the office sought for two terms. The Washington Supreme Court reached the conclusion that imposing an additional qualification does not contravene statutes setting forth the qualifications for the election of local officials in State ex rel. Griffiths v. Superior Court, 177 Wash. 619, 33 P.2d 94 (1934). This case concerned a provision in a city charter that no member of the city council "shall hold any other office, federal, state, county or municipal...." 177 Wash. at 620-21, The relator, who had been elected to the city council and also held office as a director of a school district, disputed the application of this provision in the charter. One basis of the challenge was that the charter provision conflicted with statutes enacted by the legislature setting forth the qualification for election of city officials. The statute provided that to hold elective office one must be a citizen of the United States and the State of Washington and an elector of the jurisdiction. [FN2] The court rejected © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works, Packet Page 165 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream.aspx?prft=HTNILE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 5 of 8 Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) Page 4 (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) this argument stating: The only attack made by the relator upon the charter is that it purports to superadd certain qualifications necessary for elective officers to those imposed by the legislature.... Had the framers of the charter sought to lessen the requirements demanded by the statute, a different question would be presented, for then the charter would be in direct conflict with the statute. But that is not the case here. Section 9929 merely provides that no person shall be competent to hold elective office unless he possesses certain qualifications. It does not say that no other requirements shall be prescribed, nor does it say that the political subdivision therein named may not impose restrictions not inconsistent with the statute. After all, the statute merely fixes a minimum of qualification below which its political subdivisions may not go. It does not say that other qualifications may not be required, in so far as they affect only the particular subdivision. 177 Wash. at 623-24 (emphasis added). The statutory qualification in Griffith is substantially the same as those previously cited in this opinion. Compare Rem.Rev.Stat. § 9929 and RCW 35.23.030; 35,24.030; 35.27.080; 35A.12.030; 36.16.030. Applying the same line of reasoning in this situation, we must conclude that a term limitation, which would constitute an additional qualification for a candidate, would not contravene the statutes which have been enacted by the Legislature. This brings us to the second issue raised by your first question: Do the various units of local government have the authority to enact a term limitation? We begin with charter counties and charter cities. These units of local government clearly have the authority to enact term limitations. Charter cities and charter counties have legislative power, at least as to matters of local concern, akin to that of the state. AGO 1991 No. 17 at 2. In State ex rel. Griffiths, 177 Wash. 619 (1934), the court specifically recognized the authority of a charter city to impose an additional requirement for candidates seeking office in that city. More recently, the court has approved the exercise of authority by charter counties in the election area. In State ex rel. Carroll v. King Cy., 78 Wn.2d 452, 474 P.2d 877 (1970), the court considered a provision of the King County charter that provided for the election of certain county officials in odd -numbered years and adjusted the terms of certain officials to match the new election dates. In sustaining this charter provision the court stated: We think that ... the framers of amendment 21 meant to confer upon counties adopting home rule charters those powers which had theretofore been conferred upon the legislature under Const. art. 11, § 5, including the power to fix the terms of office of county officers, with certain exceptions expressly set forth. It will be observed that the power to frame its own organic law is conferred in broad terms upon the county adopting a charter. While it is not permitted to "affect the election" of the prosecuting attorney, the superintendent of schools, the judges of the superior court and the justices of the peace (all offices in which the state has an interest), there are no restrictions placed upon its right to provide for the election of, prescribe the duties of, and fix the compensation of those officers which it deems necessary to handle its purely local concerns.78 Wn.2d at 456. The court followed State ex rel. Carroll in a subsequent decision, Henry v. Thorne, 92 Wn.2d 878, 602 P.2d 354 (1979). Henry concerned a charter provision that provided a greater restriction on the timing of elections to fill vacancies than those set forth in the State Constitution or statutes enacted by the Legislature. The court approved this charter provision stating: [Amendment 211 providing for county home rule expressed the intent of the people of this state to have "the right to conduct their purely local affairs without supervision by the State, so long as they abided by the provisions of the constitution and did not run counter to considerations of public policy of broad concern, expressed in general laws.92 Wn.2d at 881. Since charter cities and charter counties have broad legislative powers in matters of local concern, we conclude that they have the authority to impose term limitations on locally elected officials. We next turn to local governments that have not © 2007 Thomson[West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 166 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft =HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 6 of 8 Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) Page 5 (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) adopted a charter. The rule for such governments is that they are limited to those powers expressly granted to them by the Legislature and the power necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted. AGO 1991 No. 17 at 2. In reviewing the powers delegated to local governments, we find two that have been delegated sufficient authority by the Legislature to impose term limitations -first class cities, that have not adopted a charter, and noncharter code cities under the optional municipal code. With regard to first class cities, RCW 35.22.280(1) provides: Any city of the first class shall have power: (1) To provide for general and special elections, for questions to be voted upon, and for the election of officers[.]This power is granted to all first class cities, even cities that have not adopted a charter. In light of the specific grant of authority to provide for the election of officers, we conclude that a first class city may impose a term limitation upon city officers. Our conclusion here is consistent with our opinion in AGO 1991 No. 3. In that opinion we concluded that RCW 35.22.280(1) authorized a noncharter first class city to enact an ordinance imposing an additional residency requirement on candidates for the office of freeholder, elected to frame a city charter. AGO 1991 No. 3 at 11. Noncharter code cities have also been granted broad powers by the Legislature. RCW 35A.01.010 provides: The purpose and policy of this title is to confer upon two optional classes of cities created hereby the broadest powers of local self-government consistent with the Constitution of this state. Any specific enumeration of municipal powers contained in this title or in any other general law shall not be construed in any way to limit the general description of power contained in this title, and any such specifically enumerated powers shall be construed as in addition and supplementary to the powers conferred in general terms by this title. All grants of municipal power to municipalities electing to be governed under the provisions of this title, whether the grant is in specific terms or in general terms, shall be liberally construed in favor of the municipality. RCW 35A.21.160 provides: A code city [FN3] organized or reorganized under this title shall have all of the powers which any city of any class may have and shall be governed in matters of state concern by statutes applicable to such cities in connection with such powers to the extent to which such laws are appropriate and are not in conflict with the provisions specifically applicable to code cities.RCW 35A.11.020 provides in part: The legislative body of each code city shall have power to organize and regulate its internal affairs within the provisions of this title and its charter, if any; and to define the functions, powers, and duties of its officers and employees; within the limitations imposed by vested rights, to fix the compensation and working conditions of such officers and employees and establish and maintain civil service, or merit systems, retirement and pension systems not in conflict with the provisions of this title.... After reviewing the statutes in AGO 1972 No.24 we stated: The critical point to be drawn from these statutes is that by electing to come under the optional municipal code a city ceases to be governed by the traditional rules of delegated powers.... Instead, a city so opting thereby becomes possessed of all powers which either have been specifically granted by the legislature to any class of city (RCW 35A.21.160, supra) or which could be granted by the legislature (RCW 35A.01.010 and 35A.11.020, supra), subject only to such restrictions or limitations as are contained in the statutes themselves or within the state constitution; which is but another way of saying that the optional municipal code entitles cities operating thereunder to the equivalent of the home rule powers otherwise available only to first class charter cities.AGO 1972 No. 24 at 7. There is no Washington case authority directly on point relating to local governments that have not adopted a charter. However, we have discovered a © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 167 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/ptint/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 7 of 8 Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) Page 6 (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) decision from Pennsylvania that appears directly on point and we find the decision persuasive. In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Clark, 515 A.2d 1320, 512 Pa. 1 (1986), the court considered the authority of a city to enact an ordinance that limited the office of mayor to two terms. The city in question had chosen to be governed by the Code and the Charter Law, Mayor -Council Plan A. 515 A.2d at 1322. The law granted the city broad powers somewhat similar to those granted in the optional municipal code. [FN4] One of the issues before the court was whether "a third class municipality operating under Mayor -Council Plan A of the Charter Law has authority to promulgate an ordinance limiting the number of times a municipal officer can stand for reelection." 515 A.2d at 1324. The court concluded that the city did have the authority to enact the ordinance: (4) Under section 303(1), supra, the Legislature does empower the Council to administer local affairs. The power of the Council to limit incumbent municipal officers, including mayors to one term of reelection, as in the case at bar, is well within the scope of authority granted by the Legislature through section 303(1). Further, section 304 (53 P.S. § 41304, Supp.1986) provides "[a] general grant of municipal power ... intended to confer the greatest power of local self-government consistent with the Constitution of the State." Moreover, section 304 also provides that "[a]JI grants of municipal power to cities governed by an optional plan under this act, whether in the form of specific enumeration or general terms, shall be liberally construed in favor of the city." 515 A.2d at 1324 (footnote omitted). In our judgment the court's reasoning is equally applicable to powers granted noncharter first class cities and noncharter code cities. These jurisdictions have been granted the authority to impose term limitations on their elected officials. We do not find a similar grant of authority to second and third class cities, towns or the various classifications of counties. See e.g., RCW 35.23.010; 35.27.010; 36.32.120. In absence of a delegation of authority from the Legislature these levels of local government do not have the authority to limit the terms of their elected officials. Question 2: If the answer to question 1 is yes, how can the term limitation be enacted? The starting point for our analysis of your second question is the power of the Legislature to enact Iaws for the organization of city and county government. Const. art. 11, §§ 5, 10. Clearly, the Legislature has the authority to enact term limitations for city and county officials. By the same token, the Legislature could specifically prohibit term limitation for local officials or enact statutes setting forth the exclusive qualification for local officials, which would have the same effect. Before any city, town or county can impose a term limitation it must carefully review the statutes governing its elections to determine if the Legislature has enacted exclusive qualifications or acted in some other way to prohibit term limitations. We have reviewed some statutes. See infra. p. 5. However, given the broad nature of your question, we have not made an exhaustive review of the law in this area. Accordingly, any jurisdiction considering a term limitation should conduct its own review. With regard to charter cities and charter counties, the means of enacting a term limitation depends on the provisions of the charter. Obviously, the limitation can be adopted as a provision in the charter. This can be done when the charter is initially drafted or by amendment. See e.g., RCW 35.22.050-.190; 35A.08.030-.120; 35A.09.010-.070. A term limitation also might be accomplished by ordinance. However, this also depends on the provisions of the charter. If the charter sets out the exclusive qualifications for a candidate seeking city or county office, the legislative authority would be without power to change those qualifications. In this situation, a charter amendment would be necessary to enact a term limitation. On the other hand, if the charter sets out certain minimum qualifications, the legislative authority would have the power to add a term limitation by ordinance, so long as it did not conflict with the qualifications © 2007 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 168 of 433 http: //web2. westlaw .corn/print/piintstream. aspx ?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 8 of 8 Wash. AGO 1991 NO, 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) Page 7 (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) contained in the charter. A term limitation in a charter city or charter county might also be enacted by initiative of the people. Again, this can only be done if the charter provides for initiatives. If the charter does not provide an initiative process, the people have no direct legislative powers. If the charter does provide an initiative process, the people must exercise their legislative power in accordance with the charter. Thus, as with the city or county legislative authority, the people would have the power to add a term limitation, so long as it did not conflict with the qualifications contained in the charter. We turn next to noncharter first class cities and noncharter code cities. These units of Iocal government can only adopt term limitation by ordinance. Since these jurisdictions have not adopted a charter, the term limitation cannot be included as a charter provision. In addition, the people of noncharter first class cities and noncharter code cities do not have power to legislate directly through the initiative process. RCW 35.22.200; AGO 1970 No. 8 at 4. We trust the foregoing will be of assistance to you. Very truly yours, Kenneth O. Eikenberry Attorney General William B. Collins Assistant Attorney General [FN 1l As originally adopted in 1889, the Washington Constitution provided a term limitation for county officials. Article 11, section 7 stated: "No county officer shall be eligible to hold his office more than two terms in succession." Article 11, section 7 was repealed by amendment 22 in 1948. [FN2] The statute at issue provided: That no person shall be competent to qualify for or hold any elective public office within the state of Washington, or any county, district, precinct, school district, municipal corporation or other district or political subdivision, unless he be a citizen of the United States and state of Washington and an elector of such county, district, precinct, school district, municipality or other district or political subdivision.Rem.Rev.Stat. § 9929; Laws of 1919, ch. 139, § 1, p. 390. [FN3 ] The term "code city" includes both charter code cities and noncharter code cities. RCW 35A.01.030. [FN4] The Code and Charter Law provided in part: Each city governed by an optional form of government pursuant to this act shall, subject to the provisions of and limitations prescribed by this act, have full power to: (1) Organize and regulate its internal affairs, and to establish, alter, and abolish offices, positions and employments and to define the functions, powers and duties thereof and fix their term, tenure and compensation; ...515 A.2d at 1322 n. 6. Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) END OF DOCUMENT © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 169 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 EXHIBIT B {GJZ596928.DOC;1100000.000000/} Packet Page 170 of 433 t i rl -L wi % % 12A, iC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ' r qv�G"� Ri !/ o IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF W���Tp IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SNOHOMISH ------------------------------------------------------ CITY OF EDMONDS, a Washington municipal corporation Plaintiff, VS. LARRY NAUGHTEN and DEAN V. WILLIAMS, Snohomish County Audi. tor, No. 91-2-04568-1 Defendants. ) ------------------------------------------------------ VERBATIM REPORT OF ORAL DECISION BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 13th day of August, 1991, the above -entitled and numbered cause came an for Summary Judgment before the Honorable JAMES ALLENDOERFER, sitting in Department 2 of the Snohomish County Courthouse, in the City of Everett, County of Snohomish, State of Washington; For the Plaintiff: George Cody, attorney; For. the Defendant Thomas Burt a.rjrl Fax.,loam Gustafson, atta.rneys; William Meek., Cz,R, Court Reporter, 1 Packet Page 171 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: In the matter of the City of Edmonds v. Larry Naughten and Dean V. Williams, both sides have made motionw before this court for summary judgment. I have considered the briefs of the parties. I have considered the agreed statement of facts and the argument of counsel. I find that there are no material issues of disputed fact and that this case is in a posture where summary judgment is appropriate. There are two issues presented to the Court. 0ne is the validity of section 2.01.030 of the Edmonds Municipal Code which was originally enacted as Section 3 of Ordinance No. 2349 and was effective on January 1, 1984. The second issue before the Court is the validity of Mr. Naughten's Declaration of Candidacy, which was filed with the County Auditor's Office on July 24, 1991. My legal analysis starts with the question Of wijether the concept of term limitations fnZ• a Inayrar's position is constitutional or unconstitutional In determining an answer to that question, the Court must look at tyre equal protecti.ort cl.ayse of the LT. 5. Const.i.tut ion and. the Privile res a.r,d iiismuyii.ties r.:la.use of the wasliincg.ton Packet Page 172 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 ]. 12 13 14 15 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 L3 24 25 State Constitution. In analyzing the challenged section of the Edmonds Municipal Code in relation to those two constitutional provisions, I have chosen to apply the "rational basis test" rather than the "compelling interest test". I do not feel that heightened scrutiny of this section of the Edmonds Municipal Code is necessary or justified. Heightened scrutiny, which results from application of the compelling interest test, is just.i.fied only in 'cases involving electoral classificati(Dns which discriminate on the basis of wealth, race, creed or color., and is not justified in cases involving electoral classifications which are less fundamental in character, such as the one being challenged here. In making this determination as to which test to tose, I have relied most heavily upon the case of Kraft v. Barris, 18 Wn. App. 432, In apEjl,yi ng t-he rat: tonal. basis test , the cciu).--t starts with a presumption s:s f validity. The Court then asks the following question: Does the Edrnands ordinaK-Ice; or whatever ordinance is under scrutiny at a given time, advance a legit:?;hate stal-e .interest? Is the Edmonds Packet Page 173 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 i3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ordinance relevant to the achievement of a valid state interest? In answering such questions, courts give deference to the wisdom of the legislative .beady which enacted the challenged ordinance. I do find that term limitations are arguably justifiable on any of of the following theories and are, therefore, constitutional: Term limitations preserve fresh and responsive government. Term limitations guard against political entrenchment. Term limitations inject new and innovative leadership into the political system. They encourage incumbents to devote their full energies to public office rather than, campaigns during their final term of office. They expand the spectrum of political candidates, and they tend to avoid political monopolies. Fecause any and all of those theories are relevant to the achievement of a valid state interest , I f azed t11a.t the Edmonds ar-,dina3- ce , or the concept behind the Edmonds ordinance; as constituti_rina1. I further find that even if I were to have applied the compelling interest 1_e5t , the Edmonds orclirlanc;e would be c:onstit11tiorially Valid. I note Packet Page 174 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1a 11 12 1. 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 27 21. 22 23 24 25 that every case across the United States that I have reviewed has also held that term limitation ordinances are constitutional; and, of course, we may rely upon the 22nd Amendment to the United States Constitution, which was approved in 1951, as an example of a term limitation which is clearly relevant to the achievement of a valid public purpose. The term limitation in the 22nd Amendment, incidentally, is more stringent than the one that Edmonds has applied to its mayor. So, having thus determined that a tern, limitation is conceptually constitutional, the next question the Court turns to is the harder of the questions presented today: Does the Edmonds City Council have the legislative power to enact term limitations; ar what level of government does have such power,? Are term limitations something that should be reserved for constitutions or should they be reserved for state legislatures, or, as in the case of Ed►rlond-;, may they be enacted by a city council? In an:,we.ring this gi)estion, I turn. .first to the ha.si c str:7cture of main) cif».]_ cinverriment in the State of Washingtcin. That structure arises or girlally from Ari,ic,le 11 Section in (_):i 1:hP State Packet Page 175 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22. 2.3 24 25 constitution which authorizes the State legislature to enact laws for the organization of cities. The Washington constitution is fundamentally a document which restricts and limits the%t=ate:Le.;gs.lature. That is, it reserves unto the people certain checks and balances. I note that that is just the reverse of the U.S. Constitution, which itself is the source of all legislative authority, and Congress can only operate within the bounds of a constitutional grant. That's nc.it the case with the State of Washington., which .recognizes a fundamentally autonomous legislature. The Washington constitution is silent on the qualifications for local elected officials. That is, there are no restrictions in the constitution which govern what the legislature may or may not do on this topic. The legislature is, therefore, free to put whatever limitations it chooses on electoral qualifications, subject only to i:he ccansti.tutional rinc.i.ples of equal protection and privileges and immunities. So, I now turn to an arial.ysis of what our legislature has darce with respect to candidate qu.a.l.i..i 3 c:at i r11-15. V-i re are tw(-) state stal:utes that have k_reen passed. One is R . C . W . 4 2 . 04 . 02.0 . That Packet Page 176 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 i3 14 15 16 17 18 19 2n 21 22 23 24 states that a candidate for any state or municipal office must be a United States citizen and must be an elector of the jurisdiction which he is choosing to serve. Secondly, we have R.C.W. 35A.12.030, applying to code cities, which states that a candidate must be a registered voter in the city which he is choosing to serve, and he must have been a resident of that city for at least a year. That is the sum total of all restrictions the legislature has placed on municipal elected officials; and you will note that the legislature has apparently chosen not to impose term limitations as part of said minimum qualifications. 0n July 1, 1969, however, the State legislature adopted a very broad and significant amendment to municipal law in this state. It adopted the Optional Municipal Code, which I will refer to as the OMC, and which is known as title 35A R.C.W.. The OMC states that cities with c:rarters, and even those without charters, are granted the option of having broad home rule powers. Nrsrl-cYA�ri:et Cities nt�.l.st rely ulaun statutory proVisi.ons enacted by the State Legislature a5 tI-.1eJ r oro;aI fic act. .at is, that the Packet Page 177 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1.3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21. 22 23 24 25 f State Legislature has written charters for these cities without the necessity of voter participation or city council participation. Charter cities, an the other hand, must write their own organic act subject to approval by the voters of that city. Under either scenario, that is, under either the non -charter or the charter scenario, home rule powers of cities are extremely broad, and such powers may be further expanded or, supplemented by local legislation. As an illustration of the breadth of these powers, T refer to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent expressed in. the following three sections of the OMC: R.C.W. 35A.01.010 confers on OMC cities the "broadest powers of Local self-government consistent with the Constitution.' R.C.W. 35A.11.024 states that OMC cities knave "all powers passible for a r,Zty under the Constitution," Tt also states that oMC cities "sha_l]. have any authority ever given to any class of 113.paI i ty a 1.1 ,murl.i cipal i. is i rs t)f tt_te state " Finally, R.-C..W. 35A. 11 .050 states that:: ti-le grai)t. of „1unic.ipa.1 k,cwer is to he r:r;j.istr-.ier3. Packet Page 178 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 14-, o'rally in favor of OMC cities. Any specific itemizations of powers are merely supplementary or explanatory of the general presumption of power. Also, under either OMC scenario, that is the charter or non -charter scenario, there are certain limitations that are imposed can the broad powers referred to above. Those limitations arise, basically, from the 40th amendment of the State constitution. The first limitation is that an OMC city must abide by the State constitution and cannot violate it in any sense. For example, our State constitution has a provision that prohibits the lending of credit by cities. That is, cities can't make loads to private parties or make gifts of money or of their credit. The State Legislature cannot violate this prohibition, nor may a city through its own ardinances . The sec:onrl limitation. is that if general laws are enacted. by the state which either deny certain powers to cities or preempt certain areas, said laws may not be violated, supplemented or cont.radictc:=d by the cities themselves. For example, a general law has been enacted. au this state prov.id5lig that 11-1djt3.ates fo-t. the mayor's office. Packet Page 179 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21. 22 23 24 25 must be registered voters of the city which they seek to serve; this preempts the field, and certainly no city through its local ordinances could change that in any respect. The third restriction an OMC cities is the. requirement that there must be an express or implied delegation of authority from the State Legislature to the cities on certain special issues of paramount state concern, or said issues are declared out of bounds for local ordinances. This third limitation is 'expressed most. clearly in case law, but it's also expressed in R.C.W. 35A.21.160. An example of this third limitation would be a case where, a city might try to create a municipal court by its own ordinances, or might attempt to create a new power of taxation by ordinance. The State Supreme Court has ruled in both of those examples that such matters are of paramount state concern and are out of bounds for cities, even GMC cities. Mi crw, applyinU those three categories of limitations to the facts Of trios cafie. First of all, is there a. constitutional limitation acxairxst a r_.i1.y es- t.abIishi.ria a tei,III s:iIII J.t.a.t.i,(1)1, n11 1.11e c,fA.i.r,e of its ma-yor? The answer is no, The constitution is silent oil that i.ss3le . Packet Page 180 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 16 19 20 21 22. 23 24 25 Second, is there some statutory prohibition or pre-emption, express or implied, against a city council imposing a term limitation on its mayor? In answering that question, I make note, again, of the two statutes which the legislature has adopted to express what it feels the minimum qualifications should be for city candidates; R.C.W. 35A.12.030 and R.C.W. 42,04.020. I find that those expressions by the legislature are not intended to be exclusive, but are intended to be merely the minimum standards that a city cannot go below_ I find that this question has been answered by our Supreme Court in the case of State In Re Griffiths Investment v. Superior Court 177 Wash. 619. 1 further find that this principle was foilowed more recently by our Appellate Court in the case of Kraft v. Harris, 1S Wn. App. 432. 1, therefore, turn to the third limitation to see if it. applies. Is the topic of term limitat:i.cans for city nfficials an area of paramournt state concern, or joint state/city concern, thereby pl.aciria It Out of bol-131(is fcjr (7,l.ty cournc.i.l s? Iy-i answer i.i.ig 'I hi: t sues# ioyi, I have, lr.)oket] to R . C . W. 35A . 21 . 160 , an J I }i,3ve lookecl to the SupI'elne.. Co1.37:,s`. -zsr_ (:,f Tssagillall v. Teleprompter, 93 Packet Page 181 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 is 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Wn. 2nd 567. Let me restate the question in a different format. Are matters relating to the state electoral process in a special catagery of funda-mental democratic rights which can only be acted upon by the state legislature or by the vote of the people through a locally enacted charter? That is, are electoral issues organic act issues, and, if so, who can decide them? I find that term limitations on political candidates directly relate to the .integrity of the electoral process and are, therefore, fundamental to the democratic system of government. The right to run for office is a basic right of citizenship. Such matters are of organic act significance. I have searched for case law authority which supports this finding. I am relying, in part, upon Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wn. 2nd 547; I am also relying, in part, on Buckingham v. State, a Delaware case found at 35 Atl, 2nd 903. The Buckingham case: also leads to my next finding: That matters of organic: act significance may be enacted, suppl.emented or amended solely tly the level of government that has tyke underlying organic act authority. In the context of our present: -:asc: th'lii- wu: jld mFan t1lat the level of Packet Page 182 of 433 T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 L� 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 5 government which establishes the office of mayor reserves the exclusive authority to set the qualifications for mayoral candidates. In charter cities, that power is vested by the 4Oth amendment to our Constitution, and/or by the OMC, in the electorate of the city; that is, the authors of the charter. In non --charter cities, that power is vested by the Constitution in the State Legislature, which is the author of the organic act for non -charter cities. A delegation of organic act authority to city councils is legally possible. But such a delegation would have to be expressly stated in the OMC, or in a city's charter, or at least it would have to be necessarily implied from some provision in the OMC or in the city's charter. Mere general statutes found in the OMC which apply to charter and rton-charter cities alike, and. which make no sper;ifi.c reference to elec,tara.l -issues are not enough. A ftiere principle of liberal sta.tutary cc,nstr,ucrti.r�r� relating to OMC powers is nat enough. A provisi(:in inc:{:)rpc..)r;.�ting by referertce ;-ill powers and authca3-i.ty of charier ci t ie,,:n is t,c �ttc_�uci'rc; because, it is, the nec_t ple of these citie�z that Have the p)iiwCe7 on organic' ar,;is issi_trs thi- r:'Aty counc-ils. Packet Page 183 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 z1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 5 I find no express or implied delegation of organic act authority to city councils art electoral issues. In fact, I fired that R.C.W. 35A.42.020, R.C.W. 35A.12.030, and R.C.W. 35A.21.160 imply that there was no such delegation intended by the State Legislature. Clearly, the State Legislature could adopt term limitations for the position of mayor by amending Title 29 R.C.W., or by amending the OMC as an organic act amendment for non --charter cities. Buteit hasn't. Clearly, a charter city could adopt term limitations in its own charter by vote of the people. That is, amend its own organic act as the City of. Seattle did in the Griffiths case and in the Kraft case. But Edmonds doesn't have a charter that i. t can amend. Edmonds is riot the author of its own organic act. A non -charter city never can be the auth(-.)r of its own organic act. The Edmonds City Council did rent the position of the mayor; the Legislature did. Therefore, witi-,out a delegation of o.ryanic act authority from the State Legislature, ttiw ErirrIonds City Cokiric i 1. catinal: do organic: act bu.sAn+—_-ss cin its own. T lhi=-rebV Packet Page 184 of 433 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 73 24 25 2.01.030 of the Edmonds Municipal Code is contrary to State law, is in excess of the authority of the Edmonds City Council, and is void and unenforceable. I further hold that Larry Naughten's Declaration of Candidacy for a third consecutive term as Mayor of the City of Edmonds is valid and that he should remain on the ballot. If elected, I hold that he is qualified to serve a third term. I further hold that the injunctions sought by 'the City of Edmonds are denied and that the City's complaint is dismissed. That completes my ruling. Are there questions from counsel. MR. BURT : Your Honor, may the transcript of your ruling stand as your order in the case or would you prefer a written order be prepared. MR. CODY: T carr have a written order prepared certain l.y by f i rat thing in the morning and to counsel, if that time tattle would work. I thirik: we should have it, a transcript, prepared and I will order orie, but rather t-ban delay it, I think I care gP a s�_i.mma.ry j�_t{9.c�mi�IIi: <.,rder�. pr,e1)ared 'c)y t1le s11rs1,ni11(j . THE: COURT well, if (.:an do it Packet Page 185 of 433 1 that quickly I think that would be appropriate. Do 2 you want to have a time to present this tomorrow or 3 are you going to communicate with Mr. Burt to avoid 4 a formal presentation? 5 MR. CODY: If I can get it to Mr. Burt b by fax in the morning, I have to be up here on some 7 matters, and if he approves it I can just wring it 8 by and get it entered. I thank we can work that 9 from there, unless he would rather a specific time 10 for presentation. 1t MR. BURT: I think that will work, 12 Your Honor. If we don't set a specific time, I 1.1 think we can work it out by communicating, 14 THE COURT: Very well. If there is 15 nothing further, the Court will be in recess. 16 (The proceedings were concluded.) 17 18 19 20 21. 22 23 24 2 Packet Page 186 of 433 EXHIBIT C { GJZ596928.DOC;1 /00000.000000/ 1 Packet Page 187 of 433 Page 2 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) P Briefs and Other Related Documents Thorsted v. GregoireW.D.Wash.,1994. United States District Court,W.D. Washington, at Seattle.. Susan THORSTED; William First; and Timothy S. Zenk, PIaintiffs, V. Christine O. GREGOIRE; and Ralph Munro, Defendants, andSherry Bockwinkel; Limit; Citizens for Term Limits; U.S. Term Limits; Alan M. Gottlieb; Lee GiII; and Wilbur B. McPherson, Intervenors Defendants. Margaret COLONY; League of Women Voters of Washington; George Cheek; John Clute; and Thomas Foley, Plaintiffs, V. Ralph MUNRO; and Christine O. Gregoire, Defendants, andSherry Bockwinkel; Limit; Citizens for Term Limits; U.S. Term Limits; Alan M. Gottlieb; Lee Gill; and Wilbur B. McPherson, Intervenors Defendants. Nos. C92-1763WD, C93-770WD. Feb. 10, 1994. Voters and Congressional representative brought action challenging constitutionality of Washington's ballot access statutes with term limits for members of United States Senate and House of Representatives. The District Court, Dwyer, J., held that: (1) statutes violated qualifications clauses, and (2) special circumstances would make award of attorney fees unjust. Judgment for plaintiffs. West Headnotes [1] Federal Courts 170E E' -272 170B Federal Courts 170BIV Citizenship, Residence or Character of Parties, Jurisdiction Dependent on Page I 170BIV(A) In General 170Bk268 What Are Suits Against States 170Bk272 k. Injunctive or Mandatory Relief; Declaratory Judgments. Most Cited Cases Eleventh Amendment does not bar actions to enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 11. [2) Constitutional Law 92 (' —42.3(2) 92 Constitutional Law 9211 Construction, Operation, and Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions 92k41 Persons Entitled to Raise Constitutional Questions 92k42.3 Particular Classes of Persons 92k42.3(2) k. Citizens, Residents, or Taxpayers; Property Owners. Most Cited Cases Constitutional Law 92 C=42.3(3) 92 Constitutional Law 921I Construction, Operation, and Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions 92k41 Persons Entitled to Raise Constitutional Questions 92k42.3 Particular Classes of Persons 92k42.3(3) k. Government or Public Officers or Employees. Most Cited Cases Voters and congressional representative had standing to challenge constitutionality of Washington's ballot access statutes with term limits for United States Senate and House of Representatives, even though statutes provided write-in procedure, and even though no injury had actually occurred; representative would be barred from ballot in 1998, and threatened injury to right to vote was sufficient. West's RCWA Init.Measure 573 prec. § 29.68.004. [3] Federal Civil Procedure 170A C=103.2 170A Federal Civil Procedure 170AII Parties © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works, Packet Page 188 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 3 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) 170AII(A) In General 170AkIO3.1 Standing 170Ak103.2 k. In General; Injury or Interest. Most Cited Cases If one plaintiff has standing, it does not matter whether others do. [41 Elections 144 C�-21 144 Elections 144I Right of Suffrage and Regulation Thereof in General 144k20 Power to Regulate Nominations and Ballots 144k21 k. In General. Most Cited Cases Each voter has right to choose among candidates placed on ballot without unconstitutional exclusions or restrictions. [5] Associations 41 (C---20(1) 41 Associations 41k20 Actions by or Against Associations 41k20(I) k. In General. Most Cited Cases Organization of voters had representational standing to sue on behalf of voter -members who had standing to challenge constitutionality of Washington's ballot restriction statutes. West's RCWA Init.Measure 573 prec. § 29.68.004. [6] Federal Courts 170B C=12.1 170B Federal Courts 170BI Jurisdiction and Powers in General 170BI(A) In General 170Bk12 Case or Controversy Requirement 170Bkl2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 17013k12) Under "doctrine of ripeness," federal courts refrain from deciding abstract disagreements that might never become real disputes. Page 2 170Bk12 Case or Controversy. Requirement 170Bkl2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 170Bkl2) Ripeness is largely question of timing, and court must look to both fitness of issues for judicial decision and hardship to parties of withholding court consideration. [8) Federal Courts 170B C-13 170B Federal Courts 170BI Jurisdiction and Powers in General 170BI(A) In General 170Bkl2 Case or Controversy Requirement 170BkI3 k. Particular Cases or Questions, Justiciable Controversy. Most Cited Cases Challenge by voters and congressional representative to Washington's ballot access statutes with term limits was ripe for adjudication, although statutes would not bar representative from ballot until 1998; delay would substantially harm sponsor of the initiative -based statutes, would deprive voters of information, would inflict uncertainty on parties and public, and would create chance of Ninth Circuit not reviewing issues before ostensible winners of 1998 election are sworn into office. West's RCWA Init.Measure 573 prec. § 29.68.004. [91 Constitutional Law 92 C-90.1(1.2) 92 Constitutional Law 92V Personal, Civil and Political Rights 92k90 Freedom of Speech and of the Press 92k90.1 Particular Expressions and Limitations 92k90.I(1.2) k. Election Regulations. Most Cited Cases Constitutional Law 92 C�-278.4(2) 171 Federal Courts 170B �D-12.1 92 Constitutional Law 92XII Due Process of Law 170B Federal Courts 92k278.4 Regulations Affecting Public 170BI Jurisdiction and Powers in General Officers and Employees 170BI(A) In General 92k278.4(2) k. Eligibility and © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 189 of 433 http://web2.westlaw. com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 4 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) Appointment, Election, or Promotion. Most Cited Cases United States 393 �D=11 393 United States 393I Government in General 393k7 Congress 393k11 k. Regulation of Elections of Senators and Representatives. Most Cited Cases Washington's ballot access statutes with term limits for United States House of Representatives and Senate violates qualifications clauses and First and Fourteenth Amendments, even if statutes are viewed as attempt to regulate electoral process; statutes would have practical effect of imposing new qualification of nonincumbency beyond specified periods, statutes seek to determine outcome, not procedures, and are not neutral or narrowly drawn. West's RCWA Init.Measure 573 prec. § 29.68.004; U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3, 4, cl. 1; Amends. 1, 14. [10] United States 393 C�-11 393 United States 3931 Government in General 393k7 Congress 393k11 k. Regulation of Elections of Senators and Representatives. Most Cited Cases Voters' freedom to choose federal legislators must not be abridged by laws that make qualified persons ineligible to serve. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3. [11] United States 393 IC;-11 393 United States 393I Government in General 393k7 Congress 393k1I k. Regulation of Elections of Senators and Representatives. Most Cited Cases State may not diminish voters' constitutional freedom of choice by making would-be candidates for Congress ineligible on basis of incumbency or history of congressional service. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, H 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3, 4, cl. 1; Amends. 1, 14. [12] States 360 C�-18.71 Page 3 360 States 360I Political Status and Relations 3601(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption 360k18.71 k. Public Officers and Employees; Elections. Most Cited Cases United States 393 �' -11 393 United States 393I Government in General 3930 Congress 393k11 k. Regulation of Elections of Senators and Representatives. Most Cited Cases While Constitution bars states from imposing substantive restrictions on who may be elected to Congress, it permits reasonable state regulation of how elections are conducted. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3, 4, cl. 1. [13] United States 393 C=11 393 United States 393I Government in General 3930 Congress 393k11 k. Regulation of Elections of Senators and Representatives. Most Cited Cases Measures lawfully adopted under constitutional provision permitting state regulation of times, places, and manner of elections for Senators and Representatives are designed to protect integrity and reliability of electoral process. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 4, cl. 1. [14] States 360 C---4.16(1) 360 States 360I Political Status and Relations 360I(A) In General 360k4.16 Powers of United States and Infringement on State Powers 360k4.16(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases Ninth and Tenth Amendments are restrictions upon federal power and are intended to prevent interference with rights of states and their citizens. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 9, 10. [15] States 360 'E' -4.4(3) © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 190 of 433 http://web2.we stl aw.com/ptznt/pri ntstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 5 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: $41 F.Supp. 1068) 360 States 3601 Political Status and Relations 360I(A) In General 360k4.4 Powers Reserved to States 360k4.4(3) k. Other Particular Powers. Most Cited Cases States 360 C-4.16(1) 360 States 360I Political Status and Relations 360I(A) In General 360k4.16 Powers of United States and Infringement on State Powers 360W.16(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases United States 393 'E' —11 393 United States 393I Government in General 3930 Congress 393k1I k. Regulation of Elections of Senators and Representatives. Most Cited Cases Ninth and Tenth Amendments cannot be read to allow states to limit citizens' freedom of choice by adding qualifications for Congress, where qualifications clauses of Constitution preclude states from doing so. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3; Amends. 9, 10. [16] Civil Rights 78 C;-1456 78 Civil Rights 78IH Federal Remedies in General 78k1449 Injunction 78k1456 k. Other Particular Cases and Contexts. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 78k262.1) Declaratory Judgment 118A �' -124.1 I I8A Declaratory Judgment 118AII Subjects of Declaratory Relief 118AH(E) Statutes 118Akl24 Statutes Relating to Particular Subjects Cases 118Akl24.1 k. In General. Most Cited Page 4 Injunctive and declaratory relief under § 1983 were warranted as to Washington's unconstitutional ballot access statutes with term limits for United States House of Representatives and Senate, even though nothing was done to enforce statutes; state was prepared to enforce statutes if upheld, and threatened enforcement would deprive voters and congressional representative of constitutional rights. West's RCWA Init.Measure 573 prec. § 29.68.004; U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, H 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3; Amends. 1, 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. [17] Civil Rights 78 C�-1333(1) 78 Civil Rights 78I11 Federal Remedies in General 78k1328 Persons Protected and Entitled to Sue 78k1333 Injury and Causation 78k1333(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 78k203) Threatened harm that has not yet occurred, but that will occur unless judicial relief is afforded, is enough to support civil rights claim. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, [18) Civil Rights 78 �' —1479 78 Civil Rights 78111 Federal Remedies in General 78k1477 Attorney Fees 78k1479 k. Proceedings, Grounds, and Objections in General. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 78k293) Special circumstances would make award of attorney fees unjust in § 1983 challenge to constitutionality of Washington's ballot access statutes with term limits for members of United States Senate and House of Representatives; mere filing of suit by anyone with standing would have assured full court test, statutes were adopted by voter initiative, statutes were not yet being enforced, state officials acted in good faith, case was one of first impression in federal court, and state officials could not have settled case by agreement. West's RCWA Init.Measure 573 prec. § 29.68.004; U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3; Amends. 1, 14; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1988. © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 191 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 6 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite. as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) *1070 Glen K. Thorsted, Bellevue, WA, for Susan Thorsted, William First, Timothy S. Zenk. Fredric C. Tausend, Paul J. Lawrence, Stephen A. Smith, Preston, Thorgrimson, Shidler, Gates & Ellis, Seattle, WA, for Margaret Colony. Stephen A. Smith, Preston, Thorgrimson, Shidler, Gates & Ellis, Seattle, WA, for League of Women Voters of Washington, George Cheek, John Clute, Thomas Foley. John Maurice Groen, Pacific Legal Foundation, Bellevue, WA, Deborah J. La Fetra, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA, for Citizens for Term Limits. Jeffrey T. Even, Atty. General's Office, Olympia, WA, James Kendrick Pharris, Atty. General's Office, Olympia, WA, for Kenneth O. Eikenberry, State of Wash., Ralph Munro. Richard Andrew Derham, Davis Wright Tremaine, Seattle, WA, John G. Kester, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, for U.S. Term Limits, Alan M. Gottlieb, Lee Gill, Wilbur B. McPherson. Kevin J. Hamilton, Thomas More Kellenberg, Perkins Coie, Seattle, WA, for American Civ. Liberties Union of Washington (ACLU), amicus. David C. Stewart, Oles, Morrison & Rinker, Seattle, WA, for WA Legal Foundation, amicus. *1071 Richard Andrew Derham,Davis Wright Tremaine, Seattle, WA, for Taxpayers United for Term Limits, amicus, Ronald D. Rotunda, amicus. Herbert E. Wilgis, 111, Preston, Thorgrimson, Shidler, Gates & Ellis, Seattle, WA, Lloyd N. Cutler , Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, DC, for Henry J. Hyde, amicus. Wallace M. Rudolph, pro se. Shawn T. Newman, James Martin Johnson, Olympia, WA, Cleta Deatherage Mitchell, Washington, DC, Griffin B. Bell, King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA, Polly J. Price, King & Spalding, Washington, DC, for Limit (Sponsor of Initiative 573). Shawn T. Newman, James Martin Johnson, Olympia, WA, Cleta Deatherage Mitchell, Washington, DC, Griffin B. Bell, King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA, Polly J. Price, James D. Miller, King & Spalding, Washington, DC, for Sherry Bochwinkel. Sherry Bochwinkel, pro se. ORDER ON DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS Page 5 DWYER, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION These consolidated cases are of fundamental importance to the structure of representative government in the United States. At issue is the constitutionality of a state law designed to prevent incumbents who have served for a specified number of years from winning re-election to the United States Senate or House of Representatives. On November 3, 1992, the voters of the State of Washington approved Initiative Measure 573 by a margin of about fifty-two to forty-eight percent. (The measure failed, by a similar margin, in the state's Fifth Congressional District, represented by plaintiff Thomas Foley, who is Speaker of the House of Representatives.) Under Article 11, §§ 1 and l(a) of the Washington Constitution, Initiative 573 became law thirty days after its passage, and is now codified at Revised Code of Washington (" RCW") Ch. 29. It provides in relevant part: Sec. 4. A new section is added to chapter 29.68 RCW to read as follows: No person is eligible to appear on the ballot or file a declaration of candidacy for the United States house of representatives who, by the end of the then current term of office will have served, or but for resignation would have served, as a member of the United States house of representatives during six of the previous twelve years. Sec. 5. A new section is added to chapter 29.68 RCW to read as follows: No person is eligible to appear on the ballot or file a declaration of candidacy for the United States senate who, by the end of the then current term of office will have served, or but for resignation would have served, as a member of the United States senate during twelve of the previous eighteen years. Other sections provide that the Washington Secretary of State shall not accept a declaration of candidacy from a person who "is ineligible for the office" under the Initiative, nor allow such person's name to appear on the ballot (Section 7); that one who is ineligible to appear on the ballot or file a declaration of candidacy may run a write-in © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 192 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.cornlprint/printstream. aspx?prft=HTNILE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 7 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) campaign (Section 6); that no terms or years served in office before November 3, 1992, may be used to determine eligibility (Section 7); and that Sections 4 and 5, regarding candidates for federal legislative office, are not effective until at least nine other states have passed similar measures (Section 7). The latter condition has been met. The full text of Initiative 573 is set out in Appendix A to this order. Only the parts governing candidacies for the two houses of Congress are challenged here; no ruling on the provisions relating to State of Washington offices is sought or made. The plaintiffs, who are or represent registered voters in Washington, and one of whom is a member of the House of Representatives, allege that Initiative 573's restrictions on candidacies for Congress are invalid under Article I, §§ 2 and 3, of the United States Constitution, and under the First and *1072 Fourteenth Amendments. They seek a declaratory judgment and an order enjoining defendants Ralph Munro and Christine Gregoire, the Washington Secretary of State and Attorney General, from enforcing those provisions. Plaintiffs also seek relief for an alleged deprivation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The two State officers who are defendants, and the intervenor defendants (Sherry Bockwinkel, LIMIT, U.S. Term Limits, Alan M. Gottlieb, Lee Gill, Wilbur B. McPherson, and Citizens for Term Limits), seek judgment upholding the constitutionality of Initiative 573 and denying any relief to plaintiffs. A variety of amici curiae have filed briefs.FN1 FN1. Amici curiae contending that Initiative 573 is unconstitutional are Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-111.) and the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington Foundation. Arguing in favor of constitutionality are the Washington Legal Foundation; Taxpayers United for Term Limits; Citizens United Foundation; Ronald D. Rotunda; and Wallace M. Rudolph. Page 6 This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. All parties have moved for summary judgment and/or for dismissal. The motions for dismissal are treated as summary judgment motions because matters outside the pleadings have been presented. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). There is no genuine issue of material fact for trial, and the case may be resolved on the motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The briefs of all parties and friends of the court have been fully considered, as have the arguments of counsel given in open court at a hearing held on January 11, 1994. II. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT [1] These actions are brought against the Washington Secretary of State and Attorney General, who are responsible for implementing and enforcing Initiative 573. Although the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits in federal court against a state without the state's consent, see Hans V. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), it does not bar actions to enjoin state officials from enforcing an unconstitutional law. Ex Pane Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm. v. Eu, 826 F.2d 814, 824-25 (9th Cir.1987), aff d, 489 U.S. 214, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989).FN2 FN2. By a separate order entered today, an unopposed motion in the Thorsted case to dismiss that action as against the State of Washington, defendants Munro and Gregoire in their personal capacities, and the spouses of the two State officials named as defendants, is granted. The Colony plaintiffs have named only the Washington Secretary of State and Attorney General as defendants. III. STANDING AND RIPENESS The plaintiffs, supported by intervenor defendants Sherry Bockwinkel and LIMIT, and by some of the amici curiae, contend that plaintiffs have standing to O 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 193 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 8 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 8411F.Supp.1068) sue and that the constitutional challenge is ripe for decision. The State defendants, supported by intervenor defendant U.S. Term Limits and by some of the amici curiae, contend that standing is absent and the case is not justiciable, i.e., is not ripe for decision. A. Standing [21 There are eight plaintiffs. In the Colony case, Thomas Foley, who has represented the Fifth Congressional District of Washington in Congress since 1965, declares that he plans to continue serving if the voters re-elect him. Initiative 573, if valid, will bar him from the ballot in 1998. Margaret Colony, a registered voter in the State's Eighth Congressional District, claims injury to her right to vote for constitutionally qualified candidates of her choice. The League of Women Voters of Washington, a civic organization, asserts representational standing for its member -voters. George Cheek is a registered voter in the Fifth District who intends to vote for Congressman Foley. John Clute, dean of the Gonzaga University School of Law, is also a registered voter in the Fifth District. In the Thorsted case, plaintiffs Susan Thorsted, William First, and Timothy S. Zenk are registered voters in Washington. The plaintiffs allege injury to their rights as voters and/or as candidates, and to their rights of free association and political expression. Some assert standing based upon harm to public projects that are being supported*1073 by certain incumbents. The latter category need not be analyzed because plaintiff Foley's standing as a member of Congress who plans to seek re-election, and the other plaintiffs' standing as registered voters, are enough. The Supreme Court has listed three elements of standing to sue: the plaintiff must have suffered an " injury in fact" (an invasion of a legally -protected interest which is "concrete and particularized" and is "actual or imminent"); there must be a "causal connection" between the injury and the conduct complained of; and it must be "likely," and not merely "speculative," that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Page 7 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The Court in Lujan held that if "the plaintiff is himself an object of the [government] action ... at issue ... there is ordinarily little question that the action ... has caused him injury." Id. 504 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2137. Congressman Foley is clearly an "object" of Initiative 573; the measure, if enforced, will bar him from the ballot in the future. Like the plaintiffs in Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2308-09, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979), he has demonstrated a "realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the [challenged] statute's operation or enforcement." [31 If one plaintiff has standing, it does not matter whether the others do. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3185, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986); Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160, 102 S.Ct. 205, 212, 70 L.Ed.2d 309 (1981); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563 n. 9, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). In this case, however, the voter plaintiffs have standing as well. The Supreme Court has held that Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution "gives persons qualified to vote a constitutional right to vote .and to have their votes counted." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 534, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). "No right," said the Court, is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right. Id., 376 U.S. at 17-18, 84 S.Ct. at 534-36. [4] It is true, as defendants point out, that a voter " does not have a fundamental right to vote for any particular candidate." Burdick v. Takushi, 927 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir.1991), afj'd, 504 U.S. 428, 112 O 2007 ThomsonfWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 194 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 9 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). But each voter does have a right to choose among candidates placed on the ballot without unconstitutional exclusions or restrictions. The rights of voters and those of candidates are related and "do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at Ieast some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. " Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1568, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 856, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). In Anderson and Bullock, the Court allowed suits by voter plaintiffs or intervenors challenging state ballot access requirements. The Ninth Circuit, interpreting Anderson, has upheld voter standing to challenge a candidate eligibility requirement since "basic constitutional rights of voters as well as those of candidates" are implicated. Erun v. Cayetano, 881 F.2d 689, 691 (9th Cir.1989), citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206, 82 S.Ct. 691, 704, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The Circuit has also upheld a voter's standing to challenge a state election law write-in provision. Burdick, 927 F.2d at 472. Initiative 573 would prevent the plaintiffs from casting their votes for any candidate barred from the ballot under its provisions except through a burdensome write-in procedure. The Supreme Court has held that a write-in opportunity "is not an adequate substitute for having the candidate's name appear on the printed ballot." Anderson, 460 U.S. at 799 n. 26, 103 S.Ct. at 1575 n. 26, *1074 citing Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 719 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 1321 n. 5, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974). This threatened injury is enough to confer standing; the plaintiffs are not required to wait until the injury has actually occurred. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298, 99 S.Ct. at 2308-09; Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1515 (9th Cir.1992). [5) The League of Women Voters of Washington has representational standing to sue for its voter -members. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2211, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Hutt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Page 8 Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441-42, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). B. Ripeness [6)[7] Under the doctrine of ripeness, federal courts refrain from deciding "abstract disagreements" that might never become real disputes. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 3332-33, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985). Ripeness is largely a question of timing, id., 473 U.S. at 580, 105 S.Ct. at 3332, and the court must look to "both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, I515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980,51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977), Fitness for judicial decision may be found where the plaintiffs have standing and the issue "is a purely legal one," as with construction of a statute. Id. See also Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 581, 105 S.Ct. at 3333; Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir.1986); Helm v. California, 722 F.2d 507 (9th Cir.1983); Friedman Bros. Inv. Co. v. Lewis, 676 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir.1982). [8] The questions raised here are purely legal: whether a state may add qualifications for election to Congress beyond those listed in Article I, Sections 2 and 3; if not, whether Initiative 573 imposes further qualifications; and whether plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments are violated. The record is complete. The constitutional issues will not disappear, and to postpone deciding them would accomplish nothing. See Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 581, 105 S.Ct. at 2634; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2634, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); cf.. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 111 S.Ct. 2331, 115 L.Ed.2d 288 (1991) (further opportunity for the state courts to interpret the statute might alter the question presented). As for hardship to the parties, the plaintiffs and O 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 195 of 433 http://web2. westlaw.con-ilprint/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 10 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) intervenor defendants Bockwinkel and LIMIT have shown that they would be substantially harmed by delay. In the face of uncertainty about whether Initiative 573 will stand, plaintiff Foley is unable to plan whether to run again beyond the 1996 election. Even if he decides to run, until this matter is resolved he cannot know how to run -whether to wait until 1998 to campaign in the customary way, or to embark sooner on a long-range effort to overcome the ballot -exclusion barrier. The voter plaintiffs are deprived of information they need in deciding which candidates to support, when to begin supporting them, and by what methods. LIMIT, self -described as a temporary organization, is forced to try to prolong its existence and solvency for as long as necessary to defend its position. Ms. Bockwinkel is an organizer and leader of LIMIT. As an official sponsor of the initiative, LIMIT has a judicially -recognized interest in seeking to have it upheld. See RCW 29.79.010 and Yniquez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 733 (9th Cir.1991). The Supreme Court has described the importance of deciding a challenge to the constitutionality of an election law before it takes effect: Though waiting until [plaintiffs] invoke unsuccessfully the statutory election procedures would remove any doubt about the existence of concrete injury resulting from application of the election provision, little could be done to remedy the injury incurred in the particular election. Challengers to election procedures often have been left without a remedy in regard to the most immediate election because the *1075 election is too far underway or already consummated prior to judgment.... Justiciability in such cases depends not so much on the fact of past injury but on the prospect of its occurrence in an impending or future election. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 300 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 2310 n. 12. See also Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 226 (7th Cir.1993); Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853, 858 (2nd Cir.1980). To put off a court test of Initiative 573 until 1997 or 1998 would not only inflict uncertainty on the parties and the public, but would risk a failure to complete review by the Ninth Circuit, and perhaps Page 9 by the Supreme Court, before the ostensible winners of the 1998 election are sworn into office. See Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523, 1527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002, 104 S.Ct. 509, 78 L.Ed.2d 698 (1983). The case is ripe for adjudication, and the constitutional issues must be decided. IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY A. State Legislation and the Constitution The parties have expressed fervent beliefs for and against term limits for members of Congress. The proponents say that long-term incumbents become indifferent to the well-being of the people, preoccupied with re-election, aligned with special interest groups, hard to dislodge because they hold a great advantage in fund-raising, and resistant to any change that would level the playing field. The opponents say that there is in fact a large and steady turnover in congressional membership, voters should be free to re-elect good representatives, the way to end a political career is simply to defeat the incumbent at the polls, and term limits would weaken the national legislature. These arguments are important in a policy debate but cannot determine the legal issues. Whether congressional term limits are wise or foolish is not for the courts to decide. The nation could adopt them by amending the Constitution, as it did in limiting the President to two elected terms in the Twenty -Second Amendment, ratified in 1951. The question is whether a state may adopt them in the absence of a federal constitutional amendment. A state statute that violates the United States Constitution must be held invalid. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810). In Washington the initiative process is a way "to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislature...." Wash. Const., art. II, § 1. An initiative is tested by the same constitutional standards as a bill adopted by the legislature. As the Supreme Court held in © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 196 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.c om/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destinati on=atp&sv=Spli t... 3/14/2007 Page 11 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: $41)F.Supp.1068) Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981) It is irrelevant that the voters rather than a legislative body enacted [the statute], because the voters may no more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation. Id., 454 U.S. at 295, 102 S.Ct. at 437.FN3 FN3. Several Washington initiatives have been declared unconstitutional by federal courts. See Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank v. State of Washington, 696 F.2d 692 (9th Cir.1983) (Initiative 394 regulating WPPSS financing held unconstitutional under Contract Clause); Washington State Building & Construction Trades Council V. Spellman, 518 F.Supp. 928 (E.D.Wash.1981), affd, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.1982) (Initiative 383 prohibiting shipment of nuclear waste to Washington held unconstitutional under Supremacy and Commerce Clauses); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State of Washington, 473 F.Supp. 996 (W.D.Wash.1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir.1980), affd, 458 U.S. 457, 102 S.Ct. 3187, 73 L.Ed.2d 896 (1982) (Initiative 350 limiting school busing held unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause); Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Ray, 449 F.Supp. 1145, 1158 (E.D.Wash.1978) (Initiative 335 dealing with obscenity held unconstitutional under First Amendment). B. The Qualifications Clauses [91 The first challenge to Initiative 573 is brought under the Qualifications Clauses. Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution provides in part: No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall *1076 not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. Page 10 Article I, Section 3 provides in part:No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen. The defendants contend that these provisions Iist only the minimum qualifications for the House and Senate, and that a state may add to them. 1. The Powell Case The Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), held that the Article I qualifications for election -age, citizenship, and residency -cannot be added to by Congress. Powell arose from an attempt by the House of Representatives to exclude a re-elected member from New York, found by a majority of his colleagues to have engaged in financial misconduct. The member sued, claiming that since he possessed the qualifications listed in Article 1, Section 2, the House had no authority to deny him his seat. The Court agreed, holding that Congress is "without authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution." Id., 395 U.S. at 522, 89 S.Ct. at 1964 (emphasis in original). Although Section 2 is phrased in the negative -"No Person shall...." -the Court found it equivalent to a positive list of qualifications. Id., 395 U.S. at 537-39, 89 S.Ct. at 1972-73. The narrow holding of Powell defined Congress's power under Article I, Section 5, which provides that "[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own members...." But in reaching its result the Court marshaled the historical and legal precedents showing that neither Congress nor the states can add to the Article I, Sections 2 and 3, qualifications. It referred to "the Framers' understanding that the © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 197 of 433 http://web2.westl aw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destinati on=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 12 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp.1068) qualifications for members of Congress had been fixed in the Constitution." Id., 395 U.S. at 540, 89 S.Ct. at 1973. It quoted, among other sources, Alexander Hamilton's reply to an antifederalist charge that the new Constitution would favor the wealthy: "The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature." Id., 395 U.S. at 539, 89 S.Ct. at 1973, quoting The Federalist Papers 371 (Mentor ed. 1961) (emphasis omitted). The Court quoted, as well, James Madison's statement that, " `[t]he qualifications of the elected .. . have been very properly considered and regulated by the [constitutional] convention.' " Id., 395 U.S. at 540 n. 74, 89 S.Ct. at 1973, quoting The Federalist Papers 326 (Mentor ed. 1961). And the Court quoted an 1807 report by the House Committee of Elections recommending that a member be seated despite his failure to meet additional state -imposed residency requirements: "The committee proceeded to examine the Constitution, with relation to the case submitted to them, and find that qualifications of members are therein determined, without reserving any authority to the State Legislatures to change, add to, or diminish those qualifications; ...." Id., 395 U.S. at 542, 89 S.Ct. at 1975, quoting 17 Annals of Cong. 871 (1807). The Powell Court concluded that "in judging the qualifications of its members Congress is limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution." Id., 395 U.S. at 550, 89 S.Ct. at 1979 2. Pre- and Post -Powell Decisions Under the Qualifications Clauses For many years, before and after Powell, courts have held that the states, like Congress, are without power to add substantive requirements for election Page 11 to Congress to those set forth in the Qualifications Clauses. In Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d at 1528, the Ninth Circuit stated: *1077 From the beginning of the Republic, commentators have asserted that the three qualifications contained in the Clause -age, citizenship, and residency -are exclusive, and that neither Congress nor the states may require more of a candidate. See, e.g., 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 453-63 (5th ed. 1891). In Powell V. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), the Supreme Court accepted this restrictive view of the Qualifications Clause -at least as applied to Congress -and held that members of Congress may not set extra -constitutional qualifications for taking a seat in the House of Representatives. In addition, as the district court observed in the present case, the same principle has frequently been applied to state laws imposing additional qualifications on candidates for federal office. [Joyner v. Mofford] 539 F.Supp. [1120] at 1121-22 & n. I [ (D.C.Ariz.1982) ]. See also Public Citizen, Inc. v. Miller, 813 F.Supp. 821, 831 (N.D.Ga.) ("Although Powell did not address states' power to add qualifications for membership in the House of Representatives, courts agree that states are similarly denied the power to act in this area") (emphasis in original), affd mem., 992 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir.1993); United States v. Richmond, 550 F.Supp. 605, 607 (E.D.N.Y.1982) (" the states are barred from imposing additional qualifications on congressional candidates"); Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F.Supp. 729, 731 (D.N.M.1972) ("That a state cannot add to or take away from these [Article I] qualifications is well settled," invalidating two-year district residency requirement); Exon v. Tiemannt, 279 F.Supp. 609, 613 (D.Neb.1968) ("There being no such requirement in the Constitution itself, a state cannot require that a Representative live in the District from which he was nominated"). Among the many state court decisions reaching the same conclusion are State ex rel. Chandler v. Howell, 104 Wash. 99, 175 P. 569, 570 (1918) ("So long as a candidate for membership in Congress meets the requirements set forth in the constitution which created the office, no state has the right or © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 198 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTN LE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 13 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) authority to prevent his candidacy, either by provisions in its constitution or in its statutes"); Application of Ferguson, 57 Misc.2d 1041, 294 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.), affd, 30 A.D.2d 982, 294 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1968) (disqualification of candidate convicted of a felony held invalid); Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332 (anti -subversion declaration requirement held unconstitutional), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 881, 71 S.Ct. 198, 95 L.Ed. 640 (1950); Strong v. Breaux, 612 So.2d 111, 112 (La.App.1992) ("The qualifications prescribed by (Article I, Section 3] are exclusive and neither a state constitution nor state law can add to nor take away from such qualifications").FN4 FN4. The Washington legislature appears to have recognized that the state cannot add qualifications for Congress to those set forth in Article I. RCW 29.15.025 requires that "[t]he name of a candidate for an office shall not appear on a ballot for that office unless the candidate is ... properly registered to vote in the geographic area represented by the office," but adds: "This section does not apply to the office of a member of the United States Congress." Thus, while the declaration of candidacy form includes a "place for the candidate to declare that he or she is a registered voter within the jurisdiction of the office for which he or she is filing," RCW 29.15.010(i), such a declaration need not be made by a candidate for Congress. 3. The Constitutional Freedom to Choose Governmental Representatives The cases holding that neither the states nor Congress may add to the Article I qualifications for service in Congress all rest on the same foundation: the constitutional right of voters in the United States to elect legislators of their choice. The Powell Court said: A fundamental principle of our representative democracy is, in Hamilton's words, "that the people should choose whom they please to govern them." Page 12 2 Elliot's Debates 257. As Madison pointed out at the Convention, this principle is undermined as much by limiting whom the people can select as by limiting the franchise itself. 395 U.S. at 547, 89 S.Ct. at 1977. The Court in Powell repeatedly mentioned this basic freedom: "That the right of the electors to be represented by men of their own choice, was so essential for the preservation of all their other rights, that it ought to be considered*1078 as one of the most sacred parts of our [English] constitution." 395 U.S. at 534 n. 65, 89 S.Ct. at 1970 n. 65, quoting 16 Parl.Hist.Eng. 589-90 (1769)."Under these reasonable limitations [of Article 11, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession or religious faith." Id., 395 U.S. at 540 n. 74, 89 S.Ct. at 1526 n. 74, quoting Madison, The Federalist Papers 326 (Mentor ed. 1961)."[T]he true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them. Representation is imperfect in proportion as the current of popular favor is checked. This great source of free government, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed." Id., 395 U.S. at 540-41, 89 S.Ct. at 1973-75, quoting Hamilton, 2 Debates on the Federal Constitution 257 (J. Elliot ed. 1876) (hereinafter cited as " Elliot's Debates")."It has ever been considered a great security to liberty, that very few should be excluded from the right of being chosen to the legislature. This Constitution has amply attended to this idea. We find no qualifications required except those of age and residence, which create a certainty of their judgment being matured, and of being attached to their state." Id., 395 U.S. at 541, 89 S.Ct. at 1974, quoting Wilson Carey Nicholas, 3 EIliot's Debates S. © 2007 Thomson[West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 199 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream.aspx?prft=HTN LE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 14 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) [10] As Powell, Joyner, and the other authorities cited above make clear, the voters' freedom to choose federal legislators must not be abridged by laws that make qualified persons ineligible to serve. 4. Term Limit Laws and Freedom of Choice If adopted as a complete bar to re-election, a term limits law would exclude a category of candidates qualified under Article I: those who have served for a certain time. It would allow a bare majority of those voting in a current year to prevent, say, eighty percent in a later year from electing a candidate of their choice.FN5 FNS. These figures are not entirely hypothetical. The late Henry M. Jackson of Washington, who served twelve years in the House and thirty in the Senate before dying in office in 1983, won re-election with an eighty-two percent statewide majority in 1970, and often won more than two-thirds of the vote. See Official Abstract of Votes, State of Washington. Term limits for members of Congress, like the property -ownership qualification which many urged at the time, were considered by the Framers of the Constitution. A number of states had imposed term limits on members of their legislatures. Under the Articles of Confederation, delegates to Congress could not serve "for more than three years in any term of six years; ...." Art. Conf. V (1777). The phrase "rotation in office" was current then as it is now. By 1787 these efforts were widely seen as a failed experiment. FN6 On June 12, 1787, the Constitutional Convention voted unanimously to reject congressional term limits. See 1 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (1937) 217; Supplement to Max Farrand's The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987) 71. FN6. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969) at 140-41, 398-99, 436-38, 477. Page 13 In adopting a short but comprehensive list of qualifications for Congress -age, citizenship, and residency -the Framers protected the "indisputable right [of the people] to return whom they thought proper" to the legislature. Powell, 395 U.S. at 535, 89 S.Ct. at 1971, quoting 16 Parl.Hist.Eng. 589. [11] In a political climate different from today's, a state's voters -or its legislature -might believe that age brings wisdom, government experience brings knowledge, and long-term incumbency brings power in the nation's capital. The state might therefore adopt an experience requirement: only those presently serving in Congress, or with at least two years of service in Congress or in the state legislature, would be eligible for *1079 election to the federal House or Senate. This method of " going through the chairs" could be presented as thoroughly democratic, since anyone could run for the state legislature. But to bar those without legislative experience from serving in Congress would be plainly unconstitutional under Article I, Sections 2 and 3. And just as experience in government cannot be added as a qualification, neither can inexperience. A state may not diminish its voters' constitutional freedom of choice by making would-be candidates for Congress ineligible on the basis of incumbency or history of congressional service.FN7 FN7. See, for a variety of views, the law review articles listed in Appendix B to this order. See also Stumpf v. Lau, 108 Nev. 826, 839 P.2d 120, 123 (1992) ("The [Nevada] term limits initiative clearly and ` palpably' violates the qualifications clauses of Article I of the United States Constitution"). Such holdings under Article I, Sections 2 and 3, of course, relate to the federal legislature. Term limits applicable to state offices are tested not under Article I but under state constitutional law and under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F.Supp. 816 (S.D.Ohio 1993); .Legislature v. Eu, 54 Ca1.3d 492, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d © 2007 Thomson[West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 200 of 433 http://web2. westlaw.com/print/pi intstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&desti n ation=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 15 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) 1309 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 919, 112 S.Ct. 1292, 117 L.Ed.2d 516 (1992). 5. Initiative 573 and the Qualifications Clauses [12] While the Constitution bars the states from imposing substantive restrictions on who may be elected to Congress, it permits reasonable state regulation of how elections are conducted. Article I, Section 4, provides in part: The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.... It is argued that Initiative 573 is not a term limits law but a ballot access measure, and as such is constitutional under Section 4. The Initiative does not impose a total ban on re-election. While barring the targeted incumbents from the ballot in order to cause their defeat (or their decision not to run), it leaves open a pinhole of opportunity: a barred incumbent may run a write-in campaign. The Washington election code provides that a candidate who desires to have his or her name printed on the ballot for Congress must file a declaration of candidacy. RCW 29.15.010. One who seeks to be a write-in candidate may file a declaration of candidacy not later than the day before the election. RCW 29.04.180. If such a declaration has been filed, voters may write in the candidate's name at the appropriate place on the ballot; absent a filed declaration, one voting for a candidate not on the ballot "must designate the office sought and position number or political party, if applicable." Id. Whether a vote will be counted turns on the Canvassing Board's ability to discern the voter's intent. RCW 29.51.170. Initiative 573 makes incumbents with the specified length of service "ineligible to appear on the ballot or file a declaration of candidacy." Appendix A, Sections 4, 5, and 7. The measure will thus keep barred incumbents off the ballot no matter what they do. Page 14 If this restriction is a state -imposed qualification for congressional office, it must be held invalid under Article I, Sections 2 and 3. If it does not impose a new qualification, then its constitutionality as a ballot access measure is tested by different standards. The Supreme Court has recognized that "as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes." Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). It has, accordingly, " upheld generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself." Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1569 n. 9, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1982). Among the cases upholding state ballot access laws on this basis are Storer, 415 U.S. at 733, 94 S.Ct. at 1280 (law denying ballot position to independent candidates who had a registered affiliation with a political party within one year prior held " expressive of a *1080 general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot" and to involve "no discrimination against independents"; American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974) (petition requirement for independents and minor parties); Hopfmann v. Connolly, 746 F.2d 97 (Ist Cir.1984), vacated in part on other grounds, 471 U.S. 459, 105 S.Ct. 2106, 85 L.Ed.2d 469 (1985) (party requirement that candidates receive fifteen percent of the vote at the convention in order to be included on the ballot in the state primary election); Public Citizen, Inc. v. Miller, 813 F.Supp. 821 (N.D.Ga.) (law requiring a run-off election for Congress), gffd per curiam, 992 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir.1993); Williams v. Tucker, 382 F.Supp. 381 (M.D.Pa.1974) (statute preventing candidate from contemporaneously filing nomination papers and running in primary); Clark v. Rose, 379 F.Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (statute requiring authorization of parry's state committee for non-member of party to run in its primary), affd, 531 F.2d 56 (2nd Cir.1976) ; Fowler v. Adams, 315 F.Supp. 592 (M.D.F1a.1970) (statute requiring candidates to pay 0 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 201 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTNiLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 16 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) a filing fee), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 986, 91 S.Ct. 477, 27 L.Ed.2d 436 (1971). But the law recognizes that fundamental rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments are affected by ballot access measures. In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968), the Supreme Court struck down a state statute that imposed onerous petition requirements on small parties seeking ballot access, and stated: In the present situation the state laws place burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights -the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. Both of these rights, of course, rank among our most precious freedoms. It "is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the `liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). A law that excludes candidates from the ballot "burdens voters' freedom of association, because an election campaign is an effective platform for the expression of views on the issues of the day, and a candidate serves as a rallying point for like-minded citizens." Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787-88, 103 S.Ct. at 1569-70 . As for candidates' rights, although reasonable regulations may be imposed, "[tlhe right of a party or an individual to a place on a ballot is entitled to protection and is intertwined with the rights of voters." Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716, 94 S.Ct. at 1320. The inquiry is "whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the `availability of political opportunity.' " Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793, 103 S.Ct. at 1572, quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2844, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982), and Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716, 94 S.Ct. at 1320. On this basis, unduly restrictive ballot measures have been held unconstitutional as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters and candidates. See, e.g., Page 15 Anderson, supra (early filing requirement for independent candidates for President,- without comparable requirement for party candidates); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992) (requirement that more signatures be obtained to appear on local ballot than were required to appear on statewide ballot); Tashjian v. Republic Party, 479 U.S. 208, 107 S.Ct. 544, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) (requirement that party hold primary open only to its members); Lubin, supra (excessive filing fees). The state election laws that have been upheld have been general ground rules designed to make elections "fair and honest" and to impose "some sort of order, rather than chaos" on the electoral process, see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992), or to prevent "voter confusion, ballot over -crowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies," Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 537-38, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986). *1081 All such laws have been open to compliance by candidates who take the necessary steps, or make the required showing, in the election process itself. Initiative 573, in contrast, is aimed not at achieving order and fairness in the process but at preventing a disfavored group of candidates from being elected at all. The Initiative plainly states its purpose: to get rid of "entrenched incumbents." It aims to prevent "the self-perpetuating monopoly of elective office by a dynastic ruling class." Appendix A, section 1(7). It refers to ballot -barred persons as " ineligible for the office." Id., section 7(2). The statement for it in the "1992 Voters Pamphlet" published by the Secretary of State repeatedly describes it as a "term limits" measure. See Exhibit B to State Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment. It is codified at several places in RCW Ch. 29 under the heading " Initiative Measure 573-Term Limits." Denial of ballot access ordinarily means unelectability. The State concedes that no one in its history has been elected to Congress by a write-in vote. The record shows that in the country as a whole only three candidates for the House have © 2007 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 202 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstre,am.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 17 of 23 841 F.Supp, 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) been elected by write-in votes since 1958, and only one candidate for the Senate has been elected by that method since 1954. The Initiative would thus have the practical effect of imposing a new qualification: non -incumbency beyond the specified periods. The intended and probable result would be the same as if the State were to adopt non -incumbency as an absolute requirement. A state may not do indirectly what the Constitution forbids it to do directly. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94, 46 S.Ct. 605, 607, 70 L.Ed. 1101 (1926). The challenged parts of Initiative 573 must therefore be held to impose additional qualifications for Congress in violation of Article 1, Sections 2 and 3. 6. The Resign -to -Run Cases The resign -to -run cases, cited by both sides, do not suggest that Initiative 573 is constitutional. Those cases arise from laws that require public officials to resign from a state post before running for an elected federal position, or that treat a declaration of candidacy for Congress as an automatic resignation from state office. Some courts have held such provisions unconstitutional as imposing additional qualifications. See State ex rel. Chandler v. Howell, 104 Wash. 99, 175 P. 569, 570 (1918); State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d 504 (1946); Stack v. Adams, 315 F.Supp. 1295 (N.D.Fla.1970). Others have upheld them as valid exercises of a state's power to regulate the conduct of its own officeholders. See Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (2nd Cir.1980); Adams v. Supreme Court of Pa., 502 F.Supp. 1282 (M.D.Pa.1980); Oklahoma State Election Board v. Coats, 610 P.2d 776 (Okla.1980); Alex v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.App.3d 994, 111 Cal.Rptr. 285 (1973). The Ninth Circuit, reviewing an Arizona constitutional provision that required certain officials to resign as a condition of running for Congress in the final year of their state terms, explained these holdings as follows: The courts considering challenges to state laws relying on the Qualifications Clause have distinguished between state provisions which bar a Page 16 potential candidate from running for federal office, and those which merely regulate the conduct of state officeholders. The former category of laws imposes additional qualifications on candidates and therefore violates the Qualifications Clause, while the latter category is constitutionally acceptable since it merely bars state officeholders from remaining in their positions should they choose to run for federal office. Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d at 1528. Finding that the Arizona provision "regulates the conduct of state officials" and "merely requires that they not occupy a state office while seeking either a federal or state elective office," the court upheld it as constitutional. Id. at 1531, 1533. The resign -to -run cases turn on a state's power to regulate its own officials' conduct. That factor is not present here. There is no constitutional basis for a state to require non -service, or limited prior service, in Congress*1082 as a condition of election to the House or Senate. C. Alternative Ruling Under Article I, Section 4 [13) Even if viewed as an attempt to regulate the electoral process, the federal -office sections of the Initiative would have to be held invalid. Measures lawfully adopted under Article I, Section 4, are designed to "protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process." Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 1569 n. 9. Ballot -access restrictions "implicate[ ] basic constitutional rights." Id., 460 U.S. at 786, 103 S.Ct. at 1568. The court must weigh the "character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the right protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments" and "the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burdens imposed by its rule." Id., 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. at 1570. Any "severe restrictions" designed to assure an honest and orderly electoral process must be "narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance," Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, ----, 112 S.Ct. 698, 705, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992), and must be "reasonable [and] non-discriminatory," Burdick, 504 U.S. at ---- - ----, © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 203 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destin ation=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 18 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) 112 S.Ct. at 2063-64. "[W]e have repeatedly upheld," said the Burdick Court, "reasonable, politically neutral regulations that have the effect of channeling expressive activity at the polls." 504 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2066. Sections 4 and 5 of Initiative 573 are neither neutral, nor nondiscriminatory, nor narrowly drawn. They seek to determine the outcome, not the procedures. The state interest claimed is to prevent congressional incumbents from winning; but the Constitution places that decision with the voters in each election, not with a state government. The extent to which a state might try to even a congressional race through neutral measures (such as providing forums or financing for all candidates) is outside the scope of this case. Initiative 573 is not such a measure. Instead, it hobbles a few runners to make sure they lose. A state may not constitutionally do that, just as it may not bar qualified runners from the track. D. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments It is argued that, notwithstanding Article 1, Sections 2 and 3, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments reserve to the states the power to limit congressional terms. The Ninth Amendment provides: The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. The Tenth Amendment provides:The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. [14] These two amendments are "restrictions upon federal power, intended to prevent interference with the rights of the States and of their citizens." .Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 434, 12 L.Ed. 213 (1847). Their very wording shows their inapplicability. The Ninth Amendment assures rights to the people beyond those specifically listed but implies no right to alter the governmental structure established by the Constitution. The Page 17 Tenth Amendment concerns powers "not delegated to the United States by the Constitution"; it implies no state power to abridge what is delegated to the United States. Justice Story in his Commentaries spoke to whether the Tenth Amendment reserved any power to the states to add qualifications for Congress: [N]o powers could be reserved to the States, except those which existed in the States before the Constitution was adopted. The [tenth] amendment does not profess, and, indeed, did not intend to confer on the States any new powers, but merely to reserve to them what were not conceded to the government of the Union.... [W]here did the States get the power to appoint representatives in the national government? Was it a power, that existed at all before the Constitution was adopted? ... The truth is, that the States can exercise no powers whatsoever which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national government, which the Constitution does *1083 not delegate to them. They have just as much right, and no more, to prescribe new qualifications for a representative, as they have for a President. Each is an officer of the Union, deriving his powers and qualifications from the Constitution.... It is no original prerogative of State power to appoint a representative, a senator, or President for the Union. Those officers owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not of a portion of the people.... No State can say that it has reserved what it never possessed. 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 626-27 (5th ed. 1891). The case of Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991), relied upon by term limits proponents, concerned a state's power to set qualifications for state, not federal, office, and is not in point. [15] The Ninth and Tenth Amendments cannot be read to allow the states to limit their citizens' freedom of choice by adding qualifications for Congress, while Sections 2 and 3 of Article I preclude them from doing so. © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 204 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream.aspx?prft=HTU LE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 19 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1069 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) V. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS [16] The plaintiffs also seek declaratory and injunctive relief under a federal civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Since, for the reasons given above, declaratory and injunctive relief must be awarded on plaintiffs' constitutional claims -and would thus be ordered whether or not any civil rights claims were asserted -the only practical importance of the latter is the application for attorney fees. Section 1983 provides: Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. Civil rights cases typically involve acts committed by state officials with resulting harm to the plaintiffs. The defendants Munro and Gregoire, the Washington Secretary of State and Attorney General, point out that they have done nothing yet to enforce Initiative 573. They argue that they have not subjected plaintiffs "to the deprivation of any rights," and that accordingly there is no liability under Section 1983. [17] The difficulty with this argument is that the Supreme Court has mandated that Section 1983 be " `broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.' " Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 444, 111 S.Ct. 865, 869, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991), quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 700-701, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2040-41, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Threatened harm that has not yet occurred, but that will occur unless judicial relief is afforded, is enough to support a civil rights claim. See, e.g., Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 431-32, 107 S.Ct. 766, 774-75, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987). Injunctive and declaratory relief are proper under Section 1983, which authorizes, among other procedures, a "suit Page 18 in equity." See, e.g., Fraser v. Bethel School Dist., 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.1985), rev d on other grounds, 478 U.S. 675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986). The State defendants are prepared to enforce Initiative 573 if it is upheld, and have defended its constitutionality in this case. Since the threatened enforcement would deprive plaintiffs of constitutional rights, entitlement to injunctive and declaratory relief under Section 1983 has been shown. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2162, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972); see also Baer v. Meyer, 728 F.2d 471, 474-76 (10th Cir.1984); McCarthy v. Askew, 420 F.Supp. 775, 777-79 (S.D.Fla.), affd, 540 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir.1976); Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 402 F.Supp. 95, 102-103 (D.Haw.1975). It does not follow, however, that attorney fees must automatically be awarded. Section 1988 provides that the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party [in a Section 1983 case), *1084 other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. While a prevailing plaintiff " `should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust,' " Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1936, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968), a degree of discretion remains. Section 1988 should not be applied "woodenly without consideration of the underlying factors which generated it." Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir.1979), quoting Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2nd Cir.1978). [18] The special circumstances here would make an award of fees unjust. The record shows the following, which the court now finds as facts: Fxs FN8. The Ninth Circuit requires findings of fact and conclusions of law if fees are denied under Section 1988. Sethy v. Alameda County Water District, 602 F.2d © 2007 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 205 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/p. int/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 20 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) 894, 897 (9th Cir.1979). The facts found here are clearly shown in the record and no further hearing is required. The burden of showing special circumstances, see Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 744 (9th Cir.1989), has been sustained. 1. No award is needed to serve the purpose of Section 1988, which is to assure "effective access to the judicial process." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. at 1937. This is not a typical civil rights case. The mere filing of suit by anyone with standing would have assured a full court test. See the briefs amicus curiae, which demonstrate this. 2. No relief has been won under the Section 1983 claims beyond that already awarded under the constitutional claims. 3. The legislation that prompted the suit was adopted by a voters' initiative, not by State officials. The deterrence purpose of Section 1983, see Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 1830, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992), is inapplicable. 4. The defendant officials have not yet enforced Initiative 573. Their willingness to do so if it is upheld reflects only the minimum their oaths of office require. Cf.. May v. Cooperman, 578 F.Supp. 1308 (D.N.J.1984) (denying attorney fees as against state officials who took no action to enforce an unconstitutional statute, but granting them against state legislators who intervened). 5. The State officials have acted in good faith. " The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a defendant's good faith is one factor of several that a court may consider in applying the Attorney's Fees Act." Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir.1981). 6. This is a case of first impression in federal court, and the public interest requires that it be adjudicated through a full adversary process. The State defendants have done nothing to increase the litigation costs beyond what would have been necessary in any event. Page 19 7. There was no way for the State officials to settle the case by agreement. Even if a stipulation of unconstitutionality had been entered (a most unlikely event), the court would have rejected it. State legislation is presumed constitutional until the contrary is shown. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 963-64, 102 S.Ct. at 2843-44. On the basis of the foregoing findings, the court now makes and enters the following conclusions of law: 1. Within the meaning of Hensley, supra, special circumstances exist in this case which would make an award of attorney fees "manifestly unfair." See Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 869 F.2d 427, 436-37 (9th Cir.1988); Aho v. Clark, 608 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir.1979). 2. Cases holding that particular mitigation factors are insufficient to avoid a fee award (e.g., Teitelbaum, supra, and Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 951 (10th Cir.1987)), are distinguishable. None involved the totality of circumstances present here. 3. Accordingly, plaintiffs' applications for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 should be denied. VI. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, the motions for summary judgment are granted and denied as follows: The plaintiffs have standing to *1085 sue and these cases are ripe for decision. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment declaring that sections 4 and 5 of Washington Initiative Measure 573, denying ballot access to certain candidates for the United States Senate and House of Representatives, are invalid under Article I, Sections 2 and 3, of the United States Constitution, and under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and enjoining the State defendants from implementing or enforcing those sections and section 7 insofar as it incorporates them. Plaintiffs are entitled to the same relief under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because special circumstances exist that would make an award unjust, plaintiffs' applications for attorney © 2007 Thomson(West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 206 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTNVILE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 21 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are denied. Judgment will be entered accordingly. APPENDIX A COMPLETE TEXT OF INITIATIVE MEASURE 573 AN ACT Relating to ballot access for elected officials; adding a new section to chapter 43.01 RCW; adding a new section to chapter 44.04 RCW; adding new sections to chapter 29.68 RCW; adding a new section to chapter 29.51 RCW; adding a new section to chapter 29.15 RCW; adding a new section to chapter 7.16 RCW; and creating a new section. BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON: NEW SECTION. Sec. 1. The people of the state of Washington find that: (1) The people will best be served by citizen legislators who are subject to a reasonable degree of rotation in office; (2) Entrenched incumbents have become indifferent to the conditions and concerns of the people; (3) Entrenched incumbents have an inordinate advantage in elections because of their control of campaign finance laws and gerrymandering of electoral districts; (4) Entrenched incumbency has discouraged qualified citizens from seeking public office; (5) Entrenched incumbents have become preoccupied with their own reelection and devote more effort to campaigning than to making legislative decisions for the benefit of the people; (6) Entrenched incumbents have become closely aligned with special interest groups who provide contributions and support for their reelection campaigns, give entrenched incumbents special Page 20 favors, and lobby office holders for special interest legislation to the detriment of the people of this state, and may create corruption or the appearance of corruption of the legislative system; (7) The people of Washington have a compelling interest in preventing the self-perpetuating monopoly of elective office by a dynastic ruling class. The people of the state of Washington therefore adopt this act to limit ballot access of candidates for state and federal elections. NEW SECTION. Sec. 2. A new section is added to chapter 43.01 RCW to read as follows: (1) No person is eligible to appear on the ballot or file a declaration of candidacy for governor who, by the end of the then current term of office will have served, or but for resignation would have served, as governor during eight of the previous fourteen years. (2) No person is eligible to appear on the ballot or file a declaration of candidacy for lieutenant governor who, by the end of the then current term of office will have served, or but for resignation would have served, as lieutenant governor during eight of the previous fourteen years. NEW SECTION. Sec. 3. A new section is added to chapter 44.04 RCW to read as follows: (1) No person is eligible to appear on the ballot or file a declaration of candidacy for the house of representatives of the legislature who, by the end of the then current term of office will have served, or but for resignation would have served, as a member of the house of representatives of the legislature during six of the previous twelve years. (2) No person is eligible to appear on the ballot or file a declaration of candidacy for the senate of the legislature who, by the end *1086 of the then current term of office will have served, or but for resignation would have served, as a member of the senate of the legislature during eight of the previous fourteen years. © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 207 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 22 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp.1068) (3) No person is eligible to appear on the ballot or file a declaration of candidacy for the legislature who has served as a member of the legislature for fourteen of the previous twenty years. NEW SECTION. Sec. 4. A new section is added to chapter 29.68 RCW to read as follows: No person is eligible to appear on the ballot or file a declaration of candidacy for the United States house of representatives who, by the end of the then current term of office will have served, or but for resignation would have served, as a member of the United States house of representatives during six of the previous twelve years. NEW SECTION. Sec. 5. A new section is added to chapter 29.68 RCW to read as follows: No person is eligible to appear on the ballot or file a declaration of candidacy for the United States senate who, by the end of the then current term of office will have served, or but for resignation would have served, as a member of the United States senate during twelve of the previous eighteen years. NEW SECTION. Sec. 6. A new section is added to chapter 29.51 RCW to read as follows: Nothing in sections 2 through 5 of this act prohibits a qualified voter of this state from casting a ballot for any person by writing the name of that person on the ballot in accordance with RCW 29.51.170 or from having such a ballot counted or tabulated, nor does anything in sections 2 through 5 of this act prohibit a person from standing or campaigning for an elective office by means of a write-in campaign. NEW SECTION. Sec. 7. A new section is added to chapter 29.15 RCW to read as follows: (1) The secretary of state or other election official authorized by law shall not accept or verify the signatures, nor accept a declaration of candidacy or a nomination paper, from or on behalf of a person who, by reason of sections 2 through 5 of this act, is ineligible for the office, nor allow the person's name to appear on the ballot. Page 21 (2) No terms or years served in office before November 3, 1992, may be used to determine eligibility to appear on the ballot. NEW SECTION. Sec. 8. A new section is added to chapter 29.68 RCW to read as follows: Sections 4 and 5 of this act, regarding candidates for federal legislative office, are not effective until nine states other than Washington have passed laws limiting ballot access or terms of federal legislative office, or both, based on length of service in federal legislative office. NEW SECTION. Sec. 9. A new section is added to chapter 7.16 RCW to read as follows: Any resident of this state may bring suit to enforce sections 2 through 8 of this act. If the person prevails, the court shall award the person reasonable attorney's fees and costs of suit. NEW SECTION. Sec. 10. If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected. APPENDIX B COMPENDIUM OF RELATED LAW REVIEW ARTICLES The constitutionality of term limits measures is discussed in the following law review articles, notes, and comments: Brendan Barnicle, Comment, Congressional Tenn Linuts: Unconstitutional by Initiative, 67 Wash.L.Rev. 415 (1992); Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Democratic Process: Voter Standing to Challenge Abuses of Incumbency, 49 Ohio St.L.J. 773 (1988); *1087 Comment, Tenn Limits and the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments: A cQ 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 208 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTNILE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 23 of 23 841 F.Supp. 1068 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 (Cite as: 841 F.Supp. 1068) Reconceptualization of Article V, 103 Yale L.J. ---- (April, 1994) (forthcoming); Erik H. Corwin, Recent Development, Limits on Legislative Terms: Legal and Policy Implications, 28 Har.J. On Legis. 569 (1991); Robert C. DeCarli, Note, The Constitutionality o1 State -Enacted Term Limits Under the Qualifications Clauses, 71 Tex.L.Rev. 865 (1993); Troy Eid and Jim Kolbe, The New Anti -Federalism: The Constitutionality of State -Imposed Limits on Congressional Terms of Office, 69 Denv.U.L.Rev. 1 (1992); Neil Gorsuch and Michael Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of the Constitutionality of State -Imposed Term Limitations, 20 Hofstra L.Rev. 341 (1991); Steven R. Greenberger, Democracy and Congressional Tenure, 41 DePaul L.Rev. 37 (1991); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 97 (1991); Tiffanie Kovacevich, Comment, Constitutionality of Term Limitations: Can States Limit the Terns of Members of Congress?, 23 Pac.L.J. 1677 (1992); Martin E. Latz, The Constitutionality of State -Passed Congressional Tenn Limits, 25 Akron L.Rev. 155 (1991); Joshua Levy, Note, Can They Throw the Bums Out? The Constitutionality of State -Imposed Congressional Tern Limits, 80 Geo.L.J. 1913 (1992); Johnathan Mansfield, Note, A Choice Approach to the Constitutionality of Term Limitation Laws, 78 Cornell L.Rev. 966 (1993); Stephen J. Safranek, Term Limitations: Do the Winds of Change Blow Unconstitutional?, 26 Creighton L.Rev. 321 (1993). Page 22 W.D.Wash.,1994. Thorsted v. Gregoire 841 F.Supp. 1068, 62 USLW 2523 Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top) • 2:93cv00770 (Docket) (Jun. 07, 1993) • 2:92CVO1763 (Docket) (Nov. 16, 1992) END OF DOCUMENT © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 209 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/paint/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 1 of S Westlaw Attached Printing Summary Report for PARK,BIO F 5228588 Date/Time of Request: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 15:13.00 Central Client Identifier: 00006.900020 Database: WA -AG Citation Text: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22 Lines: 446 Documents: 1 Images: 0 The material accompanying this summary is subject to copyright. Usage is governed by contract with Thomson, West and their affiliates. Packet Page 210 of 433 http://web2.westl aw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 2 of 8 Wp � Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) Page 1 (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) Wash. AGO 1991 NO, 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) IOffice of the Attorney General State of Washington AGO 1991 No. 22 .Tune 24, 1991 CITIES AND TOWNS -COUNTIES -ELECTIONS -OFFICES AND OFFICERS -CHARTERS -OPTIONAL MUNICIPAL CODE -AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE TERM LIMITATIONS ON ELECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 1. Charter cities, charter counties, noncharter first class cities and noncharter code cities have the authority to impose a limit on the number of terms a locally elected official can serve. 2. Depending upon the provisions of their charter, charter cities and charter counties can adopt a term limitation as a charter provision by ordinance or through the initiative process. Noncharter first class cities and noncharter code cities can only adopt a term limitation through the passage of an ordinance. Honorable Gary A. Nelson State Senator, District 21 106-A Institutions Building, AS-32 Olympia, Washington 98504 Dear Senator Nelson: By letter previously acknowledged you have asked for our opinion on questions we paraphrase as: on the number of terms an elected official can serve? 2. If the answer to question I is yes, how can the term limitation be enacted? Brief Answer The answer to question 1 is yes for charter cities, charter counties, noncharter first class cities and noncharter code cities. For other cities, towns and counties, the answer is no. With regard to question 2, depending on the provisions of their charter, charter cities and charter counties can adopt a term limitation as a charter provision, by ordinance or through the initiative process. First class cities and noncharter code cities can only adopt term limitations by ordinance. ANALYSIS Question 1: Can a city, town or county impose a limit on the number of terms an elected official can serve? We begin our analysis with a brief review of the types of local governments authorized in Washington. The Legislature classifies cities and towns as first class, second class, third class and fourth class. RCW 35.01.010-.040. These classifications depend upon population. For example, a first class city is defined as "one having at least twenty thousand inhabitants at the time of its organization or reorganization." RCW 35.01,010. On the other hand, a fourth class municipal corporation -called a town instead of a city -is one " having not Iess than three hundred inhabitants and not more than fifteen hundred inhabitants at the time of its organization." RCW 35.01.040. 1. Can a city, town or county impose a limit Cities may also be organized pursuant to article © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 211 of 433 http://web2. westlaw. cony/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&desti nation=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 3 of 8 Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) 11, section 10 (amendment 40) of the Washington Constitution, which provides: "Any city containing a population of ten thousand inhabitants, or more, shall be permitted to frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of this state...:" In addition to the plan for organizing cities and towns in Title 35 RCW, the Legislature has enacted another scheme for the organization of municipal corporations -the optional municipal code set forth in Title 35A RCW. The optional municipal code authorizes two kinds of cities, a noncharter code city and a charter code city. A noncharter code city is defined as: A noncharter code city is one, regardless of population, which has initially incorporated as a noncharter code city, subject to the provisions of this title, or is an incorporated municipality which has elected, under the procedure prescribed in this title, to be classified as a noncharter code city and to be governed according to the provisions of this title under one of the optional forms of government provided for noncharter code cities.RCW 35 A.01.020. A charter code city is defined as: A charter code city is one having at least ten thousand inhabitants at the time of its organization or reorganization which has either initially incorporated as a charter code city and has adopted a charter under the procedure prescribed in this title; or which, as an incorporated municipality, has elected to be classified as a charter code city and to be governed according to the provisions of this title and of its adopted charter.RCW 35A.01.030. The Legislature has set up a somewhat similar organization for counties. Counties are classified by population ranging from AA counties which contain a population of 500,000 or more, to ninth class counties which have a population of less than 3,300. RCW 36.13.010. In addition, article 11, section 4 (amendment 21) of the Washington Constitution provides that "[a]ny county may frame a `Home Rule' charter for its own government subject to the Constitution and laws of this state...." Page 2 Your question is whether any of these units of local government have the authority to limit the number of terms their elected officials can serve. In AGO 1991 No. 17 we discussed the principles governing the authority of municipal corporations: The general rule is that municipal corporations are limited to those powers expressly granted to them by the Legislature and to powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted. Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wn.2d 772, 792, 666 P.2d 329 (1983); City of Spokane v. 3-R Distributors, Inc., 90 Wn.2d 722, 585 P.2d 784 (1978). At least as to matters of local concern, however, this general rule does not apply to cities and counties that have adopted charters pursuant to article 11, sections 4 and 10, of the Washington Constitution, respectively, or to cities operating under the Optional Municipal Code, Title 35A RCW. These cities and counties have legislative power akin to that of the state, except that their actions cannot contravene any constitutional provision or legislative enactment. Thus, such a city or county has broad legislative power except when restricted by enactments of the state. King Cy. Coun. v. Public Disclosure Comm'n, 93 Wn.2d 559, 562-63, 611 P.2d 1227 (1980); Winkenwerder v. Yakima, 52 Wn.2d 617, 622, 328 P.2d 873 (1958); La Mon v. Westport, 22 Wn.App. 215, 217-18, 588 P.2d 1205 (1978); Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wn.2d 772, 792-93, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).AGO 1991 No. 17 at 2. To answer your first question we must resolve two issues: (1) Does a term limitation contravene any constitutional provision or legislative enactment? (2) Do the various units of local government have the authority to enact a term limitation? Turning to the first issue, we are persuaded that a term limitation for local elected officials does not contravene a provision of the Washington Constitution or legislative enactment. Article 3, section 25 (amendment 31) sets out qualifications for state office. However, the © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 212 of 433 http://web2.westl aw. com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 4 of 8 Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) Constitution is silent on the qualifications for local elected officials. [FN1] Article 3, section 25 provides: "No person, except a citizen of the United States and a qualified elector of this state, shall be eligible to hold any state office." These qualifications only apply to state officers. For example, in In re Bartz, 47 Wn.2d 161, 287 P.2d 119 (1955) the court ruled that a justice of the peace is a judicial officer, rather than a state officer. Accordingly, the court ruled that article 3, section 25 did not apply and that the Legislature had the authority to require that a justice of the peace be an attorney. Since article 3, section 25 does not apply to the elected officials of cities, towns and counties and the Constitution is otherwise silent, a term limitation for these officials cannot conflict with a provision of the Constitution. Under the Constitution, the Legislature is authorized to enact laws for the organization of cities and counties. Article 11, section 10 provides that "the legislature, by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation, organization and classification ... of cities and towns...." Article 11, section 4 provides that "[t]he legislature shall establish a system of county government ... throughout the state ... and by general laws shall provide for township organization, under which any county may organize...." Pursuant to this authority, the Legislature has enacted some qualifications for local officials. These qualifications are scattered throughout Titles 35, 35A and 36 RCW. The prescribed qualifications are very general. They usually require that the candidate be a voter and a resident of the jurisdiction for some specified period of time. For example, RCW 35.23.030 provides: No person shall be eligible to hold any elective office in any city of the second class unless he is a registered voter therein and has resided therein for at least one year next preceding the date of his election.RCW 35.24.030 provides: No person shall be eligible to hold an elective office in a city of the third class unless he be a citizen of and a legal resident therein. RCW 35.27.080 provides: No person shall be eligible to or hold an elective office in a town unless he is a resident and elector therein.RCW 35A.12.030 provides: Page 3 No person shall be eligible to hold elective office under the mayor -council plan unless the person is a registered voter of the city at the time of filing his declaration of candidacy and has been a resident of the city for a period of at least one year next preceding his election.RCW 36.16.030 provides: In every county there shall be elected from among the qualified voters of the county [authorized county officials].... RCW 36.32.040 provides: [T]he qualified electors of each county commissioner district, and they only, shall nominate from among their own number, candidates for the office of county commissioner of such commissioner district to be voted for at the following general election. A Iimitation on the number of terms an elected official can serve has the effect of imposing an additional qualification that must be met by the candidate. To use RCW 35.23.030 as an example, if a two -term limitation were in place, a candidate for elective office in a second class city would have to meet the following requirements: L The candidate must be a registered voter. 2. The candidate must have resided in the city for at least one year preceding the date of the election. 3. The candidate must not have held the office sought for two terms. The Washington Supreme Court reached the conclusion that imposing an additional qualification does not contravene statutes setting forth the qualifications for the election of local officials in State ex rel. Griffiths v. Superior Court, 177 Wash. 619, 33 P.2d 94 (1934). This case concerned a provision in a city charter that no member of the city council "shall hold any other office, federal, state, county or municipal...." 177 Wash. at 620-21. The relator, who had been elected to the city council and also held office as a director of a school district, disputed the application of this provision in the charter. One basis of the challenge was that the charter provision conflicted with statutes enacted by the legislature setting forth the qualification for election of city officials. The statute provided that to hold elective office one must be a citizen of the United States and the State of Washington and an elector of the jurisdiction. [FN2] The court rejected © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 213 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 5 of 8 Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) this argument stating: The only attack made by the relator upon the charter is that it purports to superadd certain qualifications necessary for elective officers to those imposed by the legislature.... Had the framers of the charter sought to lessen the requirements demanded by the statute, a different question would be presented, for then the charter would be in direct conflict with the statute. But that is not the case here. Section 9929 merely provides that no person shall be competent to hold elective office unless he possesses certain qualifications. It does not say that no other requirements shall be prescribed, nor does it say that the political subdivision therein named may not impose restrictions not inconsistent with the statute. After all, the statute merely fixes a minimum of qualification below which its political subdivisions may not go. It does not say that other qualifications may not be required, in so far as they affect only the particular subdivision. 177 Wash. at 623-24 (emphasis added). The statutory qualification in Griffith is substantially the same as those previously cited in this opinion. Compare Rem.Rev.Stat. § 9929 and RCW 35.23.030; 35,24,030; 35.27.080; 35A.12.030; 36.16.030. Applying the same line of reasoning in this situation, we must conclude that a term limitation, which would constitute an additional qualification for a candidate, would not contravene the statutes 'which have been enacted by the Legislature. This brings us to the second issue raised by your first question: Do the various units of local government have the authority to enact a term limitation? We begin with charter counties and charter cities. These units of local government clearly have the authority to enact term limitations. Charter cities and charter counties have legislative power, at least as to matters of local concern, akin to that of the state. AGO 1991 No. 17 at 2. In State ex rel. Griffiths, 177 Wash. 619 (1934), the court specifically recognized the authority of a charter city to impose an additional requirement for candidates seeking office in that city. More recently, the court has approved the exercise of authority by charter counties in the election area. Page 4 In State ex rel. Carroll v. King Cy., 78 Wn.2d 452, 474 P.2d 877 (1970), the court considered a provision of the King County charter that provided for the election of certain county officials in odd -numbered years and adjusted the terms of certain officials to match the new election dates. In sustaining this charter provision the court stated: We think that ... the framers of amendment 21 meant to confer upon counties adopting home rule charters those powers which had theretofore been conferred upon the legislature under Const. art. 11, § 5, including the power to fix the terms of office of county officers, with certain exceptions expressly set forth. It will be observed that the power to frame its own organic law is conferred in broad terms upon the county adopting a charter. While it is not permitted to "affect the election" of the prosecuting attorney, the superintendent of schools, the judges of the superior court and the justices of the peace (all offices in which the state has an interest), there are no restrictions placed upon its right to provide for the election of, prescribe the duties of, and fix the compensation of those officers which it deems necessary to handle its purely local concerns.78 Wn.2d at 456. The court followed State ex rel. Carroll in a subsequent decision, Henry v. Thorne, 92 Wn.2d 878, 602 P.2d 354 (1979). Henry concerned a charter provision that provided a greater restriction on the timing of elections to fill vacancies than those set forth in the State Constitution or statutes enacted by the Legislature. The court approved this charter provision stating: [Amendment 211 providing for county home rule expressed the intent of the people of this state to have "the right to conduct their purely local affairs without supervision by the State, so long as they abided by the provisions of the constitution and did not run counter to considerations of public policy of broad concern, expressed in general laws.92 Wn.2d at 881. Since charter cities and charter counties have broad legislative powers in matters of local concern, we conclude that they have the authority to impose term limitations on locally elected officials. We next turn to local governments that have not © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 214 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/pi intstream.aspx?prft=H FMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 6 of S Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) adopted a charter. The rule for such governments is that they are limited to those powers expressly granted to them by the Legislature and the power necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted. AGO 1991 No. 17 at 2. In reviewing the powers delegated to local governments, we find two that have been delegated sufficient authority by the Legislature to impose term limitations -first class cities, that have not adopted a charter, and noncharter code cities under the optional municipal code. With regard to first class cities, RCW 35.22.280(1) provides: Any city of the first class shall have power: (1) To provide for general and special elections, for questions to be voted upon, and for the election of officers[JThis power is granted to all first class cities, even cities that have not adopted a charter. In light of the specific grant of authority to provide for the election of officers, we conclude that a first class city may impose a term limitation upon city officers. Our conclusion here is consistent with our opinion in AGO 1991 No. 3. In that opinion we concluded that RCW 35.22.280(1) authorized a noncharter first class city to enact an ordinance imposing an additional residency requirement on candidates for the office of freeholder, elected to frame a city charter. AGO 1991 No. 3 at 1 I . Noncharter code cities have also been granted broad powers by the Legislature. RCW 35A.01.010 provides: The purpose and policy of this title is to confer upon two optional classes of cities created hereby the broadest powers of local self-government consistent with the Constitution of this state. Any specific enumeration of municipal powers contained in this title or in any other general law shall not be construed in any way to limit the general description of power contained in this title, and any such specifically enumerated powers shall be construed as in addition and supplementary to the powers conferred in general terms by this title. All grants of municipal power to municipalities electing to be governed under Page 5 the provisions of this title, whether the grant is in specific terms or in general terms, shall be liberally construed in favor of the municipality. RCW 35A.21.160 provides: A code city [FN3) organized or reorganized under this title shall have all of the powers which any city of any class may have and shall be governed in matters of state concern by statutes applicable to such cities in connection with such powers to the extent to which such laws are appropriate and are not in conflict with the provisions specifically applicable to code cities.RCW 35A.11.020 provides in part: The legislative body of each code city shall have power to organize and regulate its internal affairs within the provisions of this title and its charter, if any; and to define the functions, powers, and duties of its officers and employees; within the limitations imposed by vested rights, to fix the compensation and working conditions of such officers and employees and establish and maintain civil service, or merit systems, retirement and pension systems not in conflict with the provisions of this title.... After reviewing the statutes in AGO 1972 No.24 we stated: The critical point to be drawn from these statutes is that by electing to come under the optional municipal code a city ceases to be governed by the traditional rules of delegated powers.... Instead, a city so opting thereby becomes possessed of all powers which either have been specifically granted by the legislature to any class of city (RCW 35A.21.160, supra) or which could be granted by the legislature (RCW 35A.01.010 and 35A.11.020, supra), subject only to such restrictions or limitations as are contained in the statutes themselves or within the state constitution; which is but another way of saying that the optional municipal code entitles cities operating thereunder to the equivalent of the home rule powers otherwise available only to first class charter cities.AGO 1972 No. 24 at 7. There is no Washington case authority directly on point relating to local governments that have not adopted a charter. However, we have discovered a © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 215 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 7 of 8 Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) Page 6 (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)) decision from Pennsylvania that appears directly on point and we find the decision persuasive. In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Clark, 515 A.2d 1320, 512 Pa. 1 (1986), the court considered the authority of a city to enact an ordinance that limited the office of mayor to two terms. The city in question had chosen to be governed by the Code and the Charter Law, Mayor -Council Plan A. 515 A.2d at 1322. The law granted the city broad powers somewhat similar to those granted in the optional municipal code. [FN4] One of the issues before the court was whether "a third class municipality operating under Mayor -Council Plan A of the Charter Law has authority to promulgate an ordinance limiting the number of times a municipal officer can stand for reelection." 515 A.2d at 1324. The court concluded that the city did have the authority to enact the ordinance: (4) Under section 303(1), supra, the Legislature does empower the Council to administer local affairs. The power of the Council to limit incumbent municipal officers, including mayors to one term of reelection, as in the case at bar, is well within the scope of authority granted by the Legislature through section 303(l). Further, section 304 (53 P.S. § 41304, Supp.1986) provides "[a] general grant of municipal power ... intended to confer the greatest power of local self-government consistent with the Constitution of the State." Moreover, section 304 also provides that "[a]ll grants of municipal power to cities governed by an optional plan under this act, whether in the form of specific enumeration or general terms, shall be liberally construed in favor of the city." 515 A.2d at 1324 (footnote omitted). In our judgment the court's reasoning is equally applicable to powers granted noncharter first class cities and noncharter code cities. These jurisdictions have been granted the authority to impose term limitations on their elected officials. We do not find a similar grant of authority to second and third class cities, towns or the various classifications of counties. See e.g., RCW 35.23.010; 35.27.010; 36.32.120. In absence of a delegation of authority from the Legislature these levels of local government do not have the authority to limit the terms of their elected officials. Question 2: If the answer to question 1 is yes, how can the term limitation be enacted? The starting point for our analysis of your second question is the power of the Legislature to enact laws for the organization of city and county government. Const. art. 11, §§ 5, 10. Clearly, the Legislature has the authority to enact term limitations for city and county officials. By the same token, the Legislature could specifically prohibit term limitation for local officials or enact statutes setting forth the exclusive qualification for local officials, which would have the same effect. Before any city, town or county can impose a term limitation it must carefully review the statutes governing its elections to determine if the Legislature has enacted exclusive qualifications or acted in some other way to prohibit term limitations. We have reviewed some statutes. See infra. p. 5. However, given the broad nature of your question, we have not made an exhaustive review of the law in this area. Accordingly, any jurisdiction considering a term limitation should conduct its own review. With regard to charter cities and charter counties, the means of enacting a term limitation depends on the provisions of the charter. Obviously, the limitation can be adopted as a provision in the charter. This can be done when the charter is initially drafted or by amendment. See e.g., RCW 35.22.050-.190; 35A.08 A30-.120; 35A.09.010-.070. A term limitation also might be accomplished by ordinance. However, this also depends on the provisions of the charter. If the charter sets out the exclusive qualifications for a candidate seeking city or county office, the legislative authority would be without power to change those qualifications. In this situation, a charter amendment would be necessary to enact a term limitation. On the other hand, if the charter sets out certain minimum qualifications, the legislative authority would have the power to add a term limitation by ordinance, so long as it did not conflict with the qualifications © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 216 of 433 http :I/web2.we stl aw. com/pri nt/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destinati on=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 8 of .8 Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) (Cite as: Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.)). contained in the charter. A term limitation in a charter city or charter county might also be enacted by initiative of the people. Again, this can only be done if the charter provides for initiatives. If the charter does not provide an initiative process, the people have no direct legislative powers. If the charter does provide an initiative process, the people must exercise their legislative power in accordance with the charter. Thus, as with the city or county legislative authority, the people would have the power to add a term limitation, so long as it did not conflict with the qualifications contained in the charter. We turn next to noncharter first class cities and noncharter code cities. These units of local government can only adopt term limitation by ordinance. Since these jurisdictions have not adopted a charter, the term limitation cannot be included as a charter provision. In addition, the people of noncharter first class cities and noncharter code cities do not have power to legislate directly through the initiative process. RCW 35.22.200; AGO 1970 No. 8 at 4. We trust the foregoing will be of assistance to you. Very truly yours, Kenneth O. Eikenberry Attorney General William B. Collins Assistant Attorney General [FN 1 ] As originally adopted in 1889, the Washington Constitution provided a term limitation for county officials. Article 11, section 7 stated: "No county officer shall be eligible to hold his office more than two terms in succession." Article 11, section 7 was repealed by amendment 22 in 1948. IFN2] The statute at issue provided: That no person shall be competent to qualify for or hold any elective public office within the state of Washington, or any county, district, precinct, school district, municipal corporation or other district or political subdivision, unless he be a citizen of the United States and state of Page 7 Washington and an elector of such county, district, precinct, school district, municipality or other district or political subdivision.Rem.Rev.Stat. § 9929; Laws of 1919, ch. 139, § 1, p. 390. [FN31 The term "code city" includes both charter code cities and noncharter code cities. RCW 35A.01.030. [FN4] The Code and Charter Law provided in part: Each city governed by an optional form of government pursuant to this act shall, subject to the provisions of and limitations prescribed by this act, have full power to: (1) Organize and regulate its internal affairs, and to establish, alter, and abolish offices, positions and employments and to define the functions, powers and duties thereof and fix their term, tenure and compensation; ...515 A.2d at 1322 n. 6. Wash. AGO 1991 NO. 22, 1991 WL 521713 (Wash.A.G.) END OF DOCUMENT OO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 217 of 433 http: //web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 EXHIBIT D (G1259692&DOC;1/00000.000000/ ) Packet Page 218 of 433 Page 2 of 27 949 P2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) P Briefs and Other Related Documents Gerberding v. MunroWash.,1998. Supreme Court of Washington,En Banc. William GERBERDING; Kemper Freeman, Jr.; Common Cause of Washington; Association of Washington Cities; Paul Sutley; Shirley Doty; Timothy Kaufman -Osborn; Arthur Siegal; Tom Gregory; Ida Ballasiotes; Bob McCaslin; Alex Deccio; Valoria Loveland; Helen Sommers; and Marlin Appelwick, Petitioners, V. Ralph MUNRO, Secretary of State; and Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General, Respondents, U.S. Term Limits, Inc.; Citizens for Leaders with Ethics and Accountability Now, Inc. (CLEAN), Respondents/Intervenors. No. 65059-4. Argued Oct. 15, 1997. Decided Jan. 8, 1998. Voters, public interest groups, and incumbent legislators brought original action against Secretary of State, in his capacity as State's chief elections officer, and Attorney General, seeking invalidation of initiative effectively imposing term limits on state constitutional officers, and issuance of writ of mandamus directing Secretary to allow incumbents access to ballot. The Supreme Court, Talmadge, J., held that initiative was unconstitutional attempt to impose statutory qualifications for office in addition to those prescribed by State Constitution. Ordered accordingly. West Headnotes [1] Mandamus 250 C---72 Page I Mandamus will not lie to compel discretionary act or to direct state officer to generally perform constitutional duties, but will lie to compel state officer to undertake clear duty. West's RCWA Const. Art. 4, § 4. [2] Mandamus 250 C=73(1) 250 Mandamus 25011 Subjects and Purposes of Relief 250II(B) Acts and Proceedings of Public Officers and Boards and Municipalities 250k73 Specific Acts 250k73(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases Supreme Court can declare law unconstitutional in mandamus action only if such declaration is necessary to issuance of writ. West's RCWA Const. Art. 4, § 4. [3] Constitutional Law 92 C---48(1) 92 Constitutional Law 92II Construction, Operation, and Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions 92k44 Determination of Constitutional Questions 92k48 Presumptions and Construction in Favor of Constitutionality 92k48(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases Constitutional Law 92 IC:-48(3) 92 Constitutional Law 9211 Construction, Operation, and Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions 92k44 Determination of Constitutional 250 Mandamus Questions 25011 Subjects and Purposes of Relief 92k48 Presumptions and Construction in 250II(B) Acts and Proceedings of Public Favor of Constitutionality Officers and Boards and Municipalities 92k48(3) k. Doubtful Cases; 25002 k. Matters of Discretion. Most Construction to Avoid Doubt. Most Cited Cases Cited Cases Statute is presumed constitutional, and parties © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 219 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.comlprint/printstream.aspx?prft ITFMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 3 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) challenging its constitutionality must demonstrate its unconstitutionality beyond reasonable doubt. [4] Statutes 361 C�-301 361 Statutes 361IX Initiative 361k301 k. Initiative in General. Most Cited Cases While initiative measures are reflective of reserved power of people to legislate, people in their legislative capacity remain subject to mandates of Constitution. [5] Constitutional Law 92 ID-26 92 Constitutional Law 921I Construction, Operation, and Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions 92k25 Grant or Limitation of Powers 92k26 k. State Constitutions. Most Cited Cases State Constitution is restriction on legislative power, rather than grant of powers. [6] Statutes 361 C;-64(2) 361 Statutes 361I Enactment, Requisites, and Validity in General 36lk64 Effect of Partial Invalidity 36lk64(2) k. Acts Relating to Particular Subjects in General. Most Cited Cases Provisions of initiative effectively imposing term limits on state constitutional officers were severable from portions of initiative addressing federal legislators, which had been found by federal courts to violate federal constitution; initiative had severability clause and addressed perceived evils of incumbency in state offices, and it could not fairly be said that state office provisions would not have been independently supported by initiative proponents and voters seeking to address perceived evils of incumbency at local level. West's RCWA 29.15.240(1), 29.68.015, 29.68.016, 43.01.015, 44.04.015. [71 Statutes 361 C:-64(1) Page 2 361 Statutes 361I Enactment, Requisites, and Validity in General 361k64 Effect of Partial Invalidity 361k64(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases Basic test for severability of constitutional and unconstitutional provisions of legislation is whether provisions are so connected that it could not be believed that legislature would have passed one without other, or whether unconstitutional part is so intimately connected with balance of act as to make balance useless to accomplish purposes of legislature. [81 States 360 �D-47 360 States 36011 Government and Officers 360k47 k. Eligibility to Office. Most Cited Cases States 360 C-51 360 States 360H Government and Officers 360k51 k. Term of Office, Vacancies, and Holding Over. Most Cited Cases Nonincumbency as described in initiative effectively imposing term limits on state constitutional officers was "qualification" for office, for purposes of determining initiative's constitutionality. West's RCWA 29.15.240(1), 43.01.015, 44.04.015. [9] Officers and Public Employees 283 C=18 283 Officers and Public Employees 2831 Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure 283I(C) Eligibility and Qualification 283k18 k. Eligibility in General. Most Cited Cases "Negative" framing of attribute does not preclude it from being "qualification" for office. [101 States 360 C:-47 360 States 36011 Government and Officers 360k47 k. Eligibility to Office. Most Cited © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt, Works. Packet Page 220 of 433 http: //web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&desti n ati on=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 4 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188,949 P.2d 1366) Cases Statutes 361 'E,-303 361 Statutes 361IX Initiative 361003 k. Matters Subject to Initiative. Most Cited Cases Qualifications for state constitutional officers set forth in State Constitution were exclusive, and additional qualifications effectively imposing term limits could not be added by statutory initiative; framers established qualifications for office, did not confer express authority upon Legislature to add to such qualifications by statute, specifically debated term limits, and rejected such qualifications for officers in question. West's RCWA Const. Art. 2, § 7; Art. 3, § 25; West's RCWA 29.15.240(1), 43.01.015, 44.04.015, [11] Constitutional Law 92 �---9(.5) 92 Constitutional Law 921 Establishment and Amendment of Constitutions 92k4 Amendment and Revision of State Constitutions 92k9 Submission to Popular Vote 92k9(.5) k. In General. Most Cited Cases Initiative effectively imposing term limits on state constitutional officers was statutory enactment that was not designed to, and did not, amend State Constitution. West's RCWA Const. Art. 2, § 7; Art. 3, § 25; West's RCWA 29.15.240(1), 43.01.015, 44.04.015. [12] Constitutional Law 92 C­9(.5) 92 Constitutional Law 921 Establishment and Amendment of Constitutions 92k4 Amendment and Revision of State Constitutions 92k9 Submission to Popular Vote 92k9(.5) k. In General. Most Cited Cases Initiative power may not be used to amend Constitution. Page 3 [131 States 360 C=47 360 States 360H Government and Officers 360k47 k. Eligibility to Office. Most Cited Cases Statute, whether adopted by Legislature or people, may not add qualifications for state constitutional officers where Constitution sets those qualifications. West's RCWA Const. Art. 2, § 7; Art. 3, § 25. **1367 *190 Brent D. Boger, Robin L. Rivett, Deborah La Fetra, Sacramento, CA, amicus curiae for Pacific Legal Foundation. Perkins, Coie, David Burman, Nancy Day, Seattle, for Petitioners. Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, James Pharris, Jeffrey Even, Anne Egeler, Assistant Attorneys General, Olympia, Marten & Brown, Stimson Bullitt, Appel & Glueck, William Glueck, Seattle, for Respondents. *191 TALMADGE, Justice. We are asked in this original action for a writ of mandamus to evaluate the constitutionality of those portions of Initiative 573 (the Term Limits Law) effectively placing term limits on certain state constitutional officers. Initiative 573 prevents individuals who have held state legislative seats or certain state constitutional offices FNI for a prescribed**1368 period of time from filing a declaration of candidacy and appearing on the ballot for such offices, although write-in campaigns are permitted. Such restrictions are qualifications beyond those set forth in the Washington Constitution for such offices, and the Legislature or the people acting in their legislative capacity may not add statutory qualifications to those prescribed for state constitutional officers. We find Initiative 573 unconstitutional and issue a writ of mandamus to the secretary of state directing him to accept declarations of candidacy, notwithstanding Initiative 573. FN1. Aside from legislative offices, Initiative 573 affects only the governor and the lieutenant governor, and not the judiciary, attorney general, secretary of © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 221 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 5 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 158, 949 P.2d 1366) state, auditor, treasurer, superintendent of public instruction (SPI), land commissioner, or insurance commissioner. Ironically, in AGO 61-62, No. 173, at 1 (1962), the attorney general concluded the Legislature did not have the authority to establish additional qualifications for the SPI beyond those set forth in article III, section 25: "[t]he legislature does not have the authority to establish qualifications for the office of the state superintendent of public instruction in addition to those found in Article 111, § 25, Amendment 31, of the Washington State Constitution." ISSUES 1. Are the provisions of Initiative 573 pertaining to state constitutional officers severable from the provisions pertaining to federal legislators which have been found unconstitutional by federal courts? *192 2. Do the restrictions on declarations of candidacy and appearance on the ballot for certain candidates with prior office holding experience set forth in Initiative 573 constitute qualifications for state constitutional offices? 3. May qualifications for state constitutional officers beyond those set forth in the Washington Constitution be added by statute? 4. Does Initiative 573 amend the Washington Constitution? FACTS In 1992, Washington voters approved Initiative 573, the Term Limits Law, by a 52 percent majority. That initiative restricted access to the ballot for incumbent state and federal office holders. Section 1 of Initiative 573 sets forth the perceptions upon which enactment of the initiative was based: FN' FN2. Prior to the enactment of Initiative Page 4 573, significant turnover in the Washington Legislature occurred without the mandate of this law. In the 1992 election itself, the Washington House of Representatives had 38 newly elected members, or 39 percent, and the Senate had 16 newly elected members, or 33 percent. The House of Representatives had 42 new members after the 1994 election. See 1993-94 Washington Legislative Manual at 469-78, 529-44; 1995-96 Washington Legislative Manual at 453-68. It is also noteworthy the voters in 1996 rejected Initiative 670 which would have required a notation on the ballot affixed to the name of any candidate who opposed term limits. (1) The people will best be served by citizen legislators who are subject to a reasonable degree of rotation in office; (2) Entrenched incumbents have become indifferent to the conditions and concerns of the people; (3) Entrenched incumbents have an inordinate advantage in elections because of their control of campaign finance laws and gerrymandering of electoral districts; (4) Entrenched incumbency has discouraged qualified citizens from seeking public office; (5) Entrenched incumbents have become preoccupied with their own reelection and devote more effort to campaigning *193 than to making legislative decisions for the benefit of the people; (6) Entrenched incumbents have become closely aligned with special interest groups who provide contributions and support for their reelection campaigns, give entrenched incumbents special favors, and lobby office holders for special interest legislation to the detriment of the people of this state, and may create corruption or the appearance of corruption of the legislative system; (7) The people of Washington have a compelling interest in preventing the self-perpetuating monopoly of elective office by a dynastic ruling class. Laws of 1993, ch. 1, § 1. This preamble to Initiative © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 222 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 6 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) 573 strongly implies its purpose is to make incumbents ineligible for specified state constitutional offices. See RCW 29.15.240. Under the initiative, persons who have served for 8 or more of the last 14 years (measured from the end of current term of office) for governor or lieutenant governor may not file a declaration of candidacy or appear on the ballot for such offices. **1369RCW 43.01.015. Similar restrictions, with variations in the years of service, are established for state legislators, RCW 44.04,015; United States representatives, RCW 29.68.015; and United States senators, RCW 29.68.016. The secretary of state may not accept declarations of candidacy or nomination papers, or permit a person's name to appear on the ballot if the person is subject to these restrictions. RCW 29.15.240(l) FN3 Citizens suits are allowed to enforce Initiative 573. RCW 7.16.370.FN4 FN3. The use of this language regarding declarations of candidacy, nomination papers, and names on the ballot also means the secretary, who is charged with preparing the official Voters' Pamphlet, may not include candidates subject to Initiative 573 in the official Voters' Pamphlet. RCW 29.80.010; RCW 29.04.180. FN4. Because section 7(2) of Initiative 573 excludes service before November 3, 1992 in any eligibility calculation, 1998 will be the first year in which some members of the State House of Representatives will be subject to Initiative 573. No state senator will be affected until the year 2000. Since a new governor and lieutenant governor were elected in 1996, 2004 is the first year in which there may be an incumbent in either of those offices subject to the provisions of Initiative 573. See RCW 29.15.240(2). Initiative 573 permits the people to write in the name of *194 a candidate, notwithstanding the restrictions it establishes. RCW 2951.173. But Page 5 the effect of such a write-in campaign is limited. If the incumbent write-in candidate wins his or her party's nomination, the candidate is still barred from the general election ballot and the Voters' Pamphlet. See RCW 29.15.240(l); RCW 29.80.010. Thus, the candidate must mount a second write-in campaign for the general election.FNS FNS. Cf.. Representative Linda Smith's successful 1994 Congressional campaign, in which she secured the Republican Party nomination by a write-in campaign, but her name was placed on the general election ballot and her statement and photograph appeared in the Voters' Pamphlet. Upon its enactment, Initiative 573 was challenged in federal court with respect to its effect on federal officers. Sections 4, 5, and 8 relating to United States senators and representatives were invalidated by the federal courts. See Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F.Supp. 1068 (W.D.Wash.1994), affd sub nonz. Thorsted v. Munro, 75 F.3d 454 (9th Cir.1996). State constitutional officers were not at issue in the federal litigation. The present original action was filed on March 21, 1997. The petitioners include voters, Common Cause of Washington, the Association of Washington Cities, and incumbent legislators. The respondents are Ralph Munro, the secretary of state, in his capacity as the state's chief elections officer, RCW 29.04.070, and the attorney general. The action seeks invalidation of the Term Limits Law and issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the secretary of state to allow incumbents access to the ballot. RAP 16.2(b). The secretary of state opposed the petition, arguing our consideration of Initiative 573 was premature. We, nevertheless, retained the petition. We granted the motion to intervene of public interest groups, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. (USTL) and Citizens for Leaders with Ethics and Accountability *195 Now, Inc. (CLEAN). We also granted amicus curiae status to the Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF). ANALYSIS © 2007 Tbomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 223 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.con/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 7 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188,949 P.2d 1366) In addressing an original action, we are guided by the principles of RAP 16.2 regarding the filing of original actions against a state officer. The parties here have stipulated to the facts so that a factual reference hearing pursuant to RAP 16.2(d) is unnecessary. The case takes the same course of review as any other case where we accept review of a trial court decision. RAP 16.2(e). [1][2] The Washington Constitution confers original jurisdiction upon this Court in "mandamus as to all state officers." Wash. Const. art. IV, § 4. Mandamus will not lie to compel a discretionary act, State ex rel. Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Washington State Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 93 Wash.2d 398, 410, 609 P.2d 1375 (1980), nor lie to direct a state officer to generally perform constitutional duties. Walker v. Munro, 124 Wash.2d 402, 407-08, 879 P.2d 920 (1994). Mandamus will lie to compel a state officer to undertake a clear duty. Id. at 408, 879 P.2d 920; see also **1370State ex rel. Burlington Northern, 93 Wash.2d at 410, 609 P.2d 1375. We can declare a law unconstitutional in a mandamus action only if such a declaration is necessary to the issuance of the writ. See Walker, 124 Wash.2d at 409, 879 P.2d 920. In this case, if we find Initiative 573 unconstitutional, mandamus will properly lie as to the Secretary of State. The Secretary is the chief elections officer for the state. RCW 29.04.070. The Secretary accepts declarations of candidacy for state executive officers, RCW 29.15.030(l), and legislators whose districts encompass multiple counties. RCW 29.15.030(2). The Secretary makes rules to facilitate the execution of election laws and assists local elections officers by devising uniform forms and procedures. RCW 29.04.080. The Secretary also prepares the official state Voters' Pamphlet, RCW 29.80.010, and certifies names of candidates for placement on the election ballot. See RCW 29.04.210(1), (8); RCW 29.30.101; RCW 29.79.230. Thus, *196 the writ would compel the Secretary to undertake a clear legal duty, to accept declarations of candidacy and nominations papers, and certify for placement on the election ballot the names of candidates otherwise disqualified by Initiative 573. Page 6 Turning to the arguments raised by the parties in this case, petitioners assert Initiative 573 is unconstitutional, offering three arguments: (1) the term limit provisions for state constitutional officers cannot be severed from the unconstitutional federal legislator provisions; (2) Initiative 573 impermissibly adds to the exclusive list of qualifications contained in the Washington Constitution, which can only be altered by constitutional amendment; (3) Initiative 573 violates petitioners' rights of expression, suffrage, free association, and equal treatment under the Washington and United States Constitutions. Respondents assert the provisions of Initiative 573 at issue here are constitutionally valid. Intervenors and PLF contend Initiative 573 should be sustained on policy grounds. [3][4][51 In our analysis of the provisions of Initiative 573 we are guided by general principles for evaluating its constitutionality. First, the statute is presumed constitutional and parties challenging its constitutionality must demonstrate its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wash.2d 583, 589, 919 P.2d 1218 (1996); Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 123 Wash.2d 864, 869, 872 P.2d 1090 (1994); State v. Brayman, 110 Wash.2d 183, 193, 751 P.2d 294 (1988). Second, while initiative measures are reflective of the reserved power of the people to legislate, Save Our State Park v. Hordyk, 71 Wash.App. 84, 89-90, 856 P.2d 734 (1993), the people in their legislative capacity remain subject to the mandates of the Constitution. Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 373-74, 25 P.2d 81 (1933). Finally, the Washington Constitution is a restriction on legislative power rather than a grant of powers. Moses Lake Sch. Dist. No. 161 v. Big Bend Community College, 81 Wash.2d 551, 555, 503 P.2d 86 (1972), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 934, 93 S.Ct. 2776, 37 L.Ed.2d 393 (1973); Fain v. Chapman, 89 Wash.2d 48, 53, 569 P.2d 1135 (1977). *197 A. Severability [6] The first issue advanced by petitioners is that because the provisions of Initiative 573 pertaining © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 224 of 433 http:Hweb2.westlaw. corn/print/printstreann.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp& sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 8 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188,949 P.2d 1366) to federal legislators were found unconstitutional in Thorsted, 841 F.Supp. 1068, the provisions pertaining to state constitutional officers fail as well because they cannot be severed from the unconstitutional portions of the measure. [71 The basic test for severability of constitutional and unconstitutional provisions of legislation is set forth in Hall by Hall v. Nienzer, 97 Wash.2d 574, 582, 649 P.2d 98 (1982) (quoting State ex rel. King County v. State Tax Coinm'n, 174 Wash. 336, 339-40, 24 P.2d 1094 (1933)): whether the constitutional and unconstitutional provisions are so connected ... that it could not be believed that the legislature would have passed one without the other; or where the part eliminated is so intimately connected with the balance of the act as to make it useless to accomplish the purposes of the legislature. Accord Leonard v. City of Spokane, 127 Wash.2d 194, 201, 897 P.2d 358 (1995). **1371 With respect to the first requirement, where a severability clause is present in legislation, we have found such a clause to provide the necessary assurance that the Legislature would have enacted the appropriate sections of the Iegislation despite the unconstitutional sections. State v. Anderson, 81 Wash.2d 234, 236, 501 P.2d 184 (1972). Initiative 573 contains a severability clause so that the first aspect of the severability test is met. See Laws of 1993, ch. 1, § 10. As to the second requirement, petitioners assert the elimination of the unconstitutional portions of Initiative 573 pertaining to federal legislators so destroys the act as to render it incapable of accomplishing its intended purpose. They note the frequent references in the 1992 Voters' Pamphlet to "national issues" as to the intent of Initiative 573, claiming the term limits for federal legislators*198 were essential to its enactment by the people. The 1992 Voters' Pamphlet refers to the national debt and tax burden, the S & L bailout and congressional banking and postal scandals. However, even a cursory look at the pamphlet reveals many references to state offices, referring to governor, lieutenant governor and state senators and Page 7 representatives. Although the pamphlet notes several national issues, its lamentations regarding the evils of incumbency and elimination of " deadwood" can fairly be read as applying equally to the state constitutional officers addressed in the initiative. Thus, even without the portions relating to national office, as Initiative 573 addresses perceived evils of incumbency in state offices, it has not been rendered "useless," as required by the test for severability. Nor can it fairly be said that the state office provisions would not have been independently supported by the initiative proponents and voters seeking to address the perceived evils of incumbency at the local level. The second prong of the severability test is also met. The provisions of Initiative 573 addressing state constitutional officers are severable, and are not unconstitutional per se because the provisions regarding federal legislators have been found by federal courts to violate the federal constitution. B. Qualifications for State Constitutional Officers The next question before us is whether the provisions of Initiative 573 are qualifications for state constitutional officers and whether the qualifications, set in the Washington Constitution for the officers in question, may be supplemented by statute. 1. Term Limits Are Qualifications [8] The threshold question we must answer is whether the restrictions set forth in Initiative 573 for certain candidates constitute "qualifications" for office. In the traditional sense, qualifications for office are attributes *199 which must be met before a person can be a candidate for office or officeholder such as age, residence, or citizenship. The dictionary definition is "... [a] condition or circumstance which must be satisfied." Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 961 (1984). As the term itself is undefined in the Constitution, we apply its ordinary meaning. See Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Wash.2d 869, 877, 784 P.2d 507 (1990) (undefined terms are given their " © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 225 of 433 http://web2. westlaw. conVprint/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&desti-n ation=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 9 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) plain, ordinary and popular" meaning; and courts look to standard English language dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of such terms). [9] Initiative 573, however, frames the limitation in a negative sense, barring certain people from being candidates. A "negative" framing of the attribute does not preclude it from being a qualification. In Powell v. McConnack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), the United States Supreme Court addressed U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, the qualifications clause for members of the United States House of Representatives.FN6 The Court rejected a contention that the negative phrasing of the qualifications clause prescribed standing incapacities only and did not impose further limits on the **1372 power of each house to judge its members' fitness for office. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 536-47, 89 S.Ct. at 1972-77. In holding the House was without power to exclude any member -elect who met the Constitution's requirements for membership, the Court recognized the qualifications clause provides an exclusive list of qualifications, notwithstanding its negative phrasing. Id. 395 U.S. at 536-38, 89 S.Ct. at 1972-73. FN6. U.S. Const. art.1, § 2, cl. 2 provides: No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. In State ex rel. Chandler v. Howell, 104 Wash. 99, 175 P. 569 (1918), we held the Washington Constitution's prohibition on judges seeking other offices during the term for which they were elected was a qualification that could not *200 be added to those set for federal legislative office under the United States Constitution. Moreover, under Wash. Const. art. IV, § 3(a) (amend.25), judges have a mandatory retirement age of 75 years. Thus, framed more positively, a qualification for judicial office in Washington is that judges must be 75 years of age or younger. Page 8 While some proponents of term limits of the sort established by Initiative 573 have contended the restrictions on incumbents relate to ballot access, such restrictions have been interpreted to be qualifications for office. The United States Supreme Court in United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829-39, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 1867-71, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995), rejected the view that an Arkansas constitutional amendment imposing term limits was a valid ballot access measure, and held term limits constituted a qualification for federal legislative office; such addition to the constitutional qualifications for federal office was invalid. See also Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F.Supp. 1068, 1081 (W.D.Wash.1994) (Initiative 573 imposes a new qualification for office: nonincumbency beyond the specified periods), affd sub nom. Thorsted v. Munro, 75 F.3d 454 (9th Cir.1996); Alaskans for Legislative Reform v. State, 887 P.2d 960, 966 (Alaska 1994) (rejecting Alaska's term limits initiative because it imposed " 'qualifications' as that term has been used by constitutional delegates, political thinkers, legal scholars, and courts"). Likewise in 1895, we interpreted the term limit provision of former article XI, section 7 Fv7 as a qualification for county treasurers. In Koontz v. Kurtzman, 12 Wash. 59, 40 P. 622 (1895), an unsuccessful candidate for county treasurer challenged the election asserting the person elected was ineligible to hold office under former Wash. Const. art. XI, § 7 alleging a partial term served by the treasurer pursuant to appointment should be counted in applying the term limit. In analyzing the issue, we treated the term limit as a qualification: FN7. See note 9, infra. *201 We are of the opinion that appellant was not disqualified from holding the second term under [ article XI, section 7], in consequence of having served for a part of a term under the appointment by the commissioners. The constitution does not say that no person shall hold a county office for more than four years, but says that he shall not hold it for more than two terms in succession. It interposes a term limit but not a time limit. The term of office © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 226 of 433 http://web2. westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 10 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188,949 P.2d 1366) is fixed by law and is two years, and there may be several different incumbents during a single term. Koontz, 12 Wash. at 60, 40 P. 622 (emphasis added). Counsel for Respondents Munro and Gregoire effectively conceded the restrictions of Initiative 573 are qualifications in oral argument. As the intent section of the measure proclaims, and the effect of the measure commands, nonincumbency as described in Initiative 573 becomes a qualification for state constitutional officers, and we so hold. 2. Qualifications for State Constitutional Officers Are Exclusive [10] Having determined Initiative 573 establishes nonincumbency as a new qualification for state constitutional officers we next turn to the question of whether qualifications can be added by statute to the qualifications set forth in the constitution for such officers. Petitioners contend the qualifications mandated by Initiative 573 unconstitutionally add to the exclusive qualifications for state constitutional**1373 officers established in the Washington Constitution. Respondents, in turn, assert the negative phraseology of the Constitution indicates the qualifications for state constitutional officers are minimums to which the Legislature or the people may add by statute. In determining whether term limits constitute impermissible qualifications beyond those expressed in our state Constitution, it is important to re -visit fundamental principles regarding qualifications for state constitutional *202 offices. Our cases have expressed a strong presumption in favor of eligibility for office. In State v. Schragg, 158 Wash. 74, 78, 291 P. 321 (1930), we stated: Since the right to participate in the government is the common right of all, it is the unqualified right of any eligible person within the state to aspire to any of these offices, and equally the unqualified right of the people of the state to choose from among those aspiring the persons who shall hold such offices. It must follow from these considerations that eligibility to an office in the state is to be presumed Page 9 rather than to be denied, and must further follow that any doubt as to the eligibility of any person to hold an office must be resolved against the doubt. Id. at 78, 291 P. 321. Accord State ex rel. O'Connell v. Dubuque, 68 Wash.2d 553, 566, 413 P.2d 972 (1966) ("[a] strong public policy exists in favor of eligibility for public office, and the constitution, where the language and context allows, should be construed so as to preserve this eligibility" The Washington Constitution sets forth qualifications for state legislative offices: Qualifications of Legislators. No person shall be eligible to the legislature who shall not be a citizen of the United States and a qualified voter in the district for which he is chosen. Wash. Const. art. H, § 7. Similarly, the Constitution establishes qualifications for state executive officers:Qualifications, Compensation, Offices Which May Be Abolished. No person, except a citizen of the United States and a qualified elector of this state, shall be eligible to hold any state office. Wash. Const. art. III, § 25 (amend.31). The history of these provisions indicates they were meant to be the exclusive qualifications for such state constitutional officers. The constitutional provisions establishing qualifications for state constitutional officers were the subject of intense debate in the 1889 Constitutional Convention. The original *203 draft of article III, section 25, provided a general residency in Washington requirement of two years in addition to other qualifications. For the governor and lieutenant governor, a minimum age of 35 years and a five-year Washington residency requirement were established. This draft of the section was ultimately rejected. See The Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention 1889, at 589-91 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed., 1962). Term limits were also debated, and in some cases applied, when qualifications for certain state offices © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 227 of 433 htti)://web2. westlaw.com/print/pri ntstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destinati on=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 11 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) were being determined. As originally adopted in 1889, Wash. Const. art. III, § 25, provided in part: No person, except a citizen of the United States and a qualified elector of this state shall be eligible to hold any state office, and the State Treasurer shall be ineligible for the term succeeding that for which he was elected ... (Emphasis added.) Journal at 589-90.FN8 Similarly, former Wash. Const. art. XI, § 7, initially provided: EN8. The original term limit qualification applicable to the state treasurer was deleted by Amendment 31 in 1956. See Laws of 1955, 34th Leg., S.J.R. No. 6, at 1861, approved November 6, 1956. No county officer shall be eligible to hold his office more than two terms in succession. Journal at 720 FN9 FN9. Wash. Const. art. XI, § 7, was repealed by Amendment 22 in 1948. See Laws of 1947, 30th Leg., H.R.J. No. 4 at 1385, approved November 2, 1948. Delegates at the 1889 Constitutional Convention considered but rejected term limits for other offices. Journal at 589-91. When article III, section 25, was being considered in July of 1889, delegate J.Z. Moore moved to **1374 amend the section to make the governor as well as the treasurer ineligible for a succeeding term. The Convention considered but rejected imposition of a term limit for the office of governor. Id. at 591. In addition, delegate Suksdorf moved "that no other state officer should hold office for more than two terms in succession." Id. The Convention also defeated this motion. Id. *204 A similar process took place at the 1989 Convention in addressing article II, section 7. The actual qualifications for state legislators came only after several motions to change the section by convention delegates. The initial draft of that section required a legislative candidate to be a citizen of the United States, a resident of the state Page 10 for two years, and a qualified voter of the district where she or he is chosen; provided, that at the first election every citizen of the United States who was a qualified voter when elected was eligible. A motion by delegate Griffiths to strike the two-year residence qualification failed. A subsequent motion by delegate T.M. Reed to strike language drawing a distinction between the eligibility of candidates at the first and subsequent elections carried. A motion to strike the entire section by delegate P.C. Sullivan lost, and a final motion by delegate Dunbar to "amend so that a member of Legislature must be a citizen of the United States and an elector of the state, leaving out the two-year requirement of residence" carried. Journal at 240, 527-28. Washington's constitutional framers believed qualifications for state constitutional officers were a matter of constitutional, not statutory, concern. They debated citizenship, residency in the state, age, status as qualified elector, and term limits in ultimately arriving at the appropriate qualifications for state constitutional officers. Additionally, the framers did not confer authority on the Legislature to prescribe additional qualifications for such officers. Various constitutional provisions demonstrate the framers knew how to grant, and expressly did grant the Legislature lawmaking authority pertaining to certain constitutional offices. See, e.g., Wash. Const. art. III, §§ 19-23 (establishing constitutional offices and providing such officers shall perform duties "as may be prescribed by law," thereby expressly delegating to the Legislature the power to fix the officers' duties). See also Wash. Const. art. IV, § 3(a) (amend.25) (setting mandatory retirement age for judges but authorizing Legislature to fix a lesser age). Article III, § 25 itself allows the Legislature to abolish *205 certain offices by statute. The framers were careful to spell out the extent of legislative power over other constitutional offices, indicating that if the framers intended the Legislature to have authority to add to the qualifications of Wash. Const. art. II, § 7, and art. III, § 25, they would have so stated. In addition to the text of the Constitution itself and © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 228 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.comlprint/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 12 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) our constitutional history, our case law indicates the qualifications sections of the Washington Constitution are exclusive. In In re Bartz, 47 Wash.2d 161, 287 P.2d 119 (1955), we stated the general rule with respect to constitutional qualifications for office: where the constitution has set forth qualifications for an office, either general or specific, in the absence of an express grant of power to the legislature, there is an implied prohibition against the imposition of additional qualifications by the legislature. Bartz, 47 Wash.2d at 164, 287 P.2d 119. In Bartz, we upheld a statute requiring justices of the peace in cities of over 5,000 population to be attorneys. We noted the specific constitutional qualifications for executive and legislative office and held where the Constitution failed to provide qualifications regarding justices of the peace, the legislature could appropriately fill the vacuum because enactment of such laws would not conflict with any express or implied constitutional provision. We indicated this holding was consistent with the concept of the Washington Constitution as a restriction on legislative powers, and followed from the authority expressly granted the Legislature by Wash. Const. art. IV, § 10 (amend.65) to determine the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of justices of the peace. We also noted laws governing the qualifications of these officers had been in effect for many years at the time the state Constitution was adopted. Bartz, 47 Wash.2d at 166-68, 287 P.2d 119. **1375 Under the general rule in Bartz, qualifications may not be supplemented by a legislative act where qualifications for the state officers have been expressly stated in *246article III, section 25 (regarding executive offices), and article E, section 7 (regarding legislative offices). This general rule has been repeatedly expressed in cases across the United States. 63C Am.Jur.2d Public Qfficers and Employees § 51, at 494-95 (1997), noting the general rule to be "where the constitution establishes specific eligibility requirements for a particular constitutional office, the constitutional criteria are exclusive." See, e.g., Page I I Alaskans for Legislative Refonn v. State, 887 P.2d 960, 966 (Alaska 1994) (Alaska's Constitution sets forth qualifications for legislative office and term limits may not be added thereto by initiative); Reale v. Board of Real Estate Appraisers, 880 P.2d 1205, 1206-08 (Colo.1994) (collecting cases and noting: "The law is well established that, where a state constitution provides for certain officials and names the qualification for such officers, the legislature is without authority to prescribe additional qualifications."); Opinion of the Justices, 240 Mass. 611, 614, 135 N.E. 305 (1922) (where qualifications of voters or officers are fixed by the Constitution the Legislature cannot add to or subtract from them); Pavlak v. Growe, 284 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Minn.1979) (holding fair campaign statute void as imposing an additional qualification for office not specified by the Constitution); Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578, 585-86, 71 A.2d 352, 18 A.L.R.2d 241 (1950) (collecting authorities and noting "The recognized authorities on public law are in accord: `It would seem but fair reasoning upon the plainest principles of interpretation, that when the Constitution established certain qualifications as necessary for office, it meant to exclude all others as prerequisites ... . " `The legislature cannot add to the constitutional qualifications of an officer'."). Accord State ex rel. Powers v. Welch, 198 Or. 670, 672-73, 259 P.2d 112, 114 (1953); Whitney v. Bolin, 85 Ariz. 44, 47, 330 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1958); Thomas v. State ex rel. Cobb, 58 So.2d 173, 184, 34 A.L.R.2d 140 (F1a.1952); State v. Betensen, 14 Utah 2d 121, 378 P.2d 669 (1963); State ex rel. Palagi v. Regan, 113 Mont. 343, 126 P.2d 818, 826 (1942); Gibbany v. Ford, 29 N.M. 621, 225 P. 577, 578 (1924); Cornell v. McAlister, 121 Okla. 285, 249 P. 959, 961 (1926). See also *207People ex rei. Hoyne v. McCormick, 261 Ill. 413, 423, 103 N.E. 1053, 1057 (1913); League of Women Voters of Mass. v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 425 Mass. 424, 430, 681 N.E.2d 842, 846 (1997) (rejecting the contention that the people by initiative alone can alter the qualifications for such office prescribed by the constitution, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts opined: "The idea that constitutionally prescribed qualifications may, be changed only by constitutional amendment is intuitively sound. " ). Contra, League of Women © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 229 of 433 http://web2.westlaw. con/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTN4LE&destinati on=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 13 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) Voters v. Secretary of State, 683 A.2d 769 (Me.1996) (upholding statute, enacted by initiative, adding to qualifications of state constitutional officers). Respondents assert the "better -reasoned" decisions of other state courts support the conclusion the qualifications for state constitutional officers listed in the Washington Constitution are not exclusive. Relying on annotations appearing in Legislative Power to Prescribe Qualifications for or Conditions of Eligibility to Constitutional Office, 34 A.L.R.2d 155, 167 (1954), they argue constitutional provisions phrased positively are exclusive lists of qualifications, while those phrased negatively, like Washington's, are minimum requirements. Whether phrased negatively or positively, such requirements are qualifications. The critical issue is whether such qualifications are exclusive. Respondents also argue "Courts interpreting provisions constructed similarly to Washington's have often concluded that additional qualifications can be added by statute." Br. of Resp't at 18-19. They cite four cases from the annotations, Boughton v. Price, 70 Idaho 243, 215 P.2d 286 (1950); Darrow v. People, 8 Colo. 417, 8 P. 661 (1885); State v. Johnson, 33 Del. 334, 138 A. 280 (Super.Ct.1927); and State ex rel. Thompson v. McAllister, 38 W.Va. 485, 18 S.E. 770 (1893), while noting "[i]n candor to the tribunal, however, the annotation also notes a number of cases from other states for the opposite proposition." Br. of Resp't at 19 n. 20. Indeed, we specifically noted the Boughton case and rejected its approach in Bartz. See **1376 Bartz, 47 Wash.2d at 164, 287 P.2d 119 . The other cases are readily distinguishable. Darrow, *208 Johnson and Thompson involve statutorily -added qualifications to a "statutorily created office" and are thus inapposite. The very annotation upon which respondents rely distinguishes the Legislature's power over statutory offices as opposed to constitutional offices, noting: It is generally considered that the legislature has full control over offices created by its enactment of a statute, whereas its power over constitutional offices is limited; and that it cannot abolish a constitutional office, nor change such an office, except as expressly permitted by the constitution. Page 12 34 A.L.R.2d at 168 (citation and footnote omitted). Indeed, although respondents cite the Johnson case, upholding the Delaware Legislature's addition of qualifications to the statutory office of levy court commissioner, they overlook the annotation's discussion of the later case of Buckingham v. State ex rel. Killoran, 42 Del. 405, 35 A.2d 903 (1944), in which the Delaware court rejected legislatively -imposed additional qualifications on constitutionally created judicial offices stating:Wc are convinced from all the authorities that the Legislative branch of government has no authority to add further qualifications in connection with a constitutional judicial officer where the qualifications are provided by the Constitution. 34 A.L.R.2d at 188 (quoting Buckingham, 42 Del. at 415, 35 A.2d at 907). This latter pronouncement by the Delaware court is in accord with our approach in Bartz. Intervenors argue the qualifications listed in the Constitution are minimums which may be added to by statute, listing several statutory examples. These statutes do not support their position. RCW 43.10.010 requires the attorney general to be a qualified practitioner of the supreme court of this state. This qualification can be traced to Laws of 1887-88, § 3, at 7, which noted the "attorney general of this Territory shall be learned in the law and shall be a qualified practitioner before the supreme and district courts of this Territory." This then existing qualification was recognized by the Washington Constitution upon *209 its adoption in 1889 via art. XXVII, § 2, which recognized and retained all territorial laws then in effect. See Wash. Const. art. XXVII, § 2; In re Bartz, 47 Wash.2d 161, 167, 287 P.2d 119 (1955); State v. Estill, 55 Wash.2d 576, 582, 349 P.2d 210, 89 A.L.R.2d 1251 (1960) (Mallery, J., concurring) (noting the provisions of Wash. Const. art. XXVII, § 2, and stating: "Territorial laws have a specific constitutional sanction and approval which subsequent state statutes do not have"). Intervenors also claim that judges in Washington are disqualified from office at age 75, citing RCW 2.10.100(3). This statute, part of the RCW Ch. 2.10 provisions regarding the judicial retirement © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 230 of 433 htti)://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 14 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) system, merely echoes a constitutional requirement found at Wash. Const. art. IV, § 3(a) (amend.25). The mandatory retirement age for judges is constitutionally, not statutorily prescribed.FNto FN10. Amicus PLF argues disqualifications from office for felons, minimum age requirements, durational residency requirements, and anti -nepotism requirements are all examples of valid restrictions on candidacies. We express no view on such restrictions, but note the examples cited by PLF do not support a disposition of this case different from the one we announce today. The disqualification for ex -felons is a constitutional directive in Washington, Wash. Const. art. VI, § 3 (amend.83), and qualifications such as minimum age or durational residency requirements were debated as constitutional qualifications for state officers at the 1889 convention. Journal at 589-90. These qualifications do not address the question of whether the state officer qualifications sections in the Washington Constitution are exclusive. Furthermore, the cases cited by PLF from other jurisdictions are not in conflict with our disposition of this case. See, e.g., Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260 (8th Cir.1990) , cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919, 111 S.Ct. 1307, 113 L.Ed.2d 241 (1991) (upholding a Missouri constitutional age requirement for the constitutional office of state representative); Zielasko v. Ohio, 873 F.2d 957 (6th Cir.1989) (upholding an Ohio constitutional age requirement for state judicial office). See also Sununu v. Stark, 383 F.Supp. 1287 (D.N.H.1974), affd, 420 U.S. 958, 95 S.Ct. 1346, 43 L.Ed.2d 435 (1975); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.), affd, 414 U.S. 802, 94 S.Ct. 125, 38 L.Ed.2d 39 (1973) (upholding New Hampshire's constitutionally imposed residency requirement for constitutional offices of state senator and governor, respectively). The antinepotism requirement cited by Page 13 PLF is inapposite. It is a Kentucky statutory requirement imposed on the statutorily created Board of Education by the Kentucky General Assembly which has oversight responsibility for education under the Kentucky Constitution. See Chapman v. Gorman, 839 S.W.2d 232, 233-37 (Ky.1992); Ky. Const. § 183; KRS § 160.160. **1377 RCW 29.65.010(4) cited by intervenors is not even a qualification for state office. That statute provides an avenue *210 by which any registered voter may contest any election to public office where the person elected gave or offered a bribe to a voter, inspector, or judge of election for the purpose of procuring his election. RCW 29.65.010(4). This statute addresses unlawful voting irregularites, not qualifications for office. The general rule in Bartz remains the applicable principle as to statutory additions to qualifications for constitutional offices. Where the framers established qualifications for office, did not confer express authority upon the Legislature to add to such qualifications by statute, and specifically debated term limits, rejecting such qualifications for the officers in question, we must conclude that article 11, section 7 and article III, section 25 are exclusive. Washington's constitutional framers evidenced an intent to allow broad eligibility for public office in setting the qualifications for state constitutional officers. We believe it the wiser course to adopt the general rule expressed in Bartz and not allow the qualifications for state constitutional officers to be easily altered by the particular politics of the moment. C. Initiative 573 Did Not Amend the Constitution [11][12] The intervenors claim the Washington Constitution can be amended by initiative. They contend "[e]ven if the Legislature lacks authority to qualify eligibility by term limits, the citizens have such authority through the initiative process." Intervenors Br. at 39. In this case, by its terms, Initiative 573 is a statutory enactment. It was not designed to amend either article II, section 7 or Oc 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 231 of 433 bttp:Hweb2-westiaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 15 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) article III, section 25 of our Constitution. Initiative 573 did not and cannot add qualifications to those prescribed in the Washington Constitution for state officers.FNtl FN1L We have often stated the initiative process, as a means by which the people can exercise directly the legislative authority to enact bills and laws, is limited in scope to subject matter which is legislative in nature. Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash.2d 820, 823, 505 P.2d 447 (1973) ; Seattle Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash.2d 740, 748, 620 P.2d 82 (1980) (declaring initiative attempting to achieve something not within its power invalid); see also Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wash.2d 847, 849-50, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976) (noting referendum elections are limited in scope to acts by a governmental body which are legislative in nature). Thus, the initiative power may not be used to amend the Constitution. Ford v. Logan, 79 Wash.2d 147, 156, 493 P.2d 1247 (1971); see also Philadelphia H v. Gregoire, 128 Wash.2d 707, 718, 911 P.2d 389, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 862, 117 S.Ct. 167, 136 L.Ed.2d 109 (1996). See also Jefferey T. Even, Direct Democracy in Washington: A Discourse on the Peoples' Powers of Initiative and Referendum, 32 Gonz. L. Rev. 247, 270 (1996-97) (the Washington initiative process is limited to legislative acts and does not include constitutional amendments). *211 CONCLUSION FNt' FN12. In light of our disposition of the issue of improper additional qualifications to constitutional offices in violation of the Washington Constitution, we do not address the other arguments by the parties such as the impact of the Law on rights of expression, suffrage, free association, or equal treatment. See Leonard v. City of Page 14 Spokane, 127 Wash.2d 194, 202, 897 P.2d 358 (1995). Recognizing its political significance, we are not swayed in our analysis of Initiative 573 by the policy merits or demerits of term limits for officeholders. The wisdom of term limits is ultimately a policy decision for the voters of this state, through the process for constitutional amendment articulated in Wash. Const. art. XXIII. Whether this Court thinks such choice wise, or results in the best or most effective state constitutional officers, is of no consequence. With or without Initiative 573, the people retain the ultimate power to limit election of incumbents: by the reasoned and determined exercise of their franchise, they may in their discretion evict incumbents from office at the next election. Our review here is limited to the issue of whether the voters acted in compliance with our state's Constitution in expressing their collective will. [131 Initiative 573 improperly attempts to add qualifications to constitutional offices by statute. A statute, whether adopted by the Legislature or the people, may not add qualifications**1378 for state constitutional officers where the Constitution sets those qualifications. We hereby order that a writ of mandamus be issued to the Secretary of State, requiring him to accept declarations of candidacy and nomination papers and certify names of candidates for placement on the ballot, in accordance with existing election laws, notwithstanding Initiative 573. *212 DURHAM, C.J., and DOLLIVER, GUY, JOHNSON and MADSEN, JJ., concur. SANDERS, Justice, dissenting. If the constitution, by its language, purported to exclusively set the qualifications for public office I would yield to that higher law; however, it does not. This court is not above the very constitution which created it, and must always heed its voice. I dissent because the constitution requires no less. The Constitutional Text © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 232 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 16 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) To test the majority's claim that the people may not impose limits upon the terms of their elected public servants we must repair to the words of the constitutional text as "[alppropriate constitutional analysis begins with the text and, for most purposes, should end there as well." Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash.2d 779, 799, 935 P.2d 1272 (1997).FNt As Patrick Henry similarly expressed early in our nation's history, "A Constitution, sir, ought to be, like a beacon, held up to the public eye, so as to be understood by every man." Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a Nation 137 (1st ed.1996) (quoting letter dated May 7, 1784, from John Marshall to John Ambler in I Marshall Papers 122). 1~N1. See, e.g., 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 451 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891): Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of human life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them, with the help of common-sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning or any extraordinary gloss. These clauses were worded negatively to prohibit anyone from holding office who does not possess the constitutionally minimum qualifications. Washington constitution article I1, section 7, addressing state legislators, provides: *213 No person shall be eligible to the legislature who shall not be a citizen of the United States and a qualified voter in the district for which he is chosen. And Washington constitution article III, section 25, Page 15 addressing all other state officers, provides: No person, except a citizen of the United States and a qualified elector of this state, shall be eligible to hold any state office. The majority errs when it concludes negative constitutional language which sets a minimum exclusively sets a maximum as well.'- To set a floor and ceiling, simultaneously, more appropriate language would state "all persons shall be eligible for office who are citizens and qualified voters." But it doesn't.FN3 FN2. Such an exclusive reading of constitution article II, section 7 and article III, section 25, would also require an exclusive reading of article IV, section 17 ( "No person shall be eligible to the office of judge of the supreme court, or judge of a superior court, unless he shall have been admitted to practice in the courts of record of this state, or of the Territory of Washington.") thus placing its exclusive qualifications in direct conflict with article IV, section 31(5) (supreme court may remove or suspend judge or justice "and that person is ineligible for judicial office until eligibility is reinstated by the supreme court."). FN3. One commentator has referred to the construction preferred by the majority as reading "something that is not there." Lloyd Cutler, The Constitutionality of State -Imposed Tenn Limits for Federal Office in The Politics and Law of Term Limits 113 (Edward H. Crane & Roger Pilon eds., 1994) (reading the qualifications clauses to be exclusive " suggests something that is not there. In reality, of course, those clauses do not list qualifications -much less the qualifications. They are worded entirely in the negative. They list some disqualifications. They say that `no person shall be' eligible to serve unless of at least a certain age, residency, and duration of citizenship."). © 2007 Thomson[West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 233 of 433 htty://web2.westlaw.com/piint/printstream.aspx?prft=HTU LE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 17 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) **1379 State ex rel. Griffiths v. Superior Court, 177 Wash. 619, 33 P.2d 94 (1934) is dispositive. There a Seattle council member challenged a Seattle ordinance which disqualified officeholders from holding any second public office. The council member challenged the ordinance on the grounds it was prohibited by state statute which provided: "no person shall be competent to hold an elective office within the state or any of its political subdivisions, including that of school district, unless he be a citizen of the United States *214 and of the state of Washington and an elector of such political subdivision." Id. at 623, 33 P.2d 94 (citing Rem.Rev.Stat. § 9929). The disqualified council member argued the state statute set the exclusive qualifications for city office, and, accordingly, the city could not add any qualifications. But this court disagreed, holding the negatively worded language meant what it said by setting minimum qualifications and nothing more. Holding the city could add qualifications consistent with the state statute, the court held, "Section 9929 merely provides that no person shall be competent to hold elective office unless he possesses certain qualifications. It does not say that no other requirements shall be prescribed, nor does it say that the political subdivision therein named may not impose restrictions not inconsistent with the statute." Id. at 624, 33 P.2d 94. Griffiths and today's majority read nearly identically worded qualification clauses to an opposite result. As the constitutional language is materially identical to the state statute (no person shall hold office unless ... ), the same outcome is mandated: Such negatively worded qualification clauses set the minimum qualifications but do not limit legislative power to add further qualifications above that minimum. Our starting point is the presumption that the State has the legislative power to act in any given field unless affirmatively restrained by the constitution. State ex rel. Distilled Spirits Institute, Inc. v. Kinnear, 80 Wash.2d 175, 181, 492 P.2d 1012 (1972) ("[T]he legislative power is absolute unless expressly or by fair implication limited in the constitution.") (citing State v. Fair, 35 Wash. 127, Page 16 76 P. 731 (1904)).FN4 FN4. The majority asserts that laws are presumed constitutional until proven unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt." Majority at 1370. I question whether this standard is applicable to the legal question before us. Indeed, "beyond a reasonable doubt" is generally reserved for the guilt of an accused and is used because the accused is deemed innocent until proven the opposite. However, there is no sensible reason to carry over the same factual standard to the constitutionality of legislation. Whether legislative power has been abused should be a legal question reviewed de novo as any other legal question. Compare Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Court, 280 Or. 95, 570 P.2d 52, 56 n. 6 (1977). However, were we to measure the majority by its own yardstick, it would most surely fall short, as there are many reasons to doubt the correctness of its view. If our constitution does not affirmatively limit the *215 legislature's, or the people's, ability to set reasonable qualifications for office, the legislature's authority to do so is simply not so limited. Such was the generally recognized rule of law at the time of statehood: "where the constitution has made some provision [for qualifications for office], but not exclusive ones, the legislature may add such others as are reasonable and proper." Floyd R. Mechem, A, Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers § 66 (1890). Cf. State ex rel. Buttz v. Marion Circuit Court, 225 Ind. 7, 72 N.E.2d 225, 230, 170 A.L.R. 187 (1947) ("It has been held universally that in the absence of constitutional restrictions there may be qualifications imposed by the legislature for holding public office.") (citing Floyd R. Mechem, supra, §§ 64-68 (1890)). Many of our framers were lawyers and appreciated the nuances of language.FN5 In matters of constitutional construction, courts prefer a construction C 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 234 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 18 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) FNS. For example, Justice Theodore L. Stiles, elected to the Washington Supreme Court on the same day the constitution was popularly ratified, played a leading role in the constitutional convention and was reputed as a scholar and constitutional authority. Charles H. Sheldon, The Washington High Bench, A Biographical History of the State Supreme Court, 1889-1991, at 327 (1992). which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make some words idle and nugatory. **1380 This rule is applicable with special force to written constitutions, in which the people will be presumed to have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 72 (6th ed. 1890) (footnotes omitted). This analysis could and should end here, with the conclusion that our negatively worded qualification clauses FN6 do not forbid legislative imposition of further qualifications, *216 including term limits. We know that because the text says that.FN7 FN6. Perhaps we should refer to them as " disqualification clauses" instead as they really set conditions that disqualify one from office. FN7. Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wash.2d 277, 288, 892 P.2d 1067 (1994) ("We will presume the language [of our constitution] carries its ordinary and popular meaning, unless shown otherwise."). Yet the majority ignores the plain meaning of the constitutional text embarking instead upon a journey back in time to the constitutional convention in a vain effort to give the unambiguous words of our constitution another meaning. Majority at 1373. While such is ultimately unproductive,FNs notwithstanding, I posit, our Page 17 constitutional history does nothing to alter the plain meaning of the constitutional clauses before us. This is necessarily so because it is not the subjective intent of our framers which matters but the plain meaning of the words ratified by the public in 1889. State v. Lister, 91 Wash. 9, 156 P. 858 (1916); Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash.2d 779, 799 n. 31, 935 P.2d 1272 (1997); Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. Puget Sound L.Rev. 491, 510 (1984). The framers proposed, but the public disposed. FN8. "Possible or even probable meanings, when one is plainly declared in the instrument itself, the courts are not at liberty to search for elsewhere." Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 70 (6th ed. 1890). Constitutional History At the time of the constitutional convention in 1889 Washington Territory was governed by the Organic Act. Under the Organic Act the Washington Territorial legislature was directed to set the qualifications for voting and holding office. 10 Stat. ch. 90, p. 172, § 5 (1853). The Organic Act, however, set the minimum qualifications by requiring office holders and voters alike be United States citizens at least 21 years of age. Id. § 5. The Organic Act provided: the qualifications of voters and of holding office at all subsequent elections shall be such as shall be prescribed by *217 the Legislative Assembly: Provided, That the right of suffrage and of holding office shall be exercised only by citizens of the United States above the age of twenty-one years.... Id. § 5. Thus, in the beginning, qualifications for voting and office eligibility were treated the same: the minimum was set by the Organic Act, the remainder by the legislature. The new constitution, however, altered the scheme by treating qualifications for © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 235 of 433 http://web2.wcstlaw.com/print/pzintstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 19 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) voting differently from qualifications for holding office. By unmistakable language voting qualifications were set exclusively; however, the new constitution retained the prior system's treatment of qualifications for office by setting constitutional minimums for eligibility, leaving the legislature free reign to set all remaining qualifications. The voting qualification enshrined in the new constitution affirmatively stated: All male persons of the age of twenty-one years or over, possessing the following qualifications, shall be entitled to vote at all elections .... l[[[[[rN9] FN9. The same provision, article VI, section 1, currently reads: Qualifications of Electors. All persons of the age of eighteen years or over who are citizens of the United States and who have lived in the state, county, and precinct thirty days immediately preceding the election at which they offer to vote, except those disqualified by Article VI, section 3 of this Constitution, shall be entitled to vote at all elections. Constitution article VI, section 3, currently provides: Who Disqualified. All persons convicted of infamous crime unless restored to their civil rights and all persons while they are judicially declared mentally incompetent are excluded from the elective franchise. Const. 1889 art. VI, § 1. Thus, article VI, section 1, affirmatively sets the exclusive qualifications for voting. **1381 The legislature could not, in light of this language, impose additional qualifications on voter eligibility. Noticeably contrasting language was used to address qualifications for office. The qualification clauses for office provides, "No person *218 shall be eligible to the legislature who shall not be a citizen of the United States and a qualified voter in the district for which he is chosen" Page 18 (Const. art. 11, § 7) and "No person, except a citizen of the United States and a qualified elector of this state, shall be eligible to hold any state office " (Const. art. III, § 25). Unfortunately the majority does not grasp the importance of the difference in language used in these parallel settings, purblind asserting the meaning is the same. Thus, the majority violates the cardinal rule of construction which holds, " Where different language is used in the same connection in different parts of a statute, it is presumed that a different meaning was intended." State v. Roth, 78 Wash.2d 711, 715, 479 P.2d 55 (1971). Exclusive language was employed in the voter qualification clause, evidencing the qualifications set forth therein were intentionally exclusive; however, negative language was used in the office -holding qualification clause. The difference is obvious. But the majority does not account for it. Contemporary authorities to our constitutional ratification were well able to discern the difference between negative and exclusive language: "Where the constitution has prescribed the qualifications, the possession of which shall entitle an individual to hold office under the state, it is not within the power of the legislature to change or add to them.... A negative provision, however, as that a person not an elector shall not be appointed or elected to an office in the state, does not preclude the legislature from adding other reasonable and proper requirements." Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers § 96 (1890). Case law of the time, and thereafter, agreed. For example, the Ohio high court held in 1876 that negative phraseology in its constitutional qualifications clause did not preclude the legislature from enacting reasonable additional qualifications. State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102, 117-18 (1876). The negatively worded language there was the same as ours. Id. at 117 (" No person shall be elected or appointed to any office in this *219 state, unless he possesses the qualifications of an elector.") (quoting Ohio Const. art. XV, § 4). The Ohio court there upheld a © 2007 Thomson[West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 236 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.corn/print/printstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destin ati on=atp&s v=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 20 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) statute requiring all officeholders must be residents for three years and be able to read and write. Id. at 117. Holding the negatively worded constitutional language was not offended, the court wrote: It is apparent that this statute is not in conflict with the terms of this constitutional provision. It does not authorize the appointment of a person who is not an elector. The express provision of the constitution is, that a person not an elector shall not be elected or appointed to any office in this state. Now, unless the clear implication is that every person who has the qualifications of an elector shall be eligible to any office in this state, there is no conflict between the statute and the constitution. I do not believe that such implication arises. .... If the framers of the constitution had intended to take away from the legislature the power to name disqualifications for office, other than the one named in the constitution, it would not have been left to the very doubtful implication which is claimed from the provision under consideration. The power under the general grant being ample and certain, a statute should not be declared void because in conflict with an alleged implication, unless such implication be clear and indubitable. Id. at 117-18. In 1883 the South Carolina Supreme Court followed that same distinction. **1382State v. Williams, 20 S.C. 12, 17 (1883). After our constitution was adopted, several more courts elaborated. For example, the North Carolina high court interpreted a constitutional clause which stated, "Every voter in North Carolina, except as in this article disqualified, shall be eligible to office" to be exclusive while observing that if the constitution were worded negatively, as is Washington's, then the legislature could add qualifications. State ex rel. Spruill v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 588, 591, 77 S.E. 768 (1913) (quoting N.C. Const. art. VII, § 7). The North Carolina Supreme Court therein stated the obvious: "It is true that where a Constitution provides that ` no person shall be elected or appointed to any office unless he possesses*220 the qualifications of an elector,' the Legislature can prescribe additional qualifications." Id. at 591, 77 S.E. 768. The New Mexico Supreme court followed suit soon Page 19 thereafter in Gibbany v. Ford, 29 N.M. 621, 225 P. 577, 578 (1924) (interpreting N.M. Const. art. VII, § 2: "Every citizen of the United States who is a legal resident of the state and is a qualified elector therein, shall be qualified to hold any public office in the state except as otherwise provided in this Constitution."). The court went to the heart of the issue and held that the legislature cannot add qualifications "because the constitutional provision is not a negative one, providing that no person shall be eligible to hold an office unless he possess certain qualifications, as is often the case in other states, but is a positive provision, giving the right to every person possessing the qualifications therein set forth to hold office." Id. 225 P. at 578. Drafters of our constitution had every reason to be well aware of the difference between negative and exclusive phraseology. In 1889, when our constitution was drafted, several states had recently included exclusive qualifications for holding office in their constitutions. For example, North Carolina's second constitution, written in 1868, included a provision clearly stating that citizenship and voter status shall be the sole requirements for public office and that the legislature cannot add qualifications thereto. N.C. Const. art. VI, § 6 (" Every qualified voter in North Carolina who is 21 years of age, except as in this Constitution disqualified, shall be eligible for election by the people to office.") North Carolina inserted this language because of fears the legislature might enact laws to deprive a certain group access to office.FN10 Several other state constitutions used *221 similarly exclusive Ianguage.FNtt Ours did not but our majority rewrites it under the guise of construing it. FN10. In State ex rel. Spruill v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 588, 592, 77 S.E. 768 (1913) the court explained: The purpose of this peculiar phraseology in the North Carolina Constitution is well known by every one. A newly emancipated element had been admitted to suffrage, and it was rightly anticipated that at some future day there might be a majority in the General Assembly © 2007 Thomson/West. No CIaim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 237 of 433 http://web2.westlaw . c orn/print/pri ntstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destin ati on=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 21 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) unfavorable to their holding office, so the provision was made that "every voter," except as disqualified by the Constitution, should be eligible "to office." FNII. Conn. Const. art VI, § 10 ("Every elector who has attained the age of eighteen years shall be eligible to any office in the state ... except in cases provided for in this constitution."); Minn. Const. art. VII, § 6 ("Every person who by the provisions of this article is entitled to vote at any election and is 21 years of age is eligible for any office elective by the people in the district wherein he has resided 30 days previous to the election, except as otherwise provided in this constitution......); N.M. Const. art. VII, § 2 ("Every citizen of the United States who is a Iegal resident of the state and is a qualified elector therein, shall be qualified to hold any elective public office except as otherwise provided in this constitution."); S.C. Const. art. XVII, § IA ("Every qualified elector is eligible to any office to be voted for, unless disqualified by age, as prescribed in this Constitution."). The majority makes much of the framers' debate on possibly inserting mandatory term limits into the constitution. Majority at 1373-1374. The fact is the convention debated, but decided not to make term limits a constitutional mandate. The resulting constitution suggests the framers thought enough of term limits to discuss them while simultaneously rejecting the proposition that the legislature cannot impose reasonable term limits in the future. The resulting negative language in the qualifications clause perhaps represents a compromise on the term limits debate to leave the legislature free to impose and remove term limits as it **1383 saw fit by simple legislative enactment. If the drafters intended to restrain legislative power from imposing additional disqualifications, such as term limits, they could have easily proposed an exclusive qualification provision, yet they did not. Other History Page 20 The Washington legislature has always acted consistent with the view that the negatively worded qualification clauses mean what they say and do not restrain the legislature from adding reasonable qualifications.FNt' The majority*222 acknowledges one example, the statutory requirement that the attorney general be a qualified practitioner before the supreme court. Majority at 1376 (citing RCW 43.10.010). FN12. At the time our constitution was ratified, legislatures routinely set additional qualifications. See, e.g., Thomas M. Cooley, supra, at 748 n. I (discussing in the abstract the rule that one must be a qualified voter to hold office Cooley concluded, "The question is not very important, as State constitutions or statutes generally lay down that rule, in some cases adding further requirements.") (emphasis added). The attorney general is a constitutional executive officer. Const. art. III, § 1. The constitution imposes no qualifications on the attorney general other than those minimums found in the provision setting the minimum for all state officers, the same clause at issue today. Const. art. III, § 25. The constitution sets no requirement that the attorney general be qualified to practice before this or any court. Yet the legislature imposed the qualification as an additional minimum requirement for holding that office. The additional qualification legislatively imposed on the attorney general is irreconcilable with the majority's position that the legislature may never add to the constitutional minimum qualifications. Yet the majority gives its stamp of approval to this additional qualification and that statute remains in force today. See RCW 43.10.010. The only explanation offered for this incongruous result by the majority is the fact that the territorial legislature enacted that law one year prior to the constitutional convention. Majority at 1376. However by the majority's logic, the newly adopted constitution would have nullified this law, like any other prior inconsistent statute as Const. art. XXVII, § 2, only purports to retain territorial laws "which are not repugnant to this Constitution.... © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 238 of 433 http ://web2. westl aw. com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destin ation=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 22 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188,949 P.2d 1366) A more probable view is the legislature passed a qualification law contemporaneously with the drafting of the constitution because it viewed the addition of legislative qualifications constitutionally consistent. Cf. Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash.2d 779, 799, 935 P.2d 1272 (1997) (fact that religious societies provided most social services to the public at time of constitutional convention *223 indicates the state establishment clause is not offended by use of volunteer chaplains).FNt3 FN13. See also In re Bartz, 47 Wash.2d 161, 168, 287 P.2d 119 (1955) ( "The legislature has consistently acted on the assumption that it had this power [to establish qualifications for justices of the peace), both before and after the adoption of the constitution.... `Where a particular construction has been generally accepted as correct, and especially when this has occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of the constitution, and by those who had opportunity to understand the intention of the instrument, it is not to be denied that a strong presumption exists that the construction rightly interprets the intention.' 1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.) 144 (1927)."). The practice of legislative additions to qualifications for office has continued without abatement. For example, the code of 1891 reveals a statute declaring various officeholders ineligible to hold the constitutional office of justice of the peace. Hill's Gen.Stat. (1891) vol. I, § 303 entitled "Who eligible to office of justice" ("[Nlor shall any sheriff, coroner, or clerk of the superior court be eligible to or hold such office."). See also RCW 29.65.010(4) (disqualifying from any elected office anyone who bribes a voter or election judge during his campaign); RCW 29.15.050 (to be eligible for public office, candidates must file fee of one -percent of annual salary of office sought). Such legislative acts are clearly additional qualifications inconsistent with the majority's position. Or more accurately; the majority's Page 21 position is inconsistent with long-standing practice. See Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. Puget Sound L.Rev. 491, 521 **1384 (1984) (early legislative construction of a constitutional provision "should be given great weight, especially if it extended over a long period of time."). The majority, however, ignores the text and history, instead focusing on the dicta appearing in a single case, In re Bartz, 47 Wash.2d 161, 287 P.2d 119 (1955). Majority at 1374. In Bartz the legislature enacted a statute providing no one is eligible to hold the office of justice of the peace except an attorney. Laws of 1951, ch. 156, § 2. Bartz upheld the legislatively added qualification on the ground the legislature had always set such qualifications and because judicial *224 officers were not subject to the executive or legislative qualifications clauses. However, then the court continued to enunciate a seemingly contradictory position that the legislature cannot add to qualifications for constitutional offices. Young v. Konz, 91 Wash.2d 532, 542, 588 P.2d 1360 (1979) characterized the Bartz holding as one upholding "the power of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for judges of justice courts." That which is beyond, or not necessary to, this holding is dicta. FN14 Dicta is not controlling authority and need not be followed. State v. Potter, 68 Wash.App. 134, 150 n. 7, 842 P.2d 481 (1992). FN14. Bartz's statement that qualifications are exclusive is dicta in light of the court's ultimate holding that the legislature appropriately prescribed reasonable qualifications for constitutional judicial officers. In light of that holding, any statement that the legislature may not impose qualifications on other constitutional officers is unnecessary. See Pedersen v. Klinkert, 56 Wash.2d 313, 317, 320, 352 P.2d 1025 (1960) (dicta is language not necessary to the decision in a particular case). By text, precedent, and practice, negatively phrased © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 239 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/printlprintstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/ 14/2007 Page 23 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188,949 P.2d 1366) qualification clauses do not restrict legislative imposition of additional reasonable qualifications for office. Other Jurisdictions While the majority strings citations to support its position of exclusivity (Majority at 1375-1376), in truth courts have not been uniform in their treatment of term limits. In fact, legislative term limits are currently the law in some 20 American states whereas only one court has stricken term limits as a violation of a state qualification clause. Such is a far different picture from that which the majority paints. First, we must distinguish the United States Supreme Court case which struck down state imposed term limits for federal congressional officers. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995). Thornton is a case about federalism and, as such, has very limited applicability to our state law inquiry. Thornton involved an Arkansas state constitutional amendment which purported to impose tern limits on Arkansas' *225 congressional delegation. The divided 5-4 Thornton court held neither Arkansas nor any other state could impose term limits on federal officers, however, not because of the language of the federal qualifications clauses but because the states lack power to alter the qualifications for any federal offices for reasons of federal supremacy.FNl$ The Thornton majority reasoned allowing the states to alter federal qualifications would disrupt the uniform national government.FNt6 The majority also based its holding on the particular intent of the national framers and the peculiar attendant**1385 constitutional history."N" The Thornton dissent argued that the original vision of federalism left the states the power to set the qualifications of their federal representatives. Id. at 845, 115 S.Ct. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.). Thornton has no bearing on term limits for state officers and leaves state term limits untouched. Page 22 FN15. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 1855, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995) ("each Member of Congress is `an officer of the union, deriving his powers and qualifications from the constitution, and neither created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by, the states.... Those officers owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not of a portion, of the people.' Representatives and Senators are as much officers of the entire union as is the President. States thus `have just as much right, and no more, to prescribe new qualifications for a representative, as they have for a president ..... ") (quoting also 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries as the Constitution of the United States § 627 (3d ed. 1858)). FN16, U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 783, 115 S.Ct. at 1845 ("Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States."). Cf. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 118 S.Ct. 464, 139 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) (unanimous court struck down Louisiana state statute which provided for federal congressional elections to be held in Louisiana in October because the states cannot alter- the uniformity of federal elections). FN17. U.S. Tenn Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 800-01, 115 S.Ct. at 1853-54 (after reviewing the constitutional history the majority "conclude [d] that the Framers intended the Constitution to be the exclusive source of qualifications for Members of Congress."). Turning to term limits imposed upon state officers and judicial treatment thereof, it is interesting to note many states have historically imposed term limits on their *226 governors without constitutional invalidation. FN18 The controversy © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 240 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 24 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) over term limits gathered force, however, after the states began to impose limits on legislators in 1990. Currently, 14 states have imposed term limits on state officers by state constitutional amendment, although the relevant constitutions generally allow constitutional amendment directly by the people through initiative without legislative approval. Karen Hansen, Living Within the Limits, in State Legislatures 15 (June 1997). FN19 No court has stricken term limits in these states FN20 and, where addressed, term limits have been upheld as valid expressions of popular wiIi.FN21 FN18. See Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F.Supp. 816, 821 (S.D.Ohio 1993) (noting that over 20 states have term limits for governors), afj"d, 45 F.3d 126 (6th Cir.1995). FN19. Those states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. FN20. The Ninth Circuit recently upheld California's term limits law, which imposes a specific lifetime term limits ban on state legislators and certain state officers, as consistent with federal constitutional requirements. Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir.1997). FN21. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349, 359-60 (1994), aff d, 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995); Legislature of State of Cal. v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 919, 112 S.Ct. 1292, 117 L.Ed.2d 516 (1992); Nevada Judges Assn v. Lau, 112 Nev. 51, 910 P.2d 898 (1996). In addition to the 14 states just mentioned, six states, including Washington, have imposed term limits by direct legislative enactment. Idaho Code § 34-907; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 53, § 48; Page 23 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 553-54; Utah Code Ann. § 20A-10-201; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103. FN22 Of those six states, court challenges have been made in only two, Massachusetts and Maine, besides WashingtonFN23 The Massachusetts court struck down term limits while the Maine court upheld them. Thus, there is one case *227 on each side of the debate, although, between the two, the Massachusetts case is of limited persuasiveness because of the language of its state constitution whereas the Maine case is directly on point. FN22. In all of the six term limits were popularly imposed by initiative except in Utah where the legislature itself passed term limits. FN23. The Alaska high court ruled, by advisory opinion, that the voters would not be able to enact term limits by initiative. Alaskans for Legislative Reform v. State, 887 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1994). The voters, however, never tried. Massachusetts struck down the popularly enacted term limits on the ground the people lack the power to alter qualifications for state office. League of Women Voters v. Secretary of Cam., 425 Mass. 424, 681 N.E.2d 842 (1997). However, the peculiar Ianguage of the Massachusetts constitution is exclusive in form. Indeed, the Massachusetts high court relied in part on article 9 of its state constitution in reaching its decision. Id. 681 N.E.2d at 844. That constitutional provision declares constitutional qualifications to be exclusive: "all the inhabitants of this Commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall establish by their frame of government,1[[[[rN241 have an equal right ... to be elected, for public employments." Id. at 844 n. 5 (quoting article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights). FN24. As the court noted, "The frame of government is Part II of our Constitution." League of Women Voters, 681 N.E.2d at 844. O 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 241 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/piintstream.aspx?prft=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv =Split... 3/14/2007 Page 25 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188,949 P.2d 1366) More on point is the Maine case where the relevant constitutional language is materially **1386 similar to Washington's. League of Women Voters v. Secretary of State, 683 A.2d 769 (1996). There, as here, the people of Maine enacted term limits by popular initiative. The initiative was challenged on the ground it conflicted with Maine's negative constitutional qualifications clause language which, fake Washington's, provides "No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives" (id. at 773 n. 8 (quoting Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 4)) " unless [the person] shall, at the commencement of the period for which [the person] is elected, have been 5 years a citizen of the United States, have arrived at the age of 21 years...." (Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 4). The Maine Supreme Court concluded the negatively worded constitutional language did not restrain the people from legislatively imposing term limits and, in the absence of any such restraint, the people were free to enact term limits. Id. at 773 n. 8. The Maine *228 Supreme Court therefore upheld the term limits. Id. at 773 ("We therefore answer Question One by concluding that limits on the number of consecutive terms that may be served by Maine legislators may be enacted by legislation."). The Maine case cannot be distinguished from our own. Are Term Limits Consistent with the Spirit of Our Constitution? While dispositively concluding the letter of the constitution does not prohibit term limits by initiative, I further posit neither is the spirit of our constitution offended by same. The tenor of various clauses such as Const. art. 1, § 1 ("All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed ...."), the free elections clause (Const art. I, § 19) ("All Elections shall be free and equal, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.") and the overall structure of our constitutional republic support this view. If anything the very nature of our constitution is to limit government. To strike term limits because they interfere with our constitutional system is Page 24 indeed anomalous as term limits are overtly a restraint on career politicians and serve as an indirect further check on the legislative branch.rN25 FN25. Legislature of State of Cal. v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 1329, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283 (1991) ("In sum, it would be anomalous to hold that a statewide initiative measure aimed at `restor[ing] a free and democratic system of fair elections,' and `encourag[ing] qualified candidates to seek public office' (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.5), is invalid as an unwarranted infringement of the rights to vote and to seek public office."). By design, Washington's legislature has always been a citizen legislature comprised of people wedded to other professions who gather but a short time annually or biannually about the people's business. As such these legislators, more than most, are "called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time," and then return to private Iife. The Federalist No. 62, at 419 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., *229 1961). Term limits, which ensure our legislators remain citizen legislators, FN26 not career state employees, are generally consistent with this constitutional framework and specifically consistent with our citizen's historically populist mistrust of the legislature.FN21 That this legacy remains in the minds of our citizens perhaps explains the popular adoption of the act before us today. FN26. See term limits law, Laws 1993, ch. 1, § l(l) ("The people will best be served by citizen legislators who are subject to a reasonable degree of rotation in office[.]"). FN27. See Lebbeus J. Knapp, The Origin of the Constitution of the State of Washington, 4 Wash. Historical Q. 227, 228, 250 (Oct.1913). Additionally, there is a claim that such term limits infringe on the right to free elections. Such a claim OO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 242 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&desti nation=atp&s v=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 26 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as:134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) was rejected outright with respect to California's absolute prohibition in Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 846-47 (9th Cir.1997) ("[T]erm limits on state officeholders is a neutral candidacy qualification, such as age or residence, which the State certainly has the right to impose."). The free election clause is intended in part to ensure "the door of this part of the Federal Government, is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty**1387 or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith." The Federalist No. 52, at 355 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed.1961). Term limits are intended precisely to minimize the power of incumbency and open the door to outsiders who might seek office. The logic of such limits was recently recognized by the United States Supreme Court: "[S]uch limits may provide for the infusion of fresh ideas and new perspectives, and may decrease the likelihood that representatives will lose touch with their constituents." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 1871, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995). Indeed, these term limits were enacted upon the realization that Washington's "[e]ntrenched incumbents have an inordinate advantage in elections because of their control of campaign finance laws and gerrymandering of electoral districts; [and that] [e]ntrenched incumbency has discouraged qualified citizens from seeking public office." *230 Laws of 1993, ch. 1, § 1(3), (4) (Initiative Measure No. 573). Term limits are arguably necessary to break the incumbency cycle. Constitutional Reasonableness of These Term Limits Concluding term limits are not prohibited by the qualifications clauses or by our constitutional framework, we might further inquire if they are reasonable. Indeed, to be valid, every law must be reasonable in the constitutional sense. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137, 14 S.Ct. 499, 501, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1894). Such applies with equal force to legislatively imposed qualifications for office and ballot access measures. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). Mechem, supra, § 66 (legislatively imposed Page 25 qualifications for office must be "reasonable and proper."); In re Bartz, 47 Wash.2d 161, 168, 287 P.2d 119 (1955) (upholding legislatively imposed qualification that justices of the peace be attorneys because such is "reasonable"); State ex rel. Buttz v. Marion Circuit Court, 225 Ind. 7, 72 N.E.2d 225, 170 A.L.R. 187 (1947) ("The fact, however, that the Legislature may fix qualifications for holding public office ... does not mean that in the fixing of such qualifications ... [they must] not be arbitrary, they must be reasonable and based upon substantial grounds which are natural and inherent in the subject matter of the legislation."). The classic three -prong test of reasonableness would ask: (1) do term limits have a valid public purpose, (2) do they use means calculated to achieve that purpose, and (3) are they unduly oppressive upon individuals? Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash.2d 320, 330-31, 787 P.2d 907 (1990) (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14 S.Ct. 499, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1894)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911, 111 S.Ct. 284, 112 L.Ed.2d 238 (1990). Term limits have the valid public purpose of imposing a check on elected officeholders. They are intended to promote access to office by forcing incumbents to step aside to make way for nonincumbents. See Laws of 1993, ch. ,1, *231 § 1(7) (Initiative Measure No. 573) ("The people of Washington have a compelling interest in preventing the self-perpetuating monopoly of elective office by a dynastic ruling class."). Term limits clearly promote this end. Nor are term limits unduly oppressive upon the individual incumbents who are `limited out" since it is a privilege to serve through an office of public trust, not a private right which one can conceivably be denied by an unduly oppressive government. Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendments rights are not violated by term Iimits. Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 846-47 (9th Cir.1997). Nor are Washington's term limits absolute. Compare Bates v. Jones (upholding California lifetime term limits ban against constitutional challenge). On the contrary, they merely force incumbents to step aside for a short period. A © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 243 of 433 http: //web2.westlaw.com/print/printstrea m.aspx?prf't=HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 3/14/2007 Page 27 of 27 949 P.2d 1366 Page 26 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (Cite as: 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366) legislator may serve six years in the state house, eight years in the senate and then after a six year hiatus can serve another straight eight years in the senate. RCW 44.04.015. While the enactment may practically bar one from succession to office, technically, if the incumbent is sufficiently popular, he may still win by write-in. The fact that a law uses restrictive rather than wholly prohibitory language also suggests the law is "reasonable." **1388Ralph v. City of Wenatchee, 34 Wash.2d 638, 644, 209 P.2d 270 (1949). That these limits are reasonable the majority does not dispute. Today, six votes on this court are the undoing of the 1,119,985 votes that Washingtonians cast at the polls in favor of term limits. In the final analysis term limits must be upheld because the constitution does not prohibit it. I therefore dissent. ALEXANDER, J., concurs. Wash.,1998. Gerberding v. Munro 134 Wash.2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top) • 1997 WL 33824888 (Appellate Brief) Petitioners' Reply Brief (Sep. 15, 1997) Original Image of this Document with Appendix (PDF) • 1997 WL 33824884 (Appellate Brief) Respondents'Ilntervenors' Brief (Aug. 15, 1997) Original Image of this Document (PDF) • 1997 WL 33824886 (Appellate Brief) Brief of Respondents (Aug. 15, 1997) Original Image of this Document with Appendix (PDF) • 1997 WL 33824890 (Appellate Brief) Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents (Aug. 12, 1997) Original Image of this Document (PDF) • 1997 WL 33824880 (Appellate Brief) Petitioners' Opening Brief (Sul. 11, 1997) Original Image of this Document with Appendix (PDF) END OF DOCUMENT 0 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 244 of 433 http://web2. westlaw. cornlprintlprintstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE&destinati on=atp &sv=Split... 3/ 1.4/2007 EXHIBIT E {GJZ596928.DOC; I100000.000000/1 Packet Page 245 of 433 Page 2 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page I 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) P Briefs and Other Related Documents U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. ThorntonU.S.Ark.,1995. Supreme Court of the United States U.S. TERM LIMITS, INC., et al., Petitioners, V. Ray THORNTON et al. Winston BRYANT, Attorney General of Arkansas, Petitioner, V. Bobbie E. HILL et aI. Nos. 93-1456, 93-1828. Argued Nov. 29, 1994. Decided May 22, 1995. Action was brought challenging amendment to the Arkansas Constitution which precluded persons who had served certain number of terms in the United States Congress from having their names placed on the ballot for election to Congress. The Circuit Court found that the provision violated the United States Constitution. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349. On certiorari, the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, held that: (1) states may not impose qualifications for offices of the United States representative or United States senator in addition to those set forth by the Constitution; (2) power to set additional qualifications was not reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment; and (3) state provision is unconstitutional when it has likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly. Affirmed. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Scalia joined. West Headnotes [1] United States 393 4D-7.1 . 393 United States 3931 Government in General 393k7 Congress 393k7.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases Allowing individual states to adopt their own qualifications for congressional service would be inconsistent with framers' vision of uniform national legislature representing the people of the United States. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3. [2] United States 393 C;-7.1 393 United States 3931 Government in General 393k7 Congress 393k7.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases With respect to Congress, framers of the Constitution intended the Constitution to establish fixed qualifications in the sense that they may not be supplemented by Congress. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3. [3] States 360 C7-4.16(2) 360 States 3601 Political Status and Relations 3601(A) In General 360k4.16 Powers of United States and Infringement on State Powers 360k4.16(2) k. Federal Laws Invading State Powers. Most Cited Cases Powers retained by the states under the Tenth Amendment proceed, not from the people of America, but from the people of the several states and they remain, after adoption of the Constitution, what they were before, except so far as they may be abridged by that instrument. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 10. [4] States 360 C�-4 360 States © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 246 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/pTintstream. aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 3 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) 3601 Political Status and Relations 3601(A) In General 360k4 k. Status Under Constitution of United States, and Relations to United States in General. Most Cited Cases States retain a significant measure of sovereign authority but they do so only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the federal government. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 10. [5] States 360 (' -4.4(3) 360 States 3601 Political Status and Relations 360I(A) In General 360k4.4 Powers Reserved to States 360k4.4(3) k. Other Particular Powers, Most Cited Cases United States 393 C;-7.1 393 United States 3931 Government in General 3930 Congress 3930.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases Power to add qualifications for the offices of congressman and senator is not part of the original powers of sovereignty which the Tenth Amendment reserved to the states. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3; Amend. 10. [61 States 360 C�-4.4(1) 360 States 360I Political Status and Relations 360I(A) In General 360k4.4 Powers Reserved to States 360k4A(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases States can exercise no powers whatsoever which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national government which the Constitution does not delegate to them, and no state can say that it has reserved what it never possessed. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 10. [7] Taxation 371 E--2006 Page 2 371 Taxation 3711 In General 371k2004 Power of State 371k2006 k. United States Entities, Property, and Securities. Most Cited Cases (Formerly 371k9) Constitution's silence on the subject of state power to tax corporations chartered by Congress does not imply that the states have reserved power to tax such federal instrumentalities. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 10. [8] United States 393 C=17.1 393 United States 393I Government in General 393k7 Congress 393k7.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases In the national government, representatives owe primary allegiance, not to the people of a state, but to the people of the nation. [9] United States 393 C--7.1 393 United States 393I Government in General 393k7 Congress 393k7.1 k. In General, Most Cited Cases Even if states possessed as part of their original powers some control over congressional qualifications, the qualifications clauses were intended to preclude states from exercising any such power and to fix as exclusive the qualifications set forth in the Constitution. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cI. 2, 3, cl. 3. [10] States 360 �' —18.71 360 States 3601 Political Status and Relations 3601(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption 360kl8.71 k. Public Officers and Employees; Elections. Most Cited Cases United States 393 C-7.1 393 United States 393I Government in General 393k7 Congress O 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 247 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=l 8&f... 3/14/2007 Page 4 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 3 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) 393k7.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases State -imposed restrictions on qualifications for Congress violate the idea that the right to choose representatives belongs, not to the states, but to the people. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3. [11] United States 393 C=7.1 393 United States 3931 Government in General 393k7 Congress 3930.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases Congress of the United States is not a confederation of nations in which separate sovereigns are represented by appointed delegates but is instead a body composed of representatives of the people. [12] United States 393 C=1 393 United States 3931 Government in General 393kl k. Nature of the Union. Most Cited Cases Ours is a government of the people, by the people, for the people. [13] United States 393 C�-7.1 393 United States 3931 Government in General 393k7 Congress 3930.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases Constitutionality of state law setting forth qualifications for Congress would not depend on the method of its adoption, and the people of the state, in enacting a measure, have no more power than does the state legislature to supplement the qualifications for service in Congress. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3. [14] Constitutional Law 92 C;-38 92 Constitutional Law 92II Construction, Operation, and Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions 92k37 Validity of Statutory Provisions 9208 k. In General. Most Cited Cases Constitution nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of infringing on constitutional protections. (15] States 360 16;-18.71 360 States 360I Political Status and Relations 360I(B) Federal Supremacy; Preemption 360k18.71 k. Public Officers and Employees; Elections. Most Cited Cases United States 393 C=7.1 393 United States 3931 Government in General 3930 Congress 393k7.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases United States 393 �',-11 393 United States 3931 Government in General 3930 Congress 393kll k. Regulation of Elections of Senators and Representatives. Most Cited Cases State constitutional provision which precluded person's name from appearing on ballot for election to Congress if the person had served three or more terms as a member of the House of Representatives or two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate was not a mere regulation of the times, places, and manner of holding elections but, rather, was an impermissible qualification for office. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3, 4 , cl. 1. [16] United States 393 C-7.1 393 United States 393I Government in General 3930 Congress 3930.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases State provision is unconstitutional when it has a Iikely effect of handicapping a class of candidates for Congress and has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 2, 3, cl. 3. **1843 Syllabus FN* FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the © 2007 Thomson[West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works, Packet Page 248 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/piintstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 5 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct 1842) opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499. *779 Respondent Hill filed this suit in Arkansas state court challenging the constitutionality of § 3 of Amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution, which prohibits the name of an otherwise -eligible candidate for Congress from appearing on the general election ballot if that candidate has already served three terms in the House of Representatives or two terms in the Senate. The trial court held that § 3 violated Article I of the Federal Constitution, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. A plurality of the latter court concluded that the States have no authority "to change, add to, or diminish" the age, citizenship, and residency requirements for congressional service enumerated in the Qualifications Clauses, U.S. Const., Art. I. § 2, cl. 2 , and Art. I, § 3, cl. 3, and rejected the argument that Amendment 73 is constitutional because it is formulated as a ballot access restriction rather than an outright disqualification of congressional incumbents. Held: Section 3 of Amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution violates the Federal Constitution. Pp. 1847-1871. **1844 (a) The power granted to each House of Congress to judge the "Qualifications of its own Members," Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, does not include the power to alter or add to the qualifications set forth in the Constitutions text. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 540, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1973, 23 L.Ed.2d 491. After examining Powell 's analysis of the Qualifications Clauses history and text, id., at 518-548, 89 S.Ct., at 1962-1978, and its articulation of the "basic principles of our democratic system," id., at 548, 89 S.Ct., at 1978, this Court reaffirms that the constitutional qualifications for congressional service are "fixed," at least in the sense that they may not be supplemented by Congress. Pp. 1847-1852. (b) So too, the Constitution prohibits States from imposing congressional qualifications additional to Page 4 those specifically enumerated in its text. Petitioners' argument that States possess control over qualifications as part of the original powers reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment is rejected for two reasons. First, the power to add qualifications is not within the States' pre -Tenth Amendment "original powers," but is a new right arising from the Constitution itself, and thus is *780 not reserved. Second, even if the States possessed some original power in this area, it must be concluded that the Framers intended the Constitution to be the exclusive source of qualifications for Members of Congress, and that the Framers thereby "divested" States of any power to add qualifications. That this is so is demonstrated by the unanimity among the courts and learned commentators who have considered the issue; by the Constitution's structure and the text of pertinent constitutional provisions, including Art. I, § 2, cl. 1, Art. I, § 4, cl. 1, Art. I, § 6, and Art. 1, § 5, cl. 1; by the relevant historical materials, including the records of the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates, as well as Congress' subsequent experience with state attempts to impose qualifications; and, most importantly, by the "fundamental principle of our representative democracy ... `that the people should choose whom they please to govern them,' " Powell, 395 U.S., at 547, 89 S.Ct., at 1977. Permitting individual States to formulate diverse qualifications for their congressional representatives would result in a patchwork that would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States. The fact that, immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, many States imposed term limits and other qualifications on state officers, while only one State imposed such a qualification on Members of Congress, provides further persuasive evidence of a general understanding that the qualifications in the Constitution were unalterable by the States. Pp. 1852-1866. (c) A state congressional term limits measure is unconstitutional when it has the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly. The Court rejects petitioners' argument that Amendment 73 is valid because it merely OO 2007 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 249 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/piintstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=I &prft=RTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 6 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) precludes certain congressional candidates from being certified and having their names appear on the ballot, and allows them to run as write-in candidates and serve if elected. Even if petitioners' narrow understanding of qualifications is correct, Amendment 73 must fall because it is an indirect attempt to evade the Qualifications Clauses' requirements and trivializes the basic democratic principles underlying those Clauses. Nor can the Court agree with petitioners' related argument that Amendment 73 is a permissible exercise of state power under the Elections Clause, Art. I, § 4, cI. 1, to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections." A necessary consequence of that argument is that Congress itself would have the power under the Elections Clause to "make or alter" a measure such as Amendment 73, a result that is unfathomable under Powell. Moreover, petitioners' broad construction is fundamentally inconsistent with the Framers' view of the Elections Clause, which was intended to grant States authority to protect the integrity and regularity of the election process by regulating *781 election procedures, see, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 733, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 1280, 39 L.Ed.2d 714, not to provide them with license to impose substantive qualifications that would exclude classes of candidates from federal office. Pp. 1866-1871. **1845 (d) State imposition of term limits for congressional service would effect such a fundamental change in the constitutional framework that it must come through a constitutional amendment properly passed under the procedures set forth in Article V. Absent such an amendment, allowing individual States to craft their own congressional qualifications would erode the structure designed by the Framers to form a "more perfect Union." P. 1871. 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349 (1994), affirmed. STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 1872. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. 1875. Page 5 Winston Bryant, for petitioner in 93-1828. John G. Kester, for petitioners in 93-1456. Louis R. Cohen for respondents. Drew S. Davis, III, for U.S. as amicus curiae, by special Ieave of the Court.For U.S. Supreme Court briefs, see:1994 WL 444683 (Pet.Brief), 1994 WL 4447041994 WL 513192 (Resp.Brief), 1994 WL 449512, 1994 WL 570304, 1994 WL 5770741994 WL 646175 (Reply.Brief), 1994 WL 658533, 1994 WL 659546, 1994 WL 660722 *782 Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Constitution sets forth qualifications for membership in the Congress of the United States. Article I, § 2, cl. 2, which applies to the House of Representatives, provides: *783 "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." Article I, § 3, cl. 3, which applies to the Senate, similarly provides:"No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen. 11 [11 Today's cases present a challenge to an amendment to the Arkansas State Constitution that prohibits the name of an otherwise -eligible candidate for Congress from appearing on the general election ballot if that candidate has already served three terms in the House of Representatives or two terms in the Senate. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the amendment violates the Federal Constitution. We agree with that holding. Such a state -imposed restriction is contrary to the " fundamental principle of our representative democr acy," embodied in the Constitution, that "the people should choose whom they please to govern them." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1977, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted). Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional service would be inconsistent with OO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 250 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/pi int/pi intstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l_ &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 7 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States. If the qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution are to be changed, that text must be amended. At the general election on November 3, 1992, the voters of Arkansas adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. Proposed as a "Term Limitation Amendment," its preamble stated: *784 "The people of Arkansas find and declare that elected officials who remain in office too long become preoccupied with reelection and ignore their duties as representatives of the people. Entrenched incumbency has reduced voter participation and has led to an electoral system that is less free, less competitive, and less representative than the system established by the Founding Fathers. Therefore, the people of Arkansas, exercising their reserved powers, herein limit the terms of elected officials." The limitations in Amendment 73 apply to three categories of elected officials. Section **1846 1 provides that no elected official in the executive branch of the state government may serve more than two 4-year terms. Section 2 applies to the legislative branch of the state government; it provides that no member of the Arkansas House of Representatives may serve more than three 2-year terns and no member of the Arkansas Senate may serve more than two 4-year terms. Section 3, the provision at issue in these cases, applies to the Arkansas Congressional Delegation. It provides: "(a) Any person having been elected to three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas. "(b) Any person having been elected to two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on Page 6 the ballot for election to the United States Senate from Arkansas." Amendment 73 states that it is self-executing and shall apply to all persons seeking election after January 1, 1993. On November 13, 1992, respondent Bobbie Hill, on behalf of herself, similarly situated Arkansas " citizens, residents, *785 taxpayers and registered voters," and the League of Women Voters of Arkansas, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Pulaski County, Arkansas, seeking a declaratory judgment that § 3 of Amendment 73 is " unconstitutional and void." Her complaint named as defendants then -Governor Clinton, other state officers, the Republican Party of Arkansas, and the Democratic Party of Arkansas. The State of Arkansas, through its Attorney General, petitioner Winston Bryant, intervened as a party defendant in support of the amendment. Several proponents of the amendment also intervened, including petitioner U.S. Term Limits, Inc. On cross -motions for summary judgment, the Circuit Court held that § 3 of Amendment 73 violated Article I of the Federal Constitution.FNI FNl. The Circuit Court also held that § 3 was severable from the other provisions of the amendment, but that the entire amendment was void under state law for lack of an enacting clause. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 93-1456, p. 60a. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's decision regarding severability, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251, 270, 872 S.W.2d 349, 359 (1994), and reversed its decision regarding the enacting clause, id., at 263, 872 S.W.2d, at 355. The decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court with respect to those issues of state law is not before us. With respect to that holding, in a 5-to-2 decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349, 351 (1994). Writing for a plurality of three © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 251 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTNME&n=18&f... 3/ 14/2007 Page 8 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) justices, Justice Robert L. Brown concluded that the congressional restrictions in Amendment 73 are unconstitutional because the States have no authority "to change, add to, or diminish" the requirements for congressional service enumerated in the Qualifications Clauses. Id., at 265, 872 S.W.2d, at 356. He noted: "If there is one watchword for representation of the various states in Congress, it is uniformity. Federal legislators speak to national issues that affect the citizens of every state.... The uniformity in qualifications mandated*786 in Article I provides the tenor and the fabric for representation in the Congress. Piecemeal restrictions by State would fly in the face of that order." Ibid. Justice Brown's plurality opinion also rejected the argument that Amendment 73 is "merely a ballot access amendment," concluding that "[t]he intent and the effect of Amendment 73 are to disqualify congressional incumbents from further service." Id., at 265-266, 872 S.W.2d, at 356-357. Justice Brown considered the possibilities that an excluded candidate might run for Congress as a write-in candidate or be appointed to fill a vacancy to be " glimmers of opportunity ... [that] are faint indeed -so faint in our judgment that they cannot salvage Amendment 73 from constitutional attack." Id., at 266, 872 S.W.2d, at 357. In separate opinions, Justice Dudley and Justice Gerald P. Brown **1847 agreed that Amendment 73 violates the Federal Constitution. Two justices dissented from the federal constitutional holding. Justice Hays started from " the premise that all political authority resides in the people, limited only by those provisions of the federal or state constitutions specifically to the contrary." Id., at 281, 872 S.W.2d, at 367. Because his examination of the text and history of the Qualifications Clauses convinced him that the Constitution contains no express or implicit restriction on the States' ability to impose additional qualifications on candidates for Congress, Justice Hays concluded that § 3 is constitutional. Special Chief Justice Cracraft, drawing a distinction between a measure that "impose[s] an absolute bar on incumbent succession" and a measure that " Page 7 merely makes it more difficult for an incumbent to be elected," id., at 284, 872 S.W.2d, at 368, concluded that Amendment 73 does not even implicate the Qualifications Clauses, and instead is merely a permissible ballot access restriction. The State of Arkansas, by its Attorney General, and the intervenors petitioned for writs of certiorari. Because of the importance of the issues, we granted both petitions and *787 consolidated the cases for argument. See 512 U.S. 1218, 114 S.Ct. 2703, 129 L.Ed.2d 832 (1994). We now affirm. 11 As the opinions of the Arkansas Supreme Court suggest, the constitutionality of Amendment 73 depends critically on the resolution of two distinct issues. The first is whether the Constitution forbids States to add to or alter the qualifications specifically enumerated in the Constitution. The second is, if the Constitution does so forbid, whether the fact that Amendment 73 is formulated as a ballot access restriction rather than as an outright disqualification - is of constitutional significance. Our resolution of these issues draws upon our prior resolution of a related but distinct issue: whether Congress has the power to add to or alter the qualifications of its Members. Twenty-six years ago, in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) , we reviewed the history and text of the Qualifications Clauses FN' in a case involving an attempted exclusion *788 of a duly elected Member of Congress. The principal issue was whether the power granted to each House in Art. 1, § 5, cl. 1, to judge the "Qualifications of its own Members" FN3 includes the power to impose qualifications other than those set forth in the text of the Constitution. In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren for eight Members of the Court,FN4 we **1848 held that it does not. Because of the obvious importance of the issue, the Court's review of the history and meaning of the relevant constitutional text was especially thorough. We therefore begin our analysis today with a full statement of what we decided in that case. © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 252 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l&prft=HTN LE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 9 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) FN2. As we explained, that term may describe more than the provisions quoted, supra, at 1845: "In addition to the three qualifications set forth in Art. 1, § 2, Art. 1, § 3, cl. 7, authorizes the disqualification of any person convicted in an impeachment proceeding from `any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States'; Art. 1, § 6, cl. 2, provides that `no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office'; and § 3 of the 14th Amendment disqualifies any person `who, having previously taken an oath ... to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.' It has been argued that each of these provisions, as well as the Guarantee Clause of Article IV and the oath requirement of Art. VI, cl. 3, is no less a ` qualification' within the meaning of Art. I, § 5, than those set forth in Art. 1, § 2." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 520, n. 41, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1963, n. 41, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). In Powell, we saw no need to resolve the question whether those additional provisions constitute "qualifications," because "both sides agree that Powell was not ineligible under any of these provisions. " Ibid. We similarly have no need to resolve that question today: Because those additional provisions are part of the text of the Constitution, they have little bearing on whether Congress and the States may add qualifications to those that appear in the Constitution. FN3. Art. I, § 5, cI. 1, provides in part: " Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do business.... 11 FN4, Justice Stewart dissented on Page 8 procedural grounds, arguing that the case should have been dismissed as moot. See 395 U.S., at 559-561, 89 S.Ct., at 1983-1985. Other than expressing agreement with the characterization of the case as raising constitutional issues which " `touch the bedrock of our political system [and] strike at the very heart of representative government,' " id., at 573, 89 S.Ct., at 1991, Justice Stewart did not comment on the merits. The Issue in Powell In November 1966, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was elected from a District in New York to serve in the United States House of Representatives for the 90th Congress. Allegations that he had engaged in serious misconduct while serving as a committee chairman during the 89th Congress led to the appointment of a Select Committee to determine his eligibility to take his seat. That committee found that Powell met the age, citizenship, and residency requirements set forth in Art. I, § 2, cl. 2. The committee also found, however, that Powell had wrongfully diverted House funds for the use of others and himself and had made false reports on expenditures of foreign currency. Based on those findings, the House after debate adopted House Resolution 278, excluding *789 Powell from membership in the House, and declared his seat vacant. See 395 U.S., at 489-493, 89 S.Ct., at 1947-1949. Powell and several voters of the District from which he had been elected filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the House Resolution was invalid because Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, sets forth the exclusive qualifications for House membership. We ultimately accepted that contention, concluding that the House of Representatives has no "authority to exclude FN5 any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution." 395 U.S., at 522, 89 S.Ct., at 1964 (emphasis in original); see also id., at 547, 89 S.Ct., at 1977. Fv6 In reaching that conclusion, we undertook a detailed historical review to determine the intent of the Framers. Though © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 253 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/piintstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=1 &prft=H FMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 10 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842) recognizing that the Constitutional Convention debates themselves were inconclusive, see id., at 532, 89 S.Ct., at 1969, we determined that the " relevant historical materials" reveal that Congress has no power to alter the qualifications in the text of the Constitution, id., at 522, 89 S.Ct., at 1964. FNS. The Powell Court emphasized the word "exclude" because it had been argued that the House Resolution depriving Powell of his seat should be viewed as an expulsion rather than an exclusion. Having rejected that submission, the Court expressed no opinion on issues related to the House's power to expel a Member who has been sworn in and seated. FN6. Though Powell addressed only the power of the House, the Court pointed out that its rationale was equally applicable to the Senate: "Since Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, applies to both Houses of Congress, the scope of the Senate's power to judge the qualification of its members necessarily is identical to the scope of the House's power, with the exception, of course, that Art. I, § 3, cl. 3, establishes different age and citizenship requirements for membership in the Senate." Id., at 522, n. 44, 89 S.Ct., at 1964, n. 44. Powell's Reliance on History We started our analysis in Powell by examining the British experience with qualifications for membership in Parliament, focusing in particular on the experience of John Wilkes. While serving as a member of Parliament, Wilkes had published an attack on a peace treaty with France. This *790 literary endeavor earned Wilkes a conviction for seditious libel and a 22-month prison sentence. 1n addition, Parliament declared Wilkes ineligible for membership and ordered him expelled. Despite (or perhaps because of) these difficulties, Wilkes was reelected several times. Parliament, however, persisted in its refusal to seat him. After several years of Wilkes' efforts, the House of Commons Page 9 voted to expunge the resolutions that had expelled Wilkes and had declared him ineligible, labeling those prior actions " `subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom.' " Id., at 528, 89 S.Ct., at 1967, quoting 22 Parliamentary History of England 1411 (1782) (Parl.Hist.Eng.). After reviewing Wilkes' "long and bitter struggle for the right of the British electorate to be represented by men of their own choice," 395 U.S., at 528, 89 S.Ct., at 1967, we concluded in Powell that "on the eve of the Constitutional Convention, English precedent stood for the proposition that ` the law of the land had regulated the qualifications of members to serve in parliament' and those qualifications were `not occasional but fixed.' " Ibid. quoting 16 Parl.Hist.Eng. 589, 590 (1769). **1849 Against this historical background, we viewed the Convention debates as manifesting the Framers' intent that the qualifications in the Constitution be fixed and exclusive. We found particularly revealing the debate concerning a proposal made by the Committee of Detail that would have given Congress the power to add property qualifications. James Madison argued that such a power would vest " `an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature,' " by which the Legislature `can by degrees subvert the Constitution.' " 395 U.S., at 533-534, 89 S.Ct., at 1970, quoting 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 249-250 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (hereinafter Farrand).FN7 Madison continued: " ` A Republic may be *791 converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being elected, as the number authorised to elect.' " 395 U.S., at 534, 89 S.Ct., at 1970, quoting 2 Farrand 250. We expressly noted that the "parallel between Madison's arguments and those made in Wilkes' behalf is striking." 395 U.S., at 534, 89 S.Ct., at 1971. FN7. Though we recognized that Madison was responding to a proposal that would have allowed Congress to impose property restrictions, we noted that "Madison's argument was not aimed at the imposition of a property qualification as such, but rather at the delegation to the Congress of © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 254 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/piint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti= l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 11 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881,63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct.1842) the discretionary power to establish any qualifications." Id., at 534, 89 S.Ct., at 1971. The Framers further revealed their concerns about congressional abuse of power when Gouverneur Morris suggested modifying the proposal of the Committee of Detail to grant Congress unfettered power to add qualifications. We noted that Hugh Williamson "expressed concern that if a majority of the legislature should happen to be `composed of any particular description of men, of lawyers for example, ... the future elections might be secured to their own body.' " Id., at 535, 89 S.Ct., at 1971, quoting 2 Farrand 250. We noted, too, that Madison emphasized the British Parliament's attempts to regulate qualifications, and that he observed: " `[T]he abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention.' " 395 U.S., at 535, 89 S.Ct., at 1971, quoting 2 Farrand 250. We found significant that the Convention rejected both Morris' modification and the Committee's proposal. We also recognized in Powell that the post -Convention ratification debates confirmed that the Framers understood the qualifications in the Constitution to be fixed and unalterable by Congress. For example, we noted that in response to the antifederalist charge that the new Constitution favored the wealthy and well born, Alexander Hamilton wrote: " `The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government.... The *792 qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.' " 395 U.S., at 539, 89 S.Ct., at 1973, quoting The Federalist No. 60, p. 371 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis added) (hereinafter The Federalist). We thus attached special significance to " Hamilton's express reliance on the immutability of the qualifications set forth in the Constitution." 395 U.S., at 540, 89 S.Ct., at 1974. Moreover, we Page 10 reviewed the debates at the state conventions and found that they "also demonstrate the Framers' understanding that the qualifications for members of Congress had been fixed in the Constitution." Ibid.; see, e.g., id., at 541, 89 S.Ct., at 1974, citing 3 Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 8 (J. Elliot ed. 1863) (hereinafter Elliot's Debates) (Wilson Carey Nicholas, Virginia). FN8 FN8. Our examination of the history also caused us to reject the argument that the negative phrasing of the Clauses indicated that the Framers did not limit the power of the House to impose additional qualifications for membership. Id., at 537, 89 S.Ct., at 1972 (noting that the Committee of Style, which edited the Qualifications Clauses to incorporate " their present negative form," had " `no authority from the Convention to make alterations of substance in the Constitution as voted by the Convention, nor did it purport to do so' "); id., at 539, 89 S.Ct., at 1973, quoting C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 422, n. 1 (1947) (hereinafter Warren); see also 2 Farrand 553 (the Committee of Style was appointed "to revise the stile and arrange the articles which had been agreed to"). **1850 The exercise by Congress of its power to judge the qualifications of its Members further confirmed this understanding. We concluded that, during the first 100 years of its existence, "Congress strictly limited its power to judge the qualifications of its members to those enumerated in the Constitution." 395 U.S., at 542, 89 S.Ct., at 1974. As this elaborate summary reveals, our historical analysis in Powell was both detailed and persuasive. We thus conclude now, as we did in Powell, that history shows that, with *793 respect to Congress, the Framers intended the Constitution to establish fixed qualifications.FN9 FN9. The text of the Qualifications © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 255 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.corn/print/printstream. aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/ 14/2007 Page 12 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) Clauses also supports the result we reached in Powell. John Dickinson of Delaware observed that the enumeration of a few qualifications "would by implication tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying omissions." 2 Farrand 123. Justice Story made the same point: "It would seem but fair reasoning upon the plainest principles of interpretation, that when the constitution established certain qualifications, as necessary for office, it meant to exclude all others, as prerequisites. From the very nature of such a provision, the affirmation of these qualifications would seem to imply a negative of all others." 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 625 (3d ed. 1858) (hereinafter Story). See also Warren 421 ( "As the Constitution ... expressly set forth the qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence, and as the Convention refused to grant to Congress power to establish qualifications in general, the maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius would seem to apply"). As Dickinson's comment demonstrates, the Framers were well aware of the expressio unius argument that would result from their wording of the Qualifications Clauses; they adopted that wording nonetheless. There thus is no merit either to the dissent's suggestion that Story was the first to articulate the expressio unius argument, see post, at 1885-1886, or to the dissent's assertion that that argument is completely without merit. Powell's Reliance on Democratic Principles In Powell, of course, we did not rely solely on an analysis of the historical evidence, but instead complemented that analysis with "an examination of the basic principles of our democratic system." Id., at 548, 89 S.Ct., at 1978. We noted that allowing Congress to impose additional qualifications would violate that "fundamental principle of our representative democracy ... `that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.' " Id., at Page 11 547, 89 S.Ct., at 1977, quoting 2 EIliot's Debates 257 (A. Hamilton, New York). Our opinion made clear that this broad principle incorporated at least two fundamental ideas.FN10 First, we emphasized*794 the egalitarian concept that the opportunity to be elected was open to all. FN11 We noted in particular Madison's statement in The Federalist that " `[u]nder these reasonable limitations [enumerated in the Constitution], the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.' " Powell, 395 U.S., at 540, n. 74, 89 S.Ct., at 1973, n. 74, quoting The Federalist No. 52, at 326. Similarly, we noted that Wilson Carey Nicholas defended the Constitution against the charge that it "violated democratic principles" by arguing: " `It has ever been considered a great security to liberty, that very few should be excluded from the right of being chosen to the legislature. This Constitution has amply attended to this idea. We find no **1851 qualifications required except those of age and residence.' " 395 U.S., at 541, 89 S.Ct., at 1974, quoting 3 Elliot's Debates 8. FN10. The principle also incorporated the more practical concern that reposing the power to adopt qualifications in Congress would lead to a self-perpetuating body to the detriment of the new Republic. See, e.g., Powell, 395 U.S., at 533-534, 89 S.Ct., at 1970, quoting 2 Farrand 250 (Madison) (" `If the Legislature could regulate [the qualification of electors or elected], it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being elected, as the number authorised to elect' "); 395 U.S., at 534-535, 89 S.Ct., at 1970 (citing statements of Williamson and Madison emphasizing the potential for legislative abuse). FN11. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, post, at 1891, we do not understand Powell © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 256 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 13 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842) as reading the Qualifications Clauses "to create a personal right to be a candidate for Congress." The Clauses did, however, further the interest of the people of the entire Nation in keeping the door to the National Legislature open to merit of every description. Second, we recognized the critical postulate that sovereignty is vested in the people, and that sovereignty confers on the people the right to choose freely their representatives to the National Government. For example, we noted that "Robert Livingston ... endorsed this same fundamental principle: `The people are the best judges who ought to represent them. To dictate and control them, to tell them whom they shall not elect, is to abridge their natural *795 rights.' " 395 U.S., at 541, n. 76, 89 S.Ct., at 1974, n. 76, quoting 2 Elliot's Debates 292-293. Similarly, we observed that "[blefore the New York convention , Hamilton emphasized: `The true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them. Representation is imperfect in proportion as the current of popular favor is checked. This great source of free government, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed.' " 395 U.S., at 540-541, 89 S.Ct., at 1974, quoting 2 Elliot's Debates 257. Quoting from the statement made in 1807 by the Chairman of the House Committee on Elections, we noted that "restrictions upon the people to choose their own representatives must be limited to those `absolutely necessary for the safety of the society.' " 395 U.S., at 543, 89 S.Ct., at 1975, quoting 17 Annals of Cong. 874 (1807). Thus, in Powell, we agreed with the sentiment expressed on behalf of Wilkes' admission to Parliament: " `That the right of the electors to be represented by men of their own choice, was so essential for the preservation of all their other rights, that it ought to be considered as one of the most sacred parts of our constitution.' " 395 U.S., at 534, n. 65, 89 S.Ct., at 1971, n. 65, quoting 16 Parl.Hist.Eng. 589-590 (1769). Powell thus establishes two important propositions: first, that the "relevant historical materials" compel the conclusion that, at least with respect to Page 12 qualifications imposed by Congress, the Framers intended the qualifications listed in the Constitution to be exclusive; and second, that that conclusion is equally compelled by an understanding of the " fundamental principle of our representative democracy ... `that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.' " 395 U.S., at 547, 89 S.Ct., at 1977. Powell's Holding Petitioners argue somewhat half-heartedly that the narrow holding in Powell, which involved the power of the House to exclude a Member pursuant to Art. I, § 5, does not control the more general question whether Congress has the *796 power to add qualifications. Powell, however, is not susceptible to such a narrow reading. Our conclusion that Congress may not alter or add to the qualifications in the Constitution was integral to our analysis and outcome. See, e.g., id., at 540, 89 S.Ct., at 1973 (noting "Framers' understanding that the qualifications for members of Congress had been fixed in the Constitution"). Only two Terms ago we confirmed this understanding of Powell in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). After noting that the three qualifications for membership specified in Art. I, § 2, are of "a precise, limited nature" and " unalterable by the legislature," we explained: "Our conclusion in Powell was based on the fixed meaning of `[gualifications' set forth in Art I, § 2. The claim by the House that its power to `be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members' was a textual commitment of unreviewable authority was defeated by the existence of this separate provision specifying the only qualifications which might be imposed for House membership." Id., at 237, 113 S.Ct., at 740). FN 12 FN12. Justice THOMAS' dissent purports to agree with the outcome of Powell, but rejects the reasoning in the opinion. The dissent treats Powell as simply an application of the "default rule" that if "the © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 257 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 14 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842) Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power -that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or by necessary implication -the Federal Government lacks that power and the States enjoy it." Post, at 1876, 1889-1890, 1894-1895. However, there is not a word in the Court's opinion in Powell suggesting that the decision rested on the " default rule" that undergirds the dissent's entire analysis. On the contrary, as the excerpt from Nixon quoted in the text plainly states, our conclusion in Powell was based on our understanding of the " fixed meaning of `[glualifications' set forth in Art. 1, § 2." We concluded that the Framers affirmatively intended the qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution to be exclusive in order to effectuate the principle that in a representative democracy the people should choose whom they please to govern them. Moreover, the Court has never treated the dissent's "default rule" as absolute. In McCulloch V. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), for example, Chief Justice Marshall rejected the argument that the Constitution's silence on state power to tax federal instrumentalities requires that States have the power to do so. Under the dissent's unyielding approach, it would seem that McCulloch was wrongly decided. Similarly, the dissent's approach would invalidate our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, because the Constitution is clearly silent on the subject of state legislation that discriminates against interstate commerce. However, though Justice THOMAS has endorsed just that argument, see, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 115 S.Ct, 1331, 131 L.Ed.2d 261 (1995) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment, joined by THOMAS, J.), the Court has consistently rejected that argument and has continued to apply the dormant Commerce Clause, see, e.g., id., at 179-180, 115 S.Ct., at 1335-1336); Page 13 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 108 S.Ct. 2218, 100 L.Ed.2d 896 (1988). **1852 *797 Unsurprisingly, the state courts and lower federal courts have similarly concluded that Powell conclusively resolved the issue whether Congress has the power to impose additional qualifications. See, e.g., Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523, 1528 (CA9 1983) ("In Powell ..., the Supreme Court accepted this restrictive view of the Qualifications Clause -at least as applied to Congress "); Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (CADC 1994) (citing Nixon 's description of Powell 's holding); Stumpf v. Lau, 108 Nev. 826, 830, 839 P.2d 120, 122 (1992) (citing Powell for the proposition that " [nlot even Congress has the power to alter qualifications for these constitutional federal officers ,) FNl3 FN13. Our decision in Powell and its historical analysis were consistent with prior decisions from state courts. For example, in State ex rel. Johnson v. Crane, 65 Wyo. 189, 197 P.2d 864 (1948), the Wyoming Supreme Court undertook a detailed historical analysis and concluded that the Qualifications Clauses were exclusive. Several other courts reached the same result, though without performing the same detailed historical analysis. See, e.g., Hellmann v. Collier, 217 Md. 93, 141 A.2d 908 (1958); State ex rel. Chandler v. Howell, 104 Wash. 99, 175 P. 569 (1918), State ex rel. Eaton v. Schmahl, 140 Minn. 219, 167 N.W. 481 (1918); see generally State ex rel. Johnson v. Crane, 65 Wyo., at 204-213, 197 P.2d, at 869-874 (citing cases). The conclusion and analysis were also consistent with the positions taken by commentators and scholars. See, e.g., n. 9, supra; see also Warren 412-422 (discussing history and concluding that " [t]he elimination of all power in Congress to fix qualifications clearly left the provisions of the Constitution itself as the sole source of qualifications"). © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works, Packet Page 258 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n= l S&f... 3/14/2007 Page 15 of 84 115 S.Ct, 1842 Page 14 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) [2] *798 In sum, after examining Powell 's historical analysis and its articulation of the "basic principles of our democratic system," we reaffirm that the qualifications for service in Congress set forth in the text of the Constitution are "fixed," at least in the sense that they may not be supplemented by Congress. III Our reaffirmation of Powell does not necessarily resolve the specific questions presented in these cases. For petitioners argue that whatever the constitutionality of additional qualifications for membership imposed by Congress, the historical and textual materials discussed in Powell do not support the conclusion that the Constitution prohibits additional qualifications imposed by States. In the absence of such a constitutional prohibition, petitioners argue, the Tenth Amendment and the principle of reserved powers require that States be allowed to add such qualifications. Before addressing these arguments, we find it appropriate to take note of the striking unanimity among the courts that have considered the issue. None of the overwhelming array of briefs submitted by the parties and amici has called to our attention even a single case in which a state court or federal court has approved of a State's addition of qualifications for a Member of Congress. To the contrary, an impressive number of courts have determined that States lack the authority to add qualifications. See, e.g., Chandler v. Howell, 104 Wash. 99, 175 P. 569 (1918); **1853Ekwall v. Stadelman, 146 Or. 439, 446, 30 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1934); Stockton v. McFarland, 56 Ariz. 138, 144, 106 P.2d 328, 330 (1940); State ex rel. Johnson v. Crane, 65 Wyo. 189, 197 P.2d 864 (1948); Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F.Supp. 729, 731 (N.M.1972); Stack v. Adams, 315 F.Supp. 1295, 1297-1298 (ND F1a.1970); Buckingham v. State, 42 Del. 405, 35 A.2d 903, 905 (1944); Stumpf v. Lau, 108 Nev. 826, 830, 839 P.2d 120, 123 (1992); Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 232 Minn. 149, 151, 44 N.W.2d 484, 486 (1950); *7991n re Opinion of Judges, 79 S.D. 585, 587, 116 N.W.2d 233, 234 (1962). Courts have struck down state -imposed qualifications in the form of term limits, see, e.g., Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F.Supp. 1068, 1081 (WD Wash.1994); Stumpf v. Lau, 108 Nev., at 830, 839 P.2d, at 123, district residency requirements, see, e.g., Hellmann v. Collier, 217 Md. 93, 100, 141 A.2d 908, 911 (1958); Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F.Supp., at 731; Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F.Supp. 609, 613 (D.Neb.1968); State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578, 581, 446 P.2d 445, 448 (1968) (per curiant ), loyalty oath requirements, see, e.g., Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 199, 76 A.2d 332, 341, appeal dism'd, 340 U.S. 881, 71 S.Ct. 198, 95 L.Ed. 640 (1950); In re O'Connor, 173 Misc. 419, 421, 17 N.Y.S.2d 758, 760 (Super.Ct.1940), and restrictions on those convicted of felonies, see, e.g., Application of Ferguson, 57 Misc.2d 1041, 1043, 294 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176 (Super.Ct.1968); Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 232 Minn., at 151, 44 N.W.2d, at 486; State ex rel. Eaton v. Schmahl, 140 Minn. 219, 220, 167 N.W. 481 (1918) (per curiam). Prior to Powell, the commentators were similarly unanimous. See, e.g., I W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Appendix 213 (S. Tuckered. 1803) ( "[T]hese provisions, as they require qualifications which the constitution does not, may possibly be found to be nugatory"); I Story § 627 (each Member of Congress is "an officer of the union, deriving his powers and qualifications from the constitution, and neither created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by, the states"); 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 228, n. a (3d ed. 1836) ("[T]he objections to the existence of any such power [on the part of the States to add qualifications are] ... too palpable and weighty to admit of any discussion"); G. McCrary, American Law of Elections § 322 (4th ed. 1897) ("It is not competent for any State to add to or in any manner change the qualifications for a Federal office, as prescribed by the Constitution or laws of the United States"); T. Cooley, General Principles of Constitutional Law 268 (2d ed. 1891) ("The Constitution and laws of the United States determine what shall be the qualifications for federal offices, and state *800 constitutions and laws can neither add to nor take away from them"); C. Burdick, Law of the American Constitution 160 (1922) ("It is clearly the intention of the Constitution that all persons not disqualified by the © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 259 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTN4LE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 16 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881,63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.CL 1842) terms of that instrument should be eligible to the federal office of Representative"); id., at 165 ("It is as clear that States have no more right to add to the constitutional qualifications of Senators than they have to add to those for Representatives"); Warren 422 ("The elimination of all power in Congress to fix qualifications clearly left the provisions of the Constitution itself as the sole source of qualifications ,,) FN14 This impressive and uniform body of judicial decisions and learned commentary indicates that the obstacles confronting petitioners are formidable indeed. FN14. More recently, the commentators have split, with some arguing that state -imposed term limits are constitutional, see, e.g., Gorsuch & Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of the Constitutionality of State -Imposed Term Limitation, 20 Hofstra L.Rev. 341 (1991); Hills, A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 97 (1991); Safranek, Term Limitations: Do the Winds of Change Blow Unconstitutional?, 26 Creighton L.Rev. 321 (1993), and others arguing that they are not, see, e.g., Lowenstein, Are Congressional Term Limits Constitutional?, 18 Harv.J.L. & Pub.Policy 1 (1994); Eid & Kolbe, The New Anti -Federalism: The Constitutionality of State -Imposed Limits on Congressional Terms of Office, 69 Denver L.Rev. 1 (1992); Comment, Congressional Term Limits: Unconstitutional by Initiative, 67 Wash.L.Rev. 415 (1992). Petitioners argue that the Constitution contains no express prohibition against state -added qualifications, and that Amendment 73 is therefore an appropriate exercise of a State's reserved power to place additional restrictions on the choices that its own voters may make. We disagree for two independent"1854 reasons. First, we conclude that the power to add qualifications is not within the "original powers" of the States, and thus is not reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. Page 15 Second, even if States possessed some original power in this area, we conclude that the Framers intended*801 the Constitution to be the exclusive source of qualifications for Members of Congress, and that the Framers thereby "divested" States of any power to add qualifications. [31 The "plan of the convention" as illuminated by the historical materials, our opinions, and the text of the Tenth Amendment draws a basic distinction between the powers of the newly created Federal Government and the powers retained by the pre-existing sovereign States. As Chief Justice Marshall explained, "it was neither necessary nor proper to define the powers retained by the States. These powers proceed, not from the people of America, but from the people of the several States; and remain, after the adoption of the constitution, what they were before, except so far as they may be abridged by that instrument." Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 193, 4 L.Ed. 529 (1819). This classic statement by the Chief Justice endorsed Hamilton's reasoning in The Federalist No. 32 that the plan of the Constitutional Convention did not contemplate "[a]n entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty," but only a partial consolidation in which "the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States." The Federalist No. 32, at 198. The text of the Tenth Amendment unambiguously confirms this principle: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." [4] As we have frequently noted, "[t]he States unquestionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign authority. They do so, however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested thent of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government." Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 549, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1016-17, 83 L.Ed.2d © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 260 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti= l &prft=H FMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 17 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842) 1016 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis*802 added); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-156, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2417-2418, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). Source of the Power [5][6] Contrary to petitioners' assertions, the power to add qualifications is not part of the original powers of sovereignty that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the States. Petitioners' Tenth Amendment argument misconceives the nature of the right at issue because that Amendment could only "reserve" that which existed before. As Justice Story recognized, "the states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national government, which the constitution does not delegate to them.... No state can say, that it has reserved, what it never possessed. " 1 Story § 627. [7] Justice Story's position thus echoes that of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). In McCulloch, the Court rejected the argument that the Constitution's silence on the subject of state power to tax corporations chartered by Congress implies that the States have "reserved" power to tax such federal instrumentalities. As Chief Justice Marshall pointed out, an `original right to tax" such federal entities "never existed, and the question whether it has been surrendered, cannot arise." Id., at 430. See also Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 46, I8 L.Ed. 745 (1868). In language that presaged Justice Story's argument, Chief Justice Marshall concluded: "This opinion does not deprive the States of any resources which they originally possessed." 4 Wheat., at 436.FN" FN15. Thus, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, post, at 1880, Justice Story was not the first, only, or even most influential proponent of the principle that certain powers are not reserved to the States despite constitutional silence. Instead, as Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch reveals, that principle has been Page 16 a part of our jurisprudence for over 175 years. **1855 [81 *803 With respect to setting qualifications for service in Congress, no such right existed before the Constitution was ratified. The contrary argument overlooks the revolutionary character of the Government that the Framers conceived. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the States had joined together under the Articles of Confederation. In that system, "the States retained most of their sovereignty, like independent nations bound together only by treaties. " Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 9, 84 S.Ct. 526, 531, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). After the Constitutional Convention convened, the Framers were presented with, and eventually adopted a variation of, "a plan not merely to amend the Articles of Confederation but to create an entirely new National Government with a National Executive, National Judiciary, and a National Legislature." Id., at 10, 84 S.Ct., at 531. In adopting that plan, the Framers envisioned a uniform national system, rejecting the notion that the Nation was a collection of States, and instead creating a direct link between the National Government and the people of the United States. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 791, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 2154, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("The Constitution ... permitted] direct contact between the National Government and the individual citizen"). In that National Government, representatives owe primary allegiance not to the people of a State, but to the people of the Nation. As Justice Story observed, each Member of Congress is "an officer of the union, deriving his powers and qualifications from the constitution, and neither created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by, the states.... Those officers owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not of a portion, of the people." I Story § 627. Representatives and Senators are as much officers of the entire Union as is the President. States thus "have just as much right, and no more, to prescribe new qualifications for a representative, as they have for a president.... It is no original prerogative of state *804 power to appoint a representative, a senator, or president for c0 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 261 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/piint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 18 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) the union." Ibid. Flits FN16. The Constitution's provision for election of Senators by the state legislatures, see Art. I, § 3, cl. 1, is entirely consistent with this view. The power of state legislatures to elect Senators comes from an express delegation of power from the Constitution, and thus was not at all based on some aspect of original state power. Of course, with the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, state power over the election of Senators was eliminated, and Senators, like Representatives, were elected directly by the people. We believe that the Constitution reflects the Framers' general agreement with the approach later articulated by Justice Story. For example, Art. 1, § 5, cl. 1, provides: "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." The text of the Constitution thus gives the representatives of all the people the final say in judging the qualifications of the representatives of any one State. For this reason, the dissent falters when it states that "the people of Georgia have no say over whom the people of Massachusetts select to represent them in Congress." Post, at 1882. Two other sections of the Constitution further support our view of the Framers' vision. First, consistent with Story's view, the Constitution provides that the salaries of representatives should " be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States," Art. I, § 6, rather than by individual States. The salary provisions reflect the view that representatives owe their allegiance to the people, and not to the States. Second, the provisions governing elections reveal the Framers' understanding that powers over the election of federal officers had to be delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States. It is surely no coincidence that the context of federal elections provides one of the few areas in which the Constitution expressly requires action by the States, namely that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Page 17 Senators and Representatives, shall be *805 prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof." Art. I, § 4, cl. 1. This duty parallels the duty under Article II that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of EIectors." Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. These Clauses are express delegations of **1856 power to the States to act with respect to federal elections. FN17 FN17. The Clauses also reflect the idea that the Constitution treats both the President and Members of Congress as federal officers. This conclusion is consistent with our previous recognition that, in certain limited contexts, the power to regulate the incidents of the federal system is not a reserved power of the States, but rather is delegated by the Constitution. Thus, we have noted that "[w]hile, in a loose sense, the right to vote for representatives in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the states, ... this statement is true only in the sense that the states are authorized by the Constitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by § 2 of Art. I." United States V. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1037, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941). Cf. Hawke v. Smith, No. I, 253 U.S. 221, 230, 40 S.Ct. 495, 64 L.Ed. 871 (1920) ("[T]he power to ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution has its source in the Federal Constitution. The act of ratification by the State derives its authority from the Federal Constitution to which the State and its people have alike assented"). In short, as the Framers recognized, electing representatives to the National Legislature was a new right, arising from the Constitution itself. The Tenth Amendment thus provides no basis for concluding that the States possess reserved power to add qualifications to those that are fixed in the Constitution. Instead, any state power to set the qualifications for membership in Congress must derive not from the reserved powers of state sovereignty, but rather from the delegated powers of national sovereignty. In the absence of any constitutional delegation to the States of power to © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 262 of 433 http:/hweb2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTML:E&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 19 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 51.4 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct.1842) add qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution, such a power does not exist. *806 The Preclusion of State Power [9] Even if we believed that States possessed as part of their original powers some control over congressional qualifications, the text and structure of the Constitution, the relevant historical materials, and, most importantly, the "basic principles of our democratic system" all demonstrate that the Qualifications Clauses were intended to preclude the States from exercising any such power and to fix as exclusive the qualifications in the Constitution. Much of the historical analysis was undertaken by the Court in Powell. See supra, at 1848-1850. There is, however, additional historical evidence that pertains directly to the power of the States. That evidence, though perhaps not as extensive as that reviewed in Powell, leads unavoidably to the conclusion that the States lack the power to add qualifications. The Convention and Ratification Debates The available affirmative evidence indicates the Framers' intent that States have no role in the setting of qualifications. In Federalist Paper No. 52, dealing with the House of Representatives, Madison addressed the "qualifications of the electors and the elected." The Federalist No. 52, at 325. Madison first noted the difficulty in achieving uniformity in the qualifications for electors, which resulted in the Framers' decision to require only that the qualifications for federal electors be the same as those for state electors. Madison argued that such a decision "must be satisfactory to every State, because it is comfortable to the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State itself." Id., at 326. Madison then explicitly contrasted the state control over the qualifications of electors with the lack of state control over the qualifications of the elected: "The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more Page 18 susceptible of uniformity, *807 have been very properly considered and regulated by the convention. A representative of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service must be in no office under the United States. Under**1857 these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith." Ibid. FNts FN18. The dissent places a novel and implausible interpretation on this paragraph. Consistent with its entire analysis, the dissent reads Madison as saying that the sole purpose of the Qualifications Clauses was to set minimum qualifications that would prevent the States from sending incompetent representatives to Congress; in other words, Madison viewed the Clauses as preventing the States from opening the door to this part of the federal service too widely. See post, at 1901-1902. The text of The Federalist No. 52 belies the dissent's reading. First, Madison emphasized that "[t]he qualifications of the elected ... [were] more susceptible of uniformity." His emphasis on uniformity would be quite anomalous if he envisioned that States would create for their representatives a patchwork of qualifications. Second, the idea that Madison was in fact concerned that States would open the doors to national service too widely is entirely inconsistent with Madison's emphasizing that the Constitution kept "the door ... open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith." The Federalist No. 52, at 326. 0 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 263 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/pi int/printstream. aspx?sv=Spl it&rlti= l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/ 14/2007 Page 20 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881,63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) Finally the dissent argues that "Madison could not possibly have been rebuking the States for setting unduly high qualifications for their representatives in Congress," post, at 1901, and suggests that Madison's comments do not reflect "an implicit criticism of the States for setting unduly high entrance barriers," post, at 1902. We disagree. Though the dissent attempts to minimize the extensiveness of state -imposed qualifications by focusing on the qualifications that States imposed on delegates to Congress and the age restrictions that they imposed on state legislators, the dissent neglects to give appropriate attention to the abundance of property, religious, and other qualifications that States imposed on state elected officials. As we describe in some detail, infra, at 1864-1866, nearly every State had property qualifications, and many States had religious qualifications, term limits, or other qualifications. As Madison surely recognized, without a constitutional prohibition, these qualifications could be applied to federal representatives. We cannot read Madison's comments on the " open door" of the Federal Government as anything but a rejection of the "unduly high " barriers imposed by States. *808 Madison emphasized this same idea in The Federalist No. 57: "Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people. " The Federalist No. 57, at 351 (emphasis added). The provisions in the Constitution governing federal elections confirm the Framers' intent that States lack power to add qualifications. The Framers feared that the diverse interests of the States would undermine the National Legislature, and thus they adopted provisions intended to minimize the possibility of state interference with Page 19 federal elections. For example, to prevent discrimination against federal electors, the Framers required in Art. I, § 2, cl. 1, that the qualifications for federal electors be the same as those for state electors. As Madison noted, allowing States to differentiate between the qualifications for state and federal electors "would have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch of the federal government which ought to be dependent on the people alone." The Federalist No. 52, at 326. Similarly, in Art. 1, § 4, cl. 1, though giving the States the freedom to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections," the Framers created a safeguard against state abuse by giving Congress the power to "by Law make or alter such Regulations." The Convention debates make clear that the Framers' overriding concern was the potential for States' abuse of the power to set the *809 "Times, Places and Manner" of elections. Madison noted that "[i]t was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power." 2 Farrand 240. Gouverneur Morris feared that "the States might make false returns and then make no provisions for new elections." Id., at 241. When Charles Pinckney and John Rutledge moved to strike the congressional safeguard, the motion was soundly defeated. Id., at 240-241. As Hamilton later noted: "Nothing can be more evident than that an exclusive power of regulating elections for the national government, in the **1858 hands of the State legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy." The Federalist No. 59, at 363. See also ibid. (one justification for Times, PIaces and Manner Clause is that "[i]f we are in a humor to presume abuses of power, it is as fair to presume them on the part of the State governments as on the part of the general government"}. FN19 FN19. The dissent attacks our holding today by arguing that the Framers' distrust of the States extended only to measures adopted by "state legislatures," and not to measures adopted by "the people themselves." Post, at 1896. See also post, at 1896 ("These delegates presumably did not want state legislatures © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 264 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 21 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct, 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) to be able to tell Members of Congress from their State" how to vote) (emphasis added). The novelty and expansiveness of the dissent's attack is quite astonishing. We are aware of no case that would even suggest that the validity of a state law under the Federal Constitution would depend at all on whether the state law was passed by the state legislature or by the people directly through amendment of the state constitution. Indeed, no party has so argued. Quite simply, in our view, the dissent's distinction between state legislation passed by the state legislature and legislation passed by state constitutional amendment is untenable. The qualifications in the Constitution are fixed, and may not be altered by either States or their legislatures. The Framers' discussion of the salary of representatives reveals similar concerns. When the issue was first raised, Madison argued that congressional compensation should be fixed in the Constitution, rather than left to state legislatures, because otherwise "it would create an improper dependence." 1 Farrand 216. George Mason agreed, noting *810 that "the parsimony of the States might reduce the provision so low that ... the question would be not who were most fit to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve." Ibid. When the issue was later reopened, Nathaniel Gorham stated that he "wished not to refer the matter to the State Legislatures who were always paring down salaries in such a manner as to keep out of offices men most capable of executing the functions of them." Id., at 372. Edmund Randolph agreed that "[i]f the States were to pay the members of the Nat[ional] Legislature, a dependence would be created that would vitiate the whole System." Ibid. Rufus King "urged the danger of creating a dependence on the States," ibid., and Hamilton noted that "[tlhose who pay are the masters of those who are paid," id., at 373. The Convention ultimately agreed to vest in Congress the power to set its own compensation. See Art. I, § 6.FN20 Page 20 FN20. The Framers' decision to reject a proposal allowing for States to recall their own representatives, see 1 Farrand 20, 217, reflects these same concerns. In light of the Framers' evident concern that States would try to undermine the National Government, they could not have intended States to have the power to set qualifications. Indeed, one of the more anomalous consequences of petitioners' argument is that it accepts federal supremacy over the procedural aspects of determining the times, places, and manner of elections while allowing the States carte blanche with respect to the substantive qualifications for membership in Congress. The dissent nevertheless contends that the Framers' distrust of the States with respect to elections does not preclude the people of the States from adopting eligibility requirements to help narrow their own choices. See post, at 1895-1896. As the dissent concedes, post, at 1898, however, the Framers were unquestionably concerned that the States would simply not hold elections for federal officers, and therefore the Framers gave Congress the power to " make *811 or alter" state election regulations. Yet under the dissent's approach, the States could achieve exactly the same result by simply setting qualifications for federal office sufficiently high that no one could meet those qualifications. In our view, it is inconceivable that the Framers would provide a specific constitutional provision to ensure that federal elections would be held while at the same time allowing States to render those elections meaningless by simply ensuring that no candidate could be qualified for office. Given the Framers' wariness over the potential for state abuse, we must conclude that the specification of fixed qualifications in the constitutional text was intended to prescribe uniform **1859 rules that would preclude modification by either Congress or the States.FN21 FN21. The dissent's arguments concerning these provisions of the Constitution, see post, at 1896-1899, simply reinforce our argument that the constitutional provisions surrounding elections all reveal the © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 265 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 22 of 84 115 S.Ct, 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842' 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as; 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) Framers' basic fear that the States might act to undermine the National Legislature. For example, as the dissent concedes, the Framers feared that States would use the control over salaries to influence the votes of their representative. See post, at 1896. Similarly, the dissent concedes that the Times, Places and Manner Clause reflects the Framers' fear that States would not conduct federal elections at all. See post, at 1898. We believe that the dissent's reading of the provisions at issue understates considerably the extent of the Framers' distrust. However, even under the dissent's reading of the provisions, the text of the Constitution unquestionably reveals the Framers' distrust of the States regarding elections, and thus provides powerful evidence supporting our view that the qualifications established in the Constitution are exclusive. We find further evidence of the Framers' intent in Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, which provides; "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." That Art. I, § 5, vests a federal tribunal with ultimate authority to judge a Member's qualifications is fully consistent with the understanding that those qualifications are fixed in the Federal Constitution, but not with the understanding that they can be altered by the States. If the States had the right to prescribe additional qualifications -such *812 as property, educational, or professional qualifications -for their own representatives, state law would provide the standard for judging a Member's eligibility. As we concluded in Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 22 L.Ed. 429 (1875), federal questions are generally answered finally by federal tribunals because rights which depend on federal law "should be the same everywhere" and "their construction should be uniform." Id., at 632. The judging of questions concerning rights which depend on state law is not, however, normally assigned to federal tribunals. See id., at 636. The Constitution's provision for each House to be the judge of its own qualifications thus provides further evidence that the Framers believed that the primary source of those qualifications would be federal law. Page 21 We also find compelling the complete absence in the ratification debates of any assertion that States had the power to add qualifications. In those debates, the question whether to require term limits , or "rotation," was a major source of controversy. The draft of the Constitution that was submitted for ratification contained no provision for rotation.'-' In arguments that echo in the preamble to Arkansas' Amendment 73, opponents of ratification condemned the absence of a rotation requirement, noting that "there is no doubt that senators will hold their office perpetually; and in this situation, they must of necessity lose their dependence, and their attachments to the people." FIN23 Even proponents **1860 of ratification*813 expressed concern about the "abandonment in every instance of the necessity of rotation in office." FN24 At several ratification conventions, participants proposed amendments that would have required rotation.FN'S FN22. A proposal requiring rotation for Members of the House was proposed at the Convention, see I Farrand 20, but was defeated unanimously, see id., at 217. There is no record of any debate on either occasion. FN23. 2 Elliot's Debates 309-310 (N.Y., Smith). See also id., at 287-288 (N.Y., G. Livingston) (Senators will enjoy "a security of their re-election, as long as they please.... In such a situation, men are apt to forget their dependence, lose their sympathy, and contract selfish habits.... The senators will associate only with men of their own class, and thus become strangers to the condition of the common people"); id., at 30-31 (Mass., Turner) (" Knowing the numerous arts that designing men are prone to, to secure their election, and perpetuate themselves, it is my hearty wish that a rotation may be provided for"); id., at 62 (Mass., Kingsley) ("[W]e are deprived of annual elections, have no rotation, and cannot recall our members; therefore our federal rulers will be masters, and not servants"); Samuel Bryan, " CentineI I," Independent Gazetteer (Phil., © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 266 of 433 http:/lweb2.westlaw.com/piint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=l 8&f... 3/14/2007 Page 23 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 11.5 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) Oct. 5, 1787), 1 Debate on the Constitution 52, 61 (B. Bailyn ed. 1990) (hereinafter Bailyn) ("[A]s there is no exclusion by rotation, [Senators] may be continued for life, which, from their extensive means of influence, would follow of course"); Letter from George Lee Turberville to Madison (Dec. 11, 1787), 1 Bailyn 477, 479 ("Why was not that truely republican mode of forcing the Rulers or sovereigns of the states to mix after stated Periods with the people again -observed"); Mercy Otis Warren, "A Columbian Patriot" (Boston, Feb. 1788), 2 Bailyn 284, 292 (" There is no provision for a rotation, nor any thing to prevent the perpetuity of office in the same hands for life.... By this neglect we Iose the advantages of that check to the overbearing insolence of office, which by rendering him ineligible at certain periods, keeps the mind of man in equilibrio, and teaches him the feelings of the governed"). FN24. Letter of Dec. 20, 1787, from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison. 1 id., at 209, 211. In 1814, in another private letter, Jefferson expressed the opinion that the States had not abandoned the power to impose term limits. See Letter of Jan. 31, 1814, to Joseph C. Cabell, in 14 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 82 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904). Though he noted that his reasoning on the matter "appears to me to be sound," he went on to note: "but, on so recent a change of view, caution requires us not to be too confident, and that we admit this to be one of the doubtful questions on which honest men may differ with the purest of motives; and the more readily, as we find we have differed from ourselves on it." Id., at 83. The text of Jefferson's response clearly belies the dissent's suggestion that Jefferson "himself did not entertain serious doubts of its correctness." Post, at 1889, n. 14. Page 22 FN25. See n. 40, infra. The Federalists' responses to those criticisms and proposals addressed the merits of the issue, arguing that rotation was incompatible with the people's right to choose. As we noted above, Robert Livingston argued: *814 "The people are the best judges who ought to represent them. To dictate and control them, to tell them whom they shall not elect, is to abridge their natural rights. This rotation is an absurd species of ostracism." 2 Elliot's Debates 292-293. Similarly, Hamilton argued that the representatives' need for reelection rather than mandatory rotation was the more effective way to keep representatives responsive to the people, because "[w]hen a man knows he must quit his station, let his merit be what it may, he will turn his attention chiefly to his own emolument." Id., at 320.1112e FN26. George Washington made a similar argument: "The power under the Constitution will always be in the People. It is entrusted for certain defined purposes, and for a certain limited period, to representatives of their own chusing; and whenever it is executed contrary to their Interest, or not agreeable to their wishes, their Servants can, and undoubtedly will be, recalled." 1 Bailyn 305, 306-307. Regardless of which side has the better of the debate over rotation, it is most striking that nowhere in the extensive ratification debates have we found any statement by either a proponent or an opponent of rotation that the draft constitution would permit States to require rotation for the representatives of their own citizens. If the participants in the debate had believed that the States retained the authority to impose term limits, it is inconceivable that the Federalists would not have made this obvious response to the arguments of the pro -rotation forces. The absence in an otherwise freewheeling debate of any suggestion that States had the power to impose additional qualifications unquestionably reflects the Framers' common understanding that © 2007 Thomson[West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 267 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/piintstream. aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 24 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 23 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) States lacked that power. dissent, see post, at 1895, it seems to us irrelevant that the draft in question did not In short, if it had been assumed that States could include a comparable parenthetical clause add additional qualifications, that assumption would referring to "elected" Senators because the have provided the basis for a powerful rebuttal to draft contemplated that Senators, unlike the arguments being advanced. The failure of Representatives, would not be chosen by intelligent and experienced advocates to utilize this popular election. argument must reflect a general agreement*815 Nor is there merit to the argument that the that its premise was unsound, and that the power to inclusion in the Committee's final draft of a add qualifications was one that the Constitution provision allowing each House to add denied the States.FN27 property qualifications, see 2 Farrand 179, is somehow inconsistent with our holding today. First, there is no conflict between FN27. Petitioners set forth several other our holding that the qualifications for arguments to support their contention that Congress are fixed in the Constitution and the Convention and ratification debates a provision in the Constitution itself reveal that the qualifications in the providing for property qualifications. Qualifications Clauses were not intended Indeed, that is why our analysis is to be exclusive. We find none of these consistent with the other disqualifications persuasive. contained in the Constitution itself. See n. Petitioners first observe that the notes of 2, supra. The Constitution simply Edmund Randolph, who was a member of prohibits the imposition by either States or the Committee of Detail, reveal that an Congress of additional qualifications that early draft of the Qualifications Clause are not contained in the text of the provided: Constitution. Second, of course, the "The qualifications of (a) delegates shall property provision was deleted, thus be the age of twenty-five years at least. providing further evidence that the and citizenship: (and any person Framers wanted to minimize the barriers possessing these qualifications may be that would exclude the most able citizens elected except)." 2 Farrand 139 (footnote from service in the National Government. omitted). Respondent Republican Party of Arkansas Petitioners suggest that the deletion of the also argues that the negative phrasing of parenthetical material from the Clause the Qualifications Clauses suggests that suggests that the Framers did not intend they were not meant to be exclusive. the Qualifications Clause to be exclusive. Brief for Respondents Republican Party of We reject this argument. First, there is no Arkansas et at. 5-6. This argument was evidence that the draft in Randolph's notes firmly rejected in Powell, see 395 U.S., at was ever presented to the Convention, and 537-539, and n. 73, 89 S.Ct., at 1973, and thus the deletion of the Clause tells us little n. 73; see also Warren 422, n. 1, and we about the views of the Convention as a see no need to revisit it now. whole. Moreover, even assuming that the Convention had seen the draft, the deletion **1861 *816 Congressional Experience of the language without comment is at least as consistent with a belief -as suggested by Congress' subsequent experience with state -imposed Dickinson, see n. 9, supra -that the qualifications provides further evidence of the language was superfluous as with a general consensus on the lack of state power in this concern that the language was area. In Powell, we examined that experience and inappropriate. Finally, contrary to the noted that during the first 100 years of its existence, rather ingenious argument advanced in the "Congress strictly limited its power to judge the OO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 268 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/piint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l&prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 25 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) qualifications of its members to those enumerated in the Constitution." 395 U.S., at 542, 89 S.Ct., at 1974. Congress first confronted the issue in 1807 when it faced a challenge to the qualifications of William McCreery, a Representative from Maryland who allegedly did not satisfy a residency requirement imposed by that State. In recommending that McCreery be seated, the Report of the House Committee on Elections noted: " `The committee proceeded to examine the Constitution, with relation to the case submitted to them, and find that qualifications of members are therein detennined, without reserving any authority to the State Legislatures to change, add to, or diminish those qualifications; and that, by that instrument, Congress is constituted the sole judge of the qualifications prescribed by it, and are obliged to decide agreeably to the Constitutional rules....' " Powell, 395 U.S., at 542, 89 S.Ct., at 1975 quoting 17 Annals of Cong. 871 (1807) (emphasis added). FN28 FN28. We recognize that the "Committee of Elections were not unanimous in these sentiments," and that a "minority advocated the right of the State Legislature to prescribe additional qualifications to the members from the respective States." 17 Annals of Cong. 873 (1807). The Chairman of the House Committee on Elections elaborated during debate: *817 " `The Committee of Elections considered the qualifications of members to have been unalterably determined by the Federal Convention, unless changed by an authority equal to that which framed the Constitution at first; that neither the State nor the Federal Legislatures are vested with authority to add to those qualifications, so as to change them.' " Powell, 395 U.S., at 542-543, 89 S.Ct., at 1975, quoting from 17 Annals of Cong. 872 (1807). As we noted in Powell, the congressional debate over the committee's recommendation tended to focus on the "narrow issue of the power of the States to add to the standing qualifications set forth Page 24 in the Constitution," 395 U.S., at 543, 89 S.Ct., at 1975. The whole House, however, did not vote on the committee's Report, and instead voted only on a simple resolution: "Resolved, That William McCreery is entitled to his seat in this House." 17 Annals of Cong. 1238 (1807). That resolution passed by a vote of 89 to 18. Ibid. Though the House Debate may be inconclusive, commentators at the time apparently viewed the seating of McCreery as confirmation of the States' lack of power to add qualifications. For example, in a letter to Joseph Cabeli, Thomas Jefferson noted the argument that "to add new qualifications to those of the Constitution would be as much an alteration as to detract from them"; he then added: "And so I think the House of **1862 Representatives of Congress decided in some case; I believe that of a member from Baltimore." Letter of Jan. 31, 1814, to Joseph C. CabeIl, in 14 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 82 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904). Similarly, for over 150 years prior to Powell, commentators viewed the seating of McCreery as an expression of the view of the House that States could not add to the qualifications established in the Constitution. Thus, for example, referring to the McCreery debates, one commentator noted, `By the decision in this case, [and that in another contested election), it seems to have been settled that the States have not a right to require qualifications from members, different *818 from, or in addition to, those prescribed by the constitution." Cases of Contested Elections in Congress 171 (M. Clarke & D. Hall eds. 1834) (emphasis in original). Other commentators viewed the incident similarly. See, e.g., G. Paschal, The Constitution of the United States 66 (1876) (citing McCreery to support the proposition that "[tjhe Constitution having fixed the qualifications of members, no additional qualifications can rightfully be required by the States ") (emphasis in original); G. McCrary, American Law of Elections § 323 (4th ed. 1897) (citing McCreery and stating "A state law requiring that a Representative in Congress shall reside in a particular town and country within the district from which he is chosen is unconstitutional and void"); W. Sutherland, Notes on the Constitution of the OO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 269 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=1&prft=HTN4LE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 26 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) United States 40 (1904) (citing McCreery to support statement that "[t]his clause fixes the qualifications of members so far as state action is concerned, and no additional qualifications can be required by the state"); C. Burdick, Law of the American Constitution 160 (1922) (citing McCreery to support the proposition that state -imposed " limitations have been held ... not to be effective"). Finally, it is clear that in Powell we viewed the seating of McCreery as the House's acknowledgment that the qualifications in the Constitution were fixed. See 395 U.S., at 542-543, 89 S.Ct., at 1975. The Senate experience with state -imposed qualifications further supports our conclusions. In 1887, for example, the Senate seated Charles Faulkner of West Virginia, despite the fact that a provision of the West Virginia Constitution purported to render him ineligible to serve. The Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections unanimously concluded that "no State can prescribe any qualification to the office of United States Senator in addition to those declared in the Constitution of the United States." S.Rep. No. 1, 50th Cong., Ist Sess., 4 (1887). The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration reached the same conclusion in 1964 when faced with a challenge to Pierre Salinger, who had *819 been appointed to serve as Senator from California. See S.Rep. No. 1381, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 ("It is well settled that the qualifications established by the U.S. Constitution for the office of U.S. Senator are exclusive, and a State cannot, by constitutional or statutory provisions, add to or enlarge upon those qualifications"). We recognize, as we did in Powell, that " congressional practice has been erratic" FN29 and that the precedential value of congressional exclusion cases is "quite Iimited." Powell, 395 U.S., at 545-546, 89 S.Ct., at 1976-77. Nevertheless, those incidents lend support to the result we reach today. FN29. See, e.g., Powell, 395 U.S., at 544-546, 89 S.Ct., at 1975-1977 (noting examples). Page 25 Democratic Principles Our conclusion that States lack the power to impose qualifications vindicates the same "fundamental principle of our representative democracy" that we recognized in Powell, namely, that "the people should choose whom they please to govern them." Id., at 547, 89 S.Ct., at 1977 (internal quotation marks omitted). As we noted earlier, the Powell Court recognized that an egalitarian ideal -that election to the National Legislature should be open to all people of merit -provided a critical foundation for the constitutional structure. This egalitarian theme echoes throughout the constitutional debates. In The Federalist No. 57, for example, Madison wrote: "Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may **1863 recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people. " The Federalist No. 57, at 351. Similarly, hoping to persuade voters in New York that the Constitution should be ratified, John Stevens, Jr., wrote: *820 "[N]o Government, that has ever yet existed in the world, affords so ample a field, to individuals of all ranks, for the display of political talents and abilities.... No man who has real merit, let his situation be what it will, need despair." I Bailyn 487, 492. And Timothy Pickering noted that, "while several of the state constitutions prescribe certain degrees of property as indispensable qualifications for offices, this which is proposed for the U.S. throws the door wide open for the entrance of every man who enjoys the confidence of his fellow citizens." Letter from T. Pickering to C. Tillinghast (Dec. 24, 1787), 1 Bailyn 289, 290 (emphasis in original).FN30 Additional qualifications pose the same obstacle to open elections whatever their source. The egalitarian ideal, so valued by the Framers, is thus compromised to the same degree by additional qualifications imposed by States as by those imposed by Congress. © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 270 of 433 http:l/web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti= l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 27 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) FN30. See also 2 Farrand 123 (it is " improper that any man of merit should be subjected to disabilities in a Republic where merit was understood to form the great title to public trust, honors & rewards ") (Dickinson); The Federalist No. 36, at 217 ("There are strong minds in every walk of life that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situation and will command the tribute due to their merit, not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from the society in general. The door ought to be equally open to all") (Hamilton); N. Webster, "A Citizen of America," (Phil., Oct. 17, 1787), 1 Bailyn 129, 142 ("[M]oney is not made a requisite -the places of senators are wisely left open to all persons of suitable age and merit"). Similarly, we believe that state -imposed qualifications, as much as congressionally imposed qualifications, would undermine the second critical idea recognized in Powell: that an aspect of sovereignty is the right of the people to vote for whom they wish. Again, the source of the qualification is of little moment in assessing the qualification's restrictive impact. [10)[11][12] Finally, state -imposed restrictions, unlike the congressionally imposed restrictions at issue in Powell, violate a third idea central to this basic principle: that the right to choose *821 representatives belongs not to the States, but to the people. From the start, the Framers recognized that the "great and radical vice" of the Articles of Confederation was "the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist." The Federalist No. 15, at 108 (Hamilton). Thus the Framers, in perhaps their most important contribution, conceived of a Federal Government directly responsible to the people, possessed of direct power over the people, and chosen directly, not by States, but by the people. See, e.g., supra, at 1854-1855. The Framers implemented this ideal most clearly in the Page 26 provision, extant from the beginning of the Republic, that calls for the Members of the House of Representatives to be "chosen every second Year by the People of the several States" Art. I, § 2, cl. I . Following the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, this ideal was extended to elections for the Senate. The Congress of the United States, therefore, is not a confederation of nations in which separate sovereigns are represented by appointed delegates, but is instead a body composed of representatives of the people. As Chief Justice John Marshall observed: "The government of the Union, then, ... is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., at 404-405.FN31 Ours is a **1864 "government of the people, by the people, for the people." A. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (1863). FN31. Cf. Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253 U.S. 221, 226, 40 S.Ct. 495, 496-497, 64 L.Ed. 871 (1920) ("The Constitution of the United States was ordained by the people, and, when duly ratified, it became the Constitution of the people of the United States"). Compare U.S. Const., Preamble ( "We the People"), with The Articles of Confederation, reprinted in 2 Bailyn 926 (" we the under signed Delegates of the States „). *822 The Framers deemed this principle critical when they discussed qualifications. For example, during the debates on residency requirements, Morris noted that in the House, "the people at large, not the States, are represented." 2 Farrand 217 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Similarly, George Read noted that the Framers " were forming a Nati[ona]l Gov [emmen]t and such a regulation would correspond little with the idea that we were one people." Ibid. (emphasis in original). James Wilson "enforced the same consideration." Ibid. Consistent with these views, the constitutional © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 271 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 28 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct 1842) structure provides for a uniform salary to be paid from the national treasury, allows the States but a limited role in federal elections, and maintains strict checks on state interference with the federal election process. The Constitution also provides that the qualifications of the representatives of each State will be judged by the representatives of the entire Nation. The Constitution thus creates a uniform national body representing the interests of a single people. [131 Permitting individual States to formulate diverse qualifications for their representatives would result in a patchwork of state qualifications, undermining the uniformity and the national character that the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., at 428-429 ("Those means are not given by the people of a particular State, not given by the constituents of the legislature, ... but by the people of all the States. They are given by all, for the benefit of all -and upon theory, should be subjected to that government only which belongs to all"). Such a patchwork would also sever the direct link that the Framers found so critical between the National Government and the people of the United States. FN32 FN32. There is little significance to the fact that Amendment 73 was adopted by a popular vote, rather than as an Act of the state legislature. See n. 19, supra. In fact, none of the petitioners argues that the constitutionality of a state law would depend on the method of its adoption. This is proper, because the voters of Arkansas, in adopting Amendment 73, were acting as citizens of the State of Arkansas, and not as citizens of the National Government. The people of the State of Arkansas have no more power than does the Arkansas Legislature to supplement the qualifications for service in Congress. As Chief Justice Marshall emphasized in McCulloch, "Those means are not given by the people of a particular State, not given by the constituents of the legislature, ... but by the people of all the Page 27 States." 4 Wheat., at 428-429. The dissent concedes that the people of the Nation have an interest in preventing any State from sending "immature, disloyal, or unknowledgeable representatives to Congress," post, at 1886, but does not explain why the people of the Nation lack a comparable interest in allowing every State to send mature, loyal, and knowledgeable representatives to Congress. In our view, the interest possessed by the people of the Nation and identified by the dissent is the same as the people's interest in making sure that, within "reasonable limitations, the door to this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith." The Federalist No. 52, at 326. *823 State Practice Petitioners attempt to overcome this formidable array of evidence against the States' power to impose qualifications by arguing that the practice of the States immediately after the adoption of the Constitution demonstrates their understanding that they possessed such power. One may properly question the extent to which the States' own practice is a reliable indicator of the contours of restrictions that the Constitution imposed on States, especially when no court has ever upheld a state -imposed qualification of any sort. See supra, at 1852-1853. But petitioners' argument is unpersuasive even on its own terms. At the time of the Convention, " [a]lmost all the State Constitutions required members of their Legislatures to possess considerable property." See Warren 416-417.FN33 Despite this near uniformity, only one **1865 *824 State, Virginia, placed similar restrictions on Members of Congress, requiring that a representative be, inter alia, a "freeholder." See 1788 Va.Acts, ch. 2, § 2.FN34 Just 15 years after imposing a property qualification, Virginia replaced that requirement with a provision requiring that representatives be only "qualified according to the constitution of the United States." 1813 Va.Acts, © 2007 Thomson/West. No CIaim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 272 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/piintstream. aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTNILE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 29 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 28 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct.1842) ch. 23, § 2. Moreover, several States, including qualifications which the constitution does New Hampshire, Georgia, Delaware, and South not, may possibly be found to be nugatory." Carolina, revised their Constitutions at around the 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries time of the Federal Constitution. In the revised Appendix 213 (S. Tucker ed. 1803). Constitutions, each State retained property Judge Tucker noted the two primary qualifications for its own *825 state elected arguments against the power to add such a officials yet placed no property qualification on its qualification: congressional representatives.FN35 "First, that in a representative government, the people have an undoubted right to judge for themselves of the qualification of FN33. See, e.g., 7 Federal and State their delegate, and if their opinion of the Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and integrity of their representative will supply Other Organic Laws of the States, the want of estate, there can be no reason Territories, and Colonies 3816 (F. Thorpe for the government to interfere, by saying, ed. 1909) (hereinafter Thorpe) (Virginia) that the latter must and shall overbalance (members of state legislature must be the former. freeholders); 4 id., at 2460, 2461 (New "Secondly; by requiring a qualification in Hampshire) (freehold estate of 200 pounds estate it may often happen, that men the for state senators; estate of 100 pounds, at best qualified in other respects might be least half of which is freehold, for state incapacitated from serving their country." representatives); 3 id., at 1691, 1694 Ibid. (Maryland) (real and personal property of over 500 pounds for House of Delegates; FN35. See 4 Thorpe 2477, 2479 (New real and personal property of 1,000 pounds Hampshire) (100 pounds for House; 200 for Senate); id., at 1897, 1898 (freehold pounds for Senate); 2 id., at 786 (Georgia) estate of 300 pounds or personal estate of (200 acres of land or, 150 pounds for 600 pounds for state senators; freehold House; 250 acres of land or 250 pounds estate of 100 pounds or ratable estate of for Senate); 6 id., at 3259 (South 200 pounds for state representatives); 1 id., Carolina) (500 acres and 10 slaves or 150 at 562 (Delaware) (state legislators must pounds sterling for House; 300 pounds be freeholders); 5 id., at 2595 (New sterling for Senate); 1 id., at 570, 571 Jersey) (members of Legislative Council (Delaware) (freehold for House; freehold must be freeholders and must have real and estate of 200 acres or real and personal personal property of 1,000 pounds; property of 1,000 pounds for Senate). members of Assembly must have real and Pennsylvania amended its Constitution in personal property of 500 pounds); id., at 1790. Neither the old constitution nor the 2631 (New York) (state senators must be amended one contained property freeholders); id., at 2790 (North Carolina) qualifications for state representatives. (100 acres of land for House; 300 acres of See 5 id., at 3084; id., at 3092-3093. land in Senate); 2 id., at 779 (Georgia) Several State Constitutions also imposed (150 acres of land or property of 250 religious qualifications on state pounds); 6 id., at 3251 (South Carolina) representatives. For example, New (freehold estate of 2,000 pounds for state Hampshire's Constitution of 1784 and its senate). Constitution of 1792 provided that members of the State Senate and House of FN34. Judge Tucker expressed doubt Representatives be "of the protestant about the constitutionality of the religion." 4 id., at 2460, 2461-2462 provisions of the Virginia statute, noting (1784 Constitution); id., at 2477, 2479 that "these provisions, as they require (1792 Constitution). North Carolina's © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works Packet Page 273 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream. aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=l 8 &f... 3/14/2007 Page 30 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 29 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) Constitution provided that "no clergyman, FN37. See 1 Farrand 20 ("Res[olved] that or preacher of the gospel, of any the members of the first branch of the denomination, shall be capable of being a National Legislature ought ... to be member of either the Senate, House of incapable of reelection for the space of Commons, or Council of State," 5 id., at [blank] after the expiration of their term of 2793, and that "no person, who shall deny service"). See also n. 22, supra. the being of God or the truth of the Protestant religion ... shall be capable of FN38. See, e.g., G. Wood, Creation of the holding any office or place of trust or American Republic, 1776-1787, p. 140 profit in the civil department within this (1969) (noting that 7 of the 10 State State," ibid. Georgia and South Carolina Constitutions drafted in. 1776-1777 also had religious qualifications in their provided for term limits on their state Constitutions for state legislators, see 2 id., executives); see also App. to Brief for at 779 (Georgia) ("of the Protestant State Petitioner lb-34b (describing religion"); 6 id., at 3252 (South Carolina) provisions of State Constitutions). (must be "of the Protestant religion"), but deleted those provisions when they FN39. 3 Thorpe 1695-1697 (Maryland); 4 amended their Constitutions, in 1789, see 2 id., at 2467 (New Hampshire); 5 id., at id., at 785, and in 1790, see 6 id., at 3258, 3085 (Pennsylvania); 5 id., at 2793 (North respectively. Article VI of the Federal Carolina). Constitution, however, prohibited States from imposing similar qualifications on FN40. New York attached to its federal Iegislators. ratification a list of proposed amendments and "enjoin[ed] it upon their The contemporaneous state practice with respect to representatives in Congress to exert all term limits is similar. At the time of the their influence, and use all reasonable Convention, States widely supported term limits in means, to obtain a ratification." 1 Elliot's at least some circumstances. The Articles of Debates 329. One of the proposed Confederation contained a provision for term limits. amendments was "That no person be FN36 As we have noted, some members of the eligible as a senator for more than six Convention had sought to impose term limits for years in any term of twelve years." Id., at Members of Congress.FN37 In addition, many 330. In Virginia, the Convention similarly States imposed**1866 term limits on *826 state "enjoin[ed] it upon their representatives," officers,FN38 four placed limits on delegates to the 2 Bailyn 564, to adopt "a Declaration or Continental Congress, 39 and several States Bill of Rights," id., at 558, which would voiced support for term limits for Members of include the statement that members of the " Fx40 Executive and Legislative Branches Congress. Despite this widespread support, should, at fixed periods be reduced to a no State sought to impose any term limits on its private station, return into the mass of the own federal representatives. Thus, a proper people; and the vacancies be supplied by assessment of contemporaneous state practice certain and regular elections; in which all provides further persuasive evidence of a general or any part of the former members to be understanding that the qualifications in the eligible or ineligible, as the rules of the FN Constitution were unalterable by the States.41 Constitution of Government, and the laws shall direct," id., at 559. The North Carolina Convention proposed nearly FN36. See 2 Bailyn 926, 927 ("[N]o identical language, see id., at 566, though person shall be capable of being a delegate that Convention ultimately did not ratify for more than three years in any term of six the Constitution, see 4 Elliot's Debates years"). © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 274 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l&prft=HTN LE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 31 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 30 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842) 250-251. Thus, at least three States that state practice is even less indicative of proposed some form of constitutional the Framers' understanding of state power. amendment supporting term limits for Finally, it is important to reemphasize that Members of Congress. the dissent simply has no credible explanation as to why almost every State FN41. Petitioners and the dissent also imposed property qualifications on state point out that Georgia, Maryland, representatives but not on federal Massachusetts, Virginia, and North representatives. The dissent relies first on Carolina added district residency the obvious but seemingly irrelevant requirements, and petitioners note that proposition that the state legislatures were New Jersey and Connecticut established larger than state congressional delegations. nominating processes for congressional Post, at 1907, n. 37. If anything, the candidates. They rely on these facts to smaller size of the congressional show that the States believed they had the delegation would have made States more power to add qualifications. We again are likely to put qualifications on federal unpersuaded. First, establishing a representatives since the election of any " nominating process is no more setting a pauper" would have had proportionally qualification for office than is creating a greater significance. The dissent also primary. Second, it seems to us that suggests that States failed to add States may simply have viewed district qualifications out of fear that others, e.g., residency requirements as the necessary Congress, believed that States lacked the analog to state residency requirements. power to add such qualifications. Of Thus, state practice with respect to course, this rationale is perfectly consistent residency requirements does not with our view that the general necessarily indicate that States believed understanding at the time was that States that they had a broad power to add lacked the power to add qualifications. restrictions. Finally, • we consider the number of state -imposed qualifications to *827 In sum, the available historical and textual be remarkably small. Despite the array of evidence, read in light of the basic principles of property, religious, and other qualifications democracy underlying the Constitution and that were contained in state constitutions, recognized by this Court in Powell, reveal the petitioners and the dissent can point to Framers' intent that neither Congress nor the States only one instance of a state -imposed should possess the power to supplement the property qualification on candidates for exclusive qualifications set forth in the text of the Congress, and five instances of district Constitution. residency requirements. The state practice seems to us notable for its restraint, and thus supports the conclusion *828IV that States did not believe that they generally had the power to add Petitioners argue that, even if States may not add qualifications. qualifications, Amendment 73 is constitutional Nor are we persuaded by the more recent **1867 because it is not such a qualification, and state practice involving qualifications such because Amendment 73 is a permissible exercise of as those that bar felons from being elected. state power to regulate the "Fimes, Places and As we have noted, the practice of States Manner of holding Elections." We reject these is a poor indicator of the effect of restraints contentions. on the States, and no court has ever upheld one of these restrictions. Moreover, as Unlike H I and 2 of Amendment 73, which create one moves away from 1789, it seems to us absolute bars to service for long-term incumbents Oc 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works, Packet Page 275 of 433 http:l/web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HrMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 32 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) running for state office, § 3 merely provides that certain Senators and Representatives shall not be certified as candidates and shall not have their names appear on the ballot. They may run as write-in candidates and, if elected, they may serve. Petitioners contend that only a legal bar to service creates an impermissible qualification, and that Amendment 73 is therefore consistent with the Constitution. Petitioners support their restrictive definition of qualifications with language from Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) in which we faced a constitutional challenge to provisions of the California Elections Code that regulated the procedures by which both independent candidates and candidates affiliated with qualified political parties could obtain ballot position in general elections. The code required candidates affiliated with a qualified party to win a primary election, and required independents to make timely filing of nomination papers signed by at least 5% of the entire vote cast in the last general election. The code also denied ballot position to independents who had voted in the most recent primary election or who had registered their affiliation with a qualified party during the previous year. In Storer, we rejected the argument that the challenged procedures created additional qualifications as "wholly without merit." Id., at 746, n. 16, 94 S.Ct., at 1287, n. 16. We noted that petitioners "would not have been disqualified had they been nominated at a party primary or by an adequately supported independent petition and then elected at the general election." Ibid. *829 We concluded that the California Code "no more establishes an additional requirement for the office of Representative than the requirement that the candidate win the primary to secure a place on the general ballot or otherwise demonstrate substantial community support." Ibid. See also Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d, at 1531; Hopfmann v. Connolly, 746 F.2d 97, 103 (CAl 1984), vacated in part on other grounds, 471 U.S. 459, 105 S.Ct. 2106, 85 L.Ed.2d 469 (1985). Petitioners maintain that, under Storer, Amendment 73 is not a qualification. [14] We need not decide whether petitioners' Page 31 narrow understanding of qualifications is correct because, even if it is, Amendment 73 may not stand. As we have often noted, " `[c]onstitutional rights would be of little value if they could be ... indirectly denied.' " Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 1185, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965), quoting Sinith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664, 64 S.Ct. 757, 765, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944). The Constitution "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes" of infringing on constitutional protections. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275, 59 S.Ct, 872, 876, 83 L.Ed. 1281 (1939); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S., at 540-541, 85 S.Ct., at 1185. [15] In our view, Amendment 73 is an indirect attempt to accomplish what the Constitution prohibits Arkansas from accomplishing directly. As the plurality opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized, Amendment 73 is an "effort to dress eligibility to stand for Congress in ballot access clothing," because the "intent and the effect of Amendment 73 are to disqualify congressional incumbents from further service." 316 Ark., at 266, 872 S.W.2d, at 357.FN42 We must, of course, accept the state court's view of the purpose of its own law: We are thus authoritatively informed that the sole purpose of § 3 of Amendment 73 was to attempt to achieve a result that is forbidden by the Federal Constitution. Indeed,*830 it cannot be seriously contended that the intent behind Amendment 73 is other than to prevent the election **1868 of incumbents. The preamble of Amendment 73 states explicitly: "[T]he people of Arkansas ... herein limit the terms of elected officials." Sections 1 and 2 create absolute limits on the number of terms that may be served. There is no hint that § 3 was intended to have any other purpose. FN42. Justice Dudley noted in his concurrence: "I am reassured by the style of this case, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. That name implies just what this amendment is: A practical limit on the terms of the members of the Congress." 316 Ark., at 276, 872 S.W.2d, at 364 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 276 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 33 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 32 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct, 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) Petitioners do, however, contest the Arkansas that the Arkansas Supreme Court found the Supreme Court's conclusion that the amendment has possibility of a write-in victory to be a the same practical effect as an absolute bar. They mere "glimme[r] of opportunity for those argue that the possibility of a write-in campaign disqualified." 316 Ark., at 266, 872 creates a real possibility for victory, especially for S.W.2d, at 357; see also id., at 276, 872 an entrenched incumbent. One may reasonably S.W.2d, at 364 (Dudley, J., concurring in question the merits of that contention.FN41 Indeed, part and dissenting in part) ("as a practical we are advised by the state court that there is matter, the amendment would place term nothing more than a faint glimmer of possibility that limits on service in the Congress"). the excluded candidate will win.FN44 Our prior cases, too, have suggested that *831 write-in FN44. Contrary to the dissent, post, at candidates have only a slight chance of victory. FN45 1910, we read a majority of the Arkansas But even if petitioners are correct that Supreme Court as holding that Amendment incumbents may occasionally win reelection as 73 has the same practical effect as an write-in candidates, there is no denying that the absolute bar. See 316 Ark., at 266, 872 ballot restrictions will make it significantly more S.W.2d, at 357 (plurality opinion) (the " difficult for the barred candidate to win the election. intent and the effect of Amendment 73 are In our view, an amendment with the avowed to disqualify congressional incumbents purpose and obvious effect of evading the from further service"); id., at 276, 872S.W.2d, requirements of the Qualifications Clauses by at 364 {Dudley, J., concurring in handicapping a class of candidates cannot stand. part and dissenting in part) ("That name To argue otherwise is to suggest that the Framers implies just what this amendment is: A spent significant time and energy in debating and practical limit on the terms of the members crafting Clauses that could be easily evaded. More of the Congress"). However, as we note importantly, allowing States to evade the in the text, infra, at 1868, we do not rely Qualifications Clauses by "dress[ing] eligibility to on the state court's finding on this point. stand for Congress in ballot access clothing" See also infra, at 1871. trivializes the basic principles of our democracy that underlie those Clauses. Petitioners' argument treats We noted in Lubin v. Parrish, 415 the Qualifications Clauses not as the embodiment of U.S.45. US.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 702 a grand principle, but rather as empty formalism. " ` electoral {1974), that "[t]he realities of the electoral ), t t It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the process strongly suggest that `access' Constitution of the United States may thus be - via write-in votes falls far short of access manipulated out of existence.' " Gomillion v. in terms of having the name of the Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345, 81 S.Ct. 125, 129, 5 candidate on the ballot." Id., at 719, n. 5, L.Ed.2d 110 (1960), quoting Frost & Frost 94 S.Ct., at 1321, n. 5; see also Anderson Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commit of Cal., 271 U.S. v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 799, n. 26, 583, 594, 46 S.Ct. 605, 607, 70 L.Ed. 1101 (1926). 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1575, n. 26, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) ("We have previously noted that [a write-in] opportunity is not an FN43. The uncontested data submitted to adequate substitute for having the the Arkansas Supreme Court indicate that, candidates name appear on the printed in over 1,300 Senate elections since the ballot"); United States v. Classic, 313 passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in U.S. 299, 313, 61 S.Ct. 10315 1036-37, 85 1913, only 1 has been won by a write-in L.Ed. 1368 (1941) ("Even if ... voters may candidate. In over 20,000 House lawfully write into their ballots, cast at the elections since the turn of the century, only general election, the name of a candidate 5 have been won by write-in candidates. rejected at the primary and have their App. 201-202. Indeed, it is for this reason ballots counted, the practical operation of © 2007 Thomson/West- No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works Packet Page 277 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printsti-eam.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 34 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842) the primary law ... is such as to impose serious restrictions upon the choice of candidates by the voters"); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 437, n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2065, n. 7, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) ( "If the dissent were correct in suggesting that requiring primary voters to select a specific ballot impermissibly burdened the right to vote, it is clear under our decisions that the availability of a write-in option would not provide an adequate remedy"). *832 Petitioners make the related argument that Amendment 73 merely regulates the "Manner" of elections, and that the amendment**1869 is therefore a permissible exercise of state power under Article I, § 4, cl. 1 (the Elections Clause), to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner" of elections r-N46 We cannot agree. FN46. Article I, § 4, cl. 1, provides: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." A necessary consequence of petitioners' argument is that Congress itself would have the power to "make or alter" a measure such as Amendment 73. Art. 1, § 4, cl. 1. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366-367, 52 S.Ct. 397, 399, 76 L.Ed. 795 (1932) (" [T]he Congress may supplement these state regulations or may substitute its own"). That the Framers would have approved of such a result is unfathomable. As our decision in Powell and our discussion above make clear, the Framers were particularly concerned that a grant to Congress of the authority to set its own qualifications would lead inevitably to congressional self-aggrandizement and the upsetting of the delicate constitutional balance. See supra, at 1848-1849, and n. 10, supra. Petitioners would have us believe, however, that even as the Framers carefully circumscribed congressional power to set qualifications, they intended to allow Congress to achieve the same Page 33 result by simply formulating the regulation as a ballot access restriction under the Elections Clause. We refuse to adopt an interpretation of the Elections Clause that would so cavalierly disregard what the Framers intended to be a fundamental constitutional safeguard. Moreover, petitioners' broad construction of the Elections Clause is fundamentally inconsistent with the Framers' view of that Clause. The Framers intended the Elections Clause to grant States authority to create procedural regulations, not to provide States with license to exclude classes of candidates*833 from federal office. During the Convention debates, for example, Madison illustrated the procedural focus of the Elections Clause by noting that it covered "[w]hether the electors should vote by ballot or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place, sh[oul]d all vote for all the representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district." 2 Farrand 240. Similarly, during the ratification debates, proponents of the Constitution noted: " [T]he power over the manner only enables them to determine how these electors shall elect -whether by ballot, or by vote, or by any other way." 4 Elliot's Debates 71 (Steele statement at North Carolina ratifying convention) (emphasis in original).FN47 FN47. See also "The Republican," Connecticut Courant (Hartford, Jan. 7, 1788), 1 Bailyn 710, 713 ("The constitution expressly provides that the choice shall be by the people, which cuts off both from the general and state Legislatures the power of so regulating the mode of election, as to deprive the people of a fair choice"). Hamilton made a similar point in The Federalist No. 60, in which he defended the Constitution's grant to Congress of the power to override state regulations. Hamilton expressly distinguished the broad power to set qualifications from the limited authority under the Elections Clause, noting that "there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended but by prescribing © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 278 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream. aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTNILE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 35 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1.842) qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections." The Federalist No. 60, at 371 (emphasis in original). As Hamilton's statement suggests, the Framers understood the EIections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate *834 electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints. Our cases interpreting state power under the Elections Clause reflect the same understanding. The Elections Clause gives States authority "to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved." **1870 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S., at 366, 52 S.Ct., at 399. However, "[t]he power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections does not justify, without more, the abridgment of fundamental rights." Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217, 107 S.Ct. 544, 550, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). States are thus entitled to adopt "generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself." Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570, n. 9, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). For example, in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974), the case on which petitioners place principal reliance, we upheld the validity of certain provisions of the California Elections Code. In so doing, we emphasized the States' interest in having orderly, fair, and honest elections "rather than chaos." Id., at 730, 94 S.Ct., at 1279. We also recognized the "States' strong interest in maintaining the integrity of the political process by preventing interparty raiding," id., at 731, 94 S.Ct., at 1279, and explained that the specific requirements applicable to independents were "expressive of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot," id., at 733, 94 S.Ct., at 1281. In other cases, we have approved the States' interests in Page 34 avoiding "voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies," Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-195, 107 S.Ct. 533, 537, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986), in " seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently," Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S., at 433, 112 S.Ct., at 2063, and in "guard[ing] against irregularity and error in the tabulation of votes," Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25, 92 S.Ct. 804, 810, 31 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972). In short, we have approved of state regulations designed to ensure that *835 elections are " `fair and honest and ... [that] some sort of order, rather than chaos, ... accompan[ies] the democratic processes.' " Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S., at 433, 112 S.Ct., at 2063, quoting Storer, 415 U.S., at 730, 94 S.Ct., at 1279. The provisions at issue in Storer and our other Elections Clause cases were thus constitutional because they regulated election procedures and did not even arguably impose any substantive qualification rendering a class of potential candidates ineligible for ballot position. They served the state interest in protecting the integrity and regularity of the election process, an interest independent of any attempt to evade the constitutional prohibition against the imposition of additional qualifications for service in Congress. And they did not involve measures that exclude candidates from the ballot without reference to the candidates' support in the electoral process. Our cases upholding state regulations of election procedures thus provide little support for the contention that a state -imposed ballot access restriction is constitutional when it is undertaken for the twin goals of disadvantaging a particular class of candidates and evading the dictates of the Qualifications Clauses.FN48 FN48. Nor does Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982), support petitioners. In Clements, the Court rejected First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to Texas' so-called "resign -to -run" provision. That provision treated an elected state official's declaration of candidacy for another © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works, Packet Page 279 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 36 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 35 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) elected office as an automatic resignation from the office then held. We noted that the regulation was a permissible attempt to regulate state officeholders. See id., at 972, 102 S.Ct., at 2848 ("Appellees are elected state officeholders who contest restrictions on partisan political activity") (emphasis deleted); id., at 974, n. 1, 102 S.Ct., at 2849, n. 1 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The fact that appellees hold state office is sufficient to justify a restriction on their ability to run for other office that is not imposed on the public generally"). As the Ninth Circuit recognized in upholding a similar resign -to -run statute from Arizona. "The burden on candidacy ... is indirect and attributable to a desire to regulate state officeholders and not to impose additional qualifications to serving in Congress." Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523, 1528 (1983); see also Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853, 859 (CA2 1980) ("New York's purpose is to regulate the judicial office that [the candidate] holds, not the Congressional office he seeks"). Moreover, as now -Chief Judge Newman observed while upholding similar restrictions imposed by New York, such provisions "plac[e] no obstacle between [a candidate] and the ballot or his nomination or his election. He is free to run and the people are free to choose him." Id., at 859. *836 We do not understand the dissent to contest our primary thesis, namely, that if **1871 the qualifications for Congress are fixed in the Constitution, then a state -passed measure with the avowed purpose of imposing indirectly such an additional qualification violates the Constitution. The dissent, instead, raises two objections, challenging the assertion that the Arkansas amendment has the likely effect of creating a qualification, post, at 1909-1910, and suggesting that the true intent of Amendment 73 was not to evade the Qualifications Clauses but rather to simply "level the playing field," post, at 1911. Neither of these objections has merit. [161 As to the first, it is simply irrelevant to our holding today. As we note above in n. 45, our prior cases strongly suggest that write-in candidates will have only a slim chance of success, and the Arkansas plurality agreed. However, we expressly do not rest on this Court's prior observations regarding write-in candidates. Instead, we hold that a state amendment is unconstitutional when it has the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly. Thus, the dissent's discussion of the evidence concerning the possibility that a popular incumbent will win a write-in election is simply beside the point. As to the second argument, we find wholly unpersuasive the dissent's suggestion that Amendment 73 was designed merely to "level the playing field." As we have noted, supra, at 1867-1868, it is obvious that the sole purpose of Amendment 73 was to limit the terms of elected officials, both state and federal, and that Amendment 73, therefore, may not stand. *837 V The merits of term limits, or "rotation," have been the subject of debate since the formation of our Constitution, when the Framers unanimously rejected a proposal to add such limits to the Constitution. The cogent arguments on both sides of the question that were articulated during the process of ratification largely retain their force today. Over half the States have adopted measures that impose such limits on some offices either directly or indirectly, and the Nation as a whole, notably by constitutional amendment, has imposed a limit on the number of terms that the President may serve.FN49 Term limits, like any other qualification for office, unquestionably restrict the ability of voters to vote for whom they wish. On the other hand, such limits may provide for the infusion of fresh ideas and new perspectives, and may decrease the likelihood that representatives will lose touch with their constituents. It is not our province to resolve this longstanding debate. © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 280 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 37 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 36 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) FN49. See U.S. Const., Arndt. 22 (1951) (limiting Presidents to two 4-year terms). We are, however, firmly convinced that allowing the several States to adopt term limits for congressional service would effect a fundamental change in the constitutional framework. Any such change must come not by Iegislation adopted either by Congress or by an individual State, but rather -as have other important changes in the electoral process FN5°-through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V. The Framers decided that the qualifications for service in the Congress of the United States be fixed in the Constitution and be uniform throughout the Nation. That decision reflects the Framers' understanding that Members of Congress are chosen by separate constituencies, but that *838 they become, when elected, servants of the people of the United States. They are not merely delegates appointed by separate, sovereign States; they occupy offices that are integral and essential components of a single National Government. In the absence of a properly passed constitutional amendment, allowing individual States to craft their own qualifications for Congress would thus erode the structure envisioned by the Framers, a structure that was designed, in the words of the Preamble to our Constitution, to form a " more perfect Union." FN50. See, e.g., Arndt. 17 (1913) (direct elections of Senators); Arndt. 19 (1920) (extending suffrage to women); Arndt. 22 (1951) (Presidential term limits); Arndt. 24 (1964) (prohibition against poll taxes); Arndt. 26 (1971) (lowering age of voter eligibility to 18). The judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. **1872 Justice KENNEDY, concurring. I join the opinion of the Court. The majority and dissenting opinions demonstrate the intricacy of the question whether or not the Qualifications Clauses are exclusive. In my view, however, it is well settled that the whole people of the United States asserted their political identity and unity of purpose when they created the federal system. The dissent's course of reasoning suggesting otherwise might be construed to disparage the republican character of the National Government, and it seems appropriate to add these few remarks to explain why that course of argumentation runs counter to fundamental principles of federalism. Federalism was our Nations own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it. It is appropriate to recall these origins, which instruct us as to the *839 nature of the two different governments created and confirmed by the Constitution. A distinctive character of the National Government, the mark of its legitimacy, is that it owes its existence to the act of the whole people who created it. It must be remembered that the National Government, too, is republican in essence and in theory. John Jay insisted on this point early in The Federalist Papers, in his comments on the government that preceded the one formed by the Constitution. "To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people; each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection.... "A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence...." The Federalist No. 2, pp. 38-39 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (hereinafter The Federalist). Once the National Government was formed under our Constitution, the same republican principles continued to guide its operation and practice. As © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 281 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.corn/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/ 14/2007 Page 38 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) James Madison explained, the House of Representatives "derive[s] its powers from the people of America," and "the operation of the government on the people in their individual capacities" makes it "a national government," not merely a federal one. Id., No. 39, at 244, 245 (emphasis deleted). The Court confirmed this principle in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404-405, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), when it said: "The government of the Union, then, ... is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit." The same theory led us to observe as follows in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 666, 4 S.Ct. 152, 159, 28 L.Ed. 274 (1884): "In a republican government, like ours, ... political *840 power is reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people" In one sense it is true that "the people of each State retained their separate political identities," post, at 1877, for the Constitution takes care both to preserve the States and to make use of their identities and structures at various points in organizing the federal union. It does not at all follow from this that the sole political identity of an American is with the State of his or her residence. It denies the dual character of the Federal Government which is its very foundation to assert that the people of the United States do not have a political identity as well, one independent of, though consistent with, their identity as citizens of the State of their residence. Cf. post, at 1876-1877. It must be recognized that " `[f]or all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country.' " Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (quoting Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849) (Taney, C.I., dissenting); see **1873Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43, 18 L.Ed. 745 (1868) ("The people of these United States constitute one nation" and "have a government in which all of them are deeply interested"). It might be objected that because the States ratified the Constitution, the people can delegate power Page 37 only through the States or by acting in their capacities as citizens of particular States. See post, at 1875-1876. But in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court set forth its authoritative rejection of this idea: ""The Convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected by the State legislatures. But the instrument ... was submitted to the people.... It is true, they assembled in their several States -and where else should they have assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American people into one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But *841 the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of the State governments." 4 Wheat., at 403. The political identity of the entire people of the Union is reinforced by the proposition, which I take to be beyond dispute, that, though limited as to its objects, the National Government is, and must be, controlled by the people without collateral interference by the States. McCulloch affirmed this proposition as well, when the Court rejected the suggestion that States could interfere with federal powers. "This was not intended by the American people. They did not design to make their government dependent on the States." Id., at 432. The States have no power, reserved or otherwise, over the exercise of federal authority within its proper sphere. See id., at 430 (where there is an attempt at "usurpation of a power which the people of a single State cannot give," there can be no question whether the power "has been surrendered" by the people of a single State because "[t]he right never existed"). That the States may not invade the sphere of federal sovereignty is as incontestable, in my view, as the corollary proposition that the Federal Government must be held within the boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon matters reserved to the States. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). Of course, because the Framers recognized that state power and identity were essential parts of the © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 282 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti 1 &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 39 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) federal balance, see The Federalist No. 39, the Constitution is solicitous of the prerogatives of the States, even in an otherwise sovereign federal province. The Constitution uses state boundaries to fix the size of congressional delegations, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 3, ensures that each State shall have at least one representative, ibid., grants States certain powers over the times, places, and manner of federal elections (subject to congressional revision), Art. I, § 4, ct. 1, requires that when the President is elected by the House of Representatives, the delegationsfrom *842 each State have one vote, Art. II, § 1, cl. 3, and Arndt. 12, and allows States to appoint electors for the President, Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Nothing in the Constitution or The Federalist Papers, however, supports the idea of state interference with the most basic relation between the National Government and its citizens, the selection of legislative representatives. Indeed, even though the Constitution uses the qualifications for voters of the most numerous branch of the States' own legislatures to set the qualifications of federal electors, Art. I, § 2, cl. 1, when these electors vote, we have recognized that they act in a federal capacity and exercise a federal right. Addressing this principle in Ex parse Yarbrough the Court stated as follows: "[T]he right to vote for a member of Congress" is an "office ... created by that Constitution, and by that alone.... It is not true, therefore, that electors for members of Congress owe their right to vote to the State law in any sense which makes the exercise of the right to depend exclusively on the law of the State." 110 U.S., at 663-664, 4 S.Ct., at 158. We made the same point in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1037-1038, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941), when we said: "[Tlhe right of qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots and have them counted at Congressional elections ... is a right secured by the Constitution" and "is **1874 secured against the action of individuals as well as of states." The federal character of congressional elections flows from the political reality that our National Government is republican in form and that national citizenship has privileges and immunities protected from state abridgment by the force of the Constitution itself. Even before the passage of the Page 38 Fourteenth Amendment, the latter proposition was given expression in Crandall v. Nevada where the Court recognized the right of the Federal Government to call "any or all of its citizens to aid in its service, as members of the Congress, of the courts, of the executive departments, and to fill all its other offices," and further recognized that "this right cannot be made to depend upon the pleasure of a State over whose *843 territory they must pass to reach the point where these services must be rendered." 6 Wall., at 43. And without reference to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the rights of national citizenship were upheld again in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876), where the Court said: "The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing else connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances." Cf. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 513, 59 S.Ct. 954, 963, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Black, J., and joined in relevant part by Hughes, C.J.) ("Citizenship of the United States would be little better than a name if it did not carry with it the right to discuss national legislation and the benefits, advantages, and opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom"). In the Slaughter -House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 78-80, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873), the Court was careful to hold that federal citizenship in and of itself suffices for the assertion of rights under the Constitution, rights that stem from sources other than the States. Though the Slaughter -House Cases interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, its view of the origins of federal citizenship was not confined to that source. Referring to these rights of national dimension and origin the Court observed: "But Iest it should be said that no such privileges and immunities are to be found if those we have been considering; are excluded, we venture to suggest some which owe © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 283 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti= l&prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 40 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881,63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws." Id., at 79. Later cases only reinforced the idea that there are such incidents of national citizenship. See *844Ex parte Yarbrough, supra; Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 42 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed. 352 (1922); United States v. Classic, supra; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). Federal privileges and immunities may seem limited in their formulation by comparison with the expansive definition given to the privileges and immunities attributed to state citizenship, see Slaughter -House Cases, supra, at 78; Hague, supra, at 520, 59 S.Ct., at 966 (opinion of Stone, J.), but that federal rights flow to the people of the United States by virtue of national citizenship is beyond dispute. Not the least of the incongruities in the position advanced by Arkansas is the proposition, necessary to its case, that it can burden the rights of resident voters in federal elections by reason of the manner in which they earlier had exercised it. If the majority of the voters had been successful in selecting a candidate, they would be penalized from exercising that same right in the future. Quite apart from any First Amendment concerns, see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786-788, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1568-1569, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), neither the law nor federal theory allows a State to burden the exercise of federal rights in this manner. See Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., supra, at 532, 42 S.Ct., at 188-89; **1875Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 629-631, 89 S.Ct., at 1329. Indeed, as one of the "right[s] of the citizen[s] of this great country, protected by implied guarantees of its Constitution," the Court identified the right " `to come to the seat of government ... to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions.' " Slaughter -House Cases, supra, at 79 (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall., at 44). This observation serves to illustrate the extent of the State's attempted interference with the federal right to vote (and the derivative right to serve if elected by majority vote) in a congressional election, rights that do not derive from the state Page 39 power in the first instance but that belong to the voter in his or her capacity as a citizen of the United States. It is maintained by our dissenting colleagues that the State of Arkansas seeks nothing more than to grant its people*845 surer control over the National Government, a control, it is said, that will be enhanced by the law at issue here. The arguments for term limitations (or ballot restrictions having the same effect) are not lacking in force; but the issue, as all of us must acknowledge, is not the efficacy of those measures but whether they have a legitimate source, given their origin in the enactments of a single State. There can be no doubt, if we are to respect the republican origins of the Nation and preserve its federal character, that there exists a federal right of citizenship, a relationship between the people of the Nation and their National Government, with which the States may not interfere. Because the Arkansas enactment intrudes upon this federal domain, it exceeds the boundaries of the Constitution. Justice THOMAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice O'CONNOR, and Justice SCALIA join, dissenting. It is ironic that the Court bases today's decision on the right of the people to "choose whom they please to govern them." See ante, at 1845, 1850, 1851, 1862. Under our Constitution, there is only one State whose people have the right to "choose whom they please" to represent Arkansas in Congress. The Court holds, however, that neither the elected legislature of that State nor the people themselves (acting by ballot initiative) may prescribe any qualifications for those representatives. The majority therefore defends the right of the people of Arkansas to "choose whom they please to govern them" by invalidating a provision that won nearly 60% of the votes cast in a direct election and that carried every congressional district in the State. I dissent. Nothing in the Constitution deprives the people of each State of the power to prescribe eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them in Congress. The Constitution is simply silent on this question. And where the Constitution is silent, it raises no bar to action by © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 284 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 41 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) the States or the people. *846 I Because the majority fundamentally misunderstands the notion of "reserved" powers, I start with some first principles. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, the people of the States need not point to any affirmative grant of power in the Constitution in order to prescribe qualifications for their representatives in Congress, or to authorize their elected state Iegislators to do so. A Our system of government rests on one overriding principle: All power stems from the consent of the people. To phrase the principle in this way, however, is to be imprecise about something important to the notion of "reserved" powers. The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole. The ratification procedure erected by Article VII makes this point clear. The Constitution took effect once it had been ratified by the people gathered in convention in nine different States. But the Constitution went into effect only "between the States so ratifying the same," Art. VII; it did not bind the people of North Carolina until they had accepted it. In Madison's words, the popular consent upon which the Constitution's authority rests was "given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but **1876 as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong." The Federalist No. 39, p. 243 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (hereinafter The Federalist). Accord, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 94 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876) (hereinafter Elliot) (remarks of James Madison at the Virginia Convention).41 FNL The ringing initial words of the Page 40 Constitution -"We the People of the United States" -convey something of the same idea. (In the Constitution, after all, "the United States" is consistently a plural noun. See Art. I, § 9, cl. 8; Art. II, § 1, cl. 7; Art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Art. III, § 3, cl. 1; cf. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1455 (1987) (noting this fact, though reaching other conclusions).) The Preamble that the Philadelphia Convention approved before sending the Constitution to the Committee of Style is even clearer. It began: "We the people of the States of New -Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode -Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New -York, New -Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North -Carolina, South -Carolina, and Georgia...." 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 565 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (hereinafter Farrand). Scholars have suggested that the Committee of Style adopted the current language because it was not clear that all the States would actually ratify the Constitution. M. Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 190-191 (1913). In this instance, at least, I agree with the majority that the Committee's edits did not work a substantive change in the Constitution. Cf. ante, at 1849, n. 8. *847 When they adopted the Federal Constitution, of course, the people of each State surrendered some of their authority to the United States (and hence to entities accountable to the people of other States as well as to themselves). They affirmatively deprived their States of certain powers, see, e.g., Art. I, § 10, and they affirmatively conferred certain powers upon the Federal Government, see, e.g., Art. I, § 8. Because the people of the several States are the only true source of power, however, the Federal Government enjoys no authority beyond what the Constitution confers: The Federal Government's powers are limited and enumerated. In the words of Justice Black: "The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 285 of 433 http://weia2.westlaw.corn/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l&prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 42 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) source." Reid v. Coven, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1225, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). In each State, the remainder of the people's powers-" [t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States," Arndt. 10-are either delegated to the state government or retained by the people. The Federal Constitution does not specify which of these two possibilities obtains; it is up to the various state constitutions to declare which powers the people of each State have delegated to their state government. As far as *848 the Federal Constitution is concerned, then, the States can exercise all powers that the Constitution does not withhold from them. The Federal Government and the States thus face different default rules: Where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power -that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or by necessary implication -the Federal Government lacks that power and the States enjoy it. These basic principles are enshrined in the Tenth Amendment, which declares that all powers neither delegated to the Federal Government nor prohibited to the States "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." With this careful last phrase, the Amendment avoids taking any position on the division of power between the state governments and the people of the States: It is up to the people of each State to determine which "reserved" powers their state government may exercise. But the Amendment does make clear that powers reside at the state level except where the Constitution removes them from that level. All powers that the Constitution neither delegates to the Federal Government nor prohibits to the States are controlled by the people of each State. To be sure, when the Tenth Amendment uses the phrase "the people," it does not specify whether it is referring to the people of each State or the people of the Nation as a whole. But the latter interpretation would make the Amendment pointless: There would have been no reason to provide that where the Constitution is silent about whether a particular power resides at the state level, it might or might not do so. In addition,**1877 it would make no Page 41 sense to speak of powers as being reserved to the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole, because the Constitution does not contemplate that those people will either exercise power or delegate it. The Constitution simply does not recognize any mechanism for action by the undifferentiated people of the Nation. Thus, the amendment provision of Article *849 V calls for amendments to be ratified not by a convention of the national people, but by conventions of the people in each State or by the state legislatures elected by those people. Likewise, the Constitution calls for Members of Congress to be chosen State by State, rather than in nationwide elections. Even the selection of the President -surely the most national of national figures -is accomplished by an electoral college made up of delegates chosen by the various States, and candidates can lose a Presidential election despite winning a majority of the votes cast in the Nation as a whole. See also Art. 11, § 1, cl. 3 (providing that when no candidate secures a majority of electoral votes, the election of the President is thrown into the House of Representatives, where "the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representatives from each State having one Vote"); Arndt. 12 (same). In short, the notion of popular sovereignty that undergirds the Constitution does not erase state boundaries, but rather tracks them. The people of each State obviously did trust their fate to the people of the several States when they consented to the Constitution; not only did they empower the governmental institutions of the United States, but they also agreed to be bound by constitutional amendments that they themselves refused to ratify. See Art. V (providing that proposed amendments shall take effect upon ratification by three-quarters of the States). At the same time, however, the people of each State retained their separate political identities. As Chief Justice Marshall put it, "No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American people into one common mass." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 403, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).FN' FN2. The concurring opinion appears to c0 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 286 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstrearn.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTNILE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 43 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) draw precisely the opposite conclusion from the passage in McCulloch that contains this sentence. See ante, at 1873. But while the concurring opinion seizes on Marshall's references to "the people," Marshall was merely using that phrase in contradistinction to "the State governments. " Counsel for Maryland had noted that " the constitution was formed and adopted, not by the people of the United States at large, but by the people of the respective States. To suppose that the mere proposition of this fundamental law threw the American people into one aggregate mass, would be to assume what the instrument itself does not profess to establish." McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 363) (argument of counsel). Marshall's opinion accepted this premise, even borrowing some of counsel's language. See id., at 403. What Marshall rejected was counsel's conclusion that the Constitution therefore was merely "a compact between the States." See id., at 363 (argument of counsel). As Marshall explained, the acts of "the people themselves" in the various ratifying conventions should not be confused with "the measures of the State governments." Id., at 403; see also id., at 404 (noting that no state government could control whether the people of that State decided to adopt the Constitution). *850 Any ambiguity in the Tenth Amendment's use of the phrase "the people" is cleared up by the body of the Constitution itself. Article I begins by providing that the Congress of the United States enjoys "[ajll legislative Powers herein granted," § 1, and goes on to give a careful enumeration of Congress' powers, § 8. It then concludes by enumerating certain powers that are prohibited to the States. The import of this structure is the same as the import of the Tenth Amendment: If we are to invalidate Arkansas' Amendment 73, we must point to something in the Federal Constitution that deprives the people of Arkansas of the power to enact such measures. Page 42 The majority disagrees that it bears this burden. But its arguments are unpersuasive. The majority begins by announcing an enormous and untenable limitation on the principle expressed by the Tenth Amendment. According to the majority, the States possess only those powers that the Constitution**1878 affirmatively grants to them or that they enjoyed before the Constitution was adopted; the Tenth Amendment "could only ` reserve' that *851 which existed before." Ante, at 1854. From the fact that the States had not previously enjoyed any powers over the particular institutions of the Federal Government established by the Constitution,FN3 the majority derives a rule precisely opposite to the one that the Amendment actually prescribes: " `[Tjhe states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national government, which the constitution does not delegate to them.' " Ibid. (quoting 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 627 (3d ed. 1858)). FN3. At the time of the framing, of course, a Federal Congress had been operating under the Articles of Confederation for some 10 years. The States unquestionably had enjoyed the power to establish qualifications for their delegates to this body, above and beyond the qualifications created by the Articles themselves. See Brief for Respondents Bobbie E. HiIl et al. 39, n. 79 (conceding this point); see also, e.g., Md. Const. of 1776, Art. XXVII (prescribing such qualifications), in 3 Federal and State Constitutions 1695-1696 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (hereinafter Thorpe); N.H. Const. of 1784, Pt. H (same), in 4 Thorpe 2467. It is surprising, then, that the concurring opinion seeks to buttress the majority's case by stressing the continuing applicability of "the same © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 287 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 44 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) republican principles" that had prevailed under the Articles. See ante, at 1872. The majority's essential logic is that the state governments could not "reserve" any powers that they did not control at the time the Constitution was drafted. But it was not the state governments that were doing the reserving. The Constitution derives its authority instead from the consent of the people of the States. Given the fundamental principle that all governmental powers stem from the people of the States, it would simply be incoherent to assert that the people of the States could not reserve any powers that they had not previously controlled. The Tenth Amendment's use of the word "reserved" does not help the majority's position. If someone says that the power to use a particular facility is reserved to some group, he is not saying anything about whether that group has previously used the facility. He is merely saying that the people*852 who control the facility have designated that group as the entity with authority to use it. The Tenth Amendment is similar: The people of the States, from whom all governmental powers stem, have specified that all powers not prohibited to the States by the Federal Constitution are reserved "to the States respectively, or to the people." The majority is therefore quite wrong to conclude that the people of the States cannot authorize their state governments to exercise any powers that were unknown to the States when the Federal Constitution was drafted. Indeed, the majority's position frustrates the apparent purpose of the Amendment's final phrase. The Amendment does not pre-empt any limitations on state power found in the state constitutions, as it might have done if it simply had said that the powers not delegated to the Federal Government are reserved to the States. But the Amendment also does not prevent the people of the States from amending their state constitutions to remove limitations that were in effect when the Federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights were ratified. In an effort to defend its position, the majority points to language in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 549, Page 43 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1016-17, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985), which it takes to indicate that the Tenth Amendment covers only "the original powers of [state] sovereignty." Ante, at 1854. But Garcia dealt with an entirely different issue: the extent to which principles of state sovereignty implicit in our federal system curtail Congress' authority to exercise its enumerated powers. When we are asked to decide whether a congressional statute that appears to have been authorized by Article I is nonetheless unconstitutional because it invades a protected sphere of state sovereignty, it may well be appropriate for us to inquire into what we have called the "traditional aspects of state sovereignty." See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841, 849, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 2469, 2473, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976); see also **1879New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-157, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2417-2418, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). The question *853 raised by the present case, however, is not whether any principle of state sovereignty implicit in the Tenth Amendment bars congressional action that Article I appears to authorize, but rather whether Article I bars state action that it does not appear to forbid. The principle necessary to answer this question is express on the Tenth Amendment's face: Unless the Federal Constitution affirmatively prohibits an action by the States or the people, it raises no bar to such action. The majority also seeks support for its view of the Tenth Amendment in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). See ante, at 1854. But this effort is misplaced. McCulloch did make clear that a power need not be "expressly" delegated to the United States or prohibited to the States in order to fall outside the Tenth Amendment's reservation; delegations and prohibitions can also arise by necessary implication. FN4 True to the text of the Tenth Amendment, however, McCulloch indicated that all powers as to which the Constitution does not speak (whether expressly or by necessary implication) are "reserved " to the state level. Thus, in its only discussion of the Tenth Amendment, McCulloch observed that the Amendment "leav[es] the question, whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one government, 0 2007 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 288 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=l8&f... 3/14/2007 Page 45 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole [Constitution]." 4 Wheat., at 406. McCulloch did not qualify this observation by indicating that the question also turned on whether the States had enjoyed the power before the framing. To the contrary, McCulloch seemed to assume that the people had "conferred on the general government the power contained in the constitution, and on the States the whole residuum of power." Id., at 410. FN4. Despite the majority's odd suggestion to the contrary, see ante, at 1851-1852, n. 12, 1 fully agree with this sensible position. See supra, at 1876. The structure of McCulloch 's analysis also refutes the majority's position. The question before the Court was *854 whether the State of Maryland could tax the Bank of the United States, which Congress had created in an effort to accomplish objects entrusted to it by the Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion began by upholding the federal statute incorporating the bank. Id., at 400-425. It then held that the Constitution affirmatively prohibited Maryland's tax on the bank created by this statute. Id., at 425-437. The Court relied principally on concepts that it deemed inherent in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, which declares that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land...." In the Court's view, when a power has been "delegated to the United States by the Constitution," Arndt. 10, the Supremacy Clause forbids a State to "retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry [that power] into execution." McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 436. Thus, the Court concluded that the very nature of state taxation on the bank's operations was "incompatible with, and repugnant to," the federal statute creating the bank. See id., at 425. For the past 175 years, McCulloch has been understood to rest on the proposition that the Constitution affirmatively barred Maryland from imposing its tax on the bank's operations. See, e.g., Page 44 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 859-868, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824) (reaffirming McCulloch 's conclusion that by operation of the Supremacy Clause, the federal statute incorporating the bank impliedly pre-empted state laws attempting to tax the bank's operations); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2129, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981) (citing McCulloch for the proposition that the Supremacy Clause deprives the States of the power to pass laws that conflict with federal statutes); see also North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 434, 110 S.Ct. 1986, 1994, 109 L.Ed.2d 420 (1990) (plurality opinion) (citing McCulloch for the proposition that state laws may violate the Supremacy Clause when they " regulate the Government **1880 directly or discriminate against *855 it").FN5 For the majority, however, McCulloch apparently turned on the fact that before the Constitution was adopted, the States had possessed no power to tax the instrumentalities of the governmental institutions that the Constitution created. This understanding of McCulloch makes most of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion irrelevant; according to the majority, there was no need to inquire into whether federal law deprived Maryland of the power in question, because the power could not fall into the category of "reserved" powers anyway.FN6 FN5. Though cited by the majority, see ante, at 1854, Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L.Ed. 745 (1868), did not deviate from this accepted view of McCulloch. See Crandall, supra, at 48 (observing that McCulloch and a number of other cases " distinctly placed the invalidity of the State taxes on the ground that they interfered with an authority of the Federal government ,'). FN6. To support its decision to attribute such surplusage to McCulloch, the majority quotes Marshall's observation that his opinion " `does not deprive the States of any resources which they originally possessed,' " because the power to tax federal instrumentalities was not encompassed by the States' " 'original © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 289 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/pi intstream. aspx?sv=Split&rlti= l &prft=HTNILE&n=18 &f... 3/ 14/2007 Page 46 of 84 115 S.Ct, 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881,63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) right to tax.' " Ante, at 1854 (quoting McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 436, 430). In part, Marshall was simply refuting counsel's argument that it would constitute an "overwhelming invasion of State sovereignty" for Congress to establish a bank that operated within a State but that nonetheless was exempt from state taxes. See Id., at 337-339 (argument of counsel) (stressing that "the right to raise revenue" is "the highest attribute of sovereignty" and indeed amounts to "the right to exist"). While Marshall acknowledged that "this original right of taxation" was an "essential " attribute of state sovereignty that Congress could not constitutionally control or invade, he focused more precisely than counsel on "the nature and extent of this original right," id., at 428, and concluded that it did not include the right "to tax the means employed by the government of the Union, for the execution of its powers." Id., at 430. In this respect, then, the Court was referring to the States' "original" powers in much the same context as Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolittan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985): The Court was examining whether Congress' exercise of the "privilege of exempting its own measures from State taxation," McCulloch, supra, at 434, had invaded a protected sphere of state sovereignty. Marshall did go on to argue that the power to tax the operations of the Bank of the United States simply was not susceptible to control by the people of a single State. See 4 Wheat., at 430. But that theory is perfectly consistent with my position. Marshall reasoned that the people of a single State may not tax the instrumentalities employed by the people of all the States through the National Government, because such taxation would effectively subject the people of the several States to the taxing power of a single State. See id., at 428. This sort of argument proves that the people of a single State may not prescribe qualifications for Page 45 the President of the United States; the selection of the President, like the operation of the Bank of the United States, is not up to the people of any single State. See infra, at 1882. It does not follow, however, that the people of a single State may not prescribe qualifications for their own representatives in Congress. *856 Despite the majority's citation of Garcia and McCulloch, the only true support for its view of the Tenth Amendment comes from Joseph Story's 1833 treatise on constitutional law. See 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 623-628. Justice Story was a brilliant and accomplished man, and one cannot casually dismiss his views. On the other hand, he was not a member of the Founding generation, and his Commentaries on the Constitution were written a half century after the framing. Rather than representing the original understanding of the Constitution, they represent only his own understanding. In a range of cases concerning the federal state relation, moreover, this Court has deemed positions taken in Story's commentaries to be more nationalist than the Constitution warrants. Compare, e.g., id., §§ 1063-1069 (arguing that the Commerce Clause deprives the States of the power to regulate any commerce within Congress' reach), with Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1852) (holding that Congress' Commerce Clause powers are not exclusive). See also 1 Life and Letters of Joseph Story 296 (W. Story ed. 1851) (extract of manuscript written by Story) ("I hold it to be a maxim, which should never be lost sight of by a great statesman, that the Government of the United States is *857 intrinsically too weak, and the powers of the State Governments too strong"). In this case too, Story's position that the only powers reserved to the States are those that the States enjoyed before the framing conflicts with both the plain language of the Tenth Amendment and the underlying theory of the Constitution. **1881 2 © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 290 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 47 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) The majority also sketches out what may be an alternative (and narrower) argument. Again citing Story, the majority suggests that it would be inconsistent with the notion of "national sovereignty " for the States or the people of the States to have any reserved powers over the selection of Members of Congress. See ante, at 1855, 1855-1856. The majority apparently reaches this conclusion in two steps. First, it asserts that because Congress as a whole is an institution of the National Government, the individual Members of Congress "owe primary allegiance not to the people of a State, but to the people of the Nation." See ante, at 1855. Second, it concludes that because each Member of Congress has a nationwide constituency once he takes office, it would be inconsistent with the Framers' scheme to let a single State prescribe qualifications for him. See ante, at 1855, 1871. Political scientists can debate about who commands the "primary allegiance" of Members of Congress once they reach Washington. From the framing to the present, however, the selections of the Representatives and Senators from each State has been left entirely to the people of that State or to their state legislature. See Art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that Members of the House of Representatives are chosen "by the People of the several States"); Art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (originally providing that the Senators from each State are " chosen by the Legislature thereof"); Arndt. 17 (amending § 3 to provide that the Senators from each State are "elected by the people thereof"). The very name "congress" suggests a *858 coming together of representatives from distinct entities.FN7 In keeping with the complexity of our federal system, once the representatives chosen by the people of each State assemble in Congress, they form a national body and are beyond the control of the individual States until the next election. But the selection of representatives in Congress is indisputably an act of the people of each State, not some abstract people of the Nation as a whole. FN7. See 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 393 (4th ed. 1773) (defining "congress" as "[a]n appointed meeting for settlement of affairs between Page 46 different nations: as, the congress of Cambray"); T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed. 1796) ("an appointed meeting for settlement of affairs between different nations; the assembly which governs the United States of America"). The concurring opinion suggests that this cannot be so, because it is the Federal Constitution that guarantees the right of the people of each State (so long as they are qualified electors under state law) to take part in choosing the Members of Congress from that State. See ante, at 1873-1874. But the presence of a federally guaranteed right hardly means that the selection of those representatives constitutes "the exercise of federal authority." See ante, at 1873. When the people of Georgia pick their representatives in Congress, they are acting as the people of Georgia, not as the corporate agents for the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole. See In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379, 10 S.Ct, 586, 587, 33 L.Ed. 951 (1890) ("Although [Presidential] electors are appointed and act under and pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, they are no more officers or agents of the United States than are the members of the state legislatures when acting as electors of federal senators, or the people of the States when acting as electors of representatives in Congress"). The concurring opinion protests that the exercise of " reserved" powers in the area of congressional elections would constitute "state interference with the most basic relation between the National*859 Government and its citizens, the selection of legislative representatives." See ante, at 1873. But when one strips away its abstractions, the concurring opinion is simply saying that the people of Arkansas cannot be permitted to inject themselves into the process by which they themselves select Arkansas' representatives in Congress. The concurring opinion attempts to defend this surprising proposition by pointing out that Americans are "citizens of the United States" as well as "of the State wherein they reside," Arndt. 14 § 1, and that national citizenship (particularly after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment) "has © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 291 of 433 http:Hweb2.westlaw.conVprintlprintstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft-HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 48 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) privileges **1882 and immunities protected from state abridgment by the force of the Constitution itself," ante, at 1874. These facts are indeed " beyond dispute," ante, at 1874, but they do not contradict anything that I have said. Although the United States obviously is a Nation, and although it obviously has citizens, the Constitution does not call for Members of Congress to be elected by the undifferentiated national citizenry; indeed, it does not recognize any mechanism at all (such as a national referendum) for action by the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole. See supra, at 1877. Even at the level of national politics, then, there always remains a meaningful distinction between someone who is a citizen of the United States and of Georgia and someone who is a citizen of the United States and of Massachusetts. The Georgia citizen who is unaware of this distinction will have it pointed out to him as soon as he tries to vote in a Massachusetts congressional election. In short, while the majority is correct that the Framers expected the selection process to create a " direct link" between Members of the House of Representatives and the people, ante, at 1855, the link was between the Representatives from each State and the people of that State; the people of Georgia have no say over whom the people of Massachusetts select to represent them in Congress. This arrangement*860 must baffle the majority, FNs whose understanding of Congress would surely fit more comfortably within a system of nationwide elections. But the fact remains that when it comes to the selection of Members of Congress, the people of each State have retained their independent political identity. As a result, there is absolutely nothing strange about the notion that the people of the States or their state legislatures possess " reserved" powers in this area. FN8. The majority even suggests that congressional elections do not really work in this way, because each House of Congress has the power to judge its Members' qualifications. See ante, at 1855 (citing Art. 1, § 5, cl. 1). But the power to act as "Judge" under Art. I, § 5, Page 47 is merely the power to apply pre-existing qualifications to which the people of each State have consented. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). Whether or not § 5 directs each House to judge state -law disqualifications as well as those contained in the Constitution, see infra, at 1897-1898, it is clear that neither House may exclude a representative from Massachusetts for failure to meet a qualification that the people of Massachusetts have not accepted. The majority seeks support from the Constitution's specification that Members of Congress "shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States." Art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see ante, at 1855. But the fact that Members of Congress draw a federal salary once they have assembled hardly means that the people of the States lack reserved powers over the selection of their representatives. Indeed, the historical evidence about the compensation provision suggests that the States' reserved powers may even extend beyond the selection stage. The majority itself indicates that if the Constitution had made no provision for congressional compensation, this topic would have been "left to state legislatures." Ante, at 1858; accord, 1 Farrand 215-216 (remarks of James Madison and George Mason); id., at 219, n. *. Likewise, Madison specifically indicated that even with the compensation provision in place, the individual States still *861 enjoyed the reserved power to supplement the federal salary. 3 id., at 315 (remarks at the Virginia ratifying convention). As for the fact that a State has no reserved power to establish qualifications for the office of President, see ante, at 1855, it surely need not follow that a State has no reserved power to establish qualifications for the Members of Congress who represent the people of that State. Because powers are reserved to the States "respectively," it is clear that no State may legislate for another State: Even though the Arkansas Legislature enjoys the reserved power to pass a minimum -wage law for Arkansas, it has no power to pass a minimum -wage law for © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 292 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/piint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti= l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 49 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881,63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct 1842) Vermont. For the same reason, Arkansas may not decree that only Arkansas citizens are eligible to be President of the United States; the selection of the President is not up to Arkansas alone, and Arkansas can no more prescribe the qualifications for that office than it can set the qualifications for Members of Congress from Florida. But none of this **1883 suggests that Arkansas cannot set qualifications for Members of Congress from Arkansas. In fact, the Constitution's treatment of Presidential elections actively contradicts the majority's position. While the individual States have no " reserved" power to set qualifications for the office of President, we have long understood that they do have the power (as far as the Federal Constitution is concerned) to set qualifications for their Presidential electors -the delegates that each State selects to represent it in the electoral college that actually chooses the Nation's chief executive. Even respondents do not dispute that the States may establish qualifications for their delegates to the electoral college, as long as those qualifications pass muster under other constitutional provisions (primarily the First and Fourteenth Amendments). See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 89 S.Ct. 5, 9-10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27-36, 13 S.Ct. 3, 7-11, 36 L.Ed. 869 (1892). As the majority cannot argue that the Constitutionaffirmatively *862 grants this power,FN9 the power must be one that is "reserved" to the States. It necessarily follows that the majority's understanding of the Tenth Amendment is incorrect, for the position of Presidential elector surely " `spring[s] out of the existence of the national government.' " See ante, at 1854. FN9. The only provision that might conceivably do so is Article II, § 1, which recognizes the authority of state legislatures to specify the "Manner" in which a State appoints its Presidential electors. But if a qualifications law is a " Manner" regulation for purposes of this Clause, then it is also a "Manner" regulation for purposes of Article 1, § 4-which would mean that the Constitution specifically recognizes the power of both Page 48 the States and the Congress to set qualifications for Senators and Representatives. In a final effort to deny that the people of the States enjoy "reserved" powers over the selection of their representatives in Congress, the majority suggests that the Constitution expressly delegates to the States certain powers over congressional elections. See ante, at 1855-1856. Such delegations of power, the majority argues, would be superfluous if the people of the States enjoyed reserved powers in this area. Only one constitutional provision -the Times, Places and Manner Clause of Article 1, § 4-even arguably supports the majority's suggestion. It reads: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." Contrary to the majority's assumption, however, this Clause does not delegate any authority to the States. Instead, it simply imposes a duty upon them. The majority gets it exactly right: By specifying that the state legislatures "shall" prescribe the details necessary to hold congressional elections, the Clause "expressly requires action by the States." *863 See ante, at 1855. This command meshes with one of the principal purposes of Congress' " make or alter" power: to ensure that the States hold congressional elections in the first place, so that Congress continues to exist. As one reporter summarized a speech made by John Jay at the New York ratifying convention:"[E]very government was imperfect, unless it had a power of preserving itself. Suppose that, by design or accident, the states should neglect to appoint representatives; certainly there should be some constitutional remedy for this evil. The obvious meaning of the paragraph was, that, if this neglect should take place, Congress should have power, by law, to support the government, and prevent the dissolution of the Union. [Jay] believed this was the design of the © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 293 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.corn/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 50 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct.1842) federal Convention." 2 Elliot 326 (emphasis in original). FN10 FNIO. Accord, e.g., 2 Elliot 24 (remarks of Caleb Strong at the Massachusetts ratifying convention) ("[I]f the legislature of a state should refuse to make such regulations, the consequence will be, that the representatives will not be chosen, and the general government will be dissolved. In such case, can gentlemen say that a power to remedy the evil is not necessary to be lodged somewhere? And where can it be lodged but in Congress?"); 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 400 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) (notes of Anthony Wayne at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention) ("4th section occasioned by an eventual invasion, insurrection, etc."); The Federalist No. 59, at 363 (Hamilton) (observing that if not subject to any checks, the States "could at any moment annihilate [the Federal Government] by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer its affairs"). These statements about the Clause's purposes also help refute the majority's claim that it was bizarre for the Framers to leave the States relatively free to enact qualifications for congressional office while simultaneously giving Congress " make or alter" power over the States' time, place, and manner regulations. See infra, at 1899-1900. **1884 Constitutional provisions that impose affirmative duties on the States are hardly inconsistent with the notion of reserved powers. *864 Of course, the second part of the Times, Places and Manner Clause does grant a power rather than impose a duty. As its contrasting uses of the words "shall" and "may" confirm, however, the Clause grants power exclusively to Congress, not to the States. If the Clause did not exist at all, the States would still be able to prescribe the times, Page 49 places, and manner of holding congressional elections; the deletion of the provision would simply deprive Congress of the power to override these state regulations. The majority also mentions Article II, § 1, cl. 2: " Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of [Presidential] Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress...." But this Clause has nothing to do with congressional elections, and in any event it, too, imposes an affirmative obligation on the States. In fact, some such barebones provision was essential in order to coordinate the creation of the electoral college. As mentioned above, moreover, it is uncontested that the States enjoy the reserved power to specify qualifications for the Presidential electors who are chosen pursuant to this Clause. See supra, at 1882-1883. Respondent Thornton seeks to buttress the majority's position with Article I, § 2, cl. 1, which provides: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." According to respondent Thornton, this provision " grants States authority to prescribe the qualifications of [voters]" in congressional elections. Brief for Respondent Congressman Ray Thornton 4. If anything, however, the Clause limits the power that the States would otherwise enjoy. Though it does leave States with the ability to control who may vote *865 in congressional elections, it has the effect of restricting their authority to establish special requirements that do not apply in elections for the state legislature. Our case law interpreting the CIause affirmatively supports the view that the States enjoy reserved powers over congressional elections. We have treated the Clause as a one-way ratchet: While the requirements for voting in congressional elections © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt, Works, Packet Page 294 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/ 14/2007 Page 51 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) cannot be more onerous than the requirements for voting in elections for the most numerous branch of the state legislature, they can be less so. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 225-229, 107 S.Ct. 544, 554-556, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). If this interpretation of the Clause is correct, it means that even with the Clause in place, States still have partial freedom to set special voting requirements for congressional elections. As this power is not granted in Article I, it must be among the "reserved" powers. II I take it to be established, then, that the people of Arkansas do enjoy "reserved" powers over the selection of their representatives in Congress. Purporting to exercise those reserved powers, they have agreed among themselves that the candidates covered by § 3 of Amendment 73-those whom they have already elected to three or more terms in the House of Representatives or to two or more terms in the Senate -should not be eligible to appear on the ballot for reelection, but should nonetheless be returned to Congress**1885 if enough voters are sufficiently enthusiastic about their candidacy to write in their names. Whatever one might think of the wisdom of this arrangement, we may not override the decision of the people of Arkansas unless something in the Federal Constitution deprives them of the power to enact such measures. The majority settles on "the Qualifications Clauses" as the constitutional provisions that Amendment 73 violates. See ante, at 1856. Because I do not read those provisions to impose*866 any unstated prohibitions on the States, it is unnecessary for me to decide whether the majority is correct to identify Arkansas' ballot -access restriction with laws fixing true term limits or otherwise prescribing " qualifications" for congressional office. As I discuss in Part A below, the Qualifications Clauses are merely straightforward recitations of the minimum eligibility requirements that the Framers thought it essential for every Member of Congress to meet. They restrict state power only in that they prevent the States from abolishing all eligibility requirements for membership in Congress. Page 50 Because the text of the Qualifications Clauses does not support its position, the majority turns instead to its vision of the democratic principles that animated the Framers. But the majority's analysis goes to a question that is not before us: whether Congress has the power to prescribe qualifications for its own members. As I discuss in Part B, the democratic principles that contributed to the Framers' decision to withhold this power from Congress do not prove that the Framers also deprived the people of the States of their reserved authority to set eligibility requirements for their own representatives. In Part C, I review the majority's more specific historical evidence. To the extent that they bear on this case, the records of the Philadelphia Convention affirmatively support my unwillingness to find hidden meaning in the Qualifications Clauses, while the surviving records from the ratification debates help neither side. As for the postratification period, five States supplemented the constitutional disqualifications in their very first election laws. The historical evidence thus refutes any notion that the Qualifications Clauses were generally understood to be exclusive. Yet the majority must establish just such an understanding in order to justify its position that the Clauses impose unstated prohibitions on the States and the people. In my view, the historical evidence is simply inadequate to warrant the majority's *867 conclusion that the Qualifications Clauses mean anything more than what they say. A The provisions that are generally known as the Qualifications Clauses read as follows: "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen" Art. I, § 2, cl. 2. "No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." Art. I, § 3, cl. 3. © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 295 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTNME&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 52 of 84 115 S.Ct, 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) Later in Article I, the "Ineligibility Clause" imposes another nationwide disqualification from congressional office: "[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." § 6, cl. 2. The majority is quite correct that the "negative phrasing" of these Clauses has little relevance. See ante, at 1849-1850, n. 8. The Qualifications Clauses would mean the same thing had they been enacted in the form that the Philadelphia Convention referred them to the Committee of Style: "Every Member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of twenty-five years at least; shall have been a citizen of the United States for at Ieast seven years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his election, an inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen." 2 Farrand 565. **1886 See also id., at 567 (same phrasing for Senate Qualifications Clause). But these different formulations -whether negative or affirmative -merely establish minimum qualifications. *868 They are quite different from an exclusive formulation, such as the following:"Every Person who shall have attained to the age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen, shall be eligible to be a Representative." At least on their face, then, the Qualifications Clauses do nothing to prohibit the people of a State from establishing additional eligibility requirements for their own representatives. Joseph Story thought that such a prohibition was nonetheless implicit in the constitutional list of qualifications, because "[f]rom the very nature of such a provision, the affirmation of these qualifications would seem to imply a negative of all others." 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 624 (1833); see also ante, at 1850 n. 9. This argument rests on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. When the Framers decided which qualifications to include in the Constitution, they also decided not to include any other qualifications in the Constitution. In Story's Page 51 view, it would conflict with this latter decision for the people of the individual States to decide, as a matter of state law, that they would like their own representatives in Congress to meet additional eligibility requirements. To spell out the logic underlying this argument is to expose its weakness. Even if one were willing to ignore the distinction between requirements enshrined in the Constitution and other requirements that the Framers were content to leave within the reach of ordinary law, Story's application of the expressio unius maxim takes no account of federalism. At most, the specification of certain nationwide disqualifications in the Constitution implies the negation of other nationwide disqualifications; it does not imply that individual States or their people are barred from adopting their own *869 disqualifications on a state -by -state basis. Thus, the one delegate to the Philadelphia Convention who voiced anything approaching Story's argument said only that a recital of qualifications in the Constitution would imply that Congress lacked any qualification -setting power. See 2 Farrand 123 (remarks of John Dickinson); cf. ante, at 1850, n. 9, and 1860-1861, n. 27. The Qualifications Clauses do prevent the individual States from abolishing all eligibility requirements for Congress. This restriction on state power reflects the fact that when the people of one State send immature, disloyal, or unknowledgeable representatives to Congress, they jeopardize not only their own interests but also the interests of the people of other States. Because Congress wields power over all the States, the people of each State need some guarantee that the legislators elected by the people of other States will meet minimum standards of competence. The Qualifications Clauses provide that guarantee: They list the requirements that the Framers considered essential to protect the competence of the National Legislature. FNI I FNI1. Thus, the age requirement was intended to ensure that Members of Congress were people of mature judgment and experience. See, e.g., 1 Farrand 375 © 2007 Thomson[West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 296 of 433 http:l/web2.westlaw.corm/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 53 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 52 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) (remarks of George Mason at the Philadelphia Convention); 3 id., at 147 (remarks of James McHenry before the Maryland House of Delegates). The citizenship requirement was intended both to ensure that Members of Congress were familiar with the country and that they were not unduly susceptible to foreign influence. See, e.g., 2 id., at 216 (remarks of George Mason). The inhabitancy requirement was intended to . produce a National Legislature whose Members, collectively, had a local knowledge of all the States. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 56 (Madison). The Ineligibility Clause was intended to guard against corruption. See, e.g., 1 Farrand 381 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton). If the people of a State decide that they would like their representatives to possess additional qualifications, however, they have done nothing to frustrate the policy behind the Qualifications Clauses. Anyone who possesses all of the constitutional qualifications, plus some qualifications required by state law, still has all of the federal qualifications. *870 Accordingly, the fact that the Constitution specifies certain qualifications that the Framers deemed necessary to protect the competence"1887 of the National Legislature does not imply that it strips the people of the individual States of the power to protect their own interests by adding other requirements for their own representatives. The people of other States could legitimately complain if the people of Arkansas decide, in a particular election, to send a 6-year-old to Congress. But the Constitution gives the people of other States no basis to complain if the people of Arkansas elect a freshman representative in preference to a long-term incumbent. That being the case, it is hard to see why the rights of the people of other States have been violated when the people of Arkansas decide to enact a more general disqualification of long-term incumbents. Such a disqualification certainly is subject to scrutiny under other constitutional provisions, such as the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But as long as the candidate whom they send to Congress meets the constitutional age, citizenship, and inhabitancy requirements, the people of Arkansas have not violated the Qualifications Clauses. This conclusion is buttressed by our reluctance to read constitutional provisions to preclude state power by negative implication. The very structure of the Constitution counsels such hesitation. After all, § 10 of Article I contains a brief list of express prohibitions on the States. Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517-519, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2618-2619, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (STEVENS, J.) (applying the expressio unius maxim to conclude that Congress' inclusion of an express pre-emption clause in a federal statute implies that state laws beyond the reach of that clause are not pre-empted); Nevada v. Hall 440 U.S. 410, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 1190, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979) (STEVENS, J.) (suggesting that in light of the Tenth Amendment and the Constitution's express prohibitions on the States, "caution should be exercised before concluding that unstated limitations on state power were intended by the Framers"). Many of the prohibitions listed in *871 § 10, moreover, might have been thought to be implicit in other constitutional provisions or in the very nature of our federal system. Compare, e.g., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties"), and Art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (" The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o coin Money" ), with Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty" and "No State shall ... coin Money"); see also Art. VI, cl. 2 (explicitly declaring that state law cannot override the Constitution). The fact that the Framers nonetheless made these prohibitions express confirms that one should not lightly read provisions like the Qualifications Clauses as implicit deprivations of state power. See generally Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 249, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833). FN12 FN12. The principle that the Constitution rests on the consent of the people of the States points in the same direction. Both the process of selecting delegates to the © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 297 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 54 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.CL 1842) Philadelphia Convention and the ratification procedure erected by Article VII were designed to let the States and the people of the States protect their interests. Lest those protections be evaded, one should not be quick to read the Qualifications Clauses as imposing unstated prohibitions that pre-empt all state qualifications laws. Cf. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-25, p. 480 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that courts should hesitate to read federal statutes to pre-empt state law, because "to give the state -displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia [v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) ] relied to protect states' interests"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464, III S.Ct. 2395, 2403, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (applying this argument). The majority responds that "a patchwork of state qualifications" would "undermin[e] the uniformity and the national character that the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure." Ante, at 1864. Yet the Framers thought it perfectly consistent with the "national character" of Congress for the Senators and Representatives from each State to be chosen by the legislature or the people of that State. The majority never explains why Congress' fundamental character permits this state -centered system, but nonetheless prohibits *872 the people of the States and their state legislatures from setting any eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them. **1888 As for the majority's related assertion that the Framers intended qualification requirements to be uniform, this is a conclusion, not an argument. Indeed, it is a conclusion that the Qualifications Clauses themselves contradict. At the time of the framing, and for some years thereafter, the Clauses' citizenship requirements incorporated laws that varied from State to State. Thus, the Qualifications Clauses themselves made it possible that a person would be qualified to represent State A in Congress Page 53 even though a similarly situated person would not be qualified to represent State B. To understand this point requires some background. Before the Constitution was adopted, citizenship was controlled entirely by state law, and the different States established different criteria. See J. Kettner, Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870, pp. 213-218 (1978). Even after the Constitution gave Congress the power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization ... throughout the United States," Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, Congress was under no obligation to do so, and the Framers surely expected state law to continue in full force unless and until Congress acted. Cf. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 196, 4 L.Ed. 529 (1819) (so interpreting the other part of § 8, cl. 4, which empowers Congress to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies").FN13 Accordingly, the constitutional requirement that *873 Members of Congress be United States citizens meant different things in different States. The very first contested -election case in the House of Representatives, which involved the citizenship of a would-be Congressman from South Carolina, illustrates this principle. As Representative James Madison told his colleagues, "I take it to be a clear point, that we are to be guided, in our decision, by the laws and constitution of South Carolina, so far as they can guide us; and where the laws do not expressly guide us, we must be guided by principles of a general nature...." Cases of Contested Elections in Congress 32 (M. Clarke & D. Hall eds. 1834) (reporting proceedings from May 22, 1789). FN13. Even when Congress enacted the first federal naturalization law in 1790, it left open the possibility that the individual States could establish more lenient standards of their own for admitting people to citizenship. While Hamilton had suggested that Congress' power to " establish an Uniform Rule" logically precluded the States from deviating downward from the rule that Congress established, see The Federalist No. 32, at 199, the early cases on this question took the opposite view. See Collet v. Collet, 2 © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 298 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/piint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 55 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) Dall. 294, 296, 1 L.Ed. 387 (CC Pa.1792) (Wilson, Blair, and Peters, JJ.). States therefore continued to enact naturalization laws of their own until 1795, when Congress passed an exclusive naturalization law. See J. Kettner, Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870, pp. 242-243 (1978). Even after Congress chose to exercise its power to prescribe a uniform route to naturalization, the durational element of the citizenship requirement in the Qualifications Clauses ensured that variances in state law would continue to matter. Thus, in 1794 the Senate refused to seat Albert Gallatin because, owing to the individual peculiarities of the laws of the two relevant States, he had not been a citizen for the required nine years. Id., at 859-862, 867 (reporting proceedings from February 20 and 28, 1794). Even if the Qualifications Clauses had not themselves incorporated nonuniform requirements, of course, there would still be no basis for the assertion of the plurality below that they mandate " uniformity in qualifications." See 316 Ark. 251, 265, 872 S.W.2d 349, 356 (1994). The Clauses wholly omit the exclusivity provision that, according to both the plurality below and today's majority, was their central focus. In fact, neither the text nor the apparent purpose of the Qualifications Clauses does anything to refute Thomas Jefferson's elegant legal analysis: *874 "Had the Constitution been silent, nobody can doubt but that the right to prescribe all the qualifications and disqualifications of those they would send to represent them, would have belonged to the State. So also the Constitution might have prescribed the whole, and excluded all others. It seems to have preferred the middle way. It has exercised the power in part, by declaring some disqualifications.... But it does not declare, itself, that the member shall not be a lunatic, a pauper, a convict of treason,**1889 of murder, of felony, or other infamous crime, or a non-resident of his district; nor does it prohibit to the State the power of declaring these, or any other disqualifications which its particular circumstances may call for; and these may be different in different States. Of Page 54 course, then, by the tenth amendment, the power is reserved to the State." Letter to Joseph C. Cabell (Jan. 31, 1814), in 14 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 82-83 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904).rN14 FN14. The majority notes Jefferson's concession that state power to supplement the Qualifications Clauses was "one of the doubtful questions on which honest men may differ with the purest of motives." See ante, at 1860, n. 24; 14 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 83 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904). But while Jefferson cautioned against impugning the motives of people who might disagree with his position, his use of the phrase "[o]f course" suggests that he himself did not entertain serious doubts of its correctness. B Although the Qualifications Clauses neither state nor imply the prohibition that it finds in them, the majority infers from the Framers' "democratic principles" that the Clauses must have been generally understood to preclude the people of the States and their state legislatures from prescribing any additional qualifications for their representatives in Congress. But the majority's evidence on this point establishes only two more modest propositions: (1) the Framers did not want the Federal Constitution itself to impose a *875 broad set of disqualifications for congressional office, and (2) the Framers did not want the Federal Congress to be able to supplement the few disqualifications that the Constitution does set forth. The logical conclusion is simply that the Framers did not want the people of the States and their state legislatures to be constrained by too many qualifications imposed at the national level. The evidence does not support the majority's more sweeping conclusion that the Framers intended to bar the people of the States and their state legislatures from adopting additional eligibility requirements to help narrow their own choices. I agree with the majority that Congress has no © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 299 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/ 14/2007 Page 56 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) power to prescribe qualifications for its own Members. This fact, however, does not show that the Qualifications Clauses contain a hidden exclusivity provision. The reason for Congress' incapacity is not that the Qualifications Clauses deprive Congress of the authority to set qualifications, but rather that nothing in the Constitution grants Congress this power. In the absence of such a grant, Congress may not act. But deciding, whether the Constitution denies the qualification -setting power to the States and the people of the States requires a fundamentally different legal analysis. Despite the majority's claims to the contrary, see ante, at 1851-1852, n. 12, this explanation for Congress' incapacity to supplement the Qualifications Clauses is perfectly consistent with the reasoning of Powell v. McConnack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). Powell concerned the scope of Article 1, § 5, which provides that "[e]ach House [of Congress] shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." As the majority itself recognizes, "[t]he principal issue [in Powell ] was whether the power granted to each House in Art. I, § 5, ... includes the power to impose qualifications other than those set forth in the text of the Constitution." Ante, at 1847. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, then, the critical question in Powell was whether § 5 conferred a qualification -setting power -not whether the Qualifications*876 Clauses took it away. Compare Powell, supra, at 519, 89 S.Ct., at 1963 (describing the question before the Court as "what power the Constitution confers upon the House through Art. I, § 5"), and at 536, 89 S.Ct., at 1971-72 (describing the Court's task as " determining the meaning of Art. I, § 5") with ante, at 1848, and 1849-1850, n. 8 (suggesting that Powell held that the Qualifications Clauses "limit the power of the House to impose additional qualifications"). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133, 96 S.Ct. 612, 689, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (taking my view of Powell). Powell 's analysis confirms this point. After summarizing a large quantity of historical material bearing on the original understanding of what it Page 55 meant for a legislature to act **1890 as "the Judge" of the qualifications of its members, see 395 U.S., at 521-531, 89 S.Ct., at 1963-1969, Powell went on to stress that the Philadelphia Convention specifically rejected proposals to grant Congress the power to pass laws prescribing additional qualifications for its Members, and that the Convention rejected these proposals on the very same day that it approved the precursor of § 5. See id., at 533-536, 89 S.Ct., at 1970-1972. Given this historical evidence, the Powell Court refused to read § 5 as empowering the House to prescribe such additional qualifications in its capacity as "Judge." And if nothing in the Constitution gave the House this power, it inevitably followed that the House could not exercise it. Despite the majority's claims, then, Powell itself rested on the proposition that the institutions of the Federal Government enjoy only the powers that are granted to them. See also ante, at 1850, n. 9 (describing the Qualifications Clauses merely as an independent basis for the result reached in Powell ).FN15 FN15. The majority also errs in its interpretation of Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). See ante, at 1851-1852, n. 12. In dictum, Nixon did refer to "the fixed meaning of `[q]ualifications' set forth in Art. 1, § 2." 506 U.S., at 237, 113 S.Ct., at 740. 07 But as both the surrounding context and the internal punctuation of this passage make clear, Nixon was referring to the meaning of the word "Qualifications" in § 5; that term, after all, does not even appear in the House Qualifications Clause of § 2. Thus, Nixon merely said that § 5 directs the House to judge the qualifications "set forth in Art. I, § 2," and not qualifications of its own invention. See also infra, at 1899. There would have been no occasion for Nixon to extend Powell: The only point of its discussion was to explain why the question at issue in Powell was justiciable, while the question at issue in Nixon (which concerned impeachment) was not. © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 300 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/piint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l&prft=HTN LE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 57 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 56 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) *877 The fact that the Framers did not grant a qualification -setting power to Congress does not imply that they wanted to bar its exercise at the state level. One reason why the Framers decided not to let Congress prescribe the qualifications of its own Members was that incumbents could have used this power to perpetuate themselves or their ilk in office. As Madison pointed out at the Philadelphia Convention, Members of Congress would have an obvious conflict of interest if they could determine who may run against them. 2 Farrand 250; see also ante, at 1850, n. 10. But neither the people of the States nor the state legislatures would labor under the same conflict of interest when prescribing qualifications for Members of Congress, and so the Framers would have had to use a different calculus in determining whether to deprive them of this power. As the majority argues, democratic principles also contributed to the Framers' decision to withhold the qualification -setting power from Congress. But the majority is wrong to suggest that the same principles must also have led the Framers to deny this power to the people of the States and the state Iegislatures. In particular, it simply is not true that " the source of the qualification is of little moment in assessing the qualification's restrictive impact." Ante, at 1863. There is a world of difference between a self-imposed constraint and a constraint imposed from above. Congressional power over qualifications would have enabled the representatives from some States, acting collectively in the National Legislature, to prevent the people of another State from electing their preferred candidates. The John Wilkes episode in 18th-century England illustrates the problems that might result. As the majority mentions, Wilkes' district repeatedly elected him to the House of Commons, only to have a majority of the representatives of other *878 districts frustrate their will by voting to exclude him. See ante, at 1848. Americans who remembered these events might well have wanted to prevent the National Legislature from fettering the choices of the people of any individual State (for the House of Representatives) or their state legislators (for the Senate). Yet this is simply to say that qualifications should not be set at the national level for offices whose occupants are selected at the state level. The majority never identifies the democratic principles that would have been violated if a state legislature, in the days before the Constitution was amended to provide**1891 for the direct election of Senators, had imposed some limits of its own on the field of candidates that it would consider for appointment. FN16 Likewise, the majority does not explain why democratic principles prohibit the people of a State from adopting additional eligibility requirements to help narrow their choices among candidates seeking to represent them in the House of Representatives. Indeed, the invocation of democratic principles to invalidate Amendment 73 seems particularly difficult in the present case, because Amendment 73 remains fully within the control of the people of Arkansas. If they wanted to repeal it (despite the 20-point margin by which they enacted it less than three years ago), they could do so by a simple majority vote. See Ark. Const., Arndt. 7. FN16. Oregon, for instance, pioneered a system in which the state Iegislature bound itself to appoint the candidates chosen in a statewide vote of the people. See Hills, A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 97, 108 (1991). The majority is in the uncomfortable position of suggesting that this system violated " democratic principles." The majority appears to believe that restrictions on eligibility for office are inherently undemocratic. But the Qualifications Clauses themselves prove that the Framers did not share this view; eligibility requirements to which the people of the States consent are perfectly consistent with the Framers' *879 scheme. In fact, we have described "the authority of the people of the States to determine the qualifications of their most important government officials" as "an authority that lies at the heart of representative government." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2402, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (refusing to read federal law to © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 301 of 433 hnp://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 58 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct 1842) preclude States from imposing a mandatory retirement age on state judges who are subject to periodic retention elections). When the people of a State themselves decide to restrict the field of candidates whom they are willing to send to Washington as their representatives, they simply have not violated the principle that "the people should choose whom they please to govern them." See 2 Elliot 257 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton at the New York Convention). At one point, the majority suggests that the principle identified by Hamilton encompasses not only the electorates right to choose, but also "the egalitarian concept that the opportunity to be elected [is] open to all." See ante, at 1850; see also ante, at 1862-1863. To the extent that the second idea has any content independent of the first, the majority apparently would read the Qualifications Clauses to create a personal right to be a candidate for Congress, and then to set that right above the authority of the people of the States to prescribe eligibility requirements for public office. But we have never suggested that "the opportunity to be elected" is open even to those whom the voters have decided not to elect. On that rationale, a candidate might have a right to appear on the ballot in the general election even though he lost in the primary. But see Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 746, n. 16, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1287, n. 16, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974); see also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855-56, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972) (rejecting the proposition that there is any fundamental right to be a candidate, separate and apart from the electorate's right to vote). Thus, the majority ultimately concedes that its "egalitarian concept" derives entirely from the electorate's right to choose. See ante, at 1850, n. 11; see also ante, at 1862 (deriving the "egalitarian *880 ideal" from the proposition that the Qualifications Clauses do not unduly " `fetter the judgment ... of the people' " (quoting The Federalist No. 57, at 351)). If the latter is not violated, then neither is the former. In seeking ratification of the Constitution, James Madison did assert that "[u]nder these reasonable limitations [set out in the House Qualifications CIause], the door of this part of the federal Page 57 government is open to merit of every description...." The Federalist No. 52, at 326. The majority stresses this assertion, and others to the same effect, in support of its "egalitarian concept." See ante, at 1850-1851, 1862-1863, and n. 30. But there is no reason to interpret these statements as anything more than claims that the Constitution itself imposes relatively few disqualifications for congressional office.**1892 FNf17 One should not lightly assume that Madisonand *881 his colleagues, who were attempting to win support at the state level for the new Constitution, were proclaiming the inability of the people of the States or their state legislatures to prescribe any eligibility requirements for their own Representatives or Senators. Instead, they were merely responding to the charge that the Constitution was undemocratic and would lead to aristocracies in office. Cf. ante, at 1849 (referring to "the antifederalist charge that the new Constitution favored the wealthy and well born"). The statement that the qualifications imposed in the Constitution are not unduly restrictive hardly implies that the Constitution withdrew the power of the people of each State to prescribe additional eligibility requirements for their own Representatives if they so desired. FN17. For instance, the majority quotes Noah Webster's observation that under the Constitution, "the places of senators are wisely left open to all persons of suitable age and merit, and who have been citizens of the United States for nine years." See ante, at 1863, n. 30 (citing "A Citizen of America" (Oct. 17, 1787), in 1 Debate on the Constitution 129, 142 (B. Bailyn ed. 1993) (hereinafter Bailyn)). But there is no reason to read Webster as denying the power of state legislatures to pass resolutions limiting the field of potential candidates that they would consider for appointment to the Senate. Indeed, it seems implausible that Webster would have been invoking the majority's vision of "democratic principles" in support of the constitutional provisions calling for Senators to be appointed by the various state legislatures rather than being elected OO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 302 of 433 http://web2.westIaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTNILE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 59 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) directly by the people of the States. Similarly, the majority quotes a newspaper piece written by John Stevens, Jr., to the people of New York. See ante, at 1863. But Stevens gave the following explanation for his assertion that "[nlo man who has real merit ... need despair" under the system erected by the Constitution: "He first distinguishes himself amongst his neighbours at township and county meeting; he is next sent to the State Legislature. In this theatre his abilities ... are ... displayed to the views of every man in the State: from hence his ascent to a seat in Congress becomes easy and sure." "Americanus," Daily Advertiser, Dec. 12, 1787, in 1 Bailyn 487, 492. As the States indisputably controlled eligibility requirements for membership in the various state legislatures, and indeed had established some disqualifications, I do not read Stevens to be saying that they were barred from doing the same thing with respect to Congress. Without addressing whether the people of the States may supplement the Qualifications Clauses, Stevens was merely praising the Constitution for imposing few such requirements of its own. In fact, the authority to narrow the field of candidates in this way may be part and parcel of the right to elect Members of Congress. That is, the right to choose may include the right to winnow. See Hills, A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 97, 107-109 (1991). To appreciate this point, it is useful to consider the Constitution as it existed before the Seventeenth Amendment was adopted in 1913. The Framers' scheme called for the legislature of each State to choose the Senators from that State. Art. 1, § 3, cl. 1. The majority offers no reason to believe that state legislatures could not adopt prospective rules to guide themselves in carrying out this responsibility; not only is there no express language in the Constitution barring legislatures Page 58 from passing laws to narrow their choices, but there also is absolutely no basis for inferring such a prohibition. Imagine the worst -case scenario: a state legislature, wishing *882 to punish one of the Senators from its State for his vote on some bill, enacts a qualifications law that the Senator does not satisfy. The Senator would still be able to serve out his term; the Constitution provides for Senators to be chosen for 6-year terms, Art. 1, § 3, cl. 1, and a person who has been seated in Congress can be removed only if two-thirds of the Members of his House vote to expel him, § 5, cl. 2. While the Senator would be disqualified from seeking reappointment, under the Framers' Constitution the state legislature already enjoyed unfettered discretion to deny him reappointment anyway. Instead of passing a qualifications law, the legislature could simply have passed a resolution declaring its intention to appoint someone else the next time around. Thus, the legislature's power to adopt laws to narrow its own choices added nothing to its general appointment power. While it is easier to coordinate a majority of state legislators than to coordinate a majority of qualified voters, the basic principle should be the same in both contexts. Just as **1893 the state legislature enjoyed virtually unfettered discretion over whom to appoint to the Senate under Art. I, § 3, so the qualified voters of the State enjoyed virtually unfettered discretion over whom to elect to the House of Representatives under Art. I, § 2. If there is no reason to believe that the Framers' Constitution barred state Iegislatures from adopting prospective rules to narrow their choices for Senator, then there is also no reason to believe that it barred the people of the States from adopting prospective rules to narrow their choices for Representative. In addition, there surely is no reason to believe that the Senate Qualifications CIause suddenly acquired an exclusivity provision in 1913, when the Seventeenth Amendment was adopted. Now that the people of the States are charged with choosing both Senators and Representatives, it follows that they may adopt eligibility requirements for Senators as well as for Representatives. *883 I would go further, for I see nothing in the © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 303 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/ 14/2007 Page 60 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct, 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) Constitution that precludes the people of each State (if they so desire) from authorizing their elected state legislators to prescribe qualifications on their behalf. If the people of a State decide that they do not trust their state legislature with this power, they are free to amend their state constitution to withdraw it. This arrangement seems perfectly consistent with the Framers' scheme. From the time of the framing until after the Civil War, for example, the Federal Constitution did not bar state governments from abridging the freedom of speech or the freedom of the press, even when those freedoms were being exercised in connection with congressional elections. It was the state constitutions that determined whether state governments could silence the supporters of disfavored congressional candidates, just as it was the state constitutions that determined whether the States could persecute people who held disfavored religious beliefs or could expropriate property without providing just compensation. It would not be at all odd if the state constitutions also determined whether the state legislature could pass qualifications statutes. But one need not agree with me that the people of each State may delegate their qualification -setting power in order to uphold Arkansas' Amendment 73. Amendment 73 is not the act of a state legislature; it is the act of the people of Arkansas, adopted at a direct election and inserted into the State Constitution. The majority never explains why giving effect to the people's decision would violate the "democratic principles" that undergird the Constitution. Instead, the majority's discussion of democratic principles is directed entirely to attacking eligibility requirements imposed on the people of a State by an entity other than themselves. The majority protests that any distinction between the people of the States and the state legislatures is " untenable" and "astonishing." See ante, at 1858, n. 19. In the limited area of congressional elections, however, the Framers themselves*884 drew this distinction: They specifically provided for Senators to be chosen by the state legislatures and for Representatives to be chosen by the people. In the context of congressional elections, the Framers obviously saw a meaningful difference between Page 59 direct action by the people of each State and action by their state legislatures. Thus, even if one believed that the Framers intended to bar state legislatures from adopting qualifications laws that restrict the people's choices, it would not follow that the people themselves are precluded from agreeing upon eligibility requirements to help narrow their own choices. To be sure, if the Qualifications Clauses were exclusive, they would bar all additional qualifications, whether adopted by popular initiative or by statute. But the majority simply assumes that if state legislatures are barred from prescribing qualifications, it must be because the Qualifications Clauses are exclusive. It would strain the text of the Constitution far less to locate the bar in Article I, § 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment instead: One could plausibly maintain that qualification requirements imposed by state legislatures violate the constitutional provisions entrusting the selection of Members of Congress to the people of the States, even while one acknowledges that qualification requirements imposed**1894 by the people themselves are perfectly constitutional. The majority never justifies its conclusion that " democratic principles" require it to reject even this intermediate position. L In addition to its arguments about democratic principles, the majority asserts that more specific historical evidence supports its view that the Framers did not intend to permit supplementation of the Qualifications Clauses. But when one focuses on the distinction between congressional power to add qualifications for congressional office and the power of the people or their state legislatures to add such qualifications, one realizes that this assertion has little basis. *885 In particular, the detail with which the majority recites the historical evidence set forth in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), should not obscure the fact that this evidence has no bearing on the question now before the Court. As the majority © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 304 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTML.E&n=l 8&f... 3/ 14/2007 Page 61 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 60 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881,63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) ultimately concedes, see ante, at 1850, 1851, 1852, legislature," he was merely restating his it does not establish "the Framers' intent that the prior observation that the power to set qualifications in the Constitution be fixed and qualifications "forms no part of the power exclusive," ante, at 1849; it shows only that the to be conferred upon the national Framers did not intend Congress to be able to enact government." See The Federalist No. 60, qualifications laws.Flvls If anything,*886 the at 371 (emphasis added). Indeed, only if " solidity of the evidence supporting Powell 's view the legislature" to which Hamilton was that Congress lacks the power to supplement the referring is Congress can one make sense constitutional disqualifications merely highlights the of his remark that the qualifications of weakness**1895 of the majority's evidence that the voters as well as Congressmen are "fixed States and the people of the States also tacit this in the Constitution" and "unalterable by power. the legislature." Hamilton surely knew that the States or the people of the States control eligibility for the franchise. See FN18. For instance, the majority quotes at Art. I, § 2, cl. 1. length from the debate that arose in the The majority does omit the context Philadelphia Convention when the necessary to understand one aspect of the Committee of Detail proposed the historical evidence presented in Powell. following clause: "The Legislature of the The majority quotes Powell 's observation United States shall have authority to that "on the eve of the Constitutional establish such uniform qualifications of the Convention, English precedent stood for members of each House, with regard to the proposition that `the law of the land property, as to the said Legislature shall had regulated the qualifications of seem expedient." See 2 Farrand 179, members to serve in parliament' and those 248-251; ante, at 1849. The defeat of qualifications were 'not occasional but this proposal -like the defeat of Gouverneur fixed.' " 395 U.S., at 528, 89 S.Ct., at Morris' motion to drop the words "with 1967-68 (quoting 16 Parliamentary History regard to property" from the clause, so as of England 589, 590 (1769)); see ante, at to empower Congress to enact 1848. The English rule seems of only qualifications of any sort -simply reflects marginal relevance: The pre-existing rule the Framers' decision not to grant Congress in America -that States could add the power to supplement the constitutional qualifications for their representatives in qualifications. Considered out of context, Congress, see n. 3, supra, while Congress some of James Madison's comments during itself could not -is surely more important. the debate might be thought to go farther. But in any event, Powell did not claim that See ante, at 1849. But the majority itself the English rule deemed parliamentary properly dispels this false impression. See qualifications to be fixed in the country's ante, at 1850, n. 10; see also Powell v. (unwritten) constitution, beyond the reach McCormack, 395 U.S., at 534, 89 S.Ct., at of a properly enacted law. Instead, 1970-71. qualifications were "fixed" rather than " Likewise, Powell drew support from occasional" only in the sense that neither Alexander Hamilton's comments in The House of Parliament could "exclude Federalist No. 60, which the majority also members -elect for general misconduct not quotes. See ante, at 1849. But as the within standing qualifications." Powell, majority concedes, when Hamilton wrote 395 U.S., at 528, 89 S.Ct. at 1968. The that "[t]he qualifications of the persons English rule, in other words, was simply who may choose or be chosen [for that when sitting as the judge of its Congress] ... are defined and fixed in the members' qualifications, each House of Constitution, and are unalterable by the Parliament could do no more than © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works, Packet Page 305 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 62 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) administer the pre-existing laws that defined those qualifications, see id., at 529, 89 S.Ct., at 1969, for "one House of Parliament cannot create a disability unknown to the law." T. Plucknett, Taswell-Langmead's English Constitutional History 585 (1Ith ed. 1960); cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). This history was relevant to Powell (which dealt with the grounds on which one House of Congress could exclude a Member -elect), but it is not relevant to this case. To the extent that the records from the Philadelphia Convention itself shed light on this case, they tend to hurt the majority's case. The only evidence that directly bears on the question now before the Court comes from the Committee of Detail, a five -member body that the Convention charged with the crucial task of drafting a Constitution to reflect the decisions that the Convention had reached during its first two months of work. A document that Max Farrand described as "[a]n early, perhaps the first, draft of the committee's work" survived among the papers of George Mason. 1 Farrand xxiii, n. 36. The draft is in the handwriting of *887 Edmund Randolph, the chairman of the Committee, with emendations in the hand of John Rutledge, another member of the Committee. As Professor Farrand noted, "[e]ach item in this document ... is either checked off or crossed out, showing that it was used in the preparation of subsequent drafts." 2 id., at 137, n. 6; see also W. Meigs, The Growth of the Constitution in the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. I -IX (1900) (providing a facsimile of the document). The document is an extensive outline of the Constitution. Its treatment of the National Legislature is divided into two parts, one for the " House of Delegates" and one for the Senate. The Qualifications Clause for the House of Delegates originally read as follows: "The qualifications of a delegate shall be the age of twenty five years at least. and citizenship: and any person possessing these qualifications may be elected except [blank Page 61 space]." Id., at II (emphasis added). The drafter(s) of this language apparently contemplated that the Committee might want to insert some exceptions to the exclusivity provision. But rather than simply deleting the word "except" -as it might have done if it had decided to have no exceptions at all to the exclusivity provision -the Committee deleted the exclusivity provision itself. In the document that has come down to us, all the words after the colon are crossed out. Ibid. The majority speculates that the exclusivity provision may have been deleted as superfluous. See ante, at 1860, n. 27.FNt9 But the same draft that contained the exclusivity language in the House Qualifications Clause contained no *888 such language in the Senate Qualifications Clause. See 2 Farrand 141. Thus, the draft appears to reflect a deliberate judgment to distinguish between the House qualifications and the Senate qualifications, and to make only the former exclusive. If so, then the deletion of the exclusivity provision indicates that the Committee expected neither list of qualifications to be exclusive. FN19. The majority also argues that in any event, the views of the members of the Committee "tel[l] us little about the views of the Convention as a whole." Ante, at 1860, n. 27. But our task is simply to determine whether at the time of the framing, the language of the Qualifications Clauses would have been commonly understood to contain an exclusivity provision. The surviving records suggest that the members of the Committee of Detail did not understand the final Qualifications Clauses to be exclusive, and the majority offers no reason to think that their understanding of the language was unusual for their time. The majority responds that the absence of any exclusivity provision in the Committee's draft of the Senate Qualifications Clause merely reflected the fact that "senators, unlike Representatives, would not be chosen by popular election." Ante, at 1861, n. 27. I am perfectly prepared to accept this © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 306 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l&prft=HTN LE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 63 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 62 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct.1842) explanation: The drafter(s) may well have thought that state legislatures should be prohibited from constricting the people's choices for the House of Representatives, but that no exclusivity provision was necessary on the Senate side because state legislatures would already have unfettered control over the appointment of Senators. To accept this explanation, however, is to acknowledge that the exclusivity provision in the Committee's draft of the House Qualifications Clause was not thought to be mere surplusage. It is also to acknowledge that the Senate Qualifications Clause in the Committee's draft -"the qualification of a senator shall be the age of 25 years at least: citizenship in the united states: and property to the amount of [blank space]," 2 Farrand 141-did not carry any implicit connotation of exclusivity. In short, the majority's own **1896 explanation for the difference between the two Qualifications Clauses in the Committee's draft is fundamentally at odds with the expressio unius argument on which the majority rests its holding. Unable to glean from the Philadelphia Convention any direct evidence that helps its position, the majority seeks signs of the Framers' unstated intent in the Framers' comments about four other constitutional provisions. See ante, at 1857-1859 *889 (citing Art. I, § 2, cl. 1; § 4, cl. 1; § 5, cl. 1; and § 6, cl. 1). The majority infers from these provisions that the Framers wanted "to minimize the possibility of state interference with federal elections." Ante, at 1857. But even if the majority's reading of its evidence were correct, the most that one could infer is that the Framers did not want state legislatures to be able to prescribe qualifications that would narrow the people's choices. See supra, at 1893-1896. However wary the Framers might have been of permitting state legislatures to exercise such power, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the Framers feared letting the people themselves exercise this power. Cf. The Federalist No. 52, at 326 (Madison) ("It cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this [electoral -qualification] part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution'). In any event, none of the provisions cited by the majority is inconsistent with state power to add qualifications for congressional office. First, the majority cites the constitutional requirement that congressional salaries be "ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States." Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1. Like the Qualifications Clauses themselves, however, the salary provision can be seen as simply another means of protecting the competence of the National Legislature. As reflected in the majority's own evidence, see ante, at 1857-1858; see also I Farrand 373 (remarks of James Madison), one of the recurring themes of the debate over this provision was that if congressional compensation were left up to the States, parsimonious States might reduce salaries so low that only incapable people would be willing to serve in Congress. As the majority stresses, some delegates to the Philadelphia Convention did argue that leaving congressional compensation up to the various States would give Members of Congress "an improper dependence" upon the States. Id., at 216 (remarks of James Madison); ante, at 1857-1858. These *890 delegates presumably did not want state legislatures to be able to tell the members of Congress from their State, "Vote against Bill A or we will slash your salary"; such a power would approximate a power of recall, which the Framers denied to the States when they specified the terms of Members of Congress. The Framers may well have thought that state power over salary, like state power to recall, would be inconsistent with the notion that Congress was a national legislature once it assembled. But state power over initial eligibility requirements does not raise the same concerns: It was perfectly coherent for the Framers to leave selection matters to the state level while providing for Members of Congress to draw a federal salary once they took office. Thus, the Compensation Clause seems wholly irrelevant; contrary to the majority's suggestion, see ante, at 1859, n. 21, it does not address elections at all. Second, the majority gives passing mention to the Elector -Qualifications Clause of Article I, § 2, © 2007 ThomsonWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 307 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/piintstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 64 of 84 115 S.Ct, 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) which specifies that in each State, the voters in House elections "shall have the qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." But the records of the Philadelphia Convention provide no evidence for the majority's assertion that the purpose of this Clause was "to prevent discrimination against federal electors." See ante, at 1857.F1120 *891 In fact, the Clause may simply **1897 have been a natural concomitant of one of the Framers' most famous decisions. At the Convention, there was considerable debate about whether Members of the House of Representatives should be selected by the state legislatures or directly by the voters of each State. Taken as a whole, the first Clause of Article I, § 2-including the elector -qualifications provision -implements the Framers' decision. It specifies that the Representatives from each State are to be chosen by the State's voters (that is, the people eligible to participate in elections for the most numerous branch of the state legislature). FN20. The majority inaccurately reports James Madison's explanation of the Elector -Qualifications Clause in The Federalist No. 52. Madison neither mentioned nor addressed the consequences of "allowing States to differentiate between the qualifications for state and federal electors." See ante, at 1857. Instead, he addressed the problems that would have arisen if the Constitution had assigned control over the qualifications of voters in House elections to the state legislatures rather than to the people of each State. It was such an arrangement that, in Madison's view, "would have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch of the federal government which ought to be dependent on the people alone." The Federalist No. 52, at 326; cf. ante, at 1857. The Elector -Qualifications Clause avoided this problem because the various state constitutions controlled who could vote in elections for the most numerous branch of the state legislature, and no state government could alter these requirements Page 63 unless the people of the State (through the state constitution) decided to let it do so. See The Federalist No. 52, at 326. Though one obviously could uphold the action of the people of Arkansas without reaching this issue, Madison's comments should not be read to suggest that the Elector -Qualifications Clause bars the people of a State from delegating their control over voter qualifications to the state legislature. The Clause itself refutes this reading; if a state constitution permits the state legislature to set voter qualifications, and if eligibility for the franchise in the State therefore turns on statutory rather than constitutional law, federal electors in the State still must meet the same qualifications as electors for the most numerous branch of the state legislature. Madison could not possibly have disagreed with this understanding of the Clause. Instead, he was simply explaining why, when it came to voter qualifications for House elections, the Framers had not followed the model of Article J, § 3, cl. 1, and vested ultimate control with the state legislatures (regardless of what the people of a State might provide in their state constitutions). Third, the majority emphasizes that under Article I, § 5, "[e]ach House [of Congress] shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." See ante, at 1855, 1858-1859, 1864. There was no recorded discussion of this provision in the Philadelphia Convention, and it appears simply to adopt the practice of England's Parliament. See n. 18, supra. According to the majority, however, § 5 implies *892 that the Framers could not have intended state law ever to " provide the standard for judging a Member's eligibility." Ante, at 1859. My conclusion that States may prescribe eligibility requirements for their Members of Congress does not necessarily mean that the term "Qualifications," as used in Article 1, § 5, includes such state -imposed requirements. One surely could read the term simply to refer back to the requirements 4 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 308 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 65 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) that the Framers had just listed in the Qualifications Clauses, and not to encompass whatever requirements States might add on their own. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237, 113 S.Ct. 732, 740, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (dictum) (asserting that the context of § 5 demonstrates that " the word `[q]ualifications' ... was of a precise, limited nature" and referred only to the qualifications previously "set forth in Art. I, § 2"). The Framers had deemed the constitutional qualifications essential to protect the competence of Congress, and hence the national interest. It is quite plausible that the Framers would have wanted each House to make sure that its Members possessed these qualifications, but would have left it to the States to enforce whatever qualifications were imposed at the state level to protect state interests. But even if this understanding of § 5 is incorrect, I see nothing odd in the notion that a House of Congress might have to consider state law in judging the "Qualifications" of its Members. In fact, § 5 itself refutes the majority's argument. Because it generally is state law that determines what is necessary to win an election and whether any particular ballot is valid, each House of Congress clearly must look to state law in judging the "Elections" and "Returns" of its Members. It would hardly be strange if each House had to do precisely the same thing in judging "Qualifications." Indeed, even on the majority's understanding of the Constitution, at the time of the framing all " Qualifications" questions that turned on issues of citizenship **1898 would have been governed by state law. See supra, at 1887-1888. *893 More generally, there is no basis for the majority's assertion that the Framers would not have charged "federal tribunals" with the task of " judging ... questions concerning rights which depend on state law." See ante, at 1859. Cases involving questions of federal law hardly exhaust the categories of cases that the Framers authorized the federal courts to decide. See Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The founding generation, moreover, seemed to assign relatively little importance to the constitutional grant of jurisdiction over "all Cases ... arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ... under their Page 64 Authority." Ibid. The First Congress never even implemented this jurisdictional grant at the trial Ievel; it was not until 1875 that Congress " revolutionized the concept of the federal judiciary" by giving federal courts broad jurisdiction over suits arising under federal law. See P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 962 (3d ed. 1988). By contrast, the founding generation thought it important to implement immediately the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction, in which the rules of decision generally come entirely from state law. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 78, 92; Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-80, 58 S.D. 817, 822-823, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The fourth and final provision relied upon by the majority is the Clause giving Congress the power to override state regulations of "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding [congressional] Elections." Art. I, § 4, cl. 1. From the fact that the Framers gave Congress the power to "make or alter" these state rules of election procedure, the majority infers that the Framers would also have wanted Congress to enjoy override authority with respect to any matters of substance that were left to the States. See ante, at 1858. As Congress enjoys no "make or alter" powers in this area, the majority concludes that the Framers must not have thought that state legislatures would be able to enact qualifications laws. *894 But the Framers provided for congressional override only where they trusted Congress more than the States. Even respondents acknowledge that "the primary reason" for the "make or alter" power was to enable Congress to ensure that States held elections in the first place. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 51; see also supra, at 1883, and n. 10. The Framers did trust Congress more than the States when it came to preserving the Federal Government's own existence; to advance this interest, they had to give Congress the capacity to prescribe both the date and the mechanics of congressional elections. As discussed above, however, the Framers trusted the States more than Congress when it came to setting qualifications for Members of Congress. See supra, at 1890. © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 309 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 66 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct, 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) Indeed, the majority itself accepts this proposition. See ante, at 1869 (acknowledging that the Framers were "particularly concerned" about congressional power to set qualifications). To judge from comments made at the state ratifying conventions, Congress' "make or alter" power was designed to serve a coordination function in addition to ensuring that the States had at least rudimentary election laws. For instance, George Nicholas argued at the Virginia Convention that if regulation of the time of congressional elections had been left exclusively to the States, "there might have been as many times of choosing as there are States," and "such intervals might elapse between the first and last election, as to prevent there being a sufficient number to form a House." 9 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 920 (J. Kaminski and G. Saladino eds. 1990). For this reason too, if the National Legislature lacked the "make or alter" power, .,it might happen that there should be no Congress [J ... and this might happen at a time when the most urgent business rendered their session necessary." Ibid.; cf. 2 Elliot 535 (remarks of Thomas McKean at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention) (defending § 4 on the ground that congressional elections should be "held on the same day throughout the United States, to prevent corruption or *895 undue influence"). Again, however, the desire to coordinate state election **1899 procedures did not require giving Congress power over qualifications laws. The structure of the Constitution also undermines the majority's suggestion that it would have been bizarre for the Framers to give Congress supervisory authority over state time, place, and manner regulations but not over state qualifications laws. Although the Constitution does set forth a few nationwide disqualifications for the office of Presidential elector, see Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector"), no one contends that these disqualifications implicitly prohibit the States from adding any other eligibility requirements; instead, Article II leaves the States free to establish qualifications for their delegates to Page 65 the electoral college. See supra, at 1882-1883. Nothing in the Constitution, moreover, gives Congress any say over the additional eligibility requirements that the people of the States or their state legislatures may choose to set. Yet under Article II, "[tlhe Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors...." Art. 11, § 1, cl. 4. The majority thus creates an unwarranted divergence between Article I's provisions for the selection of Members of Congress and Article II's provisions for the selection of members of the electoral college. Properly understood, the treatment of congressional elections in Article I parallels the treatment of Presidential elections in Article II. Under Article I as under Article II, the States and the people of the States do enjoy the reserved power to establish substantive eligibility requirements for candidates, and Congress has no power to override these requirements. But just as Article II authorizes Congress to prescribe when the States must select their Presidential electors, so Article I gives Congress the ultimate authority over the times, places, and manner of holding congressional elections. *896 The majority's only response is that my reading of the Constitution would permit States to use their qualification -setting power to achieve the very result that Congress' "make or alter" power was designed to avoid. According to the majority, States could set qualifications so high that no candidate could meet them, and Congress would be powerless to do anything about it. Ante, at 1858-1859. Even if the majority were correct that Congress could not nullify impossible qualifications, however, the Constitution itself proscribes such state laws. The majority surely would concede that under the Framers' Constitution, each state legislature had an affirmative duty to appoint two people to the Senate. See Art. I, § 3, cl. I ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof ..." (emphasis added)); cf. Art. 1, § 3, cl. 2 ("if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make OO 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 310 of 433 http:l/web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 67 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies "). In exactly the same way that § 3 requires the States to send people to the Senate, § 2 also requires the States to send people to the House. See Art. I, § 2, cl. I ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States ..." ); cf. Art. I, § 2, cl. 4 ("When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies"). The majority apparently is concerned that (on its reading of the "make or alter" power) Congress would not be able to enforce the constitutional proscription on impossible qualifications; enforcement would instead be relegated to the courts, the Executive Branch, or the political process. But this concern is equally applicable whether one adopts my view of the Qualifications Clauses or the majority's view. Both the majority and I agree that it is unconstitutional for *897 States to establish impossible qualifications for congressional office. Both the majority and I also agree that it is theoretically conceivable that a State might defy this proscription by erecting an impossible qualification. Whether Congress may use its "make or alter" power to override such laws turns entirely on how one reads the "make or alter" power; it has nothing to do with **1900 whether one believes that the Qualifications Clauses are exclusive. It would not necessarily be unusual if the Framers had decided against using Congress' "make or alter" power to guard against state laws that disqualify everyone from service in the House. After all, although this power extended to the times and manner of selecting Senators as well as Representatives, it did not authorize Congress to pick the Senators from a State whose legislature defied its constitutional obligations and refused to appoint anyone. This does not mean that the States had no duty to appoint Senators, or that the States retained the power to destroy the Federal Government by the simple expedient of refusing to meet this duty. It merely means that the Framers did not place the remedy with Congress.FN21 Page 66 FN21. Likewise, the Constitution requires the States to appoint Presidential electors, Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, but it does not provide for any congressional override if the States refuse to do so (or if the States set impossibly high qualifications and then announce that no one meets them). But the flaws in the majority's argument go deeper. Contrary to the majority's basic premise, Congress can nullify state laws that establish impossible qualifications. If a State actually holds an election and only afterwards purports to disqualify the winner for failure to meet an impossible condition, Congress certainly would not be bound by the purported disqualification. It is up to each House of Congress to judge the "[q]ualifications" of its Members for itself. See Art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Even if this task includes the responsibility of judging qualifications imposed by state law, see supra, at 1897-1898, Congress obviously would have not only *898 the power but the duty to treat the unconstitutional state law as a nullity. Thus, Congress could provide the appropriate remedy for the State's defiance, simply by seating the winner of the election. It follows that the situation feared by the majority would arise only if the State refused to hold an election in the first place, on the ground that no candidate could meet the impossible qualification. But Congress unquestionably has the power to override such a refusal. Under the plain terms of § 4, Congress can make a regulation providing for the State to hold a congressional election at a particular time and place, and in a particular manner.'-' FN22. Even if there is anything left of the majority's argument on this point, it would still have no bearing on whether the Framers intended to preclude the people of each State from supplementing the constitutional qualifications. Just as the Framers had no fear that the people of a State would destroy congressional elections by entirely disenfranchising themselves, see The Federalist No. 52, at 326, so the Framers surely had no fear that © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 311 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstrearn.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=l S&f... 3/1.4/2007 Page 68 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) the people of the States would destroy congressional elections by entirely disqualifying all candidates. In discussing the ratification period, the majority stresses two principal data. One of these pieces of evidence is no evidence at all -literally. The majority devotes considerable space to the fact that the recorded ratification debates do not contain any affirmative statement that the States can supplement the constitutional qualifications. See ante, at 1859-1860. For the majority, this void is " compelling" evidence that "unquestionably reflects the Framers' common understanding that States lacked that power." Ante, at 1859, 1860. The majority reasons that delegates at several of the ratifying conventions attacked the Constitution for failing to require Members of Congress to rotate out of office.FN'3 If *899 supporters of **1901 ratification had believed that the individual States could supplement the constitutional qualifications, the majority argues, they would have blunted these attacks by pointing out that rotation requirements could still be added State by State. See ante, at 1860. FN23. As the majority notes, see ante, at 1871, and 1859, n. 22, the Philadelphia Convention had dropped without discussion a portion of the original Randolph Resolutions calling for Members of the House of Representatives "to be incapable of re-election for the space of [blank space] after the expiration of their term of service." 1 Farrand 20. This provision, which at a minimum would have barred all Members of the House from serving consecutive terms, was abandoned without objection when the Convention voted to require House Members to stand for election every three years. See id., at 214-217; see also id., at 362 (opting for 2-year terms instead). Subsequently, indeed, some members of the Convention appeared to be unaware that a rotation requirement had ever been proposed. See Page 67 2 id., at 120 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris). The majority properly does not cite the omission of this nationwide rotation requirement as evidence that the Framers meant to preclude individual States from adopting rotation requirements of their own. Just as individual States could extend the vote to women before the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, could prohibit poll taxes before the adoption of the Twenty-fourth Amendment, and could lower the voting age before the adoption of the Twenty-sixth Amendment, so the Framers' decision not to impose a nationwide limit on congressional terms did not itself bar States from adopting limits of their own. See, e.g., Ga. Const. of 1877, § 2-602 (adopted Aug. 3, 1943) (reducing voting age to 18 nearly three decades before the Twenty-sixth Amendment was proposed); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 539, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 1184, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965) (noting that by the time the Twenty-fourth Amendment was proposed, "only five States retained the poll tax as a voting requirement"); Congressional Research Service, The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation 1571 (1973) (reporting that 11 States had adopted women's suffrage by the time the Nineteenth Amendment was proposed). Cf. ante, at 1871, and n. 50. But the majority's argument cuts both ways. The recorded ratification debates also contain no affirmative statement that the States cannot supplement the constitutional qualifications. While ratification was being debated, the existing rule in America was that the States could prescribe eligibility requirements for their delegates to Congress, see n. 3, supra, even though the Articles of Confederation gave Congress itself no power to impose such qualifications. If *900 the Federal Constitution had been understood to deprive the States of this significant power, one might well have expected its opponents to seize on this point in arguing against ratification. © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 312 of 433 http://web2.westl aw.com/pri nt/printstream. aspx?sv=Split&rlti= l &prft=HTMLE&n=18 &f ... 3/14/2007 Page 69 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) The fact is that arguments based on the absence of recorded debate at the ratification conventions are suspect, because the surviving records of those debates are fragmentary. We have no records at all of the debates in several of the conventions, 3 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 7 (M. Jensen ed. 1978), and only spotty records from most of the others, see ibid.; 1 id., at 34-35; 4 Elliot 342; Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Texas L.Rev. 1, 21-23 (1986). If one concedes that the absence of relevant records from the ratification debates is not strong evidence for either side, then the majority's only significant piece of evidence from the ratification period is The Federalist No. 52. Contrary to the majority's assertion, however, this essay simply does not talk about "the lack of state control over the qualifications of the elected," whether "explicitly" or otherwise. See ante, at 1856. It is true that The Federalist No. 52 contrasts the Constitution's treatment of the qualifications of voters in elections for the House of Representatives with its treatment of the qualifications of the Representatives themselves. As Madison noted, the Framers did not specify any uniform qualifications for the franchise in the Constitution; instead, they simply incorporated each State's rules about eligibility to vote in elections for the most numerous branch of the state legislature. By contrast, Madison continued, the Framers chose to impose some particular qualifications that all Members of the House had to satisfy. But while Madison did say that the qualifications of the elected were "more susceptible of uniformity" than the qualifications of electors, The Federalist No. 52, at 326, he did not say that the Constitution *901 prescribes anything but uniform minimum qualifications for congressmen. That, after all, is more than it does for congressional electors. Nor do I see any reason to infer from The Federalist No. 52 that the Framers intended to deprive the States of the power to add to these minimum qualifications. Madison did note that the existing state constitutions defined the qualifications of "the elected" -a phrase that the essay used to refer to Page 68 Members of Congress -"less carefully and properly" than they defined the qualifications of voters. But Madison could not possibly have been rebuking the States for setting unduly high qualifications for their representatives in Congress, because they actually had established only the sketchiest of qualifications. At the time that Madison wrote, the various state constitutions generally provided for the state legislature to appoint the State's delegates**1902 to the Federal Congress.FN24 Four state constitutions had added a term -limits provision that tracked the one in the Articles of Confederation, FN'j and some of the constitutions also specified that people who held certain salaried offices under the United States were ineligible to represent the State in Congress.FN'-s But only two state constitutions had prescribed any other *902 qualifications for delegates to Congress.FN27 In this context, when Madison wrote that the state constitutions defined the qualifications of Members of Congress "less carefully and properly" than they defined the qualifications of voters, he could only have meant that the existing state qualifications did not do enough to safeguard Congress' competence: The state constitutions had not adopted the age, citizenship, and inhabitancy requirements that the Framers considered essential. Madison's comments readily explain why the Framers did not merely incorporate the state qualifications for Congress. But they do not imply that the Framers intended to withdraw from the States the power to supplement the list of qualifications contained in the Federal Constitution.FN'-g FN24. See Del. Const. of 1776, Art. 11, in 1 Thorpe 564; Md. Const. of 1776, Form of Government, Art. XXVII, in 3 Thorpe 1695; Mass. Const. of 1780, Pt. 2, Ch. IV, in 3 Thorpe 1906; N.H. Const. of 1784, Pt. II, in 4 Thorpe 2467; N.Y. Const. of 1777, Art. XXX, in 5 Thorpe 2634-2635; N.C. Const. of 1776, Form of Government, Art. XXXVII, in 5 Thorpe 2793; Pa. Const. of 1776, Frame of Government, § 11, in 5 Thorpe 3085; S.C. Const. of 1778, Art. XXII, in 6 Thorpe 3253; Va. Const. of 1776, in 7 Thorpe 3817. © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 313 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTN4LE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 70 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) FN25. Md. Const. of 1776, Form of Government, Art. XXVII, in 3 Thorpe 1695; N.H. Const. of 1784, Pt. II, in 4 Thorpe 2467; N.C. Const. of 1776, Art. XXXVII, in 5 Thorpe 2793; Pa. Const. of 1776, Frame of Government, § 11, in 5 Thorpe 3085. FN26. Md. Const. of 1776, Form of Government, Art. XXVII, in 3 Thorpe 1695; N.H. Const. of 1784, Pt. II, in 4 Thorpe 2467; Pa. Const. of 1776, Frame of Government, § 11, in 5 Thorpe 3085. FN27. See Md. Const. of 1776, Art. XXVII, in 3 Thorpe 1695; N.H. Const. of 1784, Pt. II, in 4 Thorpe 2467. FN28. The majority suggests that I have overlooked Madison's observation that subject to the "reasonable limitations" spelled out in the House Qualifications Clause, the Constitution left the House's door "open to merit of every description." See ante, at 1857, n. 18; see also ante, at 1857 (quoting a similar passage from The Federalist No. 57). As discussed above, however, such statements do not advance the majority's case. See supra, at 1891-1892. Though The Federalist No. 52 did not address this question, one might wonder why the Qualifications Clauses did not simply incorporate the existing qualifications for members of the state legislatures (as opposed to delegates to Congress). Again, however, the Framers' failure to do so cannot be taken as an implicit criticism of the States for setting unduly high entrance barriers. To the contrary, the age and citizenship qualifications set out in the Federal Constitution are considerably higher than the corresponding qualifications contained in the state constitutions that were then in force. At the time, no state constitution required members of the lower house of the state legislature to be more than 21 years old, and only two required members of the upper house to be 30. See N.H. Const. of 1784, Pt. 11, in 4 Thorpe 2460; S.C. Const. of 1778, Art. XII, in 6 Thorpe 3250. Many Page 69 *903 States, moreover, permitted naturalized aliens to take seats in the state Iegislature within one or two years of becoming citizens. See Kettner, Development of American Citizenship, at 214-219. The majority responds that at the time of the framing, most States imposed property qualifications on members of the state legislature. See ante, at 1857, n. 18. But the fact that the Framers did not believe that a uniform minimum property requirement was necessary to protect the competence of Congress surely need not mean that the Framers intended to preclude States from setting their own property qualifications. In fact, the constitutional text supports the contrary inference. As the majority observes, see ibid., and ante, at 1865, n. 35, at the time of the framing some States also imposed religious qualifications on state legislators. The Framers evidently did not want States to impose such qualifications on federal legislators, for the Constitution specifically provides that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any **1903 Office or public Trust under the United States." Art. VI, cl. 3 . Both the context FN29 and the plain language of the Clause show that it bars the States as well as the Federal Government from imposing religious disqualifications on federal offices. But the only reason for extending the Clause to the States would be to protect Senators and Representatives from state -imposed religious qualifications; I know of no one else who holds a "public Trust under the United States" yet who might be subject to state disqualifications. If the expressio unius maxim cuts in any direction in this case, then, it undermines the majority's position: The Framers' prohibition on state -imposed religious disqualifications*904 for Members of Congress suggests that other types of state -imposed disqualifications are permissible. See Rotunda, Rethinking Term Limits for Federal Legislators in Light of the Structure of the Constitution, 73 Ore.L.Rev. 561, 574 (1994). FN29. The immediately preceding portion of the Clause requires not only "[t]he Senators and Representatives before mentioned" but also "the Members of the © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 314 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstreaTn.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l&prft =HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 71 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States," to take an "Oath or Affirmation" to support the Constitution. Art. VI, cl. 3. More than a century ago, this Court was asked to invalidate a Michigan election law because it called for Presidential electors to be elected on a district -by -district basis rather than being chosen by "the State" as a whole. See Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Conceding that the Constitution might be ambiguous on this score, the Court asserted that " where there is ambiguity or doubt, or where two views may well be entertained, contemporaneous and subsequent practical construction[s] are entitled to the greatest weight." McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S., at 27, 13 S.Ct., at 7. The Court then described the district -based selection processes used in 2 of the 10 States that participated in the first Presidential election in 1788, 3 of the 15 States that participated in 1792, and 5 of the 16 States that participated in 1796. Id., at 29-31, 13 S.Ct., at 8-9. Though acknowledging that in subsequent years " most of the States adopted the general ticket system, " id., at 32, 13 S.Ct., at 9, the Court nonetheless found this history "decisive" proof of the constitutionality of the district method, id., at 36, 13 S.Ct., at 11. Thus, the Court resolved its doubts in favor of the state law, "the contemporaneous practical exposition of the Constitution being too strong and obstinate to be shaken...." Id., at 27, 13 S.Ct., at 7. Here, too, state practice immediately after the ratification of the Constitution refutes the majority's suggestion that the Qualifications Clauses were commonly understood as being exclusive. Five States supplemented the constitutional disqualifications in their very first election laws, and the surviving records suggest that the legislatures of these States considered and rejected the interpretation of the Constitution that the majority adopts today. *905 As the majority concedes, the first Virginia election law erected a property qualification for Virginia's contingent in the Fe Representatives. See Virginia Elec 20, 1788), in 2 Docmentary Hist Federal Elections, 1788-1790, pp. DenBoer ed. 1984) (hereinafter Elections) (restricting possible c freeholder[s]"). What is mor Constitution merely requires repre inhabitants of their State, the legisl the seven States that divided Page 70 House of tion Law (Nov. ory of the First 293, 294 (G. First Federal andidates to " e, while the sentatives to be atures of five of themselves into districts for House elections FN30 added that representatives also had to be inhabitants of the district that elected them. Three of these States adopted durational residency requirements too, insisting that representatives have resided within their districts for at least **1904 a year (or, in one case, three years) before being elected.FN31 FN30. Despite the majority's emphasis on the Framers' supposed desire for uniformity in congressional elections, even the majority does not dispute that the Framers wanted to let States decide for themselves whether to use district elections in selecting Members of the House of Representatives. The Framers fully expected that in some States each Member of the House would be chosen by the people of the whole State, while in other States each Member would be directly accountable only to the people of a single district. See, e.g., 14 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 3 (J. Boyd ed. 1958) (letter from Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 8, 1788). FN31. See Georgia Election Law (Jan. 23, 1789) (restricting representatives from each district to "resident[s] of three years standing in the district"), in 2 First Federal Elections 456, 457; Maryland Election Law (Dec. 22, 1788) (simple district residency requirement), in 2 First Federal Elections 136, 138; Massachusetts Election Resolutions (Nov. 20, 1788) (same), in 1 First Federal Elections 508, 509 (M. Jensen & R. Becker eds. 1976); North Carolina Election Law (Dec. 16, 1789) (requiring the person elected from © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 315 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTNILE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 72 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 71 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) each district to have been "a Resident or Inhabitant of that Division for which he is elected, during the Space or Term of one Year before, and at the Time of Election"), in 4 First Federal Elections 347; Virginia Election Law (Nov. 20, 1788) (requiring each candidate to have been "a bona fide resident for twelve months within such District"), in 2 First Federal Elections 293, 294. Upon being admitted to the Union in 1796, Tennessee also required its Members in the Federal House of Representatives to have been Tennessee residents for three years and district residents for one year before their election. Act of Apr. 20, 1796, ch. 10, in Laws of the State of Tennessee 81 (1803). *906 In an attempt to neutralize the significance of the district residency requirements, respondent Hill asserts that "there is no evidence that any state legislature focused, when it created these requirements, on the fact that it was adding to the constitutional qualifications." Brief for Respondents Bobbie E. Hill et al. 20. But this claim is simply false. In Massachusetts, for instance, the legislature charged a committee with drafting a report on election methods. The fourth article of the resulting report called for the State to be divided into eight districts that would each elect one representative, but did not require that the representatives be residents of the districts that elected them. Joint Committee Report (Nov. 4, 1788), in 1 First Federal Elections 481. When the members of the State House of Representatives discussed this report, those who proposed adding a district residency requirement were met with the claim that the Federal Constitution barred the legislature from specifying additional qualifications. See Massachusetts Centinel (Nov. 8, 1788) (reporting proceedings), in I First Federal Elections 489. After "considerable debate," the House approved the committee's version of the fourth article by a vote of 89 to 72. Ibid. But the State Senate approved a district residency amendment, 1 First Federal Elections 502, and the House then voted to retain it, id., at 504. Although we have no record of the legislative debates over Virginia's election law, a letter written by one of the members of the House of Delegates during the relevant period indicates that in that State, too, the legislature considered the possible constitutional objection to additional disqualifications. In that letter, Edward Carrington (an opponent of the district residency requirement) expressed his view that the requirement "may exceed the powers of the Assembly," *907 but acknowledged that there was "no prospect of its being struck out" because Federalists as well as Anti -Federalists at least professed to "think it right" 2 id., at 367 (letter from Carrington to Madison, Nov. 9-10, 1788). Carrington was correct about the views of his colleagues: By a vote of 80 to 32, the House of Delegates rejected a motion to delete the added qualifications, while a similar motion in the State Senate lost by a vote of 12 to 3. Id., at 287, 293.FN3'- FN32. After the Virginia Legislature had enacted this bill, some of James Madison's friends suggested that he might find it harder to win election in his own district than in certain other areas of the State. They believed that if Madison won the popular vote in one of those other districts, the House of Representatives could seat him on the theory that States cannot add to the constitutional qualifications. See 11 Papers of James Madison 378-379 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson eds. 1977) (Ietter from Carrington to Madison, Dec. 2, 1788). Other advisers, however, warned that the people of Virginia might not share this understanding of the Constitution. As Alexander White wrote in a letter to Madison: "Some Gentlemen suppose you may be elected in other Districts, and that Congress would disregard the Act which requires Residence in a particular District. I will not undertake to decide that question, but this I know, such a determination would afford much ground of clamour, and enable the opposers of the Government to inflame the Minds of the 0 2007 ThomsontWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 316 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprintlpiintstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 73 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) People beyond anything which has yet happened." Id., at 380 (Dec. 4, 1788). Madison himself apparently never endorsed the idea that he should test the district residency requirement. Instead, he ran from his own district (where he overcame a stiff challenge from another future President, James Monroe). **1905 The surviving records from Maryland and Georgia are less informative, but they, too, show that the legislatures of those States gave special attention to the district residency requirements that they enacted. FN33 Out of the five original *908 States that adopted district residency requirements, in fact, only in North Carolina were the records so poor that it is impossible to draw any inferences about whether the legislature gave careful attention to the implications of the requirement.FN34 FN33. The records show that Maryland's House of Delegates put the district residency requirement to a separate vote and approved it by a margin of 41 to 24. 2 First Federal Elections 129-130 (summarizing proceedings from Dec. 3, 1788). A subsequent effort to jettison the requirement lost by a vote of 39 to 28. Id., at 132-133 (summarizing proceedings from Dec. 10, 1788). Language in Maryland's second election law confirms that the state legislature knew that it was supplementing the Qualifications Clauses. The Act of December 10, 1790, stipulated that each candidate must "b[e] a resident of his district at the time of the election, and hav [e] resided therein twelve calendar months immediately before, and [be] otherwise qualified according to the constitution of the United States." 1790 Laws of Maryland, ch. XVI, art. VIII. In Georgia, too, the State House of Assembly called special attention to the district residency requirement. Shortly before Georgia held its first federal elections, the House adopted a resolution to stress that if the top votegetter in any district had not been "an actual resident of Page 72 three years standing" in that district, then " such person shall not be considered as eligible nor shall he be commissioned." 2 First Federal Elections 459 (resolution of Feb. 4, 1789). FN34. Even the experience in New York and South Carolina -the only States that opted for district elections without requiring district residency -does not support the majority's position. While the records from South Carolina are sketchy, those from New York affirmatively undermine the majority's suggestion that the Qualifications Clauses were commonly understood to be exclusive. When the topic was first broached in the State Assembly, the assemblymen defeated a district residency proposal amid comments that "to add any other qualification [to those listed in the Constitution] would be unconstitutional." 3 First Federal Elections 232 (Dec. 18, 1788). But the State Senate took a different view, adding a district residency requirement when it considered the election bill. Id., at 320. The Assembly then approved the requirement by a vote of 36 to 12, id., at 325-326 (Jan. 19, 1789), but reconsidered the requirement the following day (apparently with more assemblymen in attendance). After a sophisticated debate on the constitutional question, with some assemblymen arguing that the district residency requirement was unconstitutional and others responding that the Constitution merely erected minimum qualifications, the Assembly divided evenly over the requirement: 28 voted in favor of it and 28 voted against it. Id., at 328-335 (Jan. 20, 1789). The chairman broke the tie with a vote against the requirement. Id., at 335. Still, there clearly was no consensus in the New York Assembly. What is more, some of the votes against the district residency requirement may well have been cast by assemblymen who simply opposed the requirement on policy grounds, as an undue restriction on the people's ability to © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 317 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 74 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 73 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) elect nonresidents if they wanted to do so. In any event, the New York Senate obviously considered the requirement constitutional. There is evidence that some members of the Pennsylvania Legislature considered the Qualifications Clauses to be exclusive. See I id., at 282-288. Of course, they also believed that § 2 of Article I -which calls for Members of the Federal House of Representatives to he "chosen ... by the People of the several States" -forbade Pennsylvania to elect its representatives by districts. See id., at 283. The legislatures of the five States that adopted district residency requirements, who had the Pennsylvania example before them, disagreed with the Pennsylvania legislators. *909 The majority asserts that "state practice with respect to residency requirements does not necessarily indicate that States believed that they had a broad power to add restrictions," because the States "may simply have viewed district residency requirements as the necessary analog to state residency requirements." Ante, at 1866, n. 41. This argument fails even on its own terms. If the States had considered district residency requirements necessary for the success of a district election system, but had agreed with the majority that the Constitution prohibited them from supplementing the constitutional list of qualifications, then they simply would have rejected the district system and used statewide elections. After all, the majority deems district residency requirements just as unconstitutional as other added qualifications. See ante, at 1853. The majority's argument also fails to account for the durational element of the residency requirements adopted in Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia (and soon thereafter in Tennessee). These States obliged Congressmen not only to be district residents when elected but also to have been district residents for at least a year before then. See n. 31, supra. **1906 Finally, the majority's argument cannot explain the election schemes of Maryland and Georgia. Though these States did divide themselves into congressional districts, they allowed every voter to vote for one candidate from each *910 district. See Georgia Election Law (Jan. 23, 1789), in 2 First Federal Elections 456, 457; Maryland Election Law (Dec. 22, 1788), in 2 First Federal Elections 136, 138. In other words, Maryland and Georgia imposed district residency requirements despite permitting every voter in the State to vote for every representative from the State. Neither of these States could possibly have seen district residency requirements as the "necessary analog" to anything; they imposed these requirements solely for their own sake. The majority nonetheless suggests that the initial election laws adopted by the States actually support its position because the States did not enact very many disqualifications. See ante, at 1866, n. 41. In this context, the majority alludes to the fact that no State imposed a religious qualification on federal legislators, even though New Hampshire continued to require state legislators to be Protestants and North Carolina imposed a similar requirement on people holding places of trust in the States "civil department." See ante, at 1866, n. 41, and 1865, n. 35. But the majority concedes that "Article VI of the Federal Constitution ... prohibited States from imposing similar qualifications on federal legislators." Ante, at 1865, n. 35. As discussed above, the constitutional treatment of religious qualifications tends to undermine rather than support the majority's case. See supra, at 1902-1903. The majority also points out that no State required its own federal representatives to rotate out of office after serving one or more terms. Ante, at 1866. At the time of the framing, however, such requirements were increasingly disfavored on policy grounds. The advantages of incumbency were substantially fewer then than now, and turnover in office was naturally quite high. The perceived advantages of term limits were therefore smaller than they are today. But the perceived disadvantages were just as great: Term limits prevented the States or the people of the States from keeping good legislators in office, even if they wanted to do so. *911 See G. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, © 2007 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works, Packet Page 318 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.comlprintlprintstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTAME&n=18&f... 3/ 1412007 Page 75 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 74 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) 1776-1787, p. 439 (1969). It is true that under the Articles of Confederation, four States had imposed term limits on their delegates to Congress. See ante, at 1866. But three of these provisions added nothing to the limits in the Articles themselves, see Md. Const. of 1776, Form of Government, Art. XXVII (echoing Article of Confederation V), in 3 Thorpe 1695; N.H. Const. of 1784, Pt. II (same), in 4 Thorpe 2467; N.C. Const. of 1776, Art. XXXVII (similar), in 5 Thorpe 2793, and the other one contained only a minor variation on the provision in the Articles, see Pa. Const. of 1776, Frame of Government, § 11, in 5 Thorpe 3085. Indeed, though the majority says that "many States imposed term limits on state officers," ante, at 1865-1866, it appears that at the time of the framing only Pennsylvania imposed any restriction on the reelection of members of the state legislature, and Pennsylvania deleted this restriction when it adopted a new Constitution in 1790. Compare Pa. Const. of 1776, Frame of Government, § 8, in 5 Thorpe 3084, with Pa. Const. of 1790, in 5 Thorpe 3092-3103; cf. Va. Const. of 1776, Form of Government (perhaps imposing term limits on members of the upper house of the state legislature), in 7 Thorpe 3816. It seems likely, then, that the failure of any State to impose term limits on its senators and representatives simply reflected policy -based decisions against such restrictions. The majority counters that the delegates at three state ratifying conventions -in Virginia, New York, and North Carolina -"proposed amendments that would have required rotation." Ante, at 1860; cf. ante, at 1865-1866, and n. 40. But the amendments proposed by both the North Carolina Convention and the Virginia Convention would have imposed term limits only on the President, not on Members of Congress. See 4 Elliot 245 (North Carolina) ("[N]o person shall be capable of being President of the United States for more than eight years in any term of fifteen years"); 3 id., at 660 *912 Virginia) (similar). If the majority is correct that **1907 these conventions also "voiced support for term limits for Members of Congress," see ante, at 1866,FN35 then the evidence from these conventions supports my position rather than the majority's: the conventions deemed it necessary for the Constitution itself to impose term limits on the President (because no State could do that on its own), but they did not think it necessary for the Constitution to impose term limits on Members of Congress. This understanding at the Virginia and North Carolina conventions meshes with the election laws adopted by both States, which reflected the view that States could supplement the Qualifications Clauses. See supra, at 1903-1904, and n. 31, 1905. FN3G FN35. The majority correctly notes that each convention, in addition to proposing a list of specific "Amendments to the Constitution," proposed a "Declaration of Rights" to be appended to the Constitution. In both States, this "Declaration" contained the general exhortation that members of both the Legislative and Executive Branches "should, at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return into the mass of the people, and the vacancies be supplied by certain and regular elections." 4 Elliot 243; 3 id., at 657-658. But both Declarations went on to state that at these elections, the previous occupants of the office in question should " be eligible or ineligible [for reelection], as the rules of the constitution of government and the laws shall direct." 4 id., at 243; 3 id., at 658. Accordingly, it is hard to describe either Declaration as a "proposed . .. constitutional amendment supporting term limits for Members of Congress." See ante, at 1866, n. 40. FN36. As for New York, the State's ratifying convention did propose amending the Federal Constitution to provide "[t]hat no person be eligible as a senator for more than six years in any term of twelve years." I Elliot 329-330. The majority finds it significant that when this suggestion fell on deaf ears, New Yorkers did not amend their State Constitution to impose this restriction on their state legislature's appointment authority. Before the © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 319 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/pi int/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/ 14/2007 Page 76 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) Seventeenth Amendment was adopted, however, the Federal Constitution vested the choice of Senators in the state Iegislatures rather than the people. See Art. 1, § 3, cl. 1. At least without a delegation of this authority from the legislature, cf. supra, at 1890-1893, and n. 16, the people of New York may well have thought that they could no more amend the State Constitution to narrow the legislature's choices for Senator than they could amend the State Constitution to take the appointment of Senators entirely away from the legislature. It obviously would not follow that they doubted their ability to amend the State Constitution to impose constraints on their own choice of Representatives. The ratifying convention's proposal thus sheds absolutely no light on whether New Yorkers considered the Qualifications Clauses to be exclusive. *913 If the majority can draw no support from state treatment of religious qualifications and rotation requirements, we are left only with state treatment of property qualifications. It is true that nine of the State Constitutions in effect at the time of the framing required members of the lower house of the state legislature to possess some property, see mate, at 1864-1865, n. 33, and that four of these Constitutions were revised shortly after the framing but continued to impose such requirements, see ante, at 1865, and n. 35. Only one State, by contrast, established a property qualification for the Federal House of Representatives. But the fact that more States did not adopt congressional property qualifications does not mean that the Qualifications Clauses were commonly understood to be exclusive; there are a host of other explanations for the relative liberality of state election laws.FN37 And whatever**1908 the explanation, the fact remains that *914 five of the election laws enacted immediately after ratification of the Constitution imposed additional qualifications that would clearly be unconstitutional under today's holding. This history of state practice -which is every bit as strong as the history we deemed "decisive" in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S., at 36, 13 S.Ct., at 11-refutes Page 75 the majority's position that the Qualifications Clauses were generally understood to include an unstated exclusivity provision. FN37. Property qualifications may simply have seemed unnecessary. For instance, it surely was far more likely that a pauper would secure one of the 202 seats in the South Carolina House of Representatives than that he would secure one of South Carolina's five seats in the United States House of Representatives. Compare S.C. Const. of 1778, Art. XHI, in 6 Thorpe 3251, with U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 3; cf. S.C. Const. of 1790, Art. I, § 3 (providing for a 122-seat State House of Representatives), in 6 Thorpe 3258. It may be significant, then, that the one State that saw fit to enact a congressional property qualification was also the State that had the largest congressional delegation. See U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 (allocating 10 seats to Virginia). In addition, people of the day expected that " [t]he representatives of each State [in the federal House] ... will probably in all cases have been members ... of the State legislature." The Federalist No. 56, at 348 (Madison); see also n. 17, supra (quoting article by John Stevens, Jr.). Because most States had property requirements for their state legislators, there may have been little perceived need for a separate property qualification for their Members of Congress. Even States that wanted to create such a qualification, and that considered it within their constitutional authority to do so, might have been deterred by the possibility that the Federal House of Representatives would take a different view. As I have shown, there certainly was no general understanding that the Qualifications Clauses included an unstated exclusivity provision. But people of the day did consider this to be "one of the doubtful questions on which honest men may differ with the purest motives." 14 Writings of © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 320 of 433 http:l/web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 77 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) Thomas Jefferson, at 83 (letter to Joseph C. Cabell, Jan. 31, 1814); see n. 14, supra. If some States feared that the "honest men' in the House might throw out the results of an election because of a qualifications law, they might well have thought that any policy benefits of such laws were outweighed by the risk that they would temporarily be deprived of representation in Congress. Alternatively, they may simply have wanted to stay away from difficult constitutional questions. Cf. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Thus, despite concluding that the States do enjoy the power to prescribe qualifications, Thomas Jefferson questioned whether the advantages of added qualifications were sufficient to justify enacting a law whose constitutionality could be disputed. See 14 Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 84. The same is true of the final category of historical evidence discussed by the majority: controversies in the House and the Senate over seating candidates who were duly elected but who arguably failed to satisfy qualifications imposed by state law. *915 As the majority concedes, " 'congressional practice has been erratic' " and is of limited relevance anyway. Ante, at 1862-1863 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S., at 545, 89 S.Ct., at 1976). Actions taken by a single House of Congress in 1887 or in 1964 shed little light on the original understanding of the Constitution. Presumably for that reason, the majority puts its chief emphasis on the 1807 debate in the House of Representatives about whether to seat Maryland's William McCreery. See ante, at 1861-1862. 1 agree with the majority that this debate might lend some support to the majority's position if it had transpired as reported in Powell v. McCormack. See ante, at 1861-1862. But the Court's discussion -both in Powell and today -is misleading. A Maryland statute dating from 1802 had created a Page 76 district entitled to send two representatives to the House, one of whom had to be a resident of Baltimore County and the other of whom had to be a resident of Baltimore City. McCreery was elected to the Ninth Congress as a resident of Baltimore City. After his reelection to the Tenth Congress, however, his qualifications were challenged on the ground that because he divided his time between his summer estate in Baltimore County and his residence in Washington, D.C., he was no longer a resident of Baltimore City at all. As the majority notes, a report of the House Committee of Elections recommended that McCreery be seated on the ground that state legislatures have no authority to add to the qualifications set forth in the Constitution. See 17 Annals of Cong. 871 (1807); ante, at 1861. But the committee's submission of this initial report sparked a heated debate that spanned four days, with many speeches on both sides of the issue. See 17 Annals of Cong. 871-919, 927-947 (reporting proceedings from Nov. 12, 13, 16, and 18, 1807). Finally, a large majority of the House voted to recommit the report to the Committee of Elections. Id„ at 950 (Nov. 19, 1807). The committee thereupon deleted all references to the *916 constitutional issue and issued a revised report that focused entirely on the factual question whether McCreery satisfied the state residency requirement. Id., at 1059-1061 (Dec. 7, 1807). After receiving the new report, the House seated McCreery with a resolution simply saying: "Resolved, That William McCreery is entitled to his seat in this House." Id., at 1237 (Dec. 24, 1807). By overwhelming majorities, the House rejected both a proposal to specify that McCreery possessed "the qualifications required by the law of Maryland," ibid., and a proposal to declare only that he was "duly qualified, agreeably to the constitution of the United States," id., at 1231. Far from supporting**1909 the majority's position, the McCrecry episode merely demonstrates that the loth House of Representatives was deeply divided over whether state legislatures may add to the qualifications set forth in the Constitution.FN38 FN38. Though obliquely acknowledging © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 321 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream. aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&L.. 3/14/2007 Page 78 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) this fact, the majority thinks it relevant that some subsequent commentators have mistakenly accepted the gloss put on the McCreery case by two editors in 1834. See ante, at 1861-1862 (citing treatises, each of which relies upon Cases of Contested Elections in Congress (M. Clarke & D. Hall eds. 1834)). But surely we need not accept an inaccurate view of history merely because it has appeared in print. The majority also cites Thomas Jefferson's hazy recollection of the McCreery case, see ante, at 1861-1862, without acknowledging Jefferson's conclusion that the States were free to supplement the Qualifications Clauses. See supra, at 1888-1889. The majority needs more than that. The prohibition that today's majority enforces is found nowhere in the text of the Qualifications Clauses. In the absence of evidence that the Clauses nonetheless were generally understood at the time of the framing to imply such a prohibition, we may not use the Clauses to invalidate the decisions of a State or its people. III It is radical enough for the majority to hold that the Constitution implicitly precludes the people of the States from prescribing any eligibility requirements for the congressional*917 candidates who seek their votes. This holding, after all, does not stop with negating the term limits that many States have seen fit to impose on their Senators and Representatives. FN39 Today's decision also means that no State may disqualify congressional candidates whom a court has found to be mentally incompetent, see, e.g., Fla.Stat. §§ 97.041(2), 99.021(1)(a) (1991), who are currently in prison, see, e.g., Ili.Comp.Stat.Ann., ch. 10, §§ 5/3-5, 517-10, 5110-5 (1993 and West Supp.1995), or who have past vote -fraud convictions, see, e.g., Ga.Code Ann. §§ 21-2-2(25), 21-2-8 (1993 and Supp.1994). Likewise, after today's decision, the people of each State must leave open the possibility that they will trust someone with their vote in Congress even Page 77 though they do not trust him with a vote in the election for Congress. See, e.g., R.I.Gen.Laws § 17-14-1.2 (1988) (restricting candidacy to people " qualified to vote"). FN39. Going into the November 1994 elections, eight States had adopted "pure" term limits of one sort or another. See Colo. Const., Art. XVIII, § 9a; Mich. Const., Art. II, § 10; Mo. Const., Art. III, § 45(a); Mont. Const., Art. IV, § 8; Ohio Const., Art. V, § 8; Ore. Const., Art. II, § 20; S.D. Const., Art. III, § 32; Utah Code Ann. § 20A-10-301. Eight other States had enacted "ballot access" provisions triggered by long-term incumbency or multiple prior terms in Congress. See Ariz. Const., Art. VII, § 18; Ark. Const., Arndt. 73, § 3; Calif.Elec.Code Ann. § 25003 (West Supp.1994); Fla. Const., Art. VI, §§ 4(b)(5), (6); N.D.Cent.Code § 16.1-01-13.1 (Supp.1993); Okla. Const., Art. II, § 12A; Wash.Rev.Code §§ 29.68.015, 29.68.016 (1994); Wyo.Stat. § 22-5-104 (Supp.1994). In the 1994 elections, six more States -Alaska, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Nevada -enacted term -limit or ballot -access measures, bringing to 22 the total number of States with such provisions. See Pear, The 1994 Elections, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1994, p. B7, col. 4. In 21 of these States, the measures have been enacted by direct vote of the people. In order to invalidate § 3 of Amendment 73, however, the majority must go further. The bulk of the majority's analysis -like fart 11 of my dissent -addresses the issues that would be raised if Arkansas had prescribed "genuine, unadulterated, undiluted term limits." See Rotunda, 73 Ore.L.Rev., at 570. But as the parties have agreed, Amendment 73 does not actually create this kind of disqualification. See *918 Tr. of Oral Arg. 53-54; cf. ante, at 1867. It does not say that covered candidates may not serve any more terms in Congress if reelected, and it does not indirectly achieve the same result by barring those candidates © 2007 Thomson[West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 322 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/piint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 79 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 78 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) from seeking reelection. It says only that if they are to win reelection, they must do so by write-in votes. One might think that this is a distinction without a difference. As the majority notes, "[t]he uncontested data submitted to the Arkansas Supreme Court" show that write-in candidates have won only six congressional elections in this century. Ante, at 1868, n. 43. But while the data's accuracy is indeed "uncontested," petitioners filed an equally **1910 uncontested affidavit challenging the data's relevance. As political science professor James S. Fay swore to the Arkansas Supreme Court, "[m]ost write-in candidacies in the past have been waged by fringe candidates, with little public support and extremely low name identification." App. 201. To the best of Professor Fay's knowledge, in modem times only two incumbent Congressmen have ever sought reelection as write-in candidates. One of them was Dale Alford of Arkansas, who had first entered the House of Representatives by winning 51% of the vote as a write-in candidate in 1958; Alford then waged a write-in campaign for reelection in 1960, winning a landslide 83% of the vote against an opponent who enjoyed a place on the ballot. Id., at 201-202. The other incumbent write-in candidate was Philip J. Philbin of Massachusetts, who -despite losing his party primary and thus his spot on the ballot -won 27% of the vote in his unsuccessful write-in candidacy. See id., at 203. According to Professor Fay, these results -coupled with other examples of successful write-in campaigns, such as Ross Perot's victory in North Dakota's 1992 Democratic Presidential primary -"demonstrate that when a write-in candidate is well-known and well -funded, it is quite possible for him or her to win an election." Ibid. *919 The majority responds that whether "the Arkansas amendment has the likely effect of creating a qualification" is "simply irrelevant to our holding today." Ante, at 1871. But the majority -which, after all, bases its holding on the asserted exclusivity of the Qualifications Clauses -never adequately explains how it can take this position and still reach its conclusion. One possible explanation for why the actual effect of the Arkansas amendment might be irrelevant is that the Arkansas Supreme Court has already issued a binding determination of fact on this point. Thus, the majority notes that "the state court" has advised us that "there is nothing more than a faint glimmer of possibility that the excluded candidate will win." Ante, at 1868. But the majority is referring to a mere plurality opinion, signed by only three of the seven justices who decided the case below. One of the two justices who concurred in the plurality's holding that Amendment 73 violates the Qualifications Clauses did write that "as a practical matter, the amendment would place term limits on service in the Congress," but he immediately followed this comment with the concession that write-in candidacies are not entirely hopeless; his point was simply that "as a practical matter, write-in candidates are at a distinct disadvantage." 316 Ark., at 276, 872 S.W.2d, at 364 (Dudley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As a result, the majority may rely upon the state court only for the proposition that Amendment 73 makes the specified candidates "distinct[ly]" worse off than they would be in its absence -an unassailable proposition that petitioners have conceded. In the current posture of these cases, indeed, it would have been extremely irregular for the Arkansas Supreme Court to have gone any further. Disputed questions of fact, in Arkansas as elsewhere, generally are resolved at trial rather than on appeal from the entry of summary judgment. See *920 Ark.Rule Civ.Proc. 56 FN40 Accordingly, the majority explicitly disclaims any reliance on **1911 the state court's purported finding about the effect of Amendment 73.. See ante, at 1868, n. 44. FN40. Even if one were inclined to believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court had departed from the usual practice and had purported to make a binding determination on a disputed issue of fact, we would not be foreclosed from examining the basis for that determination. To be sure, on direct review of a state court's judgment, we will not "conduct a more searching review of findings made in state trial court than we © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 323 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l&prft=HTN LE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 80 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 Page 79 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct.1842) conduct with respect to federal district court findings." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1871, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion). But that is only to say that we will review state -court findings under the " clear error" standard. Ibid.; accord, id., at 372, 111 S.Ct., at 1873 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); cf. id., at 379, 111 S.Ct., at 1877 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (identifying no standard of review, but arguing that the state court's decision should be reversed because its underlying factual findings were erroneous). In certain areas, indeed, this Court apparently gives quite little deference to the initial factfinder, but rather "exercise[s] its own independent judgment" about the factual conclusions that should be drawn from the record. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501, and n. 17, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1959, and n. 17, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (STEVENS, J.). Instead, the majority emphasizes another purported conclusion of the Arkansas Supreme Court. As the majority notes, the plurality below asserted that " [t]he intent" of Amendment 73 was "to disqualify congressional incumbents from further service." 316 Ark., at 266, 872 S.W.2d, at 357. According to the majority, "[w]e must, of course, accept the state court's view of the purpose of its own law: We are thus authoritatively informed that the sole purpose of § 3 of Amendment 73 was to attempt to achieve a result that is forbidden by the Federal Constitution." Ante, at 1867. I am not sure why the intent behind a law should affect our analysis under the Qualifications Clauses. If a law does not in fact add to the constitutional qualifications, the mistaken expectations of the people who enacted it would not seem to affect whether it violates the alleged exclusivity of those Clauses. But in any event, the majority is wrong about what "the state court" has told us. Even the plurality *921 below did not flatly assert that the desire to "disqualify" congressional incumbents was the sole purpose behind § 3 of Amendment 73. More important, neither of the justices who concurred in the plurality's holding said anything at all about the intent behind Amendment 73. As a result, we cannot attribute any findings on this issue to the Arkansas Supreme Court. The majority suggests that this does not matter, because Amendment 73 itself says that it has the purpose of "evading the requirements of the Qualifications Clauses." See ante, at 1868 (referring to the "avowed purpose" of Amendment 73). The majority bases this assertion on the amendment's preamble, which speaks of "limit[ing] the terms of elected officials." See ante, at 1868. But this statement may be referring only to §§ 1 and 2 of Amendment 73, which impose true term limits on state officeholders. Even if the statement refers to § 3 as well, it may simply reflect the limiting effects that the drafters of the preamble expected to flow from what they perceived as the restoration of electoral competition to congressional races. See infra, at 1912. In any event, inquiries into legislative intent are even more difficult than usual when the legislative body whose unified intent must be determined consists of 825,162 Arkansas voters. The majority nonetheless thinks it clear that the goal of § 3 is "to prevent the election of incumbents." See ante, at 1867-1868, 1871. In reaching this conclusion at the summary judgment stage, however, the majority has given short shrift to petitioners' contrary claim. Petitioners do not deny that § 3 of Amendment 73 intentionally handicaps a class of candidates, in the sense that it decreases their pre-existing electoral chances. But petitioners do deny that § 3 is intended to (or will in fact) " prevent" the covered candidates from winning reelection, or "disqualify" them from further service. One of petitioners' central arguments is that congressionally conferred advantages have artificially inflated the pre-existing electoral chances of the covered candidates, and *922 that Amendment 73 is merely designed to level the playing field on which challengers compete with them. To understand this argument requires some background. Current federal law (enacted, of course, by congressional incumbents) confers © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 324 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.conVprinttpiintstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 81 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as. 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) numerous advantages on incumbents, and these advantages are widely thought to make it " significantly more difficult" for challengers to defeat them. Cf. ante, at 1868. For instance, federal law gives incumbents enormous advantages in building name recognition and good will in their home districts. See, e.g., 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (permitting Members of Congress to send "franked" mail free of charge); 2 U.S.C. §§ 61-1, 72a, 332 (permitting Members to have sizable taxpayer -funded staffs); 2 U.S.C. § 123b (establishing the House Recording Studio and the Senate Recording and Photographic Studios).at At the same time **1912 that incumbent Members of Congress enjoy these in -kind benefits, Congress imposes spending and contribution limits in congressional campaigns that "can prevent challengers from spending more ... to overcome their disadvantage in name recognition." App. to Brief for State of Washington as Amicus Curiae A-4 (statement of former 10-term Representative William E. Frenzel, referring to 2 U.S.C. § 441a). Many observers believe that the campaign -finance laws also give incumbents an "enormous fund-raising edge" over their challengers by giving a large financing role to entities with incentives to curry favor with incumbents. Wertheimer & Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 Colum.L.Rev. 1126, 1133 (1994). In *923 addition, the internal rules of Congress put a substantial premium on seniority, with the result that each Member's already plentiful opportunities to distribute benefits to his constituents increase with the length of his tenure. In this manner, Congress effectively "fines" the electorate for voting against incumbents. Hills, 53 U.Pitt.L.Rev., at 144-145. FN41. Former Representative William E. Frenzel describes the House Recording Studio as a sophisticated operation used " to prepare tapes of speeches and messages to voters." Frenzel explains: "Taxpayers pay for the facilities, the personnel that run them, the production costs, and the costs of distributing, by mail or otherwise, the tapes that members supply (from their Page 80 taxpayer -funded expense accounts). These messages are widely disseminated by broadcasters, who can use them to fill air time at no cost to themselves." App. to Brief for State of Washington as Amicus Curiae A-5 to A-6. Cynics see no accident in any of this. As former Representative Frenzel puts it: "The practice ... is for incumbents to devise institutional structures and systems that favor incumbents." App. to Brief for State of Washington as Amicus Curiae A-3. In fact, despite his service from 1971 to 1989 on the House Administration Committee (which has jurisdiction over election laws), Representative Frenzel can identify no instance in which Congress " changed election laws in such a way as to lessen the chances of re-election for incumbents, or to improve the election opportunities for challengers." Ibid. At the same time that incumbents enjoy the electoral advantages that they have conferred upon themselves, they also enjoy astonishingly high reelection rates. As Lloyd Cutler reported in 1989, "over the past thirty years a weighted average of ninety percent of all House and Senate incumbents of both parties who ran for reelection were reelected, even at times when their own party lost control of the Presidency itself." Cutler, Now is the Time for All Good Men ..., 30 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 387, 395; see also Kristol, Term Limitations: Breaking Up the Iron Triangle, 16 Harv.J.L. & Pub.Policy 95, 97, and n. 11 (1993) (reporting that in the 100th Congress, as many Representatives died as were defeated at the polls). Even in the November 1994 elections, which are widely considered to have effected the most sweeping change in Congress in recent memory, 90% of the incumbents who sought reelection to the House were successful, and nearly half of the losers were completing only their first terms. Reply Brief for Petitioners U.S. Terre Limits, Inc., et al. 4, n. 5. Only 2 of the 26 Senate incumbents seeking reelection were defeated, see ibid., and one of *924 them had been elected for the first time in a special election only a few years earlier. The voters of Arkansas evidently believe that © 2007 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 325 of 433 http:l/web2.westlaw.comlprintlprintstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l&prft=HTN LE&n=18&f... 3/14/2007 Page 82 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) incumbents would not enjoy such overwhelming success if electoral contests were truly fair -that is, if the government did not put its thumb on either side of the scale. The majority offers no reason to question the accuracy of this belief. Given this context, petitioners portray § 3 of Amendment 73 as an effort at the state level to offset the electoral advantages that congressional incumbents have conferred upon themselves at the federal level. To be sure, the offset is only rough and approximate; no one knows exactly how large an electoral benefit comes with having been a long-term Member of Congress, and no one knows exactly how large an electoral disadvantage comes from forcing a well -funded candidate with high name recognition to run a write-in campaign. But the majority does not base its holding on the premise that Arkansas has struck the wrong balance. Instead, the majority holds that the Qualifications Clauses preclude Arkansas from trying to strike any balance at all; the majority simply says that "an amendment with the avowed purpose and obvious effect of evading the requirements of the Qualifications Clauses**1913 by handicapping a class of candidates cannot stand." Ante, at 1868. Thus, the majority apparently would reach the same result even if one could demonstrate at trial that the electoral advantage conferred by Amendment 73 upon challengers precisely counterbalances the electoral advantages conferred by federal law upon long-term Members of Congress. For me, this suggests only two possibilities. Either the majority's holding is wrong and Amendment 73 does not violate the Qualifications Clauses, or (assuming the accuracy of petitioners' factual claims) the electoral system that exists without Amendment 73 is no less unconstitutional than the electoral system that exists with Amendment 73. *925 I do not mean to suggest that States have unbridled power to handicap particular classes of candidates, even when those candidates enjoy federally conferred advantages that may threaten to skew the electoral process. But laws that allegedly have the purpose and effect of handicapping a particular class of candidates traditionally are reviewed under the First and Fourteenth Page 81 Amendments rather than the Qualifications Clauses. Compare Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S., at 728-736, 94 S.Ct., at 1278-1282 (undertaking a lengthy First and Fourteenth Amendment analysis of a California rule that denied ballot access to any independent candidate for Congress who had not severed his ties to a political party at least one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election, or 17 months before the general election), with id., at 746, n. 16, 94 S.Ct., at 1287, n. 16 (dismissing as " wholly without merit" the notion that this rule might violate the Qualifications Clauses). Term -limit measures have tended to survive such review without difficulty. See, e.g., Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946, 96 S.Ct. 1689, 48 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976) (dismissing an appeal from State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney, 159 W.Va. 513, 223 S.E.2d 607 (1976) , on the ground that limits on the terms of state officeholders do not even raise a substantial federal question under the First and Fourteenth Amendments). To analyze such laws under the Qualifications Clauses may open up whole new vistas for courts. If it is true that "the current congressional campaign finance system ... has created an electoral system so stacked against challengers that in many elections voters have no real choices," Wertheimer & Manes, 94 Colum.L.R., at 1133, are the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 unconstitutional under (of all things) the Qualifications CIauses? Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct, 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (upholding the current system against First Amendment challenge). If it can be shown that nonminorities are at a significant disadvantage when they seek election in districts dominated by minority voters, would the intentional creation of " majority -minority *926 districts" violate the Qualifications Clauses even if it were to survive scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment? Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2828, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) ("Me express no view as to whether [the intentional creation of such districts] always gives rise to an equal protection claim"); id., at 677, 113 S.Ct., at 2843-2844 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (arguing that States may draw district lines for the "sole purpose" of helping blacks or members of certain other groups win © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 326 of 433 http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l&prft=HTN LE&n=l8&f... 3/14/2007 Page 83 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842) election to Congress). More generally, if "[d]istrict lines are rarely neutral phenomena" and if " districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences," Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 2331, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973), will plausible Qualificatio ns Clause challenges greet virtually every redistricting decision? Cf. id., at 754, 93 S.Ct., at 2332 (noting our general refusal to use the Equal Protection Clause to "attemp[t] the impossible task of extirpating politics from what are the essentially political processes of the sovereign States"); see also Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89, n. 16, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 1294, n. 16, 16 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966) (finding nothing invidious in the practice of drawing district lines in a way that helps current incumbents by avoiding contests between them). The majority's opinion may not go so far, although it does not itself suggest any principled stopping point. No matter how narrowly construed, however, today's decision reads the Qualifications Clauses to impose substantial"1914 implicit prohibitions on the States and the people of the States. I would not draw such an expansive negative inference from the fact that the Constitution requires Members of Congress to be a certain age, to be inhabitants of the States that they represent, and to have been United States citizens for a specified period. Rather, I would read the Qualifications Clauses to do no more than what they say. I respectfully dissent. U.S.Ark.,1995. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881, 63 USLW 4413 Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top) • 1994 WL 714634 (Oral Argument) Oral Argument (Nov. 29, 1994) • 1994 WL 660722 (Appellate Brief) REPLY BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS REPUBLICAN PARTY OF ARKANSAS AND W. ASA HUTCHINSON SUPPORTING PETITIONERS (Nov. 22, 1994) • 1994 WL 658546 (Appellate Brief) REPLY BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS Page 82 REPRESENTATIVE JAY DICKEY AND REPRESENTATIVE TIM HUTCHINSON SUPPORTING PETITIONERS (Nov. 21, 1994) • 1994 WL 658533 (Appellate Brief) REPLY BRIEF FOR THE STATE PETITIONER (Nov. 18, 1994) • 1994 WL 646175 (Appellate Brief) REPLY BRIEF FOR PETTIONERS U.S. TERM LIMITS, INC., et al., (Nov. 16, 1994) • 1994 WL 16011865 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents (Oct. 17, 1994) Original Image of this Document (PDF) • 1994 WL 570304 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT CONGRESSMAN RAY THORNTON (Oct. 17, 1994) • 1994 WL 577074 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BOBBIE E. HILL, ON BEHALF OF THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ARKANSAS, AND DICK HERGET (Oct. 17, 1994) • 1994 WL 444683 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF FOR THE STATE PETITIONER (Aug. 16, 1994) • 1994 WL 444704 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS U.S. TERM LIMITS, INC., et al. (Aug. 16, 1994) • 1994 WL 449512 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS REPUBLICAN PARTY OF ARKANSAS AND W. ASA HUTCHINSON SUPPORTING PETITIONERS (Aug. 16, 1994) • 1994 WL 513192 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTSREPRESENTATIVE JAY DICKEY ANDREPRESENTATIVE TIM HUTCHINSONSUPPORTING PETITIONERS (Aug. 16, 1994) • 1994 WL 16011943 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) Reply in Support of Petition for Certiorari (Jun. 06, 1994) Original Image of this Document (PDF) • 1994 WL 16012050 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) Brief for the State Respondent (May. 23, 1994) Original Image of this Document (PDF) • 1994 WL 16012049 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) Brief in Opposition of Respondents Bobbie Hill, on Behalf of the League of Women Voters of Arkansas and Dick Herget (May. 16, 1994) Original Image of this Document (PDF) • 1994 WL 16099762 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (May. © 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Packet Page 327 of 433 http://web2.westlaw. com/print/printstream. aspx?s v=S plit&rlti =1 &prft=HTMLE&n=18 &f... 3/ 14/2007 Page 84 of 84 115 S.Ct. 1842 514 U.S. 779,115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881,63 USLW 4413 (Cite as: 514 U.S. 779,115 S.CL 1842) 16, 1994) • 1994 WL 16011957 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Mar. 17, 1994) Original Image of this Document with Appendix (PDF) END OF DOCUMENT c0 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. Page 83 Packet Page 328 of 433 http://we.b2.westlaw.com/piint/printstream.aspx?sv=Split&rlti=l &prft=HTMLE&n=18&f._. 3/14/2007 AM-885 Community Event Banner Sites on City -owned Property Edmonds City Council Meeting Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Frances Chapin, Parks and Recreation Submitted For: Brian McIntosh Time: 10 Minutes Department: Parks and Recreation Type: Action Review Community/Development Services Committee: Action: Recommend Review by Full Council Agenda Memo Subiect Title Public Hearing regarding a Sign Code amendment to clarify language addressing community event banner sites on City -owned property. Recommendation from Mayor and Staff Recommend proposed Sign Code amendment Ordinance be approved by City Council. Previous Council Action CSDS Committee directed staff to have amendment developed on November 14, 2006. Narrative 4. For several years the community has expressed interest in having a third location to publicize community events in addition to the sites on Caspers and on 5th Avenue S where community event banners are displayed. The need for additional sites is included in both the Community Cultural Plan and the Streetscape Plan elements of the City Comprehensive Plan. Staff has now identified a suitable new site for installing poles for pole mounted community event banners on the Public Works property to the north side of 212th Street. However, installation has been delayed because the current Sign Code language does not address this special situation where the poles are located on City property. The issue was brought to the City Council CSDS Committee on November 14, 2006 where the recommended action was to direct staff to pursue developing a code amendment to allow the construction of the proposed sign site. On January 24, 2007 the Planning Board reviewed the proposed Ordinance amending the language and held a public hearing on the proposed Ordinance on February 14, 2007 where it was recommended to City Council. Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Attachments Link: Ordinance Form Routing/Status Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/15/2007 08:22 AM APRV 2 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/15/2007 09:59 AM APRV 3 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/15/2007 10:15 AM APRV Form Started By: Frances Chapin Started On: 03/14/2007 03:27 PM Final Approval Date: 03/15/2007 Packet Page 329 of 433 0006.900000 JZL/ 12/05/06 1 /06/07 ORDINANCE NO. AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF EDMONDS, WASHINGTON, AMENDING CHAPTER 20.60 ECDC SIGN CODE; REVISING CURRENT DEFINITIONS FOR "GOVERNMENTAL SIGN", "POLE SIGN", AND "PORTABLE SIGN"; ADDING A NEW DEFINITION FOR "COMMUNITY EVENT BANNER" AND ESTABLISHING REGULATIONS THEREFORE; PROVIDING FOR SEVERABILITY; AND FIXING A TIME WHEN THE SAME SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE. WHEREAS, the City of Edmonds regulates signs through the Sign Code codified at Chapter 20.60 ECDC for the purpose of promoting traffic safety and community aesthetics; and WHEREAS, community event banners effectively inform City residents about local festivals, carnivals, fairs, recreational contests and other nonprofit, charitable or City - sponsored events that are integral to the Edmonds community; and WHEREAS, community event banners are consistent with the underlying purposes of Chapter 20.60 ECDC by advancing community aesthetics; NOW, THEREFORE, THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF EDMONDS, WASHINGTON, DO ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS: {JZL647340.D0C;2/00006.900000/} - I - Packet Page 330 of 433 Section 1. Amendment of ECDC 20.60.005. Section 20.60.005 of the Edmonds Community Development Code is hereby amended to provide for revised definitions of "Governmental Sign", "Portable Sign" and "Pole Sign", and to establish a new definition for "Community Event Banner" as follows: 20.60.005 Definitions. For the purposes of this chapter, the following definitions shall apply: "Community event banner" is a noncommercial sign composed of cloth, fabric, canvas or similarly flexible material that promotes a temporary community event endorsed, operated or sponsored wholly or in part by a local public entity the jurisdiction of which includes the City of Edmonds. Community events are nonprofit, governmental or charitable festivals, contests, programs, fairs, carnivals or recreational contests conducted within the City. "Governmental sign" is a sign owned, operated or sponsored by a governmental entity, and which promotes the public health, safety or welfare. Governmental signs include, but are not limited to, traffic signs, directional and informational signs for public facilities, publicly sponsored warning or hazard signs, and community event banners displayed by a governmental entity on public property. "Pole signs" are freestanding signs where the structural support for the sign is a pole(s). Pole signs may include community event banners where the banner is supported by at least two poles that are permanently attached to the ground ("pole - mounted community event banners"). "Portable sign" is any sign that is readily capable of being moved or removed, whether attached or affixed to the ground or any structure that is typically intended for temporary display. Portable signs include, but are not limited to: {JZL647340.DOC;2/00006.900000/} - 2 - Packet Page 331 of 433 1. Signs designed and constructed with a chassis or support with or without wheels; 2. Menu and "sandwich" board signs; 3. "A" and "T" frame signs; 4. Wooden, metal, or plastic "stake" or "yard" signs; 5. Posters or banners affixed to windows, railings, overhangs, trees, hedges, or other structures or vegetation, except for pole -mounted community event banners; 6. Signs mounted upon vehicles parked and visible from the public right-of-way, except signs identifying the related business when the vehicle is being used in the normal day- to-day operation of the business, and except for signs advertising for sale the vehicle upon which the sign is mounted; 7. Searchlights; 8. Inflatables. Section 2. Amendment of ECDC 20.60.020. Subsection 20.60.020(B) of the Edmonds Community Development Code is hereby amended to provide in its entirety as follows: 20.60.020 General regulations for permanent signs. B. Except for pole -mounted community event banners, no sign or any part of a sign may be designed or constructed to be moving by any means and shall not contain items such as banners, ribbons, streamers and spinners. Signs with type that is movable to change the message (reader boards) are allowed. {JZL647340.DOC;2/00006.900000/} - 3 - Packet Page 332 of 433 Section 3. Amendment of ECDC 20.60.045 Subsection 20.60.045(E) of the Edmonds Community Development Code is hereby amended to provide in its entirety as follows: 20.60.045 Freestanding sign — Regulations. E. Location. Freestanding signs shall be located as close as possible to the center of the street frontage on which they are located. Except for pole -mounted community event banners, freestanding signs may not be located on public property. Sites on a corner of two public streets may have one sign on the corner instead of a sign for each frontage. Section 4. Severability. If any section, sentence, clause or phrase of this ordinance should be held to be invalid or unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity or unconstitutionality shall not affect the validity or constitutionality of any other section, sentence, clause or phrase of this ordinance. Section 5. Transmittal to CTED. Pursuant to RCW 36.70A.106, the City Planner is directed to transmit a copy of this ordinance to the Washington Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development as required by law. Section 6. Effective Date. This ordinance, being an exercise of a power specifi- cally delegated to the City legislative body, is not subject to referendum, and shall take effect five (5) days after passage and publication of an approved summary thereof consisting of the title. APPROVED: MAYOR GARY HAAKENSON {JZL647340.D0C;2/00006.900000/} - 4 - Packet Page 333 of 433 ATTEST/AUTHENTICATED: CITY CLERK, SANDRA S. CHASE APPROVED AS TO FORM: OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY: :• FILED WITH THE CITY CLERK: PASSED BY THE CITY COUNCIL: PUBLISHED: EFFECTIVE DATE: ORDINANCE NO. {JZL647340.D0C;2/00006.900000/} - 5 - Packet Page 334 of 433 SUMMARY OF ORDINANCE NO. of the City of Edmonds, Washington On the day of , 2006, the City Council of the City of Edmonds, passed Ordinance No. A summary of the content of said ordinance, consisting of the title, provides as follows: AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF EDMONDS, WASHINGTON, AMENDING CHAPTER 20.60 ECDC SIGN CODE; REVISING CURRENT DEFINITIONS FOR "GOVERNMENTAL SIGN", "POLE SIGN", AND "PORTABLE SIGN"; ADDING A NEW DEFINITION FOR "COMMUNITY EVENT BANNER" AND ESTABLISHING REGULATIONS THEREFOR; PROVIDING FOR SEVERABILITY; AND FIXING A TIME WHEN THE SAME SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE. The full text of this Ordinance will be mailed upon request. DATED this day of 92007. CITY CLERK, SANDRA S. CHASE {JZL647340.DOC;2/00006.900000/}- 6 - Packet Page 335 of 433 AM-889 S. 2007-2013 Capital Improvement Program (CIP) Edmonds City Council Meeting Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Conni Curtis, Engineering Submitted For: Don Fiene Time: 45 Minutes Department: Engineering Type: Action Review Committee: Action: Agenda Memo Subiect Title Public Hearing on the 2007-2013 Capital Improvement Program. Recommendation from Mayor and Staff Council direct the City Attorney to draft an ordinance for Council consent approval adopting the Annual Update to the Capital Facilities Plan as part of the Capital Facilities Element of the Comprehensive Plan. Previous Council Action N/A Narrative The Engineering Division has completed the proposed 2007-2013 Capital Improvement Plan (CIP). It was compiled with input from the Parks and Recreation Department, Public Works Department, Community Services Department, Wastewater Treatment Plant Division and the Administrative Services Department. This Plan shows projected projects and revenues for the funds shown in Attachment 1. The proposed 2007-2013 CIP is provided in Attachment 2. The Engineering Division is in the process of developing a booklet containing descriptions of the 2007-2013 capital projects. This year, for the first time, the project description book will be available on the City web page. The initial briefings of the proposed 2007-2013 CIP were presented to the CS/DS Committee on February 13, 2007 and to the Planning Board on February 14, 2007. Staff presented the CIP again at a public hearing before the Planning Board on March 14, 2007. E-mail comments to the Planning Division from five citizens regarding 80th Avenue West sight distance issues are provided in Attachment 3. Attachment 4 is a copy of the Draft Planning Board Minutes (March 14, 2007). Staff will present an overview of the plan, a summary of issues raised at the Planning Board hearing and will invite public comment. Link: CIP Funds List Link: 2007-2013 CIP Link: Citizen E-Mails Link: Planning Board Draft Minutes Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Attachments Form Routing/Status Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 Development Services Duane Bowman 03/15/2007 09:19 AM APRV 2 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/15/2007 09:53 AM APRV 3 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/15/2007 09:59 AM APRV 4 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/15/2007 10:15 AM APRV Form Started By: Conni Curtis Started On: 03/15/2007 08:03 AM Final Approval Date: 03/15/2007 Packet Page 336 of 433 CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROJECT FUNDS 2007 - 2013 Fund Description/Purpose Division Manager Comprehensive Plan Source of Funds 112 Combined Street Engineering Transportation Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax, Construction Comprehensive Plan Federal & State Transp. Improvement — (2002) Grants, Utility Transfers, Arterial Projects Traffic Impact Fees 113 Multimodal Community Federal & State Transportation Services Appropriations and Grants 116 Buildings Public Works General Fund Maintenance 125 Parks, Open Space, Parks & Parks, Recreation & Real Estate Excise Tax, Recreation, Recreation Open Space Plan Contributions from Beautification Developers 125 Transportation Engineering Transportation Real Estate Excise Tax (REET 2) Comprehensive Plan 2002 126 Special Capital Parks & Parks, Recreation & Real Estate Excise Tax (Purchases & Recreation Open Space Plan Acquisitions) 129 SR99 — International Parks & Economic Grants District Recreation Development Comprehensive Plan 132 Parks Construction Parks & Parks, Recreation & Grants Recreation Open Space Plan 412- Combined Utility Engineering Water Comprehensive Combined Utility 100 Construction Plan Update (1995), Improvement — Comprehensive Plan Water Projects 2002 412- Combined Utility Engineering Stormwater Combined Utility 200 Construction Comprehensive Plan Improvement — (2003) Drainage Projects 412- Combined Utility Engineering Sanitary Sewer Combined Utility 300 Construction Comprehensive Plan Improvement — 2006 Sewer Projects 414 Wastewater Wastewater Secondary Wastewater Combined Utility Treatment Plant Treatment Plant Treatment Facility Plan (Approx. 50% from Other Municipalities) Packet Page 337 of 433 Capital Improvements Program Transportation Projects- Fund 112 Projects for 2007-2013 PROJECT NAME 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 100th Ave W Road Stabilization Project $1,000.000 238th St Improvements 84th to SR 104 $2,100,000 212th & 84th Ave Intersection Improvements $100,000 - $600,000 220th Street Improvements (Construction) $100 000 92nd Ave W/ 234th St SW Safety85 improvements $,000 Nonmotonzed Trans- Main Street Pedestrian Lighting $0 $75,000 Nonmotorized- Walkway & Bikeway Projects- Citywide $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 Nonmotorized Trans- Caspers/ 9th/Puget Drive Walkway $590.000 Nonmotorized Trans: 96th Ave W Pedestrian Improvements $17,000 Nonmotorized Trans: Interurban Trail $125,000 $125,000 Nonmotorized Trans.- Olympic View Dr. Ped Improvements $250,000 Nonmotorized Trans. -School Zone Improve $10.0001 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10.000 Nonmotorized Trans.- 72nd Ave W Ped Improvements $360,000 Nonmotorized Trans- 76th Ave W & 206th St Traffic Calming $70 000 Nonmotonzed Trans- Meadowdals Beach Rd $30,000 Nonmotorized Trans- 80th Ave W from 2061h to 21116 80th $220,000 Nonmotonzed Trans- 216th Street SW Walkway $90,000 Nonmotorized Trans- 80th Ave W / 180th St SW Walkway $390,000 Overlay -Citywide $50,000 overlay -Utilities $320,000 $215.000 $210,000 $210,000 $220,000 $220,000 $220,000 Signal Improvements - Cit 'de $5,000 $5,0001 $5,000 $5,000 $5,0001 $5,000 $5,000 Intersection Improvements- 88th Ave & 196th St $10,000 Sight Distance Improvements- 80th Ave W $150,000 Signal Upgrades- 238th St & 100th Ave $115,000 Signal Upgrade Main & 3rd $125,000 Signal Improvements SR 104 & 238th $240,000 Intersection Improvements 9th & Main $260,000 Intersection Improvement- 9th & Caspers $270,000 Signal Rebuild - Puget & Olympic View or $180,000 Intersection Improvements - Walnut St @ 9th Ave 1 $245,000 SR 99/ 76th Ave W Safety Improvements $75.0001 $1,450,000 Nonmotorized Trans -Shell Valle-Bike/Walk/Emer. Access $50,000 Stabilization Projects - Citywide $0 $50.000 $50,000 $0 $50,000 $0 $0 Street Improvements- Citywide $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15.000 $15.000 Traffic Calming- Citywide $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 Transportation Plan $5,000 $200,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 Total Construction Projects $2,347,000 $1,160,000 $445,000 $2,750,000 $1,610,000 $2,560,000 $1 155,000 Revenues and Cash Balances 2007-2013 Beginning Cash Balance $600.106 $692 962 $192 139 $271,781 $163 414 $147,339 $25.861 Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax $116 000 $116.000 $266,000 $266,000 $266,000 $266,000 $266,000 New Gas Tax Revenues $56,000 $56,000 $56,000 $56,000 $56,000 $56,000 $56,000 Transfer in Olympic View Water/ Sewer (220th St $10,000 Transfer in Fund 125-(REET 2 Trans.) for 100th Ave W Sloe $500,200 Transfer in Fund 125-(REET 2 Trans.) for Cas ers Walkway $152,000 Transfer in Fund 125 REET 2 Trans for Shell Valle-Bike/Walk/Emer. $50,000 Transfer in Fund 125-(REET 2 Trans.) for 72nd Ave W Ped Imp $180,000 Transfer in Fund 125- REET 2 Trans. for 76th/206th Traffic Calm 1 $36,000 Transfer in Fund 125-(REET 2 Trans.) for 80th/206th Walk $110,000 Transfer in Fund 125 REET 2 Trans) for 216th St Walkway $45,000 Transfer in Fund 125-(REET 2 Trans) for 80th /180th Walkway $390.000 Transfer in Fund 125-(REET 2 Trans) for Signal Im r. Puget & Olympic $90,000 Transfer in Fund 125-(REET 2 Trans.) for Intersection Impr. Walnut St &9th $122,500 Transfer in General Fund for Main Street Pedestrian Lighting $75,000 Investment Interest $15,003 $17.324 $4,803 $6,795 $4,085 $3,683 $647 Traffic Impact Fees $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 Transfer in -Fund 412-100 $115,000 $115,000 $115,000 $116,000 $115,000 $115,000 $115,000 Transfer in -Fund 412-200 $50,000 $55,000 $55.000 $56,000 $56,000 $55,000 $55,000 Transfer in -Fund 412-300 $25,000 $25,000 $50,000 $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 Contributions to sidewalk fund $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 Grants/ Loans Secured Grant -(State) for 220th St Improvements 38 000 Grant (State) Caspers/Pu et Drive Walkway $438,000 Additional Public Works Trust t-una Loan- 220t (2) $20.000 rant- ( ederal) for Interurban Trail 1125 000 25 000 Public Works Trust Fund- 100th Ave- RoadStabilization 499,800 Yearly Sub Total rants/ Loans Secured= 1,220,800 25 000 $0 $0 0 $0 0 Grants/ Loans Sought notSecured) Grant- (State) forsortation Plan 50,000 rant-( tate) for i nal pq raa a 238th & i uuth 45,000 rant -(Fed) for bK uuitti h Ave W t5aletV Improvements $1,160,000 Grant-(Fed/State) for SR 104 & 238th SiqnaF_200 000 Grant (Feai State) for 9th & Main intersection improvements 200,000 Grant (Fed/State) for 9th & Caspers Intersection Improvements vow Grant(State) for 72nd Ave W Pedestrian Improvements $180,000 Grant (Federal) for 76th Ave W/ 206th St Ped Improvements $35 000 Grant (State) 80th Ave W from 206th St to 21116 $110,000 Grant (State) 216th St SW Walkway $45,000 Grant (State) for ziztn & 84tn L;apaciN Improvrneents 000 $450,000 Grant- (Fed/State for Cit 'de wa & Bikewa Projects $0 $0 $7,500 $7,500 $7,500 $7.500 $7,500 Grant- (Fed tate for o0 Mnoe Im rovements $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 Grant Fed/State for 238th St Im rovements $1,800 000 rant (Fed) for Pu et & mpic igna Improvements rant (Fed) for Walnut & um intersection I m rovements 122 500 Yearly Sub Total rants Loans ou ht (not secured)= 5 000 100,000 2 500 $1,862,500 802 5 0 1,812,500 $135,000 Grant Subtotal $1,225,800 $225,000 2,600 $1 862 500 802 500 ,812,500 135,000 Interfund Transfers Out Debt Service on Loan 220th St Desi. n 20 000 20,000 $20 000 20,000 - 20 000 -$20,000 - 20,000 De t ervice on Loan 2) 220t t onstruction 22,647 22 647 22,647 - 22,64 22 647 22,647 22,64 Debt Service on Loan (3) 1 outh Ave Koaa Stabilization - 34,5 4 34, 74 34,5 4 -$34,514 -$34 514 Total Revenues & Cash Balances $3,039,962 $716,781 2 9 3,414 ,657,339 2,585,861 $1,206,347 Total Construction Projects 2,663 00 160,000 445,08010 $2 750,000 510,000 $2,560,000 1,155,000 ash Balance 92 92 27Ending $163,414 j147,339 $25 861 51,347 Note: Council reiterates its goals and policies as stated in the Comprehensive Plan and acknowledges that the six -year CIP as proposed does not have adequate funding to accomplish all the goals and objectives as stated in the Comprehensive Packet Page 338 of 433 x 0 0 0 0 OO Osl C C C 0 0 Li o0 o O M CO � COO C04 L O O to COO N V� V3 CO 0 0 O O O O V> O O O O O O N M M CD N N CO N O O CO N CO N N CO Cq OV Do VT VO' V3 VO' V3 V3 v VJ x OOO CD CD O 0 OO O OOV) O O O O Cn O O O O O N O COO OOD N- IQ O o00_ W N �N NbN Vj V3 M V) V) 4 M (fi M V3 x x O O O O Ca O CD CD O O M O O t l7 N V N V• l� _ _ M v O O N V N v N � � V! � beg x x O O O O O O O 0c 0 Ol O O Q O V) O O O CC! M OD O N M C70 00 Cl Cl O) � O O N � � N• ,ram•-- � � � b04 x x CD CD O O O CD CD 0 C7 O CD O O CO O O CD CD 'V' CD �_ O O CD M h -t N N Cfl m x x O O O O O O O O N N O N N N N N N CV N N (6 U C7 � J � U J M C CA r CD,T l C CO CO a d o m d C u, O N �, C Cj 'O O Q O rn « Ca r � U � m 4) E CL c �' C C6 mQ. p_ N £ O Cl i aN oW N '� m m 0 f0 Q ^0 I- O C 0 CCI m I- Q- �� a m.. v °— 2 �N �, _ �� dm R W lla 0 Y C CO U Q� C U 7 •` r y U d C 1° cC 04 V � 03'� � a�i mcotL CNw d �U L c .N o 2 U •E c% 41 0 d L N 0 d 7 0 w K _d P o �' O d d :6 an a)I- ClJ H w O O C d U �o. a w ao � E- m mu52 LL ofU) �w Packet Page 339 of 433 Capital Improvements Program Buildings Maintenance- Fund 116 Projects for 2007-2013 PROJECT NAME 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 ADA Improvements- City Wide $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 Anderson Center Seismic Reforcement $959,600 $472,600 Anderson Center Interior Painting $15,000 Anderson Center Exterior Painting $30,000 Anderson Center Carpets $17,000 Anderson Center Radiators $25,000 $50,000 $25,000 $25,000 Anderson Center Exterior Repairs $25,000 Anderson Center Blinds $20,000 Anderson Center Asbestos Abatement $35.000 Anderson Center Vinyl Tile $12,000 Anderson Center Flooring $75,000 Anderson Center Counter Tops $12,000 Anderson Center Oil Tank Replacement $40,000 Anderson Center Elevator Replacement $150,000 Anderson Center Sprinkler Head Replacement $10,0001 $15,000 Anderson Center Roof Replacement $15,000 Cemetery Building Gutter Replacement $3,000 City Hall Entrance Doors $18,000 City Hall Elevator $125,000 City Hall Exterior Cleaning/Repainting $50,000 City Hall Security Measures $10,000 $10,000 Grandstand Exterior and Roof $45,000 ESCO Project Phase II $472,600 Fire Station #16 Painting $5,000 Fire Station #16 Heating Unit Replacement $20,000 Fire Station #17 Stove Hood Exhaust $1,000 Fire Station #17 Carpet $12,000 Fire Station #20 Stairs and Deck $35,000 Library Carpets $50,000 Library Fire Alarm System Replacement $25,000 Library Plaza Appliance Replacement $4,500 Library Plaza Room Carpet $20,000 Library Plaza Brick Painting $65,000 Library Wood Trim $12,000 Log Cabin Lighting Replacement $3,000 Meadowdale Clubhouse Roof $16,000 Meadowdale Flooring Replacement $20,000 Meadowdale Clubhouse Gutter Replacement $5,000 Meadowdale Clubhouse Exterior Painting $3,000 $15,000 Museum Step Replacement $50,000 Museum Brick Pointing & Grouting $40,000 Museum Brick Sealing $20,000 Park Maintenance Bldg Renovation Study $15,000 Park Maintenance Bldg Paint Booth Installation $40,000 Public Safety/Fire Station #17 Soffit Installation $3,000 Public Safety Exterior Painting $8,000 Public Safety Council Chamber Carpet $15,000 Senior Center Misc Repairs & Maint. $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 Senior Center Kitchen Remodel CDBG Funding $90,000 Senior Center EntryNestibule CDBG Funding) $15,000 $135,000 Senior Center Roofing CTED Funding) $85,000 Senior Center Foundation Structural Study $35,000 Senior Center CMU Elastomenc Sealing CDBG $148,000 Senior Center Siding CTED $60,000 Wade James Theater Gutter Replacement $5,000 Wade James Theater Roof Replacement $30,000 Wade James Theater Exterior Painting $4,000 Total Facilities Projects $1,694,200 $1,041,600 $251,000 $247,000 $236,500 $251,000 $255,000 Revenues and Cash Balances 2007-2013 Beginning Cash Balance $261,753 $281,153 $126,253 $79,853 $50,053 $50,003 $50,003 Interest Eamings $7,500 $7,500 Transfer from Gen Fund #001 $56,600 $56,600 $56,600 $157,200 $236,450 $251,000 $255,000 Transfer in from Sno. Isle Library $50,000 Bank Financing for ESCO Project $408,200 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 Sno. Co. CDBG Grant Secured $97,5001 $135,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 Senior Center Funding $35,000 CTED Grants $85,000 $115,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 Bond Funding for FAC Seismic Project $435,500 $214,500 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 FEMA Grant Secured $524,100 $258,100 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 Sno. Co. CDBG Grant (Not Secured) $0 $0 $148,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 Other Grant Funding Not Secured $0 $50,000 $0 $60,000 $0 $0 $0 ESCO Utility Rebates (Not Secured) 64,200 0 $0 0 $0 $0 $0 Total Revenues $1,975,353 $1,167,853 $330,853 $297,053 $286,503 $301,003 $306,003 Total Facilities Projects $1,694,200 $1,041,600 $251,000 $247,000 $236,500 $251,000 $255,000 EndingCash Balance $281 153 $126 253 $79 853 $50 053 $50 003 $50 003 $50 003 Packet Page 340 of 433 Capital Improvements Program Parks Improvement - Fund 125 Projects for 2007-2013 PROJECT NAME 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Park Development PmjJ is 162nd Street Park 1 % $300 000 $25,000 $10,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 164th Street Walkway 1 % $270 000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 76th Ave/75th PI West Walkway 1% $945,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 Anderson Center Field/Court 1% $5,000 $40 000 $40,000 $20,000 $100 000 $10,000 $10,000 Brackett's Landing 1% $0 $10,000 _$100,000 $10,000 $50,000 $5,000 $5,000 City Park 1% $100,000 $120 000 $50,000 $25,000 $25 000 $25,000 $25,000 Civic Center Complex 1% $75 000 $40,000 $30,000 $30,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 Edmonds Marsh/Hatchery 1% $0 $40,000 $40,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 Fishing Pier/Olympic Beach 1% $20,000 $50,000 $35,000 $25,000 $25,000 $10,000 $10,000 Former Woodway HS (development dependent upon successful capital campaign) 1% $0 $1,000,000 $650,000 $25,000 $25,000 $5,000 $5,000 Maplewood Park 1% $40,000 $5 000 $5,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 Marina Beach Park 1% $0 $10,000 $10,000 $70 000 $200,000 $10,000 $10,000 Matha Ballin erPark 1% $60,000 $5,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 Meadowdale Clubhouse Grounds 1% $0 $10,000 $5,000 $50,000 $0 $0 $0 Old Woodway Elementary Park (07-'08 to Fund 132) 1% $0 $0 $20,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 Pine Ridge Park 1% $0 $5,000 $45 000 $10 000 $5,000 $0 $0 Pine Street Park 1% $0 $0 $20,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 Seaview Park 1% $0 $15,000 $50,000 $60 000 $10,000 $0 $0 Sr. Center & 144 RR Waterfront Walkway Fund 132 1% $0 $0 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $0 $0 Sierra Park 1% $0 $80,000 $100 000 $0 $0 $0 $0 Underwater Park 1 % $2 000 $2,000 $5 000 $5 000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 Waterfront Walkway/Olympic Beach 1% $20,000 $50,000 $100 000 $5,000 $0 $0 Yost Park/Pool 1% $25,000 $65,000 $10,000 $20,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 CWWW Park Improvements Citywide Beautification 1% $20,000 $60,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 ADA 1% $0 $5,000 $5,000 $5000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 Centralized Irrigation 1% $0 $0 $5,000 $5 000 $5 000 $0 $0 Misc Paving 1% $10,000 $50,000 $20,000 $10,000 $10 000 $10,000 $10,000 City,wide Park Improvements/Mist Small Projects 1% $145,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 Sports Fields Upgrade/Playground Partnership 1% $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 Specialized Projects Skateboard Park 1% $0 $0 $0 $0 $200,000 $0 $0 Trail Development Interurban Trail 07-08 to Fund 132) 1% $0 $0 $10,000 $5 000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 Misc Unpaved Trail/Bike Path 1% $10,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 Planning 4th Avenue Arts Corridor $25,000 $25,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 Cultural Arts $15,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 Comprehensive Plan $40,000 $0 $0 $0 $10,000 $50,000 $0 Edmonds Marsh Environmental Plan $30,000 $0 $0 so $0 $0 $0 Yost Pool Feasibil Study $40,000 $10,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 Total Park Projects $2,202,000 $1,782,000 $1,455,000 $630,000 $870,000 $315,000 $265,000 Revenues and Cash Balances 2007-2013 Beginning Cash Balance $5,397,997 $2,461,997 $669,997 $9 997 $154 997 $69 997 $539,997 Real Estate Tax 1/4% $750,000 $750,000 $750,000 $750 000 $750,000 $750,000 $750,000 Interest Earnings $90.000 $85,000 $50,000 $30 000 $40 000 $35,000 $45,000 Total Revenues $6.237. 997 $3,296,997 11.469. 997 789 997 944 997 $854.997 1 334 997 Expenditures Supplies $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 Professional Services $3,000 $3,000 $3,000 $3,000 $3,000 Transfer out to Fund 132 $1,569,000 $840,000 Total Park Projects $2,202,000 $1,782,000 $1,455,000 $630,000 $870,000 $315,000 $265,000 Total Expenditures $3,776,000 $2,627,000 $1,460,000i $635,0001 $875,000 $315,000 $265,000 Packet Page 341 of 433 REET 2- Transportation Fund 125 Projects for 2007-2013 PROJECT NAME 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Nonmotorized Trans: Downtown Crosswalk Rehab $125,000 Nonmotorized Trans: ADA Curb Ramp Impr $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,0001 $20,000 $20,000 Nonmotorized Trans: Pedestrian Lighting- Citywide $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 Nonmotorized Trans -Shell Valley-Bike/Walk/Emer. Access $340,000 Overlay -Citywide $550,000 $550,000 $350,000 $350,000 $450,000 $450,000 $500,000 Total Construction Projects $575,000 $700,000 $715,000 $375,000 $475,000 $475,000 $520,000 Revenues and Cash Balances 2007-2013 Beginning Cash Balance $680,111 $69,914 $21,662 $7,203 $117,383 $190,318 $330,076 REET 2 Revenues $650,000 $650,000 $700,000 $700,000 $700,000 $700,000 $700,000 Investment Interest $17,003 $1,748 $542 $180 $2,935 $4,758 $8,252 Transfer to Fund 112 for 100th Ave W Road Stabilization Project -$500,200 Transfer to Fund 112 for Nonmotorized Trans- Cas ers/ 9th/Puget Drive -$152,000 Transfer to Fund 112 for Nonmotorized Trans- Shell Valley- Bike/Walk/Emer. Access -$50,000 Transfer to Fund 112 for Nonmotorized Trans- 72nd Ave W Ped -$180,000 Transfer to Fund 112 for Nonmotorized Trans- 76th Ave & 206th St -$35,000 Transfer to Fund 112 for Nonmotorized Trans- 80th/206th Walk -$110,000 Transfer to Fund 112 for 216th St Walkway -$45,000 Transfer to Fund 112 for Nonmotorized Trans- 80th/180th Walkway -$390,000 Transfer to Fund 112 for Puget & O m is View Signal -$90,000 Transfer to Fund 112 for Walnut @ 9th Ave Signal -$122,500 Total Revenues & Cash Balances $644,914 $721 662 $722,203 $492,383 $665,318 $805,076 $525,828 Total Construction Projects $575,000 $700,000 $715,000 $375,000 $475,000 $475,000 $520,000 Ending Cash Balance $69 914 $21 662 $7,203 $117,383 $190 318 $330,076 $5,828 Note: Council reiterates its goals and policies as stated in the Comprehensive Plan and acknowledges that the six -year CIP as proposed does not have adequate funding to accomplish all the goals and objectives as stated in the Comprehensive Plan. Packet Page 342 of 433 Capital Improvements Program Parks Acquisition - Fund 126 (Special Capital) Projects for 2007-2013 PROJECT NAME 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Debt Service on City Hall $415,502 $415,500 $415,500 $415.500 $415,500 $415,500 $415,500 Debt Service on Library Roof $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 Debt Service on Marina Beach $151,835 $151,835 $151,835 $151,835 $151,835 $151,835 $151,835 Debt Service on PSCC Purchase $73,8231 $73,823 $73,823 $73,823 $73,823 $73,823 $73,823 Dept Service on FAC Seismic retrofit $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 Total Debt Service 697 160 697 158 luz 158 697 158 JqH 558 697 158 697 158 Misc. O ens ace/Land $200,000 $200,000 $200,000 $200,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 Waterfront Acquisition $500,000 $500,000 Tideland/Beach Acquisition $10,000 $10,000 $100,000 Total Park Projects 210 000 210 000 300 000 700 000 119LO 000 lip0 000 600 000 Beginning Cash Balance $289,457 $852,297 $1,115,139 $1,287,981 $1,560,823 $2,033,665 $2,436,507 Real estate Tax 1/4%/1st Qtr % $1,400,000 $1,100,000 $1,100,000 $1,100,000 $1,100,000 $1,100,000 $1,100,000 Interest Earnings $70,000 $70,000 $70,000 $70,000 $70,000 $100,000 $120,000 Projected Grants: State/Federal Waterfront Acquisition) $500,000 $500,000 Private Donations Misc Open Space) Total Revenues $1,759,457 $2,022,297 $2,285,139 $2,957,981 $2,730,823 $3,233,665 $4,156,507 Expenditures Total Debt Service $697,160 $697,158 $697,158 $697,158 $697,168 $697,158 $697,158 Total Parks Projects $210,000 $210,000 $300,000 $700,000 $100,000 $100,000 $600,000 Total Expenditures $907,1601 $907,158 $997,158 $1,397,158 $797,158 $797,158 $1,297,158 Ending Cash Balance $852,2971 $1,115,139 $1,287,981 $1,560,823 $1,933,665 $2,436,507 $2,859,349 Packet Page 343 of 433 Capital Improvements Program Special Projects- Fund 129 Projects for 2007-2013 PROJECT NAME 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 State Route SR 99 International District Enhancements Total Projects Beginning Cash Balance $11,000 Projected Grants: PSRC Transportation Enhancement Grant Secured $316,000 Total Revenues $327,000 Expenditures Total Projects Total Expenditures $327,000 Ending Cash Balance $0 Packet Page 344 of 433 Capital Improvements Program Parks Construction - Fund 132 Projects for 2007-2013 PROJECT NAME 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Dayton Street Plaza 1% $50,000 $30,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 0 Interurban Trail 1% $40,000 $660,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 0 Old Woodmay Elementary Park 1% $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 0 Senior Center & 144 RR Waterfront Walkway 1% $140,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0 Skateboard Park - Civic 1% $339,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 0 Total Projects 1 569 000 1 690 000 0 0 0 0 0 Revenue & Cash Balances beginning cash balance $0 $174,600 Transfer in from Fund 125 for Dayton St. Plaza $50,000 $30,000 Transfer in from Fund 125 for Interurban Trail $40,000 $160,000 Transfer in from Fund 125 for Old Woodway Elem Park $1,000,000 $400,000 Transfer in from Fund 125 for Senior Center $140,000 $0 Transfer in from Fund 125 for Skateboard Park $339,000 $0 Total Cash Transfer from Fund 125 $1,569,000 $840,000 Projected Grants(secured): Dayton Street Plaza Arts Festival Foundation $25,000 Skateboard Park(Community Partners $24,600 subtotal grants secured= 49 600 0 Projected Grants (not secured): Interurban Trail Federal $125,000 $125,000 Interurban Trail State $250,000 Old Woodway Elementary State $300,000 Senior Center & 144 RR Avenue CDBG - HUD $194,000 subtotal grants not secured= 125 000 869 000 Total Revenues 1 743 000 1 709 000 Expenditures Total Projects $1,569,000 $1,690,000 Total Expenditures 11,L69 000 ti&90 000 ,Ending Cash Balance $174 600 $19 000 Packet Page 345 of 433 Capital Improvements Program Combined Utility Construction Improvement- Fund 412-100 Water Projects Projects for 2007-2013 Water Projects PROJECT NAME 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Citywide Water Improvements $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 Replacement Program- 2005 Program $1,525,000 Replacement Program- 2006 Program $1,100,000 Replacement Program- 2007 Program $555,000 Replacement Program $1,460,000 $1,200,000 $1,250,000 $1,150,000 $1,200,000 $1,200,000 South Perrinville Waterline Replacement (OVD) $675,000 Five Comers Pump Station Improvements $400,000 Seismic Improvements $150,000 Reservoir Security $90,000 Chlorine Residual Analyzers $15,000 Automated Meter Evaluation Study $10,000 Automated Meter Construction $100,000 $100,000 PRV Replacements $100,000 Total Water Projects $3,960,000 $2,160,000 $1,225,000 $1,275,000 $1,185,000 $1,325,000 $1,325,000 Revenues 2007-2013 Beginning Balance $1,379,936 $190,834 $45,605 $231,746 $72,539 -$647 $84,336 Transfer from Combined Utility Fund #411 $400,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 Public Works Trust Fund Loan -Five Corners - Transfer in (Secured) $326,400 Connection Fee Proceeds $125,000 $125,000 $125,000 $125,000 $125,000 $125,000 $125,000 Bond Proceeds, Transfer in $2,000,000 $2,000,000 $1,400,000 $1,100,000 $1,100,000 $1,400,000 $1,300,000 Interest Earnings $34,498 $4,771 $1,140 $5,794 $1,813 -$161 $2,108 Transfer to Const Improv Fund #112 -$115,000 -$115,000 -$115,000 -$115,000 -$115,000 -$115,000 -$115,000 Total Revenues $4,160,834 $2,206,606 $1,466,746 $1,347,539 $1,184,363 $1,409,336 $1,396,445 Total Water Projects $3,960,000 $2,160,000 $1,225,000 $1,275,000 $1,185 000 $1,325,000 $1,325,000 Endin Cash Balance $190 834 $45 605 $231 745 $72 639 -$647 $84 336 $71 445 Packet Page 346 of 433 Capital Improvements Program Combined Utility Construction Improvement - Fund 412-200 Drainage Projects Projects for 2007-2013 PROJECT NAME 220th St Storm Improvements 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 232nd St Storm Improvements $160,000 96th Ave West Storm/ 93rd Ave West Storm $860,000 Cit ide Drainage Replacement, Extension $50,000 $50,000 $100,000 $300,000 $315,000 $330,000 $350,000 Lake Ballinger Monitoring $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 Lake Ballinger Lake Level & Outlet Study $40,000 Meadowdale-Drainage $70,000 Northstream 30" Storm Repair/ Improvements $575,000 Olympic Ave. Phase 2 $350,000 $50,000 Olympic Ave. Phase 1 $35,000 Perrinville Creek Diversion $150,000 $1,500,000 Public Involvement Projects $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 Shell Creek $30,000 Shoreline Regulation Revisions Shoreline Regulation Revisions, Monitoring & Public Education $30.000 Southwest Edmonds Basin Study, Projects $250,000 Talbot Road $300,000 Edmonds Marsh Channel Improvements $50,000 $250,000 Vehicle Wash Station $100,000 Willow Creek Outfali Ext. & Marina Beach Emer. Repair Total Drainage System Projects $2,036,000 $791,000 $1,611,000 $696,000 $376,000 $491,000 $361,000 Revenues and Cash Balances 2007-2013 Beginning Balance $0 $45,268 $780,399 $339,959 $138.682 $201,149 $150,178 Transfer from Fund411 $100,000 $66,050 $451,224 $400,000 $400,000 $400,000 Transfer from Fund 411-Bond Proceeds $2,200,000 $1,300,000 Public Works Trust Fund Proceeds Secured $30,281 Grant for Perrinville Diversion Sought, not Secured $700,000 CZM Grant for Edmonds Marsh (Sought, not Secured) $150,000 FCAAP Grant for Talbot Road (Sought, not Secured) $40,000 Lynnwood Cost Share, Perrinville Diversion (Sought, not Secured) $350,000 Contributions to Perrinville Diversion Project (Sought, not secured) $50,000 $50.000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 Storm System Development Charge Fees $40.000 $40,000 $40,000 $40.000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 Investment Interest $0 $1.132 $19,510 $8,499 $3,467 $5,029 $3 754 Public Works Trust Fund Loan- Northstream Storm (not secured Public Works Trust Fund Loan- 93rd/96th Storm not secured) Interfund Loan Payback Interfund Loan Fund 411 -$239,013 Transfer to Const. Improvement Fund 112 -$50,000 -$55,000 -$55,000 -$55,000 -$55,000 -$55,000 -$55,000 Total Revenues $2,081,268 $1,571,399�$339,959 $834,682 $577,149 $641,178 $588,933 Total Drainage Projects $2 036,000 $791,000 $696,000 $376,000 $491,000 $361,000 EndingCash Balance $45 268 $780 399 $138,6821 $201 149 1 $160,1781 $227 933 Packet Page 347 of 433 C) 0 0 0 0 o roLOO Oo (o0co 0 o O O 0 0 oV).Oo 00 000 O O O O O O OD '[Y O O O N O N O Cn O O O Cn .4 W, O O Cn O (n (n M M 00 O (O to Icr N OD O r N I-- N V r EA 69 Cl) V? m 69 V3 M EH N r 6q 64 ' M CO 69 p N _ V3 _ tq V3 6% 0 0 0 0 O O LO O w 0 0 0 O r O O O O C. O '[ Y i!) 07 O O O O O O Ct 0 O O O O N to C O O W O W (n O 0 0 O V7 N N O 0 O m Cn It N 0 Vi0 CN 00 0 00 N r' WA d3 NN V3 b9 N 6) N r V3 NN69 O N 1-7Efl Vi Hi 0 0 O O O O O V O 0 0 to O LO 00 00 O O C04900CD, 00 V O V 00 00 O O M 000 00 NON OCn OCn O CD Cn r0 Oto NON r' COr N to (O N't C) C) LO CO f� 69 ffl O V r r N V> Co Ln 0 V O r •- V3 V! 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(C OL a�i a0i aoi a°i aii oa v o m o m O— a>i a>i o 4) a°)i 2 2 o o c C)QQQU d 5c9U��U (Z) Uwn UDCL w w f �m5 F -< Packet Page 349 of 433 Message Page 1 of 1 Curtis, Conni From: Chave, Rob Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 11:05 PM To: Fiene, Don Cc: Cunningham, Diane Subject: FW: Street improvements surrounding Anglers Crossing PRD -----Original Message ----- From: Bill Rankin[mailto:billr@pacificphysicianslab.com] Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 4:11 PM To: Chave, Rob Subject: Street improvements surrounding Anglers Crossing PRD Dear Mr. Chave, Please find attached my letter to you and your staff to consider street improvements around the Anglers Crossing PRD. I thank you for your attention. Sincerely, Bill Rankin Applications and Database Supervisor Pacific Physicians' Laboratory, Inc 21313 68th Ave. West Lynnwood, WA 98036 425.774.3751 tel 888.775.5227 toll -free 425.329.2913 desk 425.775.0848 fax 206.713.1376 cell Note: this electronic transmission is intended by Pacific Physicians' Laboratory for the use of the named individual or entity to which it is directed and may contain information that is privileged or otherwise confidential. If you have received this electronic mail transmission in error, please delete it from your system without copying or forwarding it, and notify the sender of the error by reply e-mail or by telephone so that the sender's address records can be corrected. 3/15/2007 Packet Page 350 of 433 Robert Chave Edmonds Planning Board Manager 121 5th Avenue North - 2nd Floor Edmonds, WA 98020 March 14, 2007 Dear Mr. Chave, I am writing to express my concerns regarding the Angler's Crossing Planned Residential Development and its impact on Public Safety and traffic flow. Thank you for accepting public comment on this project. The approved plan that the City has before it now calls for 27 homes on two cul-de-sacs; one emptying onto Olympic View Drive, and the other on 80th Ave SW. In the near future, we will have well over 100 people trying to gain egress and access to their homes and the surrounding neighborhood. My concerns include these items: • Regrading of the hill directly north of the western access point of the PRD on 80' Ave. This is an essential component of making this new intersection safe. Drivers need to be able to see the bottom of the hill or the top of the hill depending on which way they are traveling. • Regrading of this hill makes the most sense prior to or during the development phase of the PRD. To postpone this fails to safeguard our community. • Funding for such sidewalk and street improvements are available through the sale of city land and assessments from the PRD. This money should be used for the community in which it was taken. • The possible placement of an additional 4 way stop at the base of the blind hill on 80tt, Ave and 184t'. How many southbound people will get hit by those motorists who fly over the hill and don't have a proper stopping distance? Again, Public Safety is at stake. • If your department's calculations are correct about the additional number of car trips that these new households will bring, the City must make substantial improvements to 80th Ave and also Olympic View Drive. These include: o Wider shoulders on 80th o Sidewalks or an area for the many pedestrians that travel between the County Park and Seaview Park. o Sidewalk on the steep hill on 184th connecting to 80tt, o Improvement of the "dog leg" turn from 80th Ave to 180th Street. I invite you to park your car at Seaview Park and walk to Olympic View Drive. You'll get a rush as you try to traverse this corner with cars traveling both directions. You can also see tire ruts on the outside corner of cars that didn't make the turn. This situation will only worsen with more homes, and more traffic. Packet Page 351 of 433 I realize that you must balance Public Safety with reasonable development, the Growth Management Act with the use of Critical Areas. However, I question whether the current situation meets these criteria. I'd like to work on a solution that is mutually beneficial for new residents and the current neighborhood. Respectfully submitted, Bill Rankin 8005 18Vt PL SW Edmonds, WA 98026 Packet Page 352 of 433 Message Page 1 of 1 Curtis, Conni From: Chave, Rob Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 11:04 PM To: Fiene, Don Cc: Cunningham, Diane Subject: FW: 80th ave w re -grade -----Original Message ----- From: Thomas gangland [mailto:viktom3@yahoo.com] Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 7:28 PM To: Chave, Rob; michaelppp98@yahoo.com; deannadawson@yahoo.com; j_wilson@cmc.net; electpeggy@comcast.net; maurinmark@comcast.net; Spellman, Jana; daveandmartha.orvis@verizon.net Subject: 80th ave w re -grade To: The Mayor, Planning Board ,& City Council Members For thirty years my neighbors and I have had to literally sneak in and out of our driveways living with the fear of getting clobbered by vehicles racing up and down a blind hill on 80th ave w. Now with a new development Anglers Crossing apparently going in I believe its time for the city and or the contractor to step up and do something to alleviate the problem. While the contractor may not be the cause of the problem developing the site is certain compound it. During construction there will be many trucks hauling equipment, dirt and other material in and out. Contractors, employees and sub contractors entering and leaving the site,and needing a place to park, 80th being the likely choice. When completed there will be 27 new residents and their familys, 6 with direct access to 80th ave w at probably the worst point of all, the bottom of the hill, and all of which will likely want to use Seaview park at some point in time, or cross there to go to Seaview school. Then there are the people who already live here who will now have easier access to Perinville on foot. This hill is blind and dangerous for anyone that uses it. My wife and I have had many close calls as well as our neighbors. I believe re- grading the hill for improved sight distance will greatly increase the safety for traffic and pedestrians. Now is the time to fix the problem. Please don't wait until someone especially a child is injured or killed. With the traffic impact fees and the sale of land, 2 /3 of an acre by the city to the developer there seems to be plenty of money available. Thank You, Thomas & Vickie Langland 18226 80Th Ave W Edmonds, Wa 98026 Need Mail bonding? Go to the Yahoo! Mail Q&A for great tips from Yahoo! Answers users. 3/15/2007 Packet Page 353 of 433 Message Page 1 of 1 Curtis, Conni From: Chave, Rob Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 10:34 AM To: Fiene, Don Cc: Cunningham, Diane Subject: FW: Traffic Safety on 80th Avenue West N"s -----Original Message ----- From: Suzanne Beliveau [maiIto: suzannembeliveau@yahoo.com] Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 10:20 AM To: Chave, Rob Cc: rrwalbolt@msn.com; electpeggy@comcast.net; maurinmark@comcast.net; Spellman, Jana; daveandmartha.orvis@verizon.net; deannadawson@yahoo.com; michaelppp98@yahoo.com Subject: Traffic Safety on 80th Avenue West Edmonds Planning Board, Please accept this note as notice of our disappointment with the Board's decision to delay the re -grading and installation of sidewalks on 80th Avenue. Both situations are dangerous. One for drivers and the other for pedestrians. Because of the increased traffic from the new development, both problems will be exacerbated. The funds are available from the sale of the land as well as funds from the developer. To delay these improvements for six or seven years would be unconscionable. Please make these improvements a priority. Ray and Sue Beliveau 7817 182nd Place SW Looking for earth -friendly autos? Browse Top Cars by "Green Rating" at Yahoo! Autos' Green Center. 3/15/2007 Packet Page 354 of 433 Curtis, Conn! From: Chave, Rob Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 10:33 AM To: Fiene, Don Cc: Cunningham, Diane Subject: FW: Regrading hill on 80th Ave West between 18th SW and 182nd Place SW CIP.. -----Original Message ----- From: David Johnson [mailto:dsj1954@msn.com] Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 10:19 AM To: Chave, Rob Cc: dfarmen@msn.com; rrwambolt@msn.commichaelppp98@yahoo.com; deannadawson@yahoo.com; electpeggy@comcast.net; maurinmark@comcast.net; Spellman@ci.edmonds.wa.gov; daveandmartha.orvis@verizon.net; ghaakenson@ci.edmonds.wa.gov Subject: Regrading hill on 80th Ave West between 18th SW and 182nd Place SW Hello, I am writing to urge the City to improve traffic safety on 80th Ave West by regrading the street at the crest of the hill between 184th and 182nd Place. The sight lines are danderously obscured by the slope and there is a history of accidents here. Pedestrians literally put there lives at risk when they walk up or down this hill. Money is available as the City has received $220,000 from its sale of 2/3 of an acre of land to the developer of the upcoming Angler's Crossing development. The City will also be receiving $22,400 from the developer for traffic impact fees. I urge you to approve this regrade and include it on the Capital Improvement Project list for 2008 (2009 at the latest). I write these comments to you as I will be unable to attend either the Planning Board meeting on March 14, 2007 or the City Council meeting on March 20, 2007. I also hereby authorize Duane Farmen to introduce these comments into the record on my behalf at both the Planning Board meeting and the City Council meeting. Thank you. David Johnson 7810 182nd Place SW Edmonds, WA 98026 1 Packet Page 355 of 433 Curtis, Conni From: Chave, Rob Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 9:58 AM To: Cunningham, Diane; Fiene, Don Subject: FW: public comments for Planning Board meeting of March 14 For CIP hearing... -----Original Message ----- From: william gronau [mailto:bgronau82@hotmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2007 8:38 AM To: Chave, Rob Subject: public comments for Planning Board meeting of March 14 I would like to go on record as supporting the statements of Duane Farmen concerning the re -grade and sidewalk project for 80th Ave. It is only fair that since the city received money from the construction project (development at 80th and 184th) that this money be spent in the neighborhood. I have lived about 5 houses north of Duane Farmen for over 30 years, and have driven up the subject hill hundreds of times --probably thousands of times. If the crest of the hill was low enough to see oncoming traffic it would make all of the neighbors feel safer. As far as a sidewalk is concerned ---there are a lot of people that walk by my house on the way to the park at the north end of 80th. Also, 80th is a route for the school buses --the kids now stand in the wet grass on the side of the road, and have a choice of walking in the street or on the shoulder of the road to get to the bus stop. Put a sidewalk in!!! Thanks for the consideration. Bill Gronau 18119 80th Ave W 425-776-7397 Mortgage rates as low as 4.625% - Refinance $150,000 loan for $579 a month. Intro*Terms https://www2.nextag.com/goto.jsp?product=100000035&url=o 2fst.jsp&tm=y&search=mortgage text links 88 h27f6&disc=y&vers=743&s=4056&p=5117 1 Packet Page 356 of 433 CITY OF EDMONDS PLANNING BOARD MINUTES March 14, 2007 Chair Guenther called the regular meeting of the Planning Board to order at 7:46 p.m. in the Council Chambers, Public Safety Complex, 250 — 5th Avenue North. BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT Cary Guenther, Chair Janice Freeman Jim Young Don Henderson Michael Bowman John Reed BOARD MEMBERS ABSENT Judith Works John Dewhirst, Vice Chair READING/APPROVAL OF MINUTES STAFF PRESENT Rob Chave, Planning Division Manager Frances White Chapin, Cultural Services Manager Don Fiene, Assistant City Engineer Noel Miller, Public Works Director Stephan Clifton, Community Services Director Karin Noyes, Recorder BOARD MEMBER FREEMAN MOVED THAT THE MINUTES OF FEBRUARY 28, 2007 BE APPROVED AS SUBMITTED. BOARD MEMBER YOUNG SECONDED THE MOTION. THE MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY, WITH BOARD MEMBERS HENDERSON AND GUENTHER ABSTAINING. ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGENDA Mr. Chave advised that the Parks and Recreation Department Quarterly Report would have to be rescheduled to a future date since the Parks, Recreation and Cultural Services Director was not able to be present. AUDIENCE COMMENTS There was no one in the audience who expressed a desire to address the Board during this portion of the meeting. PUBLIC HEARING ON CIP UPDATE FOR 2008 — 2013 (FILE NUMBER AMD-07-3) Mr. Fiene presented the draft 2008-2013 Capital Improvement Plan (CIP). He advised that the Growth Management Act (GMA) requires that the City update their CIP on an annual basis. He noted that the CIP is used as a long-range planning tool and identifies projects that are included in the Comprehensive Plan. He referred the Board to a spread sheet, which provides a list and description of the 12 funds. It also identifies the project managers for each one. He advised that staff is currently in Packet Page 357 of 433 the process of updating the Project Description Booklet, which would be posted on the City's website in the near future. The booklet describes each of the projects identified in the CIP. He reviewed each of the funds as follows: • Fund 112 (Combined Street Construction Improvement Projects) and Fund 125 (Transportation/REET 2) — Mr. Fiene advised that these funds deal with the street overlay improvements, street widening, traffic signals, road stabilization projects, and all other transportation projects that occur within the City's rights -of -way. Sample projects include City overlay projects and the Casper/9`h Avenue walkway project. He noted that a contract has just been awarded to a consultant to design the walkway project. Mr. Fiene advised that funding for transportation capital projects is much improved compared to last year because REET 2 funding over and above $750,000 has now been allocated for transportation projects rather than parks projects. In 2006 a total of $1.43 million in REET 2 funding was collected, resulting in $680,000 for transportation capital projects. However, even though the transportation fund now receives money from REET 2, it is important to understand that the fund also lost $75,000 in motor vehicle tax in 2007, $150,000 in 2006 and $150,000 again in 2008. If this practice continues beyond 2008, the proposed CIP would have to be changed to identify a 40-year overlay cycle rather than the current 33-year cycle. Mr. Fiene also expressed concern that the Olympic View Franchise fee dollars continue to go to the City's general fund rather than to the transportation fund. If this funding were allocated to the transportation fund, the City would be able to use the money to overlay streets in the Olympic View Water and Sewer District service area. Commissioner Reed inquired if the two situations noted by Mr. Fiene resulted from a City Council action to redirect the money to the general fund. Mr. Fiene answered that the City Council made the decision to redirect the motor vehicle tax to the general fund, but the franchise fees have never gotten into the transportation fund. Staff has recommended that the franchise fees be placed in the transportation fund since the Olympic View Water and Sewer District is paying the fee so they can work within the City's rights -of -way. It seems logical that the money should be used to fix streets that are torn up as a result of the utility work. • Fund 113 (Multimodal Transportation) — Mr. Fiene explained that this fund is related to the Edmonds Crossing Multimodal Transportation Project that would link several modes of transportation (bicycles, buses, trains, ferries, etc.) at one site. • Fund 116 (Building Maintenance) — Mr. Fiene advised that this fund deals with maintenance of the buildings in the City's current inventory, including the senior center, City Hall, the Anderson Center, etc. Currently, this fund is financed by the general fund, which has been significantly impacted by recent initiatives. While sufficient funding is available through 2008, definite problems could arise beyond that date, and it is important to understand that deferring maintenance could lead to overall deterioration and damage to the City's buildings. • Fund 125 (Parks, Open Space, Recreation, Beautification) and Fund 132 (Parks Construction) — Mr. Fiene explained that the money from these two funds is used for park beautification, streetscape, construction of trails, etc. Sample projects include the skate park that is nearing completion and ADA improvements. • Fund 126 (Special Capital/Purchases and Acquisition) — Mr. Fiene advised that the money in this fund is used to purchase park properties, and waterfront acquisition is a City priority. • Fund 129 (SR-99 International District) — Mr. Fiene advised that this is an economic development fund that was created solely for the International District Enhancement Project. He noted that the City recently received a grant for this project. • Fund 412: Mr. Fiene reported that a rate study was completed in 2005, showing a minimal rate increase would be necessary, but the combined utility bills would be increased less than inflation over the next several years. • Fund 412-100: Mr. Fiene advised that this fund would support projects identified in the 2002 Water Comprehensive Plan. The bulk of the money spent in this fund would be used to replace one percent of the City's current water lines per year. Waterline improvements are currently planned in the Perrinville and College Place areas in 2007 and 2008. Planning Board Minutes March 14, 2007 Page 2 Packet Page 358 of 433 • Fund 412-200: Mr. Fiene advised that the projects in this fund are identified in the 2003 Stormwater Comprehensive Plan. Sample projects include the Northstream Project that is currently being designed by a consultant. In addition, the Southwest Edmonds area that was annexed in December of 2005 had no storm system whatsoever, and City staff is currently constructing and installing pipe to address this problem area. • Fund 412-300: Mr. Fiene said the projects in this fund are identified in the 2006 Sanitary Sewer Comprehensive Plan. Sample projects include Lift Stations 7 and 8 and the 7th Avenue North Sewer Project. • Fund 414: Mr. Fiene advised that this is the Wastewater Treatment Plant Fund. Sample projects include bar screen replacement, concrete repairs, and electrical improvements. He noted that the Edmonds Treatment Plant serves other jurisdictions, as well. Only about half of the drainage comes from properties within the City of Edmonds. In summary, Mr. Fiene advised that the transportation capital funds are much improved, but staff does have concerns about the fuel tax revenue. Fund 116 indicates a heavy reliance on grants to meet the project needs, and the Public Works Director plans to draw more from the general fund if approved by the City Council. The other funds in the CIP appear to be meeting the minimum needs. He noted that a public hearing has been scheduled before the City Council on March 20t1, and staff anticipates final adoption at that time. Duane Farman indicated that he has lived just north of Seaview Park since June of 1970. He said he was present to speak to the Commission regarding the site distance project at 80th Avenue West, which is currently identified in the draft CIP as a 2013 project. He said he represents nearly 100 people from the Seaview Neighborhood who are very interested in the project, and 75 of them have signed the petition that was provided to each of the Board Members. He explained that the neighborhood group was originally organized to limit the impacts of the Anglers Crossing Planned Residential Development (PRD) that was proposed for their neighborhood. Now that the project has been approved by the City, the neighbors have turned their focus to resolving the traffic safety concern that currently exists on 80tt' Avenue West. He advised that, at this time, the City's Engineering Department is conducting a study of the hill in conjunction with the project developer, the McNaughton Group. Survey work is being done to determine how much grading would be required to improve the site distance at the top of the hill. The Engineering Department is also working to identify cost estimates. Mr. Farman urged the Planning Board to move this project up in the CIP so that the improvements could be completed no later than 2009. By that time, the McNaughton Group would be ready to start grading and preparing their property for the new subdivision. Mr. Farman distributed a packet of information related to his presentation to each of the Board Members. He explained that because of the slope of the hill on 80th Avenue West, the site distance is extremely limited and the existing grade is over 12 percent. There are many blind spots on the hill, and several accidents have occurred in the recent past, mostly above the hill and one on the hill itself. He advised that accidents occur largely because residents cannot see what is on the other side and they get surprised by people coming up the hill. Mr. Farman provided photographs to further illustrate the neighborhood's concern about site distance on the hill. The pictures particularly illustrated the difficulty he and his neighbors have backing out of their driveways as a result of the poor site distance that currently exists. He noted that some property owners have to drive across neighboring properties in order to see what is coming up the hill. Mr. Farman pointed out that besides being a safety hazard for vehicular traffic, the pedestrians who walk along 80th Avenue West are in danger, as well. He asked that the City consider constructing a sidewalk on 80th Avenue West to connect to the baseball field and Seaview Park. He recalled that the City recently reached an agreement with the McNaughton Group that would allow them to construct a sidewalk on the west side of 801h Avenue West in lieu of the sidewalk that would typically be required along the front of the PRD on the east side of 80th Avenue West. This change would end up saving the City money if they were to provide a sidewalk all along the street. Mr. Farman referred the Board to a public utility department scale drawing of the hill on 806' Avenue West, which shows the existing grade. He noted that the hill is not level at the top. Instead, it comes up and then drops off sharply. The dashed lines on the drawing show the type of grading that would be necessary to improve the site distance situation. Mr. Farman suggested that the project would likely cost less than the $150,000 identified in the CIP since there are no utility line within the roadway. Planning Board Minutes March 14, 2007 Page 3 Packet Page 359 of 433 Mr. Farman said he understands the City's current difficulty in finding money to take care of all of the necessary projects. However, he noted that a condition of the PRD approval was that 10% of the property be set aside for open space. In order to meet this requirement, the McNaughton Group purchased 2/3 of an acre of property along 80th Avenue West from the City for $220,000. Since the proposed PRD would increase the amount of traffic on 80th Avenue West, Mr. Farman said the neighborhood group requests that this money be earmarked for the site distance improvements. In addition, he noted that the developer would be required to pay impact fees of $22,000, and this could be utilized for projects along 801h Avenue West, too. Again, Mr. Farman requested the Board consider moving the 80th Avenue project up to 2008 or 2009 because the hill is already very unsafe, and he expects more accidents every two or three years. He said he would rather not experience another one. He reminded the Board that the McNaughton Group is currently doing survey work on the hill to determine the extent of grading that would be required to resolve the problem, and their work would reduce the overall cost of the project in the future. Mr. Farman advised that the McNaughton Group has indicated an interest in working with the City on an agreement that would allow them to construct a sidewalk on 801h Avenue West in lieu of a sidewalk on Olympic View Drive. He said he hopes the information he provided to the Board would be helpful to illustrate the need to do the project sooner than 2013. Tony Shapiro said that while some believe the proposed location for the multimodal project would be a desirable solution, it might not be the best solution for the economic well being of the downtown. He recalled that rather than finding a way to draw the ferry traffic through the downtown, the City has historically turned its back on ferry traffic. The proposed relocation would not make this situation any better. In addition, he noted that funding for the project is quite far down on the State's priority list, particularly considering the other major transportation issues the State is faced with. He urged the Planning Board to consider other options that would look at replacing and/or enhancing the present ferry lanes rather than relocating them further to the south. If the ferry terminal and train station are relocated as proposed, there would be very little commuter traffic coming through downtown Edmonds. Warren Henderson said he also lives in the Seaview Neighborhood and supports the comments provided by Mr. Farman regarding 801h Avenue West and moving the project up much earlier. He said the issue has become much more important to people in the neighborhood as a result of the City's recent approval for the new Anglers Crossing Project and the additional types of traffic that would be found on 80th Avenue West. He noted that not only would vehicular traffic be increased, but pedestrian traffic would also increase. He advised that even though sidewalks would be constructed on the hill, it would still be difficult for drivers to see the pedestrians. He urged the City to do everything possible to make the situation safe. Mr. Henderson also pointed out the safety concerns that exist on 1841h Street near Seaview Park. A crown exists on this hill, and it is difficult for cars going up and down the hill to see clearly. The result is that the people living in the area cannot see traffic coming up the hill when they back out of their driveways. He asked that the City take a careful look at 1801 Street, as well as 80th Avenue West and make improvements so that vehicular and pedestrians traffic will be safer. Board Member Henderson asked Mr. Fiene to provide more information about the 80th Avenue West Project. Mr. Fiene reminded the Board that the CIP is driven by the Comprehensive Plan, and the site distance problem on 80th Avenue West was not identified in the current Comprehensive Plan. While the walkway project on 80th Avenue West was included in the Comprehensive Plan, the priority was lower than other projects that were scheduled ahead of it. However, he emphasized that while the priorities were established through a public process, the City Council does have the ability to make changes as new situations arise. He said that even though there may be a past history of residents contacting the City regarding the site distance problems on 80th Avenue West, he just recently learned about the situation. Board Member Henderson asked where the $220,000 from the sale of City owned property would go. He expressed his opinion that the money should be used for projects in the Seaview Neighborhood. Mr. Chave recalled that some years ago, the City went through a process of reviewing their property holdings and trying to divest properties they were not intending to use. The goal was to obtain revenue for the general fund and the moneys were not tied to any particular project. Board Member Young suggested it would be appropriate for the City Council to provide a policy and procedure for mitigating impacts, particularly since the City wants to encourage infill development as required by GMA. He recalled that the City Council has recently denied applications because there was no mechanism to provide the infrastructure associated Planning Board Minutes March 14, 2007 Page 4 Packet Page 360 of 433 with making more intense use of a property. He said he plans to attend the City Council hearing on this issue and ask them to provide procedural and policy guidance. Board Member Freeman asked regarding the City's policy for changing the priorities identified in the CIP. She recognized that if one project is moved up, other projects would have to be postponed. Mr. Fiene explained that the CIP is a long-range plan, and the City continually updates the document as priorities shift. The City Council could decide to move a project up based on new information that becomes available. Board Member Freeman complimented Mr. Farman for doing a good job of presenting the facts associated with the situation on 80th Avenue West. She agreed that the City should look at the problem further in the near future. Board Member Young noted that the City collects $90,000 each year in traffic impact fees, but the CIP does not provide any explanation about where these funds are collected from. He suggested it would be helpful if the CIP were to provide a narrative explanation of the traffic impact fees. Mr. Fiene agreed that would be a worthwhile option to consider. Again, Board Member Young said it would be helpful to have policy direction from the City Council about how additional infrastructure would be provided to meet the needs of more intensive land uses. While the CIP is not necessarily the place for this type of information, it is important for the public to know that the City has a policy for keeping traffic moving safely. Board Member Reed asked if the sidewalk component of the CIP includes sidewalk improvements on 80th Avenue West. Mr. Fiene answered that the walkway project was included in the CIP for 2013. He expressed his belief that this sidewalk project would be a good link between South County Park, Seaview Park, and Olympic View Drive. However, only so much money is available for sidewalk improvements, and there are numerous higher priority projects ahead of it. Board Member Freeman asked when the project description booklet would be available on line. Mr. Fiene answered that staff hopes to have this document available to the public by the end of March. He noted that the document would help the citizens understand what projects the City is doing and why. Board Member Reed asked when the Anglers Crossing Project would be completed. Mr. Fiene advised that the project is still in the planning stages. Mr. Chave added that it could be quite a while before the project is completed. Mr. Fiene noted that site distance is a problem already, and the new project would only add six new homes. Board Member Reed asked if doing the roadway and development project together would result in a cost savings. Mr. Fiene answered no. Board Member Young said he sees some very important improvements that need to be made in 2010 and most would be paid for by grant funding that has not yet been secured. He noted that there are two potential sources of grant funding, the State Pedestrian Safety Program and the Federal Intersection and Corridor Safety Improvement Program. Mr. Fiene described some of the grant funding that has already been secured by the City for transportation projects. He noted that the City's ability to provide more matching funding should make it easier for the City to obtain grants in the future. Board Member Young agreed but suggested staff point out to the City Council that grant money has already been spoken for through 2009, and anew transportation act would be adopted in 2010. Therefore, the funding situation beyond 2009 is not a given, but there are no other funding options noted for 2010 projects. Mr. Fiene advised that the City has a history of successfully obtaining grant funding. Board Member Young agreed that staff has done a good job of obtaining grant funding for City projects, but it is important to understand that grant funding is competitive. Board Member Young referred to Fund 116 and noted that there is a heavy reliance on grants in the early years and most appear to be secured. However, in the later years there is more and more reliance on the general fund. He asked Mr. Miller to share his observation about how solid the City Council's commitment is to part with $200,000 to $250,000 per year from the general fund. Mr. Miller advised that this was identified in the CIP as a placeholder to let the City Council know there is a need for additional money from the general fund. He advised that, up to this point, the City has been fortunate to find other ways to pay for projects without a direct contribution from the general fund, but staff s research shows there would not be lot of grant opportunities available in the near future to address the project needs. Staff makes the City Council aware each year that there is a forecast need for additional money in order to maintain the level of service in the City Buildings. He suggested it would be helpful for the Board to raise this issue, as well. Planning Board Minutes March 14, 2007 Page 5 Packet Page 361 of 433 Board Member Reed asked if there were previous funding sources for building maintenance that no longer exist. Mr. Miller answered that in the past the City has used a community block grant to pay for projects at the senior center, but other buildings in the City do not qualify for this grant money. As a result of recent initiatives, Fund 116 monies were cut back with the hope the City would be able to find other funding sources. Board Member Young asked if the City has a Plan B for the Edmonds Crossing Project if the necessary funding is not available for the preferred plan. Mr. Clifton explained that there are currently three options. If no funding is available, the option would be to do nothing and leave the terminal in its existing location. The other options are considered Phase I and Phase 2 of the preferred plan. Phase 1 would involve construction of ferry holding lanes in the new location, as well as a terminal parking lot and ferry pier. Phase 2 would add the multimodal terminal, etc. If only a portion of the project can be funded, they could move ahead with Phase 1 until the additional funds are available. Regarding Mr. Shapiro's comments, Mr. Clifton noted that the project is a multi -entity effort to build a significant multimodal project for the area. The project partners include the Federal Transit Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, Washington State Department of Transportation, Washington State Ferries, and the City of Edmonds. The project is included in six transportation plans: the Vision 20/30 Plan, the 1995 Metropolitan Transportation Plan, the Snohomish County and Edmonds Transportation Plans, the Washington State Ferries System Plan, and the Port of Edmonds Strategic and Master Plans. Regarding funding, Mr. Clifton shared that since he arrived at the City of Edmonds, he has worked to retain and secure $12.3 million in Federal dollars that is available now and would be used for the next phase of the project, which is final design and development. In addition, he has worked with Washington State Ferries to solicit a consultant to help with the design and permitting phase. Washington State dollars were also used to provide the match for Federal dollars. Mr. Clifton said he has made a number of presentations over the last few years to Washington State Representatives and Senators. As a result, they have appropriated $58.2 million through 2017 for the Edmonds Crossing Project. For the past three to four years, he has worked with RTID and Sound Transit to position the project to receive $126 million in RTID funding and $30 million in Sound Transit funding if the voters approve the combined road and transit project this fall. If these funds are obtained, the project would be fully funded. Mr. Clifton advised that Washington State Ferries plans to construct the new project beginning in 2012 through 2017. The City Council has indicated their support for the Edmonds Crossing Project on a number of occasions. In addition, the Port of Edmonds, the Lynnwood City Council and the Town of Woodway Town Council have all passed resolutions in support of the project. He said he would continue to work with Washington State Ferries to be good stewards of the citizen dollars and bring the costs of the project down as much as possible. THE PUBLIC PORTION OF THE HEARING WAS CLOSED. BOARD MEMBER FREEMAN MOVED THAT THE BOARD FORWARD THE DRAFT CIP UPDATE FOR 2008 — 2013 (FILE NUMBER AMD-07-3) TO THE CITY COUNCIL WITH A RECOMMENDATION OF APPROVAL. BOARD MEMBER YOUNG SECONDED THE MOTION. Board Member Reed recalled that the Board previously expressed a desire that the City Council consider Mr. Farman's request related to 801h Avenue West. He suggested, and the remainder of the Board concurred, that staff should provide additional information regarding this project for the City Council to consider at their public hearing. THE MOTION CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY. PUBLIC HEARING ON AN APPLICATION BY TONY SHAPIRO TO REZONE PROPERTIES FROM MULTI- FAMILY RESIDENTIAL (RM-1.5) TO MULTI-FAMILY/EDMONDS WAY (RM-EW) AND FROM COMMUNITY BUSINESS (BC) TO COMMUNITY BUSINESS/EDMONDS WAY (BC-EW) (FILE NUMBER R-06-95) ma N Planning Board Minutes March 14, 2007 Page 6 Packet Page 362 of 433 THE BOARD TOOK A BREAK FROM 9:00 P.M. TO 9:12 P.M. TO REVIEW THE NEW WRITTEN COMMENTS THAT WERE RECEIVED REGARDING THE PROPOSED REZONE APPLICATION. Chair Guenther reviewed the Appearance of Fairness Rules and inquired if any of the Board Members participated in any ex parte conversations regarding the topic of the hearing. Board Member Freeman disclosed that after the last public hearing on the proposed rezone application, Mr. Shapiro phoned her and requested her help when presenting the application to the City Council for review. She indicated she declined to assist the applicant and did not contact the City Council in any way regarding the matter. None of the other Board Members disclosed potential conflicts with the Appearance of Fairness Laws. No one in the audience challenged the participation of any Board Members, either. Mr. Chave presented the staff report REVIEW OF EXTENDED AGENDA PLANNING BOARD CHAIR COMMENTS PLANNING BOARD MEMBER COMMENTS ADJOURNMENT The meeting was adjourned at 10:40 p.m. Planning Board Minutes March 14, 2007 Page 7 Packet Page 363 of 433 AM-886 Public Hearing on ECDC Amendments to Chapter 19.10 Edmonds City Council Meeting Date: 03/ 20/ 2007 Submitted By: Duane Bowman, Development Services Time: 45 Minutes Department: Development Services Type: Review Committee: Action: Agenda Memo Subiect Title 6. Public Hearing on the proposed amendments to Edmonds Community Development Code Chapter 19.10 dealing with development permit requirements for the Earth Subsidence Landslide Hazard Area of North Edmonds. The proposal includes an updated Landslide Hazard Area Map. Recommendation from Mayor and Staff Adopt the proposed ordinance amending Chapter 19.10 of the Edmonds Community Development Code. Previous Council Action The process of updating Chapter 19.10 of the Edmonds Community Development Code (ECDC) started back in 2004. The goal was to clean-up the regulations and adopt a better map for use in the Earth Subsidence Landslide Area in north Edmonds. A series of action took place in 2004 including: March 23, 2004 Council Work Session April 20, 2004 Public Hearing May 19, 2004 Community Meeting at the Meadowdale Clubhouse July 27, 2004 Council Work Session (power -point presentation) September 13, 2004 CS/DS Committee meeting to review draft Ordinance September 21, 2004 Public Hearing on draft ordinance. Because the City was undertaking new LIDAR aerial mapping for the entire city, the project was delayed to allow more accurate data to be collected. Landau and Associates was hired to study the new data and prepare a new map based upon the more accurate information. On October 9, 2006, staff conducted a community meeting at the Meadowdale Clubhouse to discuss LIDAR Findings and introduce the new draft Landslide Hazard Map. Narrative At the September 21, 2004 Council Meeting, staff was directed to utilize best available science to produce a more accurate Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area Map. The City's consultant, Landau & Associates, utilized LIDAR based technology to prepare a much more accurate map of the boundaries of the landslide hazard area ofNorth Edmonds. Staff and the consultant then worked on the regulations to address issues raised by the community and the development review process. The purpose of this public hearing is to take public testimony on the proposed ordinance changes, including adoption of a new Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area Map. Dennis Stettler, P.E., from Landau & Associates, will make a presentation and be available for questions at the hearing. Proposed Administrative Changes to the Earth Subsidence Landslide Hazard Provisions of ECDC 19.10 include: • Eliminate the need for an Architect Stamp on Building Plans • Application and Permit Timeline Extensions • Vicinity Map with greater detail of Adjacent Hazards within 100 feet • Summary Report Created from Roger Lowe and GeoEngineer's Reports • TEC (Temporary Erosion Control) Requirements Increased, After Storm Inspections Required and Create Provisions for Seasonal Ground Work Extensions • Eliminate Mapped Percentages from Map & Adopt the Hazard Zone Approach for Mitigation • Restrict Rockeries, Swimming Pools, Hot Tubs, Ponds, Watering or Irrigation Systems and Stockpile Fill Packet Page 364 of 433 Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Attachments Link: Exhibit 1 - Draft Ordinance - ECDC 19.10 Link: Exhibit 2 - Landau North Edmonds ESLHA Report Link: Exhibit 3 - Draft New ESLHA MAP Link: Exhibit 4 - City Atty response to Hillman Letter Form Routing/Status Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/16/2007 08:51 AM APRV 2 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/16/2007 08:55 AM APRV 3 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/16/2007 09:05 AM APRV Form Started By: Duane Bowman Started On: 03/14/2007 03:37 PM Final Approval Date: 03/16/2007 Packet Page 365 of 433 0006.900000 *Significant changes are underlined. WSS/gjz 4/26/04 R;9/8/04gjz ORDINANCE NO. AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF EDMONDS, WASHINGTON, AMENDING THE EDMONDS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CODE, CHAPTER 19.10 ENTITLED EARTH SUBSIDENCE AND LANDSLIDE HAZARD AREAS, PROVIDING A SAVINGS CLAUSE, AND FIXING A TIME WHEN THE SAME SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE. WHEREAS, the Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area is an area of Edmonds that has been geologically active for thousands of years, and WHEREAS, although public improvements have enhanced the overall stability of property in the area, there remains both an underlying risk of deep seated earth movement and a potential for earth movement " on other factors such as inclement weather, steep slopes, seismic events, acts of man, failures of utility lines and many other factors, and WHEREAS, the City's policy since 1983 has been to permit development of property in the area consistent with the full extent of the property rights and obligations of its citizens, so long as that development shoulders all costs and liabilities, both current and potential, relating to development of the property, including full investigation of site conditions by competent professionals, design for conditions and notification to the City and the Building 4 Department, neighboring property owners and future purchasers of the property of all risks associated with development and the measures taken to mitigate such risks, NOW, THEREFORE, {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - I - Packet Page 366 of 433 THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF EDMONDS, WASHINGTON, DO ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS: Section 1. Chapter 19.10 Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Areas is hereby repealed, provided, however, that in the event that a court of competent jurisdiction should strike down the enactment of Chapter 19.10 hk provided in Section 2 below, or any portion thereof, Chapter 19.10 Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Areas or any part thereof parallel to the portion struck down, shall be and remain in effect to the extent necessary to prevent any gap in regulation. Section 2. The Edmonds Community Development Code is hereby amended by the addition of a new Chapter 19.10 Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Areas to read as follows: Ch ter 1� BUILDING PERMITS - *JA& LANDSLIDE Sections: 19.10."no 9.10.010 9.10.020 9.10.030 9.10.040 J. .� 19.10.050 19.10.060 19.10.070 19.10.080 CE AND AREAS StatemeWof purpose and application. Section amendments. Definitions. Minimum required application submissions. Site posting notice, disclosures, declarations, covenants and waivers. Site bonds, contractor general public liability insurance. Review to determine compliance with engineering practice and best available science. Issuance and denial of permits. Site access, professional/special inspection monitoring during construction and final geotechnical report. { WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} -2- Packet Page 367 of 433 19.10.000 Statement of purpose and application. A. This chapter has been enacted in order to provide both substantive and procedural provisions relating to the issuance of permits within designated earth subsidence and landslide hazard areas of the city. It shall be the policy of the city that no permit shall be issued for any site which is found to be unsuitable for improvement due to excessively steep slopes, unsatisfactory foundation support, instability or unsuitable topography for the particular permit requested for issuance. When development occurs on an unstable site, an unreasonable risk of danger may exist to the public, to public improvements or to adjacent property owners. If such a site can be stabilized through the construction of on -site improvements, that risk may be reduced. B. The construction of professionally designed struc addressing the risks of earth movement, and employing feasibl attendant measures (including but not limited to: drainag improvements, specially designed foundations, retaining walls, removal of overburden and other improvements designed to minimize the risk of earth movement, prevent avoidable damage to structures, safeguard adjacent properties, limit risk to inhabitants, and to stabilize the structure in the event of movement) may mitigate and reduce the risk of earth movement on individual properties. Nothing herein shall relieve an owner of any obligation imposed by the State Building Code or City ordinance to take all reasonable and practical measures available to reduce or eliminate the risk or hazard. C. The IRC/IBC, as promo by the state of Washington and required to be adopted by the city, does not specify a standard #4* regarding lot stability. Since the city's request for an interpretation of the uniform building code by the state building code council to designate an acceptable level of lot stability was denied, and because the city wishes to comply with state law requiring that the issuance of building permits be a ministerial and not a discretionary act, the provisions of this chapter have been adopted in order to provide reasonable certainty in the permit issuance process. The purpose of these provisions is not to lessen the minimum requirements of the current adopted building code, but rather to define its requirements for city implementation. D. These provisions have been adopted in order to establish a policy that permits shall not be issued for any site where a substantial risk of earth subsidence and landslide hazard exist unless: {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/ - 3 - Packet Page 368 of 433 1. The risks can be defined with reasonable scientific certainty and found to be within acceptable limits as determined in accordance with this chapter. 2. Any hazard associated with the site is scientifically ascertained and fully disclosed through the permit process. 3. Notice of any risk is given to future purchasers through the land records of Snohomish County. 4. Any risks associated with construction and habitation are assumed by the builder and future owners of the site. 5. Adequate indemnification is provided by the builder, and the owner of, the site in order that the general public not assume or bear any portion of the costs or liability associated with the builder's investigation, design and construction as well as the continuing maintenance of the site bye property owner. E. Notwithstanding any contrary provision of this ordinance or the IRC/IBC, all applications for permits received for any site, any portion of which lies within an earth subsidence and landslide hazard area, shall be governed by the provisions of this chapter. In addition to all other requirements of these sections, the restrictions and provisions of this chapter shall apply to all building, grading, fill and excavation permits (herein "permits"). Minor permits such as plumbing, mechanical, re -roof and interior alterations are exempt from the requirements of this chapter. F. All applications for 19.10 ECDC permits shall disclose within the`g_eotechnical report whether or not any part of the site lies within, or adjacent to an earth subsidence and landslide hazard area or within a critical area as defined by the city's environmentall4N y critical areas title. The building official may require preliminary investigation by a geotechnical engineer for any applicant whose property lies within or lies adjacent to a known earth subsidence landslide hazard area, or within a known hazard area, or areas with steep slopes or unusual topography or which has a history of earth movement in order to assist the building official in determining whether these provisions should be applied. G. Nothing in this chapter should or shall be interpreted to guarantee issuance of a permit with respect to any property unless the requirements of the IRC/IBC as amended and interpreted by this chapter have been met. {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 4 - Packet Page 369 of 433 19.10.010 Section amendments. The provisions of this section amend the 2003 edition of the IRC/IBC and all subsequent revisions adopted by RCW 19.27.031 as the state building code as previously amended by Chapter 19.05 ECDC. All prior substantive amendments have received the approval of the state building code council. All provisions of the IRC/IBC which conflict with this chapter shall be deemed amended hereby, and any ambiguity created, shall be resolved in favor of the specific provision or general intent of said chapter. In addition to the amendments of the IRC/IBC by its alteration, improvement and correction to incorporate the chapter, the following specific code provisions are amended and the substantive and procedural requirements of Chapter 19.10 ECDC are amended by the correction and alteration of the following sections of the IRC/IBC: A. Chapter 1 Administration. 1. Section R105.1.1 Permit Review Applicability. Any permit requested for a site lying in whole or in part within an earth subsidence and landslide hazard area as defined by ECDC 19.10.020(F) shall be processed and acted upon in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 19.10 ECDC. 11011' 2. Section R105.2 Work exempt from a permit. ECDC 19.00.010 exemptions A, B, D, E, F, G, J, K, M, and P and ECDC 19.05.010 exemptions, A, C, and D shall not apply in any area designated as an earth subsidence and landslide hazard area as defined in ECDC 19.10.020(F). 3. Section R105.3.2 Time limitation of permit application. a. Applications, for which no permit is issued within one (1) year following the date of application, shall expire by limitation, and plans and other data submitted for review may thereafter be returned to the applicant or destroyed by the building official. Prior to expiration, the applicant may request a seven (7) month application extension if the approval of the application is affected by the wet weather season from October 1st to April 301h. The application may only be extended once. b. The building official may not extend the time for action by the applicant on an expired application. In order to renew action on an expired application, the applicant shall submit a new application, revised plans based on current adopted codes and pay new plan review fees as well as any outstanding peer review fees incurred to date. {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 5 - Packet Page 370 of 433 4. Section R105.5 Permit expiration and extension. a. Every permit issued under the provisions and development standards of Chapter 19.10 ECDC shall expire by limitation two 2 years after issuance, except as provided in ECDC 19.00.005(A)(6)(b). b. Prior to expiration of an active permit the applicant may request in writing an extension for a third and final year. If the plans and specifications for the permit extension application are the same as the plans and specifications submitted for the original permit application and provided there has been at least one (1) required progress inspection conducted by the city building inspector prior to the extension, the permit shall be extended. Permit fees shall be charged at a rate of one half the original building permit fee to extend the permit. c. The maximum amount of time any building permit may be extended shall be a total of three (3) years. At the end of any three (3) year period starting from the original date of permit issuance, the permit shall become null and void and a new building permit shall be required, with full fees, in order for the applicant to complete work. The issuance of a new permit shall negate all previous vesting of zoning or building codes. Whenever an appeal is filed and a necessary development approval is stayed in accordance with the Land Use Petition Act, the time limit periods imposed under this section shall also be stayed until final decision. W d. The building official shall reject requests for permit extensions if modifications or amendments to the applicable zoning and building codes have occurred since the original issuance of the permit, and modifications or amendments would significantly promote public health and safety if applied to the project through the issuance of a new permit. 5. Section R105.5.1 Recommence work on an expired permit. a. In order to recommence work on an expired permit, a new permit application with full fees shall be submitted to the building official. b. New permit applications shall be reviewed under current zoning and building codes in effect at the time of complete application submittal. If a new permit is sought to recommence work on an expired permit, the new permit shall be vested under the codes in effect at the time of complete application for the new permit, not the expired permit. When additional plan review is required, plan {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 6 - Packet Page 371 of 433 review fees shall be charged. When applicable peer review and peer review fees shall be assessed. 6. Section R106.3.3.1 Phased approval. a. The building official may require sequencing of construction phases or activities such as the installation of shoring or temporary erosion control remedies and/or drainage systems, well in advance of grading or foundation construction on a time frame consistent with geotechnical recommendations and peer review. As part of the sequencing process, the building official may impose permit conditions that address site work sequencing to include but not limited to: limiting all excavation, drainage systems and foundation installation to the dryer season between May lst and September 301h. b. When permit conditions such as groundwork are limited by the building official on a particular project, the applicants' ,geotechnical engineer may submit a letter detailing geotechnical recommendations that portions of work may progress. The letter shall include a detailed work schedule submitted by the general contractor specifying work to be done, timeline, provisions for monitoring and equipment to be used. Any such recommendation shall be based upon best available science and be consistent with standard geotechnical en ing eeringLpractice. The building official may require a peer review prior to a decision which provides concurrence re ag rding at least the following issues: i. duration of work, ii. type of equipment to use, iii. additional temporary erosion and sediment control provisions required, and aDDlicability of special insDections. and similar issues. V ing official may issue partial permits for phased on before the entire plans and specifications for e building or structure have been approved peer review approval has been granted. Phased approval means separate permits for grading, shoring, and foundation may be issued separately, provided concurrent approval is granted by the planning manager, city engineer, and city public works director, when applicable. No phased approval permit shall be issued unless approved civil plans detailing the construction of all site improvements (including, but not limited to: curbs, gutters, sidewalks, paved streets, water lines, sewer lines, and storm drainage) have been signed as approved by the city {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - % - Packet Page 372 of 433 engineer. With such phased approval, a performance bond shall be posted with the city pursuant to Chapter 17.10 ECDC, to cover the estimated cost of construction to city standards for the improvements. B. Chapter 2 Definitions. 1. Section R 202 and IBC 202, are hereby amended to include the definitions set forth in ECDC 19.10.020, incorporalgL by this reference as fully as if herein set forth. C. Chapter 4 Foundations. 4ii 1. Section R 401.1 General Exception 3. Any permit requested for a site lying in whole or in part within an earth subsidence and landslide hazard area shall be processed and acted upon in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 19.10 ECDC. r D. IBC Chapter 16 Structural design. IV 1. Section IBC 1601.1.1 Scope. Setting forth the requirements of Chapter 19.10 ECDC, incorporated by this reference as fully as if herein set forth. E. IBC Appendix J Grading. 1. Section IBC Appendix J requirements of Chapter 19 reference as fully as if herein s etting forth the iorated by this 19.10.020 Definitions. The following terms, when used within this chapter, shall have the following definitions: #4** A. "Architect" shall mean a person licensed to practice architecture by the state of Washington. B. "Best available science" shall be determined in accordance with the criteria established in WAC 365-195-900. et sea. C. "Bluff' shall mean any slope ten (10) feet in height or rg eater inclined at greater than 1 unit vertical in 1 unit horizontal or 100% slope. D. "Building Official" shall mean the building official of the city of Edmonds. { WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} Packet Page 373 of 433 E. "Director" shall mean the director of development services as well as any authorized representative of the director. F. "Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area" shall mean any area of the city which, by reason of excessively steep slopes, unsatisfactory foundation support, stability or topography has a risk of earth subsidence and landslide hazard in excess of normal allowances. The earth subsidence and landslide hazard area is a subcategory of landslide hazard area (ageologically hazardous area) as defined in city of Edmonds environmentally critical areas title. The hazard area designated as the North Edmonds Earth Subsidence Landslide Hazard Area in the 2007 report of Landau Associates and as may be amended in future adopted earth subsidence and landslide hazard maps are hereby incorporated by this reference and made a part of this chapter as fully as if herein set forth and may be provided in a summary text form. Future adopted landslide hazard maps shall be incorporated by reference upon adoption by ordinance. Areas designated on the adopted North Edmo s Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Areas Map, or any future adopted landslide hazard map as having a risk of earth subsidence or landslide hazard, areas with slopes as designated in ECDC 23.80.020, areas which exhibit geologic characteristics of earth movement, or any other area identified as having a history of earth movement shall be presumed to have such risk and shall be considered to be an earth subsidence and landslide hazard area. Applicants for permits in such areas shall submit a geotechnical report and complete plan set submittal as required by this chapter to the building official for review. #44%The presumption of risk shall be rebuttable and the decision of the director or building official that any area lies within, or adjacent to, such earth subsidence and landslide hazard area shall be appealable as a staff decision to superior court in accordance with the Land Use Petition Act. Copies of the reports and maps shall be maintained in the offices of the building official and shall be available for inspection during all normal working hours. Individual copies of the reports and map may be obtained by the public upon the payment of the cost of reproduction. G. "General Contractor" shall mean a bonded, insured and registered contractor in the state of Washington. A general contractor shall maintain state required bonding and shall carry general public liability insurance in the minimum amount of one {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 9 - Packet Page 374 of 433 million dollars. The general contractor shall have a current valid state contractor's license with the state of Washington and a city of Edmonds resident or non-resident business license, whichever is applicable. H. "Geologist" means a practicing geologist licensed in the state of Washington with at least four (4) years experience as a licensed geologist in responsible charge, including experience with landslide evaluation. I. "Geotechnical Engineer" means a practicing, geotechnical/civil engineer licensed as a professional civil engineer in the state of Washington who has at least four (4) years of professional employment as a geotechnical engineer in responsible charge, including experience with landslide evaluation. J. "Landslide Hazard Area" geologically hazardous areas. K. "Land Surveyor" means a person who holds a Washington State land surveyor's license. L. "Lead Design Professional" means the person designated by the applicant to oversee and coordinate the permit review process on behalf of the applicant. M. "Plan Set Submittal" means a complete application pursuant to ECDC 19.00.015 including: 1. Vicini trol, storm drainage, utilities and site im 4. Treeec�cutting/land clearing plans. 5. Gebtechnical report. 6. Architectural and structural plans with design calculations, stamped and signed by licensed design professionals of the state of Washington. N. "Site" means the entire area within the boundaries, as described in a legal description, of the property that is to be developed under the permit for which the applicant has applied. {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 10 - Packet Page 375 of 433 O. "Stable" shall mean that the risk of damage to the proposed development, or to adjacent properties, from soil instability is minimal subject to the conditions set forth in the reports developed under the requirements of ECDC 19.10.030 and the proposed development will not increase the potential for soil movement. In the event that any site has an underlying risk of movement based upon deep-seated earth movement or large-scale earth failure which is not susceptible of correction by on -site improvements, such hazard shall not render a site proposed for single-family residences to be presumed unstable for the purpose of this provision if the geotechnical engineer of record and recommendation of any peer reviewer confirm the risk of probability of earth movement is thirty (30) percent or less within a twenty-five (25) year period. '1W In order to meet the definition of stable the measures proposed to reduce or correct the hazards along with measures taken to mitigate potential impacts from the remaining hazards, including, all on and off site measures taken to correct or reduce the risk. These shall be fully disclosed to the applicant and future owners, heirs and assigns in the covenant required to be executed in accordance with provisions of this chapter, in which case the defined risk may be approved as an acceptable condition. Edi P. "Steep Slope" shall be defined and calculated pursuant to Chapter 23.80 ECDC. Q. "Storm Event" means one (1) inch or remprecipitation in a twenty-four (24) hour period as reported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). R. "Structural Engineer" means a person licensed to practice structural engineering by the state of Washington. S. "Structural Fill" shall mean anv fill placed below structures including slabs, where the fill soils are intended to support loads without unacceptable deflections or shearing. Structural fill should be clean and free draining and should be placed above unyielding native site soils compacted in accordance with an approved geotechnical report prepared utilizing best engineering science. {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 11 - Packet Page 376 of 433 19.10.030 Minimum required application submittals. A. The applicant shall submit a complete plan set submittal and permit application and specifications for the proposed development as defined in ECDC 19.10.020(M) and this chapter. B. An Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard area permit submittal checklist shall be adopted at the direction of the director and shall be provided to all persons inquiring regarding building permit applications or development permits in the designatedearth subsidence and landslide hazard area of North Edmonds. The submittal checklist shall include but not be limited to the requirements contained in city public handouts, written policies, adopted maps, reference maps, summary reports, minimum geotechnical report guidelines, and the following: 1. North Edmonds Earth Subsidence and Landslide HazardNmap. 2. Vicinity map. 3. Topographic map and survey. 4. Civil plans (i.e., grading, temporary erosion and sediment control, storm drainage, utilities and site improvements). w., 5. Tree cutting/land clearing plan. li 6. Geotechnical report. 7. Owner and professional declarations. 8. Detailed architectural and structural plans with structural calculations and specifications. Bonds, covenants and contractor public liability insurance in accordance with the detailed requirements stated below. s .' If any item in the checklist is inapplicable to a particular project, a letter or a report shall be provided to the director stamped by the appropriate licensed design professional, with sufficient information or data to demonstrate why the item is inapplicable. The director may utilize appropriate licensed consultants to determine if generally accepted engineering_practice requires submission of an application requirement. When consultants are used to determine if generally accepted engineering_ practice requires submission of an application requirement the cost of review shall be paid b, t�pplicant. {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 12 - Packet Page 377 of 433 C. A copy of the North Edmonds Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard map shall be included in the submittal checklist materials. D. The vicinity map shall be suitable for locating the site and include information related to existiniz conditions on or near the site, based on the topographic map and survey and shall designate all known landslide masses, or debris flows or mud flows on or near the site which could threaten proposed structures within 100 feet, as referenced, noted, described or discussed in the geotechnical report. )161 E. The applicant shall submit a topographic map and survey prepared and stamped by a licensed land surveyor, prior to studies and evaluations by the geotechnical engineer, and shall show: 1. Map scale, north arrow, legal description, tax account parcel numbers, easements, lot property lines. 2. Existing grade contour lines, at two (2) foot intervals. 3. All distances between existing structures on the site and approximate distances of existing habitable structures on adjacent sites within 50 feet of property lines (all adjacent sites which could affect or be affected by the proposed development shall be shown). 4. Lowest footing or basement slab elevation of existing and proposed structures on the property and on adjacent properties to the extent that such information is reasonably available and, proposed finish floor elevations. IW 5. The location of existing�ry sewers, storm water drainage facilities, septic tanks, drain fields, wells, piezometers, private drainage systems, underground storage tanks, subsurface drains, and other sewer/drainage facility components on, and adjacent to, the site to the extent such information is reasonably available. 6. The location of all existing underground utilities on, and adjacent to, the site including, but not limited to; telephone, cable television, gas, electric and water utilities, vaults, fire hydrants and other cables, wires, meters and drainage pipes to the extent that such information is available. 7. A separate topographical drawing shall be submitted showing proposed grade contours at two (2) foot intervals. This drawing shall include bottom of proposed footing elevations including all stepped footing elevations. {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 13 - Packet Page 378 of 433 F. Civil engineered plans shall be prepared and stamped by a state of Washington licensed civil engineer pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 18.30 ECDC and current adopted City Stormwater Manual. Geotechnical report recommendations affecting _ civil plans shall be incorporated into the design and detailed on the plans and shall include: 1. Storm drainage plan with storm drainage calculations. 2. Provisions for building pad and foundation drainage. 3. Temporary erosion and sediment control with drainage and maintenance provisions, and/or other sediment control assemblies. 4. Permanent erosion control with drainage and maintenance provisions. 5. Fill/soil stockpile limitation provisions, specific location, height, protection and maintenance. 6. Slope protection plans, rockeries, retaining walls, ecology 7. Utilities and site improvements. A toe of slope setbacks, driveway slope. G. In lieu of the procedural requirements of Chapter 18.45 ECDC a tree cutting/land clearing plan shall be submitted when significant trees are proposed to be removed. A significant tree is a tree with a trunk diameter of six inches or greater measured 4 feet from the ground. No significant tree shall be removed until the permit is approved. A detailed landscape plan may also be required in order for the city to evaluate long-term erosion control measures. The plan shall comply with all requirements of the ECDC relating to tree clearing and critical areas review, if applicable. The director may require the project geotechnical engineer's concurrence regarding an approval of a tree cutting/land clearing plan when slope stability is at issue. H. Included in the Dermit submittal checklist shall be general and specific soils and aeotechnical information. details or analvsis required pursuant to IBC 1802. The applicant shall retain a geotechnical engineer to prepare a report and evaluation of the subsurface soil conditions on the site to include: {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 14 - Packet Page 379 of 433 1. The geotechnical report shall be prepared in accordance with generally accepted geotechnical engineering practices, under the supervision of, and signed and stamped by, the geotechnical engineer. A geologist may be required to be part of the geotechnical consulting staff. The report shall reference the Landau Associates Summary Report (2007) as a technical document reviewed as part of the geolo ig c analysis for the project and discuss all items listed in the permit submittal checklist and shall make specific recommendations concerning dev ent of the site. 2. The opinions and recommendations contained in the geotechnical report shall be supported by field observations and, where appropriate or applicable, by literature review, conducted by the geotechnical engineer. The report shall be based on best available science. ALI through appropriate explorations, such as borings or test pits to a minimum depth of 6 feet below the proposed lowest footing or pile, an analysis of soil characteristics conducted by or�under the supervision of, the engineer in accordance with the standards adopted by the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) or other applicable standards. The report must provide subsurface data to SUDoort the engineer's conclusions reaardina slope stability. 4. If the evaluation involves geologic evaluations or interpretations, the report shall be reviewed and approved by a geologist. It shall be the responsibility of the geotechnical engineer to assure that the geologist meets the qualifications listed in the definition section. A letter of concurrence from the geologist shall be included in the report. Based upon.the North Edmonds Landslide Area Geology and Slide Mechanisms map and table found in the Landau Associates Summary Report (2007), any lot which contains any portion of any hazard zone or is adjacent thereto, (regardless of whether the proposed building pad is located within any hazard area) shall specifically consider within the geotechnical report, the following types of typical hazard zones and shall specifically note if the hazard is, or is not, present on the site. The report shall address hazards from encroaching landslide materials, hazards from ground failure in material that has not previously failed, and hazards from ground failure in previously failed material. For each landslide hazard identified on a property, the geotechnical engineer shall identify the types of specific processes associated with the hazard {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 15 - Packet Page 380 of 433 and include design features to reduce such hazards and mitigate impacts. 6. For properties containing or adjacent to bluffs, the geotechnical engineer shall, as a part of the building permit process provide analysis of the rate of retreat of the bluff prepared by a geologist and estimate the bluff retreat amount and regression rate for periods of twenty-five (25) and 125 years. The geotechnical engineer shall address the effects of bluff retreat on the stability of structures and/or improvements. A structure is defined as. a. A building intended for human habitation, b. A building, structure or other improvement, whose stress or weight, collapse or movement would endanger public safety in the event of slope failure and, c. Any improvement on the site which is necessary to mitigate danger to public safety or provide stability. If the bluff retreat rate analysis shows that the rate of retreat of the bluff is such that any structure or improvement constructed pursuant to the building permit would be unreasonably endangered or reasonably could be anticipated to be endangeredy landslide or earth subsidence during its normal useful life, the application shall be denied. 7. Geotechdagghtter addressing the provisions of Chapter 23.80 I. The applicant shall submit, consistent with the findings of the geotechnical report, detailed structural plans with corresponding calculations prepared and stamped by the structural engineer of record. When architectural plans incorporate such structural details said plans shall be stamped and signed by the structural engineer of record. All other architectural plans may be prepared by an architect, designer, builder or layperson. J. The applicant shall submit documentation of required bonds, frozen funds or adequate instrument of credit. The applicants shall submit a copy of the contractor's general public liability insurance pursuant to ECDC 19.10.050. K. The applicant shall submit declarations, disclosures, covenants and waivers as required by ECDC 19.10.040. 19.10.040 Site posting notice, disclosures, declarations, covenants and waivers. {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 16 - Packet Page 381 of 433 A. Notices of permit submittal application with the city shall be posted pursuant to ECDC 20.91.01013(b). Such notices shall be conspicuously posted and maintained at each street frontage at the applicant's expense and direction. Notice of permit issuance or denial shall be conspicuously posted as required above. Upon each posting a ten (10) day appeal period shall commence. Appeals shall be heard at Snohomish County Superior Court in accordance with the Land Use Petition Act, and no other appeal shall be permitted. B. At permit application submittal, the applicant shall submit a written declaration with the permit application that includes the statement that the accuracy of all information is warranted by the owner/applicant in a form which relieves the city and its staff from any liability associated with reliance on such submittals. The declaration shall also state that the owner/applicant understands and accepts the risk of developing in an area with potential unstable soils and that the owner/applicant will advise in writing any prospective purchasers of the site, or any prospective purchasers or residential lessees of structures or portions of a structure on the site of the slide potential of the area. The owner applicant shall also acknowledge that he, she or they understand and accept the need for future monitoring and maintenance of the property as described in the final geotechnical report when future monitoring and maintenance may affect slope stability over time. While an application may reference the reports of prior public consultants to the city, all conclusions shall be those of the owner/applicant and his or her professionals. C. The plan set submittal shall include a disclosure letter from the geotechnical engineer and civil engineer who prepared the geotechnical report and civil plans, stating that in his or her judgment the plans and specifications submitted for the project conform to the recommendations in the geotechnical report, and that the risk of damage to the proposed development, or to adjacent properties, from soil instability will be minimized subject to the conditions set forth in the report; and the proposed development will not increase the potential for soil movement. Minimized shall mean that the applicant has utilized best available science and commonly accepted engineering and architectural practice to minimize, to the extent possible, the risks associated with development of the property. The geotechnical engineer shall review the erosion and sediment control plan and provide a statement about the adequacy of the {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 1% - Packet Page 382 of 433 plan with respect to site conditions and report findings. The geotechnical engineer's statement shall also include an identification of landslide hazards applicable to the site, the on -site measures taken to correct or reduce the hazards, as applicable, and measures taken to mitigate potential impacts from the remaining hazards. For sites where the hazards are not mitigated or where the risks from deep-seated or large-scale earth movement cannot be practically reduced by individual lot owners, the geotechnical engineer shall prepare a statement identifying what design measures will be taken to mitigate the risk to structures, ad'a� cent properties, and inhabitants in the event of deep-seated or large- scale movement. The statement shall specify any risks from earth movement that are not fully mitigated _ by design measures and render an opinion as to whether the site will be stable within the meaning of the ordinance following installation of all proposed improvements. The statement will clarify to currWt and future owners what measures were installed to reduce risks and what hazards could not be addressed by individual lot development. D. Further recommendations signed and sealed " by the geotechnical engineer shall be provided should there be additions or exceptions to the original recommendations based on the plans, site conditions or other supporting data. If the geotechnical engineer who reviews the plans and specifications is not the same engineer who prepared the geotechnical report, the new engineer shall, in a letter to the director accompanying the plans and specifications, express agreement or disagreement with the recommendations in the geotechnical report and state that the revised plans and specifications conform to the new o4* recommendations. E. The plan set submittal shall include a disclosure letter or notation on the design drawings by the structural engineer of record stating that; he has reviewed the geotechnical report(s), that he understands its recommendations, has explained or has had explained to the owner/applicant, the risk of loss due to slides on the site, and that he has incorporated into the design the recommendations of the report and established measures to reduce the potential risk of injury or damage that might be caused by any risk of earth movement referenced in the report. The statement shall note any risks, hazards, potential problems from earth movement that are not fully mitigated by design measures. F. The owner shall execute a covenant, (in a form provided by the city) to be submitted with the application (with necessary fee) to be {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 1g - Packet Page 383 of 433 filed with the Snohomish County Auditor. The director shall cause such completed covenant to be so filed. A copy of the recorded covenant shall be forwarded to the owner. This covenant shall be a covenant running with the land, which shall at a minimum include: 1. A legal description of the property. 2. A statement explaining that the site is in a potential earth subsidence and landslide hazard area, that the risk associated with the development of the site is set forth in permit file No. I* with the city of Edmonds building department, that conditions or prohibitions on development may have been imposed by the city in the course of permit issuance, and referencing any features in the design which will require maintenance or modification to address anticipated soil changes. The covenant may incorporate by reference the statements and conditions to be observed in the form proposed by the owner/applicant's geotechnical engineer, geologist, architect and/or structural engineer as approved after the review set forth in ECDC 19.10.060. 3. A statement waiving and promising to indemnify and hold harmless the city of Edmonds, its officers and employees from any claims the owner/applicant and his/her successors or assigns may have for any loss or damage to people or property either on or off the site resulting from soil movement and arising from or out of the issuances of any permit(s) authorizing development on the site, as well as due to any act or failure to act by the indemnitor , its agents or successors, in interest under or following issuance of the permit. 4. The date of permit issuance and permit number authorizing the development. 19.10.050 Site bonds and contractor general public liability insurance. A. Site bonding requirements. 1. A surety bond, in an amount to be determined by the director, executed by a surety company authorized to do business in the state of Washington shall be posted by the owner/applicant or general contractor to assure the restoration of any areas on the site, or in the surrounding area, disturbed or damaged by slides during construction, and to ensure completion of the work authorized by the permit, or, if the work is not completed, to assure that the site will be restored to a safe and stable condition at least equal to the safety and stability of the site prior to commencement of work {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 19 - Packet Page 384 of 433 under the permit. The bond will be exonerated upon occupancy approval of the building permit by the building official. 2. In lieu of the surety bond, the owner/applicant or general contractor may propose to file a cash deposit or an instrument of credit with the director in an amount equal to that which would be required in the surety bond, and similarly conditioned. B. Public liability insurance. The general contractor of record shall carry general public liability insurance effective through final occupancy in the minimum amount of one million dollars, and which shall name the city as an additional named insured, against the injury, death, property damage and/or loss arising from or out of the city's involvement in the permitting process for the project. C. Homeowner insurance. The city strongly recommends that each property owner maintain policies of liability insurance, adequate to provide sufficient funds, to indemnify and hold harmless third parties in the event of earth subsidence or landslides emanating from or across the® er's property. 19.10.060 Review to determine compliance with engineering practice and best available science. A. The city shall require professional peer review of the plan set submittals accompanying the permit application by a civil engineer, geotechnical engineer, geologist, architect, and/or structural engineer as may be necessary and determined by the building official or director, in order to determine whether the plan set submittals were prepared in accordance with generally accepted engineering practice or the practice of the particular engineering or design specialty and are based uDon best available science. The full cost of such peer review shall be paid in full by the owner/applicant within thirty (30) days of billing by the city. Failure to make timely payments shall result in a stay plan review services on the application. B. This requirement may be selectively waived at the discretion of the director provided the applicable project geotechnical engineer, civil engineer or structural engineer provides written concurrence, determination, details, facts and/or data that individual site conditions warrant an exemption from outside peer review. Once waived, the building official shall not be required to inquire further into the adequacy of any report, plans, or data, but rather may rely upon the submittals as warranted by the owner/applicant as {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 20 - Packet Page 385 of 433 reviewed by the city's consultant. Nothing herein shall relieve the owner/applicant of the obligation to submit a complete application fulfilling all the requirements of this chapter and the IRC/IBC. C. The final recommendation of the peer review re ag rding whether a submittal complies with generally accepted practice and/or is based on best available science shall be binding upon the buildina official. Such recommendation may be aDDealed to Superior Court under the Land Use Petition Act. ram. 19.10.070 Issuance and denial of permits. A. Permit Issuance. The following requirements must be satisfied before a permit will be issued: 1. An approved geotechnical report has been submitted and approved. 2. Plans and specifications have been submitted incorporating the recommendations of the geotechnical report and said plans have been approved. 3. The required declarations, disclosures, covenants and waivers have been submitted and approved. 4. Required bonds, cash deposits and public liability insurance have been posted with the city. 5. When peer review has been required, all submittals have been determined to have been prepared in accordance with generally accepted engineering practice. Peer review concurrence for permit issuance has been received 7. other provisions of ECDC Titles 16, 18 & 20 have been reviewed and approved by the appropriate city official. B. Permit denial. The following criteria shall result in the denial of issuance of permit: 1. Building, grading and excavation permits for construction on land which the director finds to be unsuitable for improvement due to excessively steep slopes, unsatisfactory foundation support, instability or unsuitable topography, or {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 21 - Packet Page 386 of 433 2. The resulting development would increase the potential of soil movement resulting in an unacceptable risk of damage to adjacent properties or an unreasonable risk of damage to the proposed development, or 3. Excessive flooding, seepage, high water table, or inadequate drainage, or 4. If the bluff retreat rate analysis shows that the rate retreat of the bluff is such that any structure or improvement would be unreasonably endangered or reasonably could be anticipated to be endangeredy landslide or earth subsidence during its normal b. A building, structure or other improvement, whose stress or weight, collapse or movement would endanger public safety in the event of slope failure and, c. Any improvement on the site which is necessary to mitigate danger to public safety or provide stability, or 5. Other hazardous conditions posing an unreasonable risk to public health, safety, or welfare, or 6. Where the noted site dangers or geologic hazards are not Minimized to the extent possible by the use of best available science and generally accepted engineering and architectural practice, or 7. If the applicant's geotechnical engineer determines that there is a greater chance than thirty (30) percent in a 25 year period that landslide damage on site will occur. C. In making a determination of permit denial, the director shall consider not only the land which is the subject of the application, but in addition, the surrounding area which would be adversely affected if the permit were granted. Permit denial shall be made in writing to the owner/applicant when the site cannot be rendered stable as defined in ECDC 19.10.020(0). This decision and other preliminary determinations as referenced herein shall be appealable to Snohomish County Superior Court in accordance with the Land Use Petition Act. No other appeal shall be permitted. The appeal period shall commence upon the date of mailing of any preliminary or final decision, or upon posting, if posting is the only notice a party with standing receives under the terms of this chapter. {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 22 - Packet Page 387 of 433 D. Prohibitions. Because of the relationship of ,groundwater to stability, the discharge of collected surface water or storm water to the ground surface or subsurface is prohibited on sites within the earth subsidence and landslide hazard area. In addition, the following construction, buildings, or improvements are hereby prohibited within the earth subsidence and landslide hazard area: 1. Swimming pools or hot tubs. 2. Ponds or other artificial impoundments of water. 3. Wateringor r irrigationystems. slopes. 5. Rockeries. E. Waiver. The prohibitions established in paragraph D above shall apply unless the property owner requests a waiver based upon the written analysis of a geotechnical engineer which clearly establishes that the proposed improvement will have no reasonable likelihood of triggering or otherwise contributingto o any landslide hazard or earth subsidence risk either on the site or in the neighboring earth subsidence or landslide hazard area. In any review or appeal of the director's or building official's denial of a waiver to construct an otherwise prohibited improvement, the burden of proof shall always be upon the aqpplicant to establish by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that no such risk will be created by the improvement. Any ;geotechnical engineering eering report provided in any review shall consider not only the risk incurred due to or during construction of #4' the otherwise prohibited improvement, but also the potential impacts due to failure to maintain the improvement, damage through reasonably foreseeable events such as earthquakes or other acts of God, or the reasonably foreseeable negligence of the owner or future owners. The director may utilize peer review consultants. 19.10.080 Site access, professional/special inspection monitoring during construction and final geotechnical report. A. Site clearing and grading. The owner/applicant or contractor shall secure the building official's approval before entering an earth subsidence and landslide hazard area site with excavating or other grading and clearing equipment to clear, remove trees or grade for any purpose including the creation of access to the site. tWSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 23 - Packet Page 388 of 433 The building official may condition such access approval if site conditions are warranted and when discretionary approval permits are required. As part of the approval process the building official may impose conditions that address site work issues; such measures could include but are not limited to limiting all excavation and drainage installation to the dryer season between May and the end of September, or sequencing activities such as the installation of drainage systems well in advance of construction. St for any purpose shall be submitted to the building official accompanied by written concurrence of the owner/applicant's geotechnical engineer of record. The building official may utilize peer review consultants to determine whether the request is based on generally accepted engineering_ practice and is reasonable with regard to time -frame to complete the work, types of equipment proposed to perform the work, length of exposure of slopes, and adequacy of site monitoring and temporary erosion control measures. When such peer review is utilized the applicant is responsible for the peer review fee. B. Reporting authority. The owner/a *cant shall retain a P g Y pp geotechnical engineer to monitor the site during construction. The owner/applicant shall preferably retain the geotechnical engineer who prepared the final geotechnical report in the plan set submittal and who has reviewed the approved plans and specifications. If a different geotechnical engineering consultant is retained by the owner/applicant, the new geotechnical engineer shall submit a letter to the director stating that he or she has read all reports and recommendations and reviews to date and state whether or not he or she agrees with the opinions and recommendations of the original geotechnical report and peer review comments. Further recommendations, signed and sealed by the new geotechnical engineer, and supporting data, shall be provided should there be exceptions or changes to the original recommendations that would effect the approved plans. C. Construction monitoring, special inspections. 1. Inspection requirements. During the period from October 1 st to April 30th, when on site, the owner/applicant or designated erosion sedimentation control (ESC) site supervisor shall perform erosion {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 24 - Packet Page 389 of 433 and sedimentation control inspections. Records of installed ESC facilities shall be maintained by the erosion and sedimentation control supervisor and copies of all ESC records shall be provided to Ci . inspectors upon request. ESC facilities on inactive sites (sites where no work will be performed for more than three (3) consecutive days) shall be inspected weekly by the erosion and sedimentation control supervisor. During all other times of the year, weekly inspections by the ESC site supervisor are required and shall be recorded. 2. Weekly field reports. The geotechnical engineer shall monitor, during construction, compliance with the recommendations in the geotechnical report including; site excavation, shoring, temporary erosion control, soil support for foundation, piles, sub drainage installation, soil compaction and other geotechnical aspects of the construction. Unless otherwise approved by the director, the specific recommendations contained in the geotechnical report shall be implemented by the owner/applicant. Omissions or deviations from the approved geotechnical report and civil plans shall be highlighted to the city in a separate report. All reports shall be submitted to the city on a weekly basis for review. Failure to submit required reports may result in the issuance of a stop work be performed after storm events as defined in ECDC 19.10.020(Q). The storm event report shall be provided within one week of the event. D. Final construction report. The geotechnical engineer of record shall prepare a final written report to be submitted to the building official, stating that based upon his or her professional opinion, site observations and final site grading that the completed development substantially complies with the recommendations of the geotechnical report and with all geotechnical related permit requirements as shown on the approved plans. Substantially complies means that the completed development offers at least the level of stability and safety, on and off site, as was afforded by the original recommendations and report. Recommendations to the owner/applicant shall be included in the report for future monitoring and maintenance of the property including drainage, tightlines, catch basins, berms, retaining wall drainage, hazard mitigation improvements, slopes, bluffs, vegetation, and permanent erosion control that effect slope stability {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 25 - Packet Page 390 of 433 over time. Occupancy of the residence shall not be granted until the report has been reviewed and accepted by the building official. Section 3. Severability. If any section, sentence, clause or phrase of this ordinance should be held to be invalid or unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity or unconstitutionality shall not akfect the validity or constitutionality of any other section, sentence, clause or phrase of this ordinance. Section 4. Effective Date. This ordinance, being an exercise of a power specifically delegated to the City legislative body, is not subject to referendum, and shall take effect five (5) days after passage and publication of an approved summary thereof consisting of the title. APPROVEl� t, ATTEST/AUTHENTICA CITY CLERK, SANDRA S. CHASE APPROVED AS TO FORM: OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY: BY 4 W. SCOTT SNYDER FILED WITH THE CITY CLERK: PASSED BY THE CITY COUNCIL: PUBLISHED: EFFECTIVE DATE: ORDINANCE NO. K UAK Y HAA&tN NUN {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/} - 26 - Packet Page 391 of 433 On the passed Ordinance No. SUMMARY OF ORDINANCE NO. of the City of Edmonds, Washington day of , 2007, the City Council of the City of Edmonds, . A summary of the content of said ordinance, consisting of the title, provides as follows: AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF EDMONDS, WASHINGTON, AMENDING THE EDMONDS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CODE, REPEALING CHAPTER 19.05 EARTH SUBSIDENCE AND LANDSLIDE HAZARD AREAS, AND ENACTING IN ITS PLACE CHAPTER 19.10 EARTH SUBSIDENCE AND LANDSLIDE HAZARD AREAS, PROVIDING A SAVINGS CLAUSE, AND FIXING A TIME WHEN THE SAME SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE. The full text of this Ordinance will be mailed upon request. DATED this day of 92007. CITY CLERK, SANDRA S. CHASE 1Im {WSS580435.DOC;1/00006.900000/}- 27 - Packet Page 392 of 433 North Edmonds Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area Summary Report Edmonds, Washington March 14, 2007 Prepared for City of Edmonds Community Services Department Edmonds, Washington LANDAU ASSOCIATES 130 2nd Avenue South Edmonds, WA 98020 (425) 778-0907 Packet Page 393 of 433 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PURPOSE 1 BACKGROUND 1 North Edmonds Landslide Ordinance 1 Key North Edmonds Area Geotechnical Studies 2 NORTH EDMONDS AREA LANDSLIDE SETTING AND HISTORY 4 Landslide Geology and Setting 4 Landslide History 4 LANDSLIDING — LOCATIONS, HAZARDS, AND PROCESSES 5 Potential Landsliding Locations 6 Landslide Hazards 7 Landslide Processes 7 Severity of Landsliding 8 Changes Over Time 8 Risk Reduction and Mitigation Measures 9 CONCLUSIONS 9 USE OF THIS REPORT 10 REFERENCES 11 LIST OF FIGURES Eigure Title 1 North Edmonds Landslide Area Geology and Slide Mechanisms LIST OF TABLES Table Title 1 Recommended Geotechnical Report Requirements, North Edmonds Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area 3/14/07 \\Edmdata\projects\074\137\FileRm\RWEdmondsLandslideSumm_rpt.doc LANDAU ASSOCIATES ii Packet Page 394 of 433 PURPOSE The purpose of this document is to provide a summary of key reports and information that are pertinent to permit applicants and their design team for property development within or adjacent to the North Edmonds Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area, as defined by Edmonds Community Development Code (ECDC) Chapter 19.10. This document does not summarize individual plat or property consultant reports; these consultant reports are available for review in the City of Edmonds (City) Development Services office. This document provides applicants and their design team with technical information and identifies issues that should be considered and addressed related to landslide hazards and landslide processes in the North Edmonds Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area. BACKGROUND The North Edmonds area includes a large historic/prehistoric landslide often called the Meadowdale Landslide in previous documents. The landslide includes a massive downset block of land that extends from the steep bluffs along the east edge of the slide to Puget Sound. In this summary report, the downset block is referred to as the "landslide mass." The identification of the landslide mass will change over time. Some areas currently outside of the landslide mass may become part of the mass as slopes regress from natural or other erosional processes. The landslide mass is defined as the area that has previously moved in historic or prehistoric times and is referred to as the North Edmonds Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area (North Edmonds ESLHA). This area is subject to the terms of the City's original "Meadowdale Ordinance" (Ordinance #2661) and subsequent revisions and updates enacted by the City of Edmonds. The requirements of the most recent ordinance revisions are contained in ECDC Chapter 19.10. Development in Landslide Hazard Areas, including areas both within and outside of the North Edmonds ESLHA, is also controlled by the provisions of ECDC 23.80, Geologically Hazardous Areas. NORTH EDMONDS LANDSLIDE ORDINANCE The North Edmonds (Meadowdale) landslide hazards and risks have been known for a number of years, and the landslide has been the subject of many previous geologic and geotechnical studies. Large scale landsliding of the area was described in newspapers in 1947 and damaging slides have been historically recorded in many years since that time. In the past, development in the area was limited because of landslide hazards. In 1984, Local Improvement District (LID) No. 210 was passed for the Meadowdale area (which included the landslide mass as well as properties east of the slide). In 1984, a public sanitary sewer, limited storm sewers, and other drainage components were installed under this 3/14/07 \\Edmdata\projects\074\137\FileRm\RWEdmondsLandslideSumm_rpt.doc LANDAU ASSOCIATES I Packet Page 395 of 433 LID. The installation of these various LID improvements generally lowered groundwater levels within the slide and lowered the risk to new development. Since 1988, residential development has been allowed in the landslide area under specific conditions and requirements prescribed under City Ordinance 2661. The ordinance included development guidelines and requirements to limit risks for a property owner and risk of impacts to adjacent properties. Development within the landslide area under Ordinance 2661 has occurred assuming that an acceptable risk of landsliding for a property is less than 30 percent in 25 years. Under those conditions, property development was only allowed if a property owner and their consultant provided an estimated landslide risk for the property, based on sound scientific and engineering principles, that was less than 30 percent in 25 years. Substantial risks due to landslide hazards exist within the North Edmonds ESLHA. These risks are estimated to range from less than 10 percent probability of occurrence in 25 years to about 30 percent probability of occurrence in 25 years (GeoEngineers 1985). The actual landslide hazard risk depends on both regional and site -specific conditions, including topography, geology, surface water, groundwater, and vegetation conditions. In many cases, the landslide hazard risk can be reduced and impacts mitigated through appropriate siting, land development, and design features. It is the responsibility of the applicant and their design team to: • Clearly identify landslide hazards that affect or are affected by property development, and • Provide measures to reduce hazards and mitigate impacts. KEY NORTH EDMONDS AREA GEOTECHNICAL STUDIES The current understanding of the North Edmonds ESLHA has been developed from geologic and geotechnical studies that began in the 1960s and have continued through the present time. Most of these reports are available for viewing at the City's Development Services office. Key area -wide technical reports are summarized below. The following key reports have formed the historic basis of the North Edmonds ESLHA and the related ordinances enacted by the City. Dames & Moore. 1968. This report evaluated the overall stability of the Meadowdale area from a geologic standpoint and identified soil and groundwater conditions, described slide history of the area, and provided a map showing geologic contacts, the ancient slide scarp, and areas of 1947 and 1955-56 movement. This report concluded that it was feasible to install sanitary sewers and that installation would benefit the stability of the area. This report also suggested that new residential development in much of the Meadowdale area should be prohibited unless some measures are made to control groundwater and surface water. • Roger Lowe Associates, Inc. 1979. This report provided a summary of the Meadowdale area landslide history, geology, and hydrology. This report provided a landslide hazard map that enumerated the probability of landslide hazards in the Meadowdale slide area at the time the 3/14/07 \\Edmdata\projects\074\137\FileRm\RWEdmondsLandslideSumm_rpt.doc LANDAU ASSOCIATES 2 Packet Page 396 of 433 report was prepared (prior to LID sewer and drainage improvements). The probabilities of landslide movement ranged from 2 to 90 percent over a 25-year period and much of the landslide mass area had probabilities greater than 30 percent. The probabilities presented in the report were based on a 30- to 40-year historical record and site observations of landslide feature ages and activity. The report identified that the stability of the Meadowdale Landslide is very sensitive to groundwater levels. The report also identified land use and risk reduction measures, including the installation of sanitary sewers, storm drainage, and interceptor drains. The report provided a summary of the results of stability analyses with respect to possible improvements in factors of safety and potential lowered groundwater levels. GeoEngineers, Inc. 1985. This report provided a summary of predicted improvements in stability due to the LID measures implemented in 1984. GeoEngineers' evaluation was based on comparing 4 years of groundwater data prior to the LID construction with 3 months of data following LID construction. The report concluded that an average 3-ft decline in groundwater levels was observed in the Meadowdale Landslide mass. The decline in groundwater levels was tied to an increase in factor of safety and a decrease in landslide hazard risk. A map showing this decreased landslide risk, modified from the original 1979 mapping, was provided in this report. The probabilities shown on the revised map range from 2 to 30 percent over a 25-year period. The reduction in probabilities presented in the report was based on subjective evaluations that related change in factor of safety from lower groundwater levels to reduction in risk. The intent of the report was to help identify and approximately quantify the relative degree of risk for various broad areas within the overall landslide mass so that this information could be used for planning and communication of the relative landslide hazards to the public. The information was not intended to provide a detailed assessment of lot -specific landslide hazards or a precise estimate of landslide probabilities at a particular location. Landau Associates. 2007. Previous mapping of the landslide hazard area boundary was based on hand -drawn lines on older USGS base maps. Various inaccuracies became evident in the base map over time. In addition, the landslide boundary included areas that had previously failed as a result of landslide movement, as well as some adjacent areas that could be hazardous, but had not yet failed. The definition of what was inside or outside the boundary line was not always consistent and subject to interpretation. To address these issues, the City had LiDAR (light detection and ranging) mapping flown of the entire city in 2005. The topographic and imaging data from the LiDAR survey provided current, high quality base mapping that formed the basis for the development of landslide hazard mapping for the entire city. Particular emphasis was placed on the North Edmonds ESLHA. Topographic data, LiDAR imaging, previous geologic studies, geotechnical reports prepared for individual properties, and geologic mapping was reviewed to develop the boundary of the North Edmonds ESLHA. It was decided that the boundary of the North Edmonds ESLHA should be set at the interpreted boundary of the landslide mass (i.e., the interpreted top of the landslide scarp surrounding the North Edmonds landslide). The results of the mapping and evaluation process are summarized in a Landau Associates report and the North Edmonds ESLHA boundary line is incorporated in the City's Landslide Hazard Area maps. It should be noted that setting the boundary line at the interpreted top of the landslide scarp defines the intended extent of the requirements of ECDC 19.10 for the North Edmonds ESLHA and is not meant to imply that landslide hazards are not present beyond that line. However, requirements for considering and addressing landslide hazard areas defined on the basis of slope steepness and requirements for addressing areas adjacent to landslide hazard areas are already addressed in ECDC 23.80, Geologically Hazardous Areas. 3/14/07 \\Edmdata\projects\074\137\FileRm\RWEdmondsLandslideSumm_rpt.doc LANDAU ASSOCIATES Packet Page 397 of 433 NORTH EDMONDS AREA LANDSLIDE SETTING AND HISTORY An understanding of the landslide setting, conditions, and history will help the applicant and their design team to better address issues in site development. LANDSLIDE GEOLOGY AND SETTING The soils in the North Edmonds area include soils from glacial and interglacial periods and disturbed soils from post -glacial landslide processes. Outside of the landslide area (east of the landslide), the uppermost soil in many areas is glacial till —an unsorted and consolidated mixture of sand, silt, and gravel that has been glacially consolidated and is very dense. Directly beneath this unit (or at the surface if till is not present), is a glacial outwash deposit of sand and sandy gravel. The bottom of the outwash deposit often includes transitional interbeds of silty sand and silt. The glacial outwash unit is present along the steep slopes that form the eastern edge of the landslide. Both the glacial till and the outwash are considered to be from the most recent glacial period, termed the Vashon age. An older -age sequence of silt and clay, often termed the Whidbey Formation, underlies the outwash deposit. Within the landslide mass, the outwash sands and underlying silt and clay have been disturbed from sliding and form landslide deposits. In some cases, the landslide movement has completely mixed up these soils so no soil structure can be seen. In other cases, landslide failure occurred as large blocks of soil that stayed intact, so bedding may be visible. Landsliding in the area is caused by a combination of topography, geology, and groundwater. The slopes throughout the area are steeper than the strength of soils will support. Within the landslide complex, soils strengths in disturbed soils are very low, so slopes may be unstable at 3H:1V (horizontal:vertical) or 411:1 V and flatter. On the outer edge of the landslide complex, undisturbed soils have higher strengths, but existing slopes are also steeper; many areas are steeper than 1H:1V, and slopes are potentially unstable. In both conditions, groundwater or seepage is typically a triggering factor acting to reduce soil strength and cause erosion. The subsurface conditions present on the east edge of the landslide complex are similar to other landslide areas in the Puget Sound region; permeable sands are eroded by groundwater that lies above relatively impermeable silts and clays causing a zone of frequent and active ground movement. LANDSLIDE HISTORY Landsliding in the area, and throughout the Puget Sound region, probably began thousands of years ago as glaciers retreated. The landsliding activity reflects a process of steep slopes attempting to reach geologic equilibrium. The North Edmonds landslide is not yet in equilibrium, so continued ground 3/14/07 \\Edmdata\projects\074\137\FileRm\RWEdmondsLandslideSumm_rpt.doc LANDAU ASSOCIATES 4 Packet Page 398 of 433 movements should be expected to occur for an extended period of at least hundreds and possibly thousands of years into the future. Several very large landslide events have been documented in the area in the 1940s and 1950s (information prior to the 1940s has not been identified). In 1947 an area south of the wharf was involved in a large landslide event that had been identified variously as between about 800 ft long (Dames & Moore 1968) to greater than 2,400 ft long (Seattle Post-Intelligencer February 23, 1947), with impacts that extended up to about 1,000 ft eastward from the shoreline. As part of this landslide event, which apparently continued over some period of time, four homes were reportedly wrecked and 20 to 40 homes threatened or endangered. In 1955-56, another large slide is documented (Dames & Moore 1968) that destroyed at least 2 homes and damaged many other homes. It is appropriate to note that the density of development in this area in the 1940s and 1950s was significantly less than present day conditions. A large-scale landslide similar to these earlier landslides could be expected to involve many more structures if it were to occur today. Since the 1950s, large-scale movements of the landslide mass have not been documented. Generalized movement does occur in the landslide area as evidenced by roadway cracking and localized, small-scale slope failures. The risk of large-scale landsliding has been substantially reduced by the LID improvements that were installed in 1984. However, extreme climatic conditions have the potential to affect groundwater sufficiently to reactivate the overall landslide mass. For instance, the `rain -on -snow' event of late 1996 and early 1997 caused several slides in the North Edmonds area and throughout the Puget Sound region. In particular, large-scale landslides that caused significant damage occurred along the bluffs in the town of Woodway and in the Perkins Lane area of Magnolia Hill in Seattle. Smaller scale landsliding, such as sloughs or debris flow on the east edge (scarp) of the landslide complex and movements of benches within the landslide mass continue to occur indicating that the North Edmonds landslide area is still active. LANDSLIDING — LOCATIONS, HAZARDS, AND PROCESSES Previous geologic reports for the area considered landslide locations, hazards, and processes known at the time the reports were completed. Although the specific boundaries of areas with certain hazards may have changed over time, the concept of identifying landslide hazards and processes is still directly applicable to development within the North Edmonds ESLHA. The previous reports did not provide detail about the expected severity of landsliding with respect to property damage or potential loss of life. It should be noted that most previous reports were completed before substantial development of the area within and directly adjacent to the landslide area. Some small landslides (such as from bluffs along the east side of the landslide complex), may be happening more frequently over time (or they may 3/14/07 \\Edmdata\projects\074\137\FileRm\RWEdmondsLandslideSumm_rpt.doc LANDAU ASSOCIATES 5 Packet Page 399 of 433 now be reported more often as development has increased on properties near the bluff). The type and frequency of landsliding should be expected to change over timefactors that need to be considered for development. The location of landslides, the types of hazards, and the landslide process affect the development of properties in the North Edmonds ESLHA. Table 1 summarizes relationships between location, type of landslide hazard, landslide processes, and recommended geotechnical report requirements and issues to be considered in the design of property improvements within or adjacent to the North Edmonds ESLHA. Specific requirements for development are provided in the City of Edmonds North Edmonds ESLHA Checklist for Permit Submittal and the Geotechnical Report Guidelines. POTENTIAL LANDSLIDING LOCATIONS In and adjacent to the North Edmonds ESLHA, various types of landslide hazards and processes may occur at different locations. For a common understanding of landslide issues, the North Edmonds landslide area has been divided into five zones, A through E. These zones are schematically shown on Figure 1. • Zone A. This zone includes the lowermost (west) parts of the landslide. Slide movement from the large-scale slide complex and smaller slides within the complex can both affect this zone. Impacts from sliding in this zone have the potential to affect the nearby Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) railroad. • Zone B. This zone includes the majority of the landslide mass or complex. Soils in this area are typically disturbed, although blocks of intact soil may be found within this zone. Localized small-scale failures occur in this zone from weak soils and localized groundwater conditions. Large-scale sliding of the slide complex has the potential to affect this zone. • Zone C. This zone lies near the edge of the landslide complex. This zone is most affected by landslide hazards due to slides that initiate on the steep slopes on the east side of this zone. Small-scale failures within this zone are also possible. This zone has the highest risk to public safety. • Zone D. This zone encompasses the active scarp of the landslide and incorporates ground that is outside the currently active landslide area. The west part of this zone includes parts of the slope that are actively failing as shallow debris slides. This zone also includes areas that can potentially fail as large block failures. The eastern part of this zone includes currently stable ground that has not yet failed behind the present top of the landslide scarp. This area could be subject to failure from a large block -type landslide failure or a series of shallower debris slides occurring on the face of the bluff and the resultant bluff retreat over a period of years. Any development near a designated landslide hazard zone will require consideration of the landslide hazard, potential bluff retreat, and buffers (designated as a distance of 50 ft or the height of the steep slope back from the top of the slope, whichever is greater, per the requirements of ECDC 23.80). 3/14/07 \\Edmdata\projects\074\137\FileRm\RWEdmondsLandslideSumm_rpt.doc LANDAU ASSOCIATES 6 Packet Page 400 of 433 • Zone E. This zone lies outside of the active landslide area and the area that may be involved in long-term slope retreat. However, development in this zone has the potential to contribute to surface water or groundwater conditions that affect hazards within Zones A though D. Locally steep slopes may also be present in this area that are unrelated to the North Edmonds ESLHA, but that could be considered a landslide hazard area as defined by ECDC 23.80. It is important to understand that it is possible to have features, hazards, and processes common to one zone present in another zone. As part of development permitting, the applicant and their design team will need to identify specific hazards and processes that apply to the property. LANDSLIDE HAZARDS Four different types of landslide hazards were identified by Roger Lowe Associates (1979) and GeoEngineers (1985) on their maps. These hazards consist of- 0 No hazard identified • Encroaching landslide debris originating upslope • Hazards from landslides in ground that has not previously failed • Hazards from reactivating landslide debris causing ground failure and movement. More than one type of hazard can occur at any given location. Due to impacts from landsliding adjacent to an area, hazards can occur in areas that have previously been stable and have not previously failed. The landslide hazards identifiers also recognize that landsliding and related hazards can occur in areas that are now stable, but that have the potential to become unstable at some time in the future. The applicant and their design team must identify all landslide hazards that currently exist on the property, as well as those likely to exist in the future, and determine if those hazards have the potential to affect human safety or cause property damage. LANDSLIDE PROCESSES The Landslide Hazard Map, initially developed by Roger Lowe Associates (1979) and also used by GeoEngineers (1985) identified four landslide processes that commonly occur in the area: • Slumps • Debris Slides • Debris Avalanches • Debris Flows. 3/14/07 \\Edmdata\projects\074\137\FileRm\RWEdmondsLandslideSumm_rpt.doc LANDAU AssocIATES 7 Packet Page 401 of 433 Multiple hazards and multiple processes can be present at any location. For each hazard identified on a property, the applicant and their design team shall identify the types of processes associated with the hazard. The site design should include features to reduce hazards, mitigate impacts from site hazards, and cause no additional impacts to other property owners in the area. SEVERITY OF LANDSLIDING Previous maps of the North Edmonds landslide area did not distinguish between size or severity of landslide hazards. As part of the development permit process, applicants and their design team should assess the size of possible landslide impacts and present design features to mitigate impacts. All impacts that could affect public safety must be mitigated. It may not be possible to fully mitigate property damage impacts from very large-scale landsliding. In this case, the applicant's geotechnical report should clearly identify the steps taken to reduce the impacts and the possible impacts that are not fully mitigated by design. For instance, the designer's report should note that significant structural damage should be expected if large-scale reactivation of the North Edmonds landslide should occur. CHANGES OVER TIME The risk of landslide hazards in the area will remain substantial for hundreds to thousands of years. Landslide processes and susceptible locations will change over time. Some changes may be due to human influences; other changes are part of natural geologic processes. The assessment of landslide hazards and processes on a parcel should consider changes that may occur over time. For all zones, development shall not increase the likelihood, extent, or severity of hazard for the applicant's property or other properties. For lots in Zones C and D, slope retreat processes must be explicitly considered in the applicant's technical documentation. For these zones, applicants should evaluate the effect of slope retreat processes over a minimum 120-year period. The 120-year period has been chosen as the normal useful life of residential structures under normal upkeep and maintenance conditions. For some site improvements, an alternate `normal useful life' may be appropriate and can be proposed by the applicant. Groundwater levels in and near the North Edmonds area will affect the stability in all zones. Groundwater levels are affected by a wide range of factors, both natural and human caused. Changing climatic conditions could lead to increased groundwater levels in the future. Municipal sewers and storm sewers and drains remove some surface water before it can re -infiltrate back into the landslide mass. However, watering associated with gardens and lawns introduces water back into the landslide area and into the groundwater and removal of trees and vegetation also increases the amount of precipitation that is available to infiltrate to the groundwater. Thus, the net effect from human factors is not known. 3/14/07 \\Edmdata\projects\074\137\FileRm\RWEdmondsLandslideSumm_rpt.doc LANDAU ASSOCIATES 8 Packet Page 402 of 433 RISK REDUCTION AND MITIGATION MEASURES The applicant and their design team need to evaluate the landslide hazards in relationship to the proposed development and incorporate means to reduce the risk related to potential landsliding and to develop measures to mitigate the potential remaining hazards. Mitigation measures may take a variety of forms, depending on the specific site conditions and details of the design. For example, some structures within the North Edmonds ESLHA have been supported on pile foundations extending down through the landslide debris and founded on underlying undisturbed materials. Other projects have been designed with a shallow foundation consisting of a relatively rigid structural foundation mat or grid that is designed to span over areas of underlying vertical or horizontal soil movement. In essence, the structure is designed to stay intact even if soil support under a portion of the structure is lost due to landsliding. Structures located near the base of the steep bluff have been designed considering the potential for landslide debris flow originating from upslope areas. Mitigation measures for structures near the base of the steep slope that could be impacted by debris flows have included debris deflection or catchment walls above the structure, reinforced shear walls within the structure, minimal door or window openings on the uphill side of the structure, and placement of the main living and sleeping areas away from the upslope side of the house. CONCLUSIONS The 1984 LID activities, a combination of sanitary sewers (with associated removal of septic systems) and limited storm drainage improvements, have, on the average, lowered groundwater levels and improved the stability of areas within the landslide mass. The storm drainage portions of the LID were installed primarily to protect City -owned property such as the new sanitary sewer line. The LID improvements were not intended to address groundwater levels outside the landslide mass, and thus have not changed stability in these areas. The improvement in stability from lower groundwater levels could change in the future, and activities associated with the development of the North Edmonds ESLHA and surrounding areas can affect stability in both positive and negative ways. The North Edmonds ESLHA Ordinance and associated requirements contained in ECDC 19.10 allows development if landslide risks can be reduced and impacts can be shown to be mitigated by appropriate design. Nonetheless, it is imperative that applicants and homeowners understand that living in a known landslide area presents a real and substantial risk to both public safety and private/public property. Residents in and immediately adjacent to the North Edmonds ESLHA should be prepared to accept that risk. 3/14/07 \\Edmdata\projects\074\137\FileRm\RWEdmondsLandslideSumm_rpt.doc LANDAU ASSOCIATES 9 Packet Page 403 of 433 USE OF THIS REPORT This report was prepared for the use of the City to summarize geotechnical and geologic information related to the North Edmonds ESLHA. The information in this summary report is general in nature and could be used as background information, but should not be used as a basis for design and development of individual lots. Within the limitations of scope, schedule, and budget, our services have been conducted in accordance with generally accepted geotechnical engineering and geologic practices. No other warranty, express or implied, is made as to the professional advice included in this report. We appreciate the opportunity to provide geotechnical services to the City. If you have any questions regarding the information contained in this report, or if we may be of further service, please call. LANDAU ASSOCIATES, IN Dennis R. Stettler, P.E. Principal 1 Colin B. Turnbull, L.E.G. Senior Engineering Geologist DRS:CBTfrgm RV1 Colin B Turnbull 37I4/07\T--clmima5pmjectsW741I371FileRmlRWEdmindsLandslide5umm_rpi.dac LANDAU ASSOCIATES 10 Packet Page 404 of 433 REFERENCES Dames & Moore. 1968. Report of Geologic Evaluation, Meadowdale Area, Edmonds, Washington. Prepared for the City of Edmonds. September 23. GeoEngineers, Inc. 1985. Report of Geotechnical; Consultation Property Value Appraisals and Assessments Meadowdale Landslide Area, Edmonds, Washington. Prepared for the City of Edmonds. February 28. Landau Associates. 2007. Technical Memorandum. Summary of LiDAR Processing and Evaluation Methods, LiDAR Mapping Evaluation Project, Edmonds, Washington. Prepared for the City of Edmonds. March. Roger Lowe Associates, Inc. 1979. Final Report, Landslide Hazards Investigation, Meadowdale Area, Edmonds, Washington. Prepared for the City of Edmonds. October 16. 3/14/07 \\Edmdata\projects\074\137\FileRm\RWEdmondsLandslideSumm_rpt.doc LANDAU ASSOCIATES I Packet Page 405 of 433 Potential Landslide Hazard Area and West Buffer Equal to the Height of the Steep East Slope or 50 ft, Whichever is Greater North Edmonds Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area (ECDC 19.10) ECDC 23.80 Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone A B C D E Potential Slope Ground Surface Re� 300 GLACIAL OUTWASH SANDS Potential Debris �/ / Sand/Sandy Gravel Potential Landslide Slide / Hazard Area Potential Large (ECDC 23.80) / Block Failure 250 Seepage — ' —?— — — ? — — —?— — —?— / Potential Large -Scale 200 Slope Instability /// Potential Debris Slide / �C/ 150 Ground Surface // WHIDBEY FORMATION Silt/Clay / Potential Large -Scale Slope Instability �/ 100 Potential Localized / Q Small -Scale Slope r Instabilities Potential Large -Scale _ / Slope Instability / SLIDE COMPLEX / 50 / (Disturbed/Mixed — Sand/Silt/Clay) � m _ ?— — Landslide Rupture Surface —?— — — — —?— _ — — — ?— _ (Actual Depth Varies) Notes Puget Sound 1. This cross section is intended to be a schematic 0 Potential Localized representation of typical landslide zones, landslide - Small -Scale Slope configuration, and landslide mechanisms within the Elevation Instabilities North Edmonds Earth Subsidence and Landslide (Feet) Hazard Area. The landslide zone boundaries are conceptual only. LANDAU ASSOCIATES 2. For an explanation of Zones see Table 1. 0 100 200 North Edmonds Earth Figure Subsidence and Landslide North Edmonds Landslide Area Approximate Scale in Feet Hazard Area Geology and Slide Mechanisms Vertical Exaggeration = 2x Edmonds, Washington Packet Page 406 of 433 Page 1 of 2 TABLE 1 RECOMMENDED GEOTECHNICAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS NORTH EDMONDS EARTH SUBSIDENCE AND LANDSLIDE HAZARD AREA Locations Technical Issues and Landslide Hazards Recommended Report Requirements Recommended Key Design Features All Zones Possible Technical Issues Possible Report Requirements Possible Key Design Features • Localized slope instability 0 Subsurface exploration must be at least 6 ft deeper than lowest elevation of the proposed foundation 0 Temporary and permanent fills may be restricted • Large-scale slope instability 0 Subsurface exploration required for retaining structures 0 Roof drains and impervious surface runoff should be tightlined to stormwater system and separate from footing public to Risk safety • p y Subsurface exploration must include measurement or estimate of high seasonal groundwater conditions drain lines • Risk to private/public property 0 Provide estimated vertical and horizontal differential movement for appropriate foundation design Stormwater infiltration typically prohibited in hazard area • Potential impacts to North Edmonds Earth Subsidence 0 Provide criteria for minimum span distance between foundation support due to potential loss of soil support Permanent irrigation systems prohibited in Zones A, B, C, D; minimize water that is used for irrigation in all zones and Landslide Hazard Area and other properties from Provide information about the potential size and mass of landslide debris originating upslope Select native, drought -tolerant vegetation (dense, low-lying, and deeply rooted species) surface water or groundwater conditions Outdoor swimming pools prohibited in Zones A, B, C, D • Potential localized Landslide Hazard Area due to steep Provide required foundation and wall loading conditions based on impact forces from landslide debris slopes (ECDC 23.80) originating upslope if determined to be a risk 0 If permitted, hot tubs should include special design features so that tub water is conveyed to a suitable and Establish Steep Slope Buffer width based on rate of slope retreat or stable slope angle over 120-year period approved discharge point Possible Potential Hazards Include a minimum 15 ft setback from Steep p p Slope Buffer for all site development Foundations should withstand high lateral forces from upslope and large-scale movement • Encroaching landslide debris originating upslope Provide recommendations for suitable vegetation; in most cases, buffer shall be maintained in undisturbed, g Foundations should be designed to withstand loss of soil beneath parts of foundation natural condition 0 Structures should be designed to accommodate a certain level of vertical and horizontal movement from local and • Reactivation of landslide debris causing ground failure large-scale landsliding and movement Determine if activities on property, particularly drainage features, are expected to impact the Landslide Hazard Area 0 Depending on location, may need to consider features for human safety from encroaching materials including • Landslide in ground that has not previously failed deflection walls, reinforced shear walls; appropriate home layout features • Full Geotechnical Report may not be required if outside of the North Edmonds Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area and other designated Landslide Hazard Areas 0 Reinforced shear walls; appropriate door and window placement • Appropriate location of main living and sleeping areas • No yard waste, debris or fill may be placed within Steep Slope Buffer on either a temporary or permanent basis • No permanent irrigation in buffer or setback • No water discharged or infiltrated in landslide, buffer or setback Zone A Specific Technical Issues Specific Report Requirements Specific Key Design Features • Localized slope instability 0 Subsurface exploration must be at least 6 ft deeper than lowest elevation of the proposed foundation 0 Temporary and permanent fills may be restricted • Large-scale slope instability 0 Subsurface exploration required for retaining structures 0 Roof drains and impervious surface runoff should be tightlined to stormwater system and separate from footing public to Risk safety • p y Subsurface exploration must include measurement or estimate of high seasonal groundwater conditions drain lines Risk to private/public property 0 Provide estimated vertical and horizontal differential movement for appropriate foundation design Stormwater infiltration typically prohibited in hazard area • Provide criteria for minimum span distance between foundation elements • Permanent irrigation systems should not be allowed in Zones A, B, C, D; minimize water that is used for irrigation in all zones Specific Potential Hazards • Select native, drought -tolerant vegetation (dense, low-lying, and deeply rooted species) • Reactivation of landslide debris causing ground failure swimming pools prohibited in Zones A, B, C, D and movement and • If permitted, hot tubs should include special design features so that tub water is conveyed to a suitable and approved discharge point • Foundations should withstand high lateral forces from upslope and large-scale movement • Foundations should be designed to withstand loss of soil beneath parts of foundation • Structures should be designed to accommodate a certain level of vertical and horizontal movement from local and large-scale landsliding Zone B Specific Technical Issues Specific Report Requirements Specific Key Design Features • Localized slope instability Subsurface exploration must be at least 6 ft deeper than lowest elevation of the proposed foundation Temporary and permanent fills may be restricted • Large-scale slope instability 0 Subsurface exploration required for retaining structures 0 Roof drains and impervious surface runoff should be tightlined to stormwater system and separate from footing Risk to public safety 0 Subsurface exploration must include measurement or estimate of high seasonal groundwater conditions drain lines Risk to private/public ublic property • p P p p Y Provide information about the potential size and mass of landslide debris originatingupslope p Stormwater infiltration prohibited in hazard area Provide estimated vertical and horizontal differential movement for appropriate foundation design Permanent irrigation systems prohibited in Zones A, B, C, D; minimize water that is used for irrigation in all zones Specific Potential Hazards Provide criteria for minimum span distance between foundation elements Select native, drought -tolerant vegetation (dense, low-lying, and deeply rooted species) • Reactivation of landslide debris causing ground failure 0 Provide required foundation and wall loading conditions based on impact forces from landslide debris Outdoor swimming pools prohibited in Zones A, B, C, D and movement originating upslope if determined to be a risk 0 If permitted, hot tubs should include special design features so that tub water is conveyed to a suitable and approved discharge point 3/14/07 A\Edmdata\projects\074\137AFileRm\R\NEdmondsLandslideSumm_Tbl.doc LANDAU ASSOCIATES Packet Page 407 of 433 Page 2 of 2 TABLE 1 RECOMMENDED GEOTECHNICAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS NORTH EDMONDS EARTH SUBSIDENCE AND LANDSLIDE HAZARD AREA Locations Technical Issues and Landslide Hazards Recommended Report Requirements Recommended Key Design Features • Landslide in ground that has not previously failed 0 Structures should be designed to accommodate a certain level of vertical and horizontal movement from local and Encroaching landslide debris originating upslope large-scale landsliding • Foundations should be designed to withstand loss of soil beneath parts of foundation • Depending on location, may need to consider features for human safety from encroaching materials including deflection walls, reinforced shear walls; appropriate home layout features Zone C Specific Technical Issues Specific Report Requirements Specific Kev Design Features • Localized slope instability Subsurface exploration must be at least 6 ft deeper than lowest elevation of the proposed foundation Temporary and permanent fills may be restricted • Large-scale slope instability 0 Subsurface exploration required for retaining structures Roof drains and impervious surface runoff should be tightlined to stormwater system and separate from footing Risk to public safety 0 Subsurface exploration must include measurement or estimate of high seasonal groundwater conditions drain lines Risk to private/public ublic property • p p p p y Provide information about the potential size and mass of landslide debris originating upslope Stormwater infiltration typically prohibited in hazard area Provide required foundation and wall loading conditions based on impact forces from landslide debris Permanent irrigation systems prohibited in Zones A, B, C, D; minimize water that is used for irrigation in all zones Specific Potential Hazards originating upslope if determined to be a risk 0 Select native, drought -tolerant vegetation (dense, low-lying, and deeply rooted species) Encroaching landslide debris originating upslope Provide estimated vertical and horizontal differential movement for appropriate foundation design 0 Outdoor swimming pools prohibited in Zones A, B, C, D • Reactivation of landslide debris causing ground failure If permitted, hot tubs should include special design features so that tub water is conveyed to a suitable and and movement approved discharge point • Landslide in ground that has not previously failed Depending on location, may need to consider features for human safety from encroaching materials including deflection walls, reinforced shear walls; appropriate home layout features • Reinforced shear walls; appropriate door and window placement • Appropriate location of main living and sleeping areas Zone D Specific Technical Issues Specific Report Requirements Specific Kev Design Features • Risk to public safety 0 Subsurface exploration must be at least 6 ft deeper than lowest elevation of the proposed foundation 0 Temporary and permanent fills may be restricted • Risk to private/public property 0 Subsurface exploration required for retaining structures 0 Roof drains and impervious surface runoff should be tightlined to stormwater system and separate from footing Subsurface exploration must include measurement or estimate of high seasonal groundwater conditions drain lines Specific Potential Hazards Establish Steep Slope Buffer width based on rate of slope retreat or stable slope angle over 120-year period Stormwater infiltration typically prohibited in hazard area Landslide in ground that has not previously failed 0 Include a minimum 15 ft setback from Steep Slope Buffer for all site development Permanent irrigation systems prohibited in Zones A, B, C, D; minimize water that is used for irrigation in all zones Provide recommendations for suitable vegetation; in most cases, buffer shall be maintained in an Select native, drought -tolerant vegetation (dense, low-lying, and deeply rooted species) undisturbed, natural condition 0 Outdoor swimming pools prohibited in Zones A, B, C, D • If permitted, hot tubs should include special design features so that tub water is conveyed to a suitable and approved discharge point • Steep Slope Buffer is to be maintained in a natural, undisturbed condition; no gardens, patios, steps, pavers, garden retaining walls, sheds, patios or other garden our outdoor development features are allowed in buffer • No yard waste, debris or fill may be placed within Steep Slope Buffer on either a temporary or permanent basis • No permanent irrigation in buffer or setback • No water discharged or infiltrated in buffer or setback Zone E Specific Technical Issues Specific Report Requirements Specific Kev Design Features • Potential impacts to North Edmonds Earth Subsidence Subsurface exploration must be at least 6 ft deeper than lowest elevation of the proposed foundation Temporary and permanent fills may be restricted and Landslide Hazard Area and other properties by affecting surface water or groundwater conditions • Subsurface exploration required for retaining structures 0 Roof drains and impervious surface runoff should be tightlined to stormwater system and separate from footing Subsurface exploration must include measurement or estimate of high seasonal groundwater conditions drain lines Specific Potential Hazards 0Determine if activities on property, particularly drainage features, are expected to impact the Landslide • Stormwater infiltration typically prohibited in hazard area Hazard Area 0 Select native, drought -tolerant vegetation (dense, low-lying, and deeply rooted species) Potential localized Landslide Hazard Area due to steep slopes (ECDC 23.80) Full Geotechnical Report may not be required 0 Hot tubs should include special design features so that tub water conveyed to a suitable and approved discharge point 3/14/07 A\Edmdata\projects\074\137AFileRm\R\NEdmondsLandslideSumm_Tbl.doc LANDAU ASSOCIATES Packet Page 408 of 433 nV EDi, r4?C. 1 S9\3 North Edmonds Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Areas Map Legend North Edmonds Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area Q(See ECDC 23.80.020 B.1 and ECDC 19.10) (Note: Boundaries are the approximate extent of previous landsliding; hazards are present adjacent to the landslide boundaries) 0 Steep Slope Areas: Slope of 40% or steeper and with a vertical relief of ten (10) ft or more (See ECDC 23.80.020 B.2) Minimum buffer equal to the height of the steep slope or 50 feet, whichever is greater (see ECDC 23.80.070 A.1) — (The buffer shown is the minimum buffer L adjacent to the North Edmonds Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area; a similar buffer would apply to steep slope areas, but is not shown on this map for clarity) i 2 ft Topographic Contour Vertical datum: NAVD88 C 0 100 200 Scale T Map created by Landau Associates, Inc. (May 2006) Aerial photo: City of Edmonds a Topographic contours and steep slopes data derived from LiDAR data: City of Edmonds (February 27, 2005) 3 � 13 I �`iffls i[ Packet Page 409 of 433 DEN Ulf .ALLACE P. ". L. C. A T T O R N E Y S .11 LAI MEMORANDUM DATE: March 15, 2007 TO: Edmonds City Council City of Edmonds FROM: W. Scott Snyder, Office of the City Attorney RE: Hillman Letter - Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Areas I have been asked to respond to a letter to the Development Services Committee from Lin Hillman regarding the draft Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Areas ordinance. Specifically, I have been asked by the Department to address paragraph 1. In her letter, Ms. Hillman notes that other cities' geologic hazard regulations encompass the entire city. She asserts that the City remains "fixated" on one particular portion of the City without addressing the other similar areas with the same "increased scrutiny." First, please note that the City's provisions do apply to all geologically hazardous areas of the City. This reference is contained at Chapter 23.80 of the City Code, and is integrated with the City's critical areas ordinance provisions. Therefore, the City has the same generalized structure which is in place in every other City in the State. The provisions of that Chapter are also integrated with the current provisions of Chapter 19.10 ECDC relating to building permits in Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Areas. See ECDC 23.80.040. Therefore, as the citizen requests, the City's landslide hazard permit provisions are applicable City-wide to all geographically hazardous and landslide areas. The current provisions of Chapter 19.10 were enacted 20 years ago to address a known and well defined situation in the North Meadowdale area. The City's provisions have been expanded by the Critical Area Ordinance and within Chapter 19.10 to include all geologically hazardous areas. By integrating the critical areas ordinance provisions and the provisions of current Chapter 19.10, the City uniformly applies the permit requirements across the City wherever a geologically Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area has been mapped. ECDC 23.80.030{A} lists a variety of resources including the Department of Ecology Coastal Zone Atlas for Marine Bluffs, US Geological Survey Geologic Maps and Landslide Hazard Maps, the A Member of the International Lawyers Network with independent member law firms worldwide 1601 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2100 + Seattle, WA 98101-1686 • 206.447.7000 • Fax: 206.447.0215 . Web: www.omwlaw.com { W5s654946.DOC;1/00006.900000/1 Packet Page 410 of 433 Edmonds City Council March 15, 2007 Page 2 Washington State Department of Natural Resources Seismic Hazard Maps, the Washington State Department of Natural Resources Slope Stability Maps, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration Tsunami Hazard Maps, and FEMA Flood Insurance Maps. In summary, the current structure of City ordinance does exactly what Ms. Hillman requests -- that is, applies the Earth Subsidence and Landslide Hazard Area chapter uniformly to all known hazard areas in the City. WSS:gjz ( WSS654946.DOC;1/00006.900000/) Packet Page 411 of 433 AM-893 7. Old Woodway Elementary ILA Edmonds City Council Meeting Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Linda Carl, Mayor's Office Submitted For: Gary Haakenson Time: 5 Minutes Department: Mayor's Office Type: Action Review Committee: Action: Agenda Memo Subiect Title Ratify Interlocal Cooperation Agreement between Snohomish County, City of Edmonds, and Edmonds School District #15 regarding Termination of Previously Executed Interlocal Agreement, and Ratify Interlocal Cooperation Agreement between Snohomish County and the City of Edmonds for Assistance in the Acquisition of All or Part of the Old Woodway Elementary Site. Recommendation from Mayor and Staff Ratify the termination of the previously executed Interlocal Agreement and ratify the Interlocal Cooperation Agreement with Snohomish County for funding assistance. Previous Council Action On May 18, 1999, the City Council authorized the Mayor to sign the Interlocal Agreement with Snohomish County and Edmonds School District 15 for the Old Woodway Elementary School. Narrative In a recent Council meeting, a citizen brought up several questions regarding the termination of the Interlocal Agreement (ILA) with the County and the school district. City Attorney Scott Snyder prepared a memo to address those concerns. Mr. Snyder's memo, as well as the original ILA with the County and school district, are attached as Exhibit A. A chronological timeline associated with the preparation and signing of the two ILAs being considered by the Council to be ratified was prepared by Sandy Chase, City Clerk, and is attached as Exhibit B. The termination of the previously executed ILA is attached as Exhibit C, and the funding assistance ILA is attached as Exhibit D. Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Attachments Link: Exhibit A - City Attorney Memo Link: Exhibit B - City Clerk Memo Link: Exhibit C - Termination ILA Link: Exhibit D - Funding Assistance ILA Form Routing/Status Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/16/2007 08:39 AM APRV 2 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/16/2007 08:43 AM APRV 3 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/16/2007 08:51 AM APRV Form Started By: Linda Carl Started On: 03/15/2007 02:41 PM Final Approval Date: 03/16/2007 Packet Page 412 of 433 DEN 6j�9 Y A I ACE �. r.. A T T 0 R N V.Y S A T L A W MEMORANDUM DATE: March 13, 2007 TO: Edmonds City Council Mayor Gary Haakenson City of Edmonds FROM: W. Scott Snyder, Office of the City Attorney RE: Termination of Interlocal Agreement and Execution of Interlocal Agreement Accepting Funds At a recent Council meeting, a citizen, Mr. Southcote-Want, raised questions regarding the termination of an Interlocal Agreement (ILA) with Snohomish County and the Edmonds School District relating to a playfield at the old Woodway Elementary site. In addition, Council member Moore has questioned certain aspects of the transaction. The purpose of this memo is to address two questions: Is City Council approval required to execute an Interlocal Agreement? 2. Is there a gift of public funds issue relating to the termination of the Interlocal Agreement recorded at Snohomish County Auditor File No. 199906230764? I answer these questions as follows: I. City Council approval is generally required for any Interlocal Agreement which exercises a governmental power, which provides for an expenditure of funds beyond the current budget year or contains an indemnity agreement. While executing the Interlocal Agreement "releasing" the City from its obligations to maintain the ball field can be argued to be within the Mayor's authority under RCW 35A.11.160, best practice indicates that it should go on the Council agenda for approval. The Interlocal cooperation agreement accepting funds and imposing long term obligations on the use of the property must go before the City Council. 2. The School District has no obligation to continue ownership and use of the property. Use by Edmonds' residents is contingent upon use by School District patrons. Therefore, nothing of value is released by the Interlocal Agreement. A Member of the International lawyers Network with independent member law firms worldwide 1601 Fifth ,Avenue, Suite 2100 . Seattle, WA 98101.1686 • 206,447.7000 • Fox: 206.447.0215 . Web: www.omwlow.com ( WSS654954.DOC;1 /00006.900000/) Packet Page 413 of 433 Edmonds City Council Mayor Gary Haakenson March 13, 2007 Page 2 AUTHORIZATION OF INTERLOCAL AGREEMENTS RCW 39.34.080 requires that a contract between public agencies "... to perform any governmental service, activity, or undertaking ... shall be authorized by the governing body of each party to the contract." The original underlying agreement between the parties provided for the exercise of a governmental power -- that is, it required the City to maintain the ball field on School District property with City forces or by City contractors. The agreement granting funds to the City to purchase the park contains long-term limitations on the use of the property. These agreements require City Council approval under the cited statute. In general, while the City Council may authorize the expenditure of funds by contract through budget appropriation, that authorization is limited to appropriated funds and is limited to agreements that will be fully executed within the budget year and which contain no indemnity provisions which impose long- term liability on the City. The agreement terminating the original Interlocal Agreement is a closer call. RCW 35A.12.100 defines the Mayor's powers. Among his duties: the Mayor "...shall see that all contracts and agreements made with the City or for its use are faithfully kept and performed..." It could be argued that acceptance of a release from the County and School District of the City's paper obligation is within this authority and duty. As will be discussed in greater detail in the following section, the School District and County had no remaining obligations under the Interlocal Agreement. The only remaining obligation was the purely illusory obligation of the City to maintain a ball field which is no longer in School District ownership. As discussed in the next section, no right of the public to use the property existed after the School District sold the site. Therefore, the City had only the paper obligation to maintain a ball field that will no longer exist. In effect, the Interlocal Agreement between the School District, City and County regarding termination of the underlying Interlocal Agreement is a release. In theory, it could be considered a part of the Mayor's duty to fulfill the existing contract, but I have uniformly recommended that best practice requires all Interlocal Agreements be approved by the City Council. HAS THERE BEEN A GIFT OF PUBLIC FUNDS? A copy of the underlying Interlocal Agreement is attached. Please note that in Section 2.1 the School District's sole duty is to "...make the premises available for City and County residents on the same terms as it is available to School District residents." [emphasis added] This duty is consistent with the School District's authority under RCW 28A.335.150 to permit the use and rental of its playfields. That statute provides that permission to use school playfields "... shall be for such compensation and under such terms as regulations of the Board of Directors adopted from time to time so provide." RCW 28A.335.120(1)(a) authorizes the Board of Directors of any school district at its discretion to sell at public or private sales real property "...which is no longer required for school Packet Page 414 of 433 Edmonds City Council Mayor Gary Ilaakenson March 13, 2007 Page 3 purposes..." Therefore, the School District Board of Directors has sole discretion to determine how long property must be maintained by the District and nothing in the Interlocal Agreement limits that authority. The public's right, that is the right of City and County residents, disappears at the same time as that of School District residents and patrons -- at the time the property is sold by the District. Therefore, the District retains the right to sell the property at its discretion, and when sold, any right to use the property under the ILA disappears. The County's obligation was solely to provide funding. The City had two obligations which have been fulfilled. Bleachers and dug -outs were installed, and an identifying sign listing Snohomish County as a funding participant was erected. The City's remaining obligation was to guarantee and provide long-term maintenance and upkeep of the ball fields and any improvements. ILA, 2.1 Subparagraphs (a) through (c). FinaIly, the agreement has a ten-year life and no termination provision. During. the City's purchase of property and in my conversations with School District counsel, I noted the existence of this ILA and suggested that it be referenced in the transactions while the process to terminate the agreement was under way. Mr. McIntosh instituted the proceeding which resulted in the School District's and Snohomish County's approval of an amendment to the Interlocal Agreement, terminating its provisions. RATIFICATION As an attached memo from Ms. Chase notes, she and I were unaware that the Mayor was forwarded a copy of the Interlocal Agreement terminating the interlocal and authorizing receipt of funds. Those were executed and returned by the Mayor as Ms. Chase's memo outlines. Unaware that this had occurred, I drafted a similar document and forwarded it to the City Clerk. It arrived while she was on vacation and it was not until January that she or I became aware that the agreements had been executed by the Mayor and returned. In this situation, the City Council should be forwarded a copy of the agreements in order to ratify them. Since only the City Council may accept the funds and obligations that are incurred, that interlocal, as well as the termination agreement, should be placed before the City Council for ratification. CONCLUSION The City Council should approve or reject all Interlocal Agreements. In situations where an agreement has been signed without its authorization, it should be placed on the Council agenda for ratification. Please note that this has been done several times in the past year when agreements, such as an ILA to purchase an aid car, had not been approved by the City Council. There has been no gift of public funds. The City Council is asked to authorize the final step in the process to purchase five and one half acres of the School District site for a City park. The Packet Page 415 of 433 Edmonds City Council Mayor Gary Haakenson March 13, 2007 Page 4 termination of the Interlocal Agreement simply releases the City from an ephemeral obligation. Nothing of public value is given away because the public's (citizens of Edmonds' right) to use the property ended when it was sold by the District. As always, I would be happy to answer any questions which you may have. WSS:gjz Attachments Packet Page 416 of 433 07/31/2006 11:17 425771W266 C:1:'(Y CLERK 199906230764 06623/1999 04.22 PM Snohomish P. C1006 RECORDED County ReTURN TO; Snohomish County Parks & Recreation 30DO Rockefeller Ave. NIS 303 Everett, WA 93201 ORIGINAL SNOHOMISH COUNTY REQ10NAL RECREATION TASK FORCE INTERLOCAL AGREEMENT with the CITY OF EDMONDS and EDMONDS SCHOOL DISTRICT #15 for the OLD WOODWAY ELEMENTARY SITE RENOVATION WHEREAS, Snohomish County's Comprehensive Rark.Plan and Rbgiorial Recreation Task Force have documented a County -wide need for regional athletic facilities; and PAGE U WHEREAS, The Snohomish County Executive and Council have determined that it is consistent with the Snohomish County Comprehensive Park Plan and is in the best public interest of County residents to participate in joint partnerships to increase recreational opportunities; and WHEREAS, the Snohomish County Regional Recreation Task Force developed a coMpetive process to identify and evaluate potential athletic Meld development/ renovation projects to be accomplished through the cooperation of local oi#y, school district, and County jurisdictions, and Packet Page 417 of 433 07/2112006 11:17 4257710756 CITY CLERK PAGE 04 WHEREAS, the Snohomish County Regional Recreation Task Farce recommended funding for the, old Woodway Elementary School site, which ranked seventh among proposed renovation projects, and WHEREAS, Edmonds School District owns and operates Old Woodway Elementary Site which is located within the City of Edmonds; and WHERr=AS, Snohomish County and Edmonds School District agree that it would be in the best interest of the school and community to jointly repair and maintain the play field at Old Woodway Elementary Site_ WHEREAS, the City of Edmonds and Edmonds School District have in place an inter#ocal agreement for field maintenance and scheduling. NOW THEREFORE, the parties do agree as follows: L GENERAL. CONDITIONS 1.1 Parties- This agreement is made by and between the the City of Edmonds, o municipal corporation, hereinafter referred to as CITY; Edmonds School district # 15, a municipal corporation, hereinafter referred to as SCHOOL DISTRICT; and Snohomish County, a municipal corporation, hereinafter referred to as COUNTY, under authority of the lnterlocal Cooporation Act, Chapter 39.34 RCW_ 1.2 Purpose. Capital improvements at the Old Woodway Elementary site are needed to provide recreational facilit#es for both School District and County residents. Snohomish County's Comprehensive Park Plan and regional Recreation Task Force document a need for park facilities in this area. The Snohomish County Executive and Council have determined that it is consistent with the objoctives of the Snohomish County Comprehensive Park Plan. and in the best public interest of County residents to provide funding for capital improvements at the school so long as the facilltles are made available to County residents do fhe same terms as they are available to School !District residents. 1.3 Premisos. The Old Woodway Elementary property subject to this agreement is owned and controlled by the School District and is located within the City limits of Edmonds, Snohomish County, Washington, as shown on the location map attached as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reforence, more particularly described as follows: The north 56B feet of the east 920 feet of the northwest 114 of the southwest 1/4 of Sect. 36 TWP. 27N_ R3E.W.M. subject to an easement to Standard coil Co_ over the south 33 feet of the north 118 feet of said northwest 114 of the southwest 1/4 and subject to road right of way over east 20 feet thereof. 199-906230764 Packet Page 418 of 433 07/21/2006 11:17 4257710'266 CITY CLERK PAGE 05 1.4 Term. This agreement shall commance upon execution by the parties and shall remain In effect for ten (10) years according to its terms. 1.5 Termination. This agreement may be terminated only upon written agreement of the parties, .executed in the same manner as provided by law for the execution of this agreement; provided that the County may terminate this agreement based on lack of legislative appropriation, 1.6 Amendments. This agreement may be amended only upon written agreement of the parties, executed in the same mariner as provided by law for the execution of this agreement. This agreement shall constitute the full and complete agreement as between the parties. 1.7 Conflicts, The parties acknowledge and recognize the existence of an interlo al agreement between the City and the School District dated March 25, 1997, The documents shall be read and interpreted in such a mA'nner as to fully effectuate ail of their provisions, prodded, however, in the event of irre$otvabiw conflict between the language of the interlocal agreements, this agreement shall control. II. DUTIES OF THE PARTIES 2A School Districts Duties. The School District agrees to make the premises available for City and County residents on the same terms as it is available to School District residents 2.2 City's Duties: The City agrees to: a) Within two years of receiving the approval provided for in this Agreement, install bleachers and two (2) concrete dugouts, renovate the backstop, and provide top dressing as needed at the Old Woodway Elementary site baseball field. b) Provide an identifying sign listing Snohomish County as a financial participant In the park site development. c) Guarantee and provide long-term maintenance and upkeep of the ballfelds and any improvements. 1 9P906 r30 d 64 Packet Page 419 of 433 07/31/2006 11:17 425771P256 CITY CLERK PAGE 06 2.3 County's Duties. The County agrees to provide financial assistance to the City in the amount of (Five Thousand, Five Hundred dollars) $5,500 for renovation of the Old Woodway Elementary site ballfield within the defined premises and to be made available to county residents as desoribed,in this agreement. Payment shall be made Wthin (ten) 10 days of receipt of an expenditure invoice from the CITY submitted with documentation. III. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS 3.1 Compliance with Laves, The City and. School District shall comply with atl applicable federal, state and local laws, rules, and regulations in performing this agreement, including, but not limited to laws against discrimination_ 3.2 Dlrectlon and Control. The City and School District vtirill perform the services under this agreement as independent contractors and not as agents, employees, or servants of the County. The City and School District specifically have the right to direct and control their own activities in providing the agreed services In accordance with the spec cations set out in this agreement. The County Shall only have the right to ensure performance. 3.3 Hold Harmless and Indemnification. The School District and the City shall protect, save harmless, indemnify, and defend, at their own expense, Snohomish County, its elected and appointed officials, officers, employees, and agents, from any loss or claim for damages of any nature whatsoever, including costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, arising Gut of or relating to this agreement or the property subject to this agreement, including claims by employees of the School District or City, or third parties, except for those damages solely caused by the negligence or willful misconduct of Snohomish County, its elected or appointed officials, offices, employees, or agents. If a claim subject to RCW 4.24.115 is caused by or results from the concurrent negligence of Snohomish County, its elected or appointed officials, officers, employees cr agents, and the City, Its elected or appointed officials, officers, agents, or employees, or the School district, its elected or appointed officials, officers, agents, or employees; this section shall be valid and enforceable only to the extent of the negligence of the School District and/or City, and their respective elected or appointed officials, officers, agents, and employees. Packet Page 420 of 433 07/31/2006 11:17 425771P-?,SG CITY CLERK PAGE e7 3.4 Governing Law and Stipulation of Venue. This agreement shall be governed by the laws of -the State of Washington and the parties stipulate that any lawsuit regarding this agreement must be brought in Snohomish County, Washington. The prevailing party in any litigation to enforce the terms of this Agreement shall be entitled to rocover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 3.5 Severability. Should any clause, phrase, sentenoe or paragraph of this agreement be declared invalid or void, the remaining provisions of this agreement shall remain in full force and effect. EXECUTED this —Akiday ofav�—.' 1999. SNOHOMISH COUNTY: V,R4�. 2 art I.mil, ifggfttX Executive .l xamilve Dlre4tor GARY WEIKEL acutiva Diroutor APPROVED AS TO FORM: Deputy Pirosemttidg Attorney RE WED BY RISK MANAGEMENT Approved 00ther 9 99 06 230 76 EDMONDS SCHOOL DISTRICT: Susan Torrc�nps Superintendent CITY OF EDMONDS Barb Fahey, Mayor APPR 1/ED AS TO FORM: City Attorney Packet Page 421 of 433 07/31/2006 11:17 125771,P:966 CITY CLERK PAGE 08 i SE pl sw Efam23700 104th AVe W Old Woodway . Edmonds, WA 98020-5758 i =i AL-41 wA } Old V!/1}putWW ©gin. G ack to map) CAtttCl�ts ppy1117 t omitP t�hDn. All riots x'�serve& Usc si�ect to ict1a58. US Maps Copyrlgitt 01998 Etxk, jAc• Cu,,,�'°n Maps Copyri� 01998 DNM. Inc. Packet Page 422 of 433 6 MEMORANDUM Date: March 16, 2007 To: Mayor Haakenson Council President Pritchard Olson City Council From: Sandy Chase, City Clerk Subject: Interlocal Agreements: (1) Termination of Previously Executed Interlocal Agreement, and (2) Assistance in the Acquisition of All or Part of the Old Woodway Elementary Site Below is information associated with the preparation and signing of the above -referenced Interlocal Agreements. • November 15, 2006 — Both Interlocal Agreements were signed by Snohomish County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. (Note: The agreements were prepared by the County.) • November 16, 2006 — Mayor Haakenson signed both documents on behalf of the City of Edmonds. • November 16, 2006 — Superintendent Dr. Nick Brossoit signed the Termination of Previously Executed Interlocal Agreement on behalf of Edmonds School District. • December 18, 2006 — County Executive Aaron Reardon signed both documents on behalf of Snohomish County. (Note: The County passed motions authorizing signature on December 13, 2006.) • December 21, 2006 — A draft "Addendum and Release to Interlocal" was received via email from Scott Snyder, City Attorney. The email was received by Mayor Haakenson, Parks and Recreation Director Brian McIntosh and City Clerk Sandy Chase. (Note: This document was not signed or processed pending further direction.) • January 18, 2007 — Colin Southcote-Want submitted a Request for Public Records to obtain copies of any documents pertaining to a termination agreement. The City Clerk's Office researched and was unable to find in the city files a signed termination document. Through further research, Linda Hynd, Deputy City Clerk, contacted Snohomish County to determine if the County was aware of a termination agreement and requested copies. • February 2, 2007 — Fully signed copies of the two Interlocal Agreements were received by the City Clerk's Office from Marc Krandel, Park Planning Supervisor, Snohomish County Parks. City of Edmonds C,3 City Clerk's Office Packet Page 423 of 433 AFTER RECORDING RETURN TO: Snohomish County Council 3000 Rockefeller Avenue M/S #609 Everett, WA 98201 CONFORMED COPY 200612280135 2PGS 12/28/2006 9:22am FASHINGTON00 SNOHOMISH COUNTY, INTERLOCAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT between SNOHOMISH COUNTY and CITY OF EDMONDS and EDMONDS SCHOOL DISTRICT #15 for TERMINATION OF PREVIOUSLY EXECUTED INTERLOCAL AGREEMENT THIS INTERLOCAL AGREEMENT is made by and between Snohomish County, a political subdivision of the State of Washington (the "County"), the City of Edmonds, a municipal corporation (the "City") and Edmonds School District #15, a municipal corporation (the "School District") under the authority of the Interlocal Cooperation Act, chapter 39.34 RCW. Pursuant to Section 1.5 of that certain interlocal agreement between the parties recorded with the Snohomish County Auditor as document number 199906230764 on June 23, 1999, the parties hereto agree to terminate said agreement. The termination shall be effective upon recording of this document with the Snohomish County Auditor. "COUNTY" SNOHOMISH COUNTY: MARK : , INE Aaron Re3FC1111���� Approved as to Form: �.cutin Attorney Date COUNCIL USE ONLY Approved- Docfile: "SCHOOL DISTRICT" EDMONDS SCHOOL DISRICT #15: By: Date "CITY" CITY OF EDMONDS: Date �q c� raek6 W— Aof 433 i SNOHOMISH COUNTY COUNCIL SNOHOMISH COUNTY, WASHINGTON MOTION NO. 06-546 A MOTION OF THE COUNTY COUNCIL OF SNOHOMISH COUNTY AUTHORIZING TERMINATION OF A PREVIOUSLY EXECUTED INTERLOCAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN SNOHOMISH COUNTY AND CITY OF EDMONDS AND EDMONDS SCHOOL DISTRICT #15 WHEREAS, Snohomish County entered into an Interlocal Cooperation Agreement with City of Edmonds and Edmonds School District in 1999 to provide $5,000 to improve the playability of the baseball fields at the Old Woodway Elementary; and WHEREAS, Edmonds School District wishes to surplus the property and sell all or a part of the site to the City of Edmonds for an active park but is constrained by the 10-year duration of the Interlocal Cooperation Agreement; and WHEREAS, all parties wish to terminate the 1999 Interlocal Cooperation Agreement and move ahead with the sale of the property; NOW, THEREFORE ON MOTION, the County Council of Snohomish County resolves the following: Section 1. The termination of the Interlocal Cooperation Agreement between Snohomish County and City of Edmonds and Edmonds School District #15 (recorded with the Snohomish County Auditor as document number 199906230764) is hereby approved. Section 2. The County Executive is authorized to execute the Interlocal Cooperation Agreement with City of Edmonds and Edmonds School District #15. PASSED this 13th day of December, 2006. SNOHOMISH COUNTY COUNCIL Snohomish County, Washington /s/ Kirke Sievers Chairperson ATTEST: /s/ Barbara Sikorski Asst. Clerk of the Council D-12 Packet Page 425 of 433 AFTER RECORDING RETURN TO: Snohomish County Council 3000 Rockefeller Avenue M/S #609 Everett, WA 98201 AN INTERLOCAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT between SNOHOMISH COUNTY and the CITY OF EDMONDS for ASSISTANCE IN THE ACQUISITION OF ALL OR PART OF THE OLD WOODWAY ELEMENTARY SITE THIS INTERLOCAL AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is made by and between SNOHOMISH COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Washington (the "County"), and the CITY OF EDMONDS, a municipal corporation (the "City") under the authority of the Interlocal Cooperation Act, chapter 39.34 RCW. For and in consideration of the mutual promises set out below, the parties agree as follows: 1. Purpose. The purpose of this Agreement is to provide a means for the County to assist the City in the purchase of all, or a portion of, a parcel of property owned by the Edmonds School District #15, located within the City, in order to create a park for the use and enjoyment of both County and City residents. Acquisition of such property using funds approved by the County Council is appropriate provided the City makes the property and any public facilities thereon available to County residents on the same terms as those which govern their availability to City residents. 2. Property. The property to be acquired is commonly known as the Old Woodway Elementary Site (the "Property"), and is located at 23700 —104tn Avenue West within the City limits of Edmonds, Snohomish County, Washington, more particularly described as follows: The north 568 feet pf the east 920 feet of the northwest % of the southwest % of Section: 36, Township: 27N, Range: 3E.W.M. subject to an easement to Standard Oil Co. over the south 33 feet of the north 118 Packet Page 426 of 433 'a. feet of said northwest '/4 and subject to road right-of-way over east 20 feet thereof. 3. Duration/Termination. This Agreement shall become effective when executed by the parties and recorded with the Snohomish County Auditor in accordance with RCW 39.34.040, and shall continue in perpetuity. This Agreement may be terminated in the event of failure of funding from any source or other non -appropriation of funds or upon the mutual written agreement of the parties. 4. Duties of the City. The City shall: a. Acquire all or a portion of the Property as described in Section 2 of this Agreement and upon closing, record a declaration of protective covenants, conditions, and restrictions to maintain, operate and preserve the Property, in perpetuity, as a park -and recreational facility for public use, which declaration shall be substantially in the form attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit A. b. Make the Property and any facilities thereon available to County residents on the same terms as those which govern their availability to City residents. C. Provide an identifying sign at the entrance to the Property listing Snohomish County as a participant in the acquisition of the Property. d. Develop the Property as a park and recreation facility. e. Guarantee and provide long-term maintenance of the Property and any future facility improvements. f. Forward a copy of the recorded deed and declaration of covenants with the County as soon as the same are returned from the Snohomish County Auditor. 5. Duties of the County. The County shall provide financial assistance to the City in the amount of up to One Million, Two -Hundred Thousand dollars ($1,200,000) for acquisition of the Property. Payment shall be made within ten (10) days of receipt of an invoice from the City submitted with documentation of imminent or completed acquisition of the Property. 6. Conversion of the Property. The Property acquired with funds under this Agreement may not be converted to uses other than park and Packet Page 427 of 433 recreation facility uses unless the County approves the conversion. The County may approve the conversion if it is assured the facilities will be substituted or replaced with similar facilities that are of at least equal value at a park property in the same geographic area. 7. Miscellaneous. a. Compliance with Laws. The parties shall comply with all applicable federal, state and local laws, rules and regulations in performing this Agreement, including, but not limited to, laws against discrimination. b. Hold Harmless and Indemnification. The City shall assume the risk of, be liable for, and pay all damage, loss, costs and expense of any party arising out of its activities under this Agreement, except that caused solely by the negligence and/or willful misconduct of the County and its employees acting within the scope of their employment. The City shall hold harmless, indemnify and defend the Lounty, its officers, elected and appointed officials- employees and agents from and against all claims, losses, suits, actions, counsel fees, litigation costs, expenses, damages, judgments, or decrees by reason of damage to any property or business and/or any death, injury or disability to or of any person or party, including but not limited to any employee, arising out of or suffered, directly or indirectly, by reason of or in connection with the Property or the performance of this Agreement, or arising out of the design, construction, use or maintenance of improvements to be constructed in full or in part on the Property, or any act, error or omission of the City, the City's employees, agents and subcontractors, whether by negligence or otherwise. It is specifically and expressly understood that the indemnification provided in this Agreement constitutes the City's waiver of immunity under the state industrial insurance laws, Title 51 RCW, solely for the purpose of this indemnification. The City agrees that this waiver has been mutually negotiated. C. Amendments. This Agreement shall constitute the full and complete agreement of the parties and may be amended only by written agreement of the parties, executed in the same manner as provided by laws for the execution of this Agreement. d. Severability. Should any clause, phrase, sentence or paragraph of this Agreement be declared invalid or void, the remaining provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. -- -- - -- EXECUTED this day o 006. Packet Page 428 of 433 "COUNTY" SNOHOMISH COUNTY: D- G"Puty By:7� Aaron Reardon-------"-- Date Approved as to Form: XDeputy se"in Attorney "CITY" CITY OF EDMONDS By: 7 16-v C Date a COUNCIL USE ONLY Approved lDocflle: Packet Page 429 of 433 AM-892 Committee Meeting Minutes Edmonds City Council Meeting 9. Date: 03/20/2007 Submitted By: Sandy Chase, City Clerk's Office Time: 15 Minutes Department: City Clerk's Office Type: Information Review Committee: Action: Agenda Memo Subiect Title Report on City Council Committee Meetings. Recommendation from Mavor and Staff N/A Previous Council Action N/A Narrative The following Committee Meeting Minutes are attached: 1. Finance Committee (3/13/07) 2. Public Safety Committee (3/13/07) Revenue & Expenditures Fiscal Impact Attachments Link: Finance Comm Minutes Link: Public Safety Comm Minutes Form Routing/Status Route Seq Inbox Approved By Date Status 1 City Clerk Sandy Chase 03/15/2007 10:14 AM APRV 2 Mayor Gary Haakenson 03/15/2007 10:24 AM APRV 3 Final Approval Sandy Chase 03/16/2007 07:09 AM APRV Form Started By: Sandy Chase Started On: 03/15/2007 10:13 AM Final Approval Date: 03/16/2007 Packet Page 430 of 433 FINANCE COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES March 13, 2007 6:00 PM Present: Councilmember Ron Wambolt Councilmember Dave Orvis Staff: Kathleen Junglov Deb Sharp Committee Chair Orvis called the meeting to order at 6:00 PM. Item A: Surplus of computer monitors and donation to Interconnection. Kathleen briefly reviewed the benefits of surplusing and donating items to Interconnection. Committee members approved forwarding this item to full Council as a consent agenda item. Item B: Discussion regardinglegal services. After a brief discussion on legal services, the Committee requested Finance perform an analysis of the cost benefit using inside vs. outside legal services. Item C: 220th Street Project. The Committee next discussed the 220th Street Project. It was the Committee's consensus to have Finance staff prepare a schedule showing original budget, amendments, and final costs. Adjournment The meeting was adjourned at 6:15 PM. V:\WORDATA\FINANCE COMM MINUTES\2007 FINANCE COMMITTEE MINUTES\FINANCE - 070313.DOC Packet Page 431 of 433 Minutes Public Safety Committee Meeting March 13, 2007 Committee Members Present: Councilmember Deanna Dawson, Chair Councilmember Michael Plunkett Staff Present: Chief of Police David Stern Assistant Chief of Police Al Compaan Assistant Chief of Police Gerry Gannon Guests: Mayor Gary Haakenson Bio Park, City Attorney's Office Reporter from the Beacon One audience members The meeting was called to order at 1810 hours. A. Continued discussion regarding graffiti in the city and enacting an anti -graffiti ordinance. Previously Chief Stern presented an overview of the issue indicating that there was evidence of two distinct types of graffiti in the community. Those types being the so called art form placed by taggers and a small amount of gang related material. It was noted that existing enforcement is conducted under the malicious mischief provisions of code and is adequate for the purpose. Removal of graffiti is done in part by the city and in part by property owners depending on who owns the property in question. Edmonds Community Development Code section 20.110.030 specifies that graffiti is a nuisance on private property and must be removed by the owner but does not specify a time frame. Previous discussion of several options, included adding code to make it a crime to possess, purchase or furnish implements used to produce graffiti and formalizing abatement procedures. It was agreed that a time factor needed to be added to the existing code. Chair Dawson invited Bio Park from the City Attorney's Office to present their view of legal issues involved in some of the options previously discussed. Mr. Park mentioned the use of public funds to remove graffiti on private property as a potential obstacle which could be avoided by use of monies recovered from suspects. Mr. Park also noted that for City personnel to enter private property for abatement purposes a warrant from superior court would be needed. Mr. Park also discussed the differences between burden of proof and affirmative defense issues relating to possession of graffiti implements and recommended the latter. The final issue dealt with service by certified mail in abatement cases as an acceptable method. It was determined by the Council members that a broad range of options should be presented to the full Council in a public hearing format to allow for citizen input. Chief Stern and Chair Dawson will collaborate on a presentation Packet Page 432 of 433 Action: On March 13, 2007 the Public Safety Committee met. Continued discussion was held regarding enacting an anti -graffiti ordinance. It was agreed by the committee that a broad range of options be presented to the full Council in a public hearing format to allow for citizen input. Chair Person Dawson and Police Chief David Stern will collaborate on a presentation. This item will be placed on the City Council Agenda for a public hearing on a date to be determined. Meeting adjourned at 1834 hours. Packet Page 433 of 433